JUDGMENT : M.A. ABDUL HAKHIM, J. 1. The appellant is the 1st defendant in O.S. No. 377/1985 of the Munsiffs Court, Karunagappally. The suit was for a mandatory injunction to handover the plaint schedule property after demolishing the building therein after finding that the 1st defendant has only licence over the plaint schedule property for recovery of arrears of rent and notice charges of Rs.135/- and future ground rent at the rate of Rs.400/- per annum. The plaint schedule property is 6 cents of land in Sy. 458/A.B of Kulasekharapuram village and the building situated therein. 2. The plaintiffs are two brothers who derived the plaint schedule property from their mother, Lakshmi Antharjanam. The main averments in the plaint are to the effect that the dilapidated building in the plaint schedule property was sold to one Adv. Sivarama Panicker as per Ext.A1 Sale Deed dated 10.08.1955 agreeing that the said Sivarama Panicker is free to either repair and continue to use the building or to reconstruct the same, and in case he continues to use the building after repairing, the plaint schedule property is given on ground rent for a period of three years @ Rs.55/- per annum to Lakshmi Antharjanam. Sivarama Panicker repaired the dilapidated building to its present condition. Sivarama Panicker sold his rights to the 1st defendant as per Ext.B1 document dt 26.03.1962. The defendants 2 to 6 are the tenants of the 1st defendant. Since the plaint schedule property was given to Sivarama Panicker, who was an Advocate, it is not for an industrial purpose, and hence, the 1st defendant, as his assignee, is not entitled to get any benefits under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. As per Ext.A1 Adv. Sivarama Panicker was given only a licence over the plaint schedule property for a period of three years. 3. The defendants 1, 2, 3, and 4 filed separate Written Statements opposing the suit prayers. The principal contention raised by the defendants was that the arrangement, as per Ext.A1, is a lease. Sivarama Panicker completed the construction of the building in the plaint schedule property, and he had been running a textile shop and other business establishments in the building. The 1st defendant is entitled to get fixity of tenure under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 4. Sivarama Panicker completed the construction of the building in the plaint schedule property, and he had been running a textile shop and other business establishments in the building. The 1st defendant is entitled to get fixity of tenure under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 4. The Trial Court framed the issues: (1) Whether Ext.A1 Sale deed is really a lease deed as alleged by the defendants? (2) Whether the defendants got the assignment of all the rights in Ext.A1? (3) Whether Sivarama Panicker was a licensee of the plaint schedule property? (4) Whether the defendants are entitled to get protection under S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act? 5. The claim with respect to fixity of tenure under S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was referred to the Land Tribunal Kollam and the Land Tribunal by its order dated 07.06.1994 found that the defendants are not entitled to the benefits under S. 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 6. The 1st plaintiff was examined as PW-1, the Secretary of the 1st defendant is examined as DW-1. On the side of the plaintiff Exts.A1 to A6 were marked and on the side of the defendants Ext.B1 was marked. 7. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that Ext.A1 is in the nature of a lease deed and not a licence deed as claimed by the plaintiffs and that the defendants got assignment of all rights under Ext.A1. 8. 7. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that Ext.A1 is in the nature of a lease deed and not a licence deed as claimed by the plaintiffs and that the defendants got assignment of all rights under Ext.A1. 8. The plaintiffs filed A.S. No. 89/1995 before the First Appellate Court and the said Appeal was allowed setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and allowing recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property and the building on payment of value of improvements to the 1st defendant to be fixed in the execution proceedings, declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to realise ground rent at the rate of Rs.55/- per annum for three years prior to the filing of the suit and till the date of the judgment of the Appellate Court and at the rate of Rs.400/- per annum from the date of the Appellate Court judgment till realisation holding that Ext.A1 is a composite document consisting of sale in the case of building and lease in the case of property; that the 1stdefendant is not entitled to get protection under S. 106 of the KLR Act; that the purpose stated in Ext.A1 is not commercial or industrial, the nature of new construction made by Sivarama Panicker in the plaint schedule property is not proved; that the plaintiff is liable to pay value of improvements which has to be assessed in the execution proceedings. 9. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on 11.06.2001 without formulating any Substantial question of law. Hence, I formulated the following substantial question of law in this Second Appeal: (i) Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in holding that Ext.A1 document is a lease? (ii) Whether the First defendant is entitled to the fixity of tenure under S.106 of the KLR Act? (iii) Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in allowing recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs? 10. I heard the learned Counsel for the appellant Sri. G.P. Shinod and the learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 Sri. B. Krishanamani. Question of Law No. 1 11. The specific case of the plaintiffs in the plaint is that Ext.A1 is a license, whereas the defendants contended that it is a lease. The First Appellate Court found that Ext.A1 is a lease and that Sivarama Panicker and the 1st defendant are lessees. B. Krishanamani. Question of Law No. 1 11. The specific case of the plaintiffs in the plaint is that Ext.A1 is a license, whereas the defendants contended that it is a lease. The First Appellate Court found that Ext.A1 is a lease and that Sivarama Panicker and the 1st defendant are lessees. The contention of the counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiffs have not challenged this finding of the First Appellate Court either by filing a Regular appeal or by filing a Cross Objection. I am unable to accept such a contention. In view of Order 41 Rule 22 CPC, any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree, but also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour. CPC does not permit the filing of an appeal against a finding. Only a person aggrieved by the decree can file an appeal. It is well settled by the decisions of the Hon’ble Court in Smt. Ganga Bhai vs. Vijayakumar and Others, (1974) 2 SCC 393 and Bansari and Others vs. Ramphal, (2003) 9 SCC 606 that no appeal will lie against mere finding for the simple reason that the Code does not provide for any such appeal and that unless a person is prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree, he is not entitled to file an appeal. Hence, the contesting respondents are perfectly justified in advancing contentions against the finding of the First Appellate Court in view of Order 41 Rule 22 CPC, even though they did not file an appeal. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Ext.A1 is a composite document in which the sale of the old, dilapidated building for Rs.3,00/- and the lease of the landed property for a ground rent of Rs.55/- per annum are included and hence it could not be construed as a license. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents contended that Ext.A1 is a license as only permission to occupy the land alone granted with the right to retain either the existing construction or to make a new construction. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents contended that Ext.A1 is a license as only permission to occupy the land alone granted with the right to retain either the existing construction or to make a new construction. The Counsel for the contesting respondents cited the Full Bench decision of this Court in Velayudhan Vivekanadan vs. Ayyappan Sadasivan, 1975 KLT 1 to substantiate that the document must be read as a whole and in its entirety, giving due weight to every term in it and the nomenclature of the document keeping in mind the surrounding circumstances. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision of this Court in Sivaprasad & Others vs. Karthiyayani @ Kathu & Others, 2018 (4) KLT 1193 to substantiate the point that the schedule description in a document only for the purpose of identification of the property and much weight should not be given to the same while interpreting the document. I am of the view that the documents must be read as a whole in order to understand the real intention of the parties. The importance of each and every clause while interpreting the document depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. When exclusive possession is given without reserving any control with the transferor, the arrangement is the lease and not a license. When control is reserved in the hands of the transferor while permitting occupation of the property, there is no transfer of interest so as to attract a lease, and in such cases, it can only be a license. In the case of a license, the legal possession of the land remains with the licensor. The terminology used in the document on the basis of which the arrangement started is indicative to decide the nature of the arrangement, though it is not conclusive. On going through the recitals in Ext.A1, it was found that the exclusive possession of the property was given to Sivarama Panicker as per Ext.A1. It is specifically stated that the land is entrusted on a lease, and the consideration is rent. In the plaint also, the amount payable by the 1st defendant is stated as ‘Tharappattom” which means ground rent. No control is reserved in favour of the land owner in Ext.A1. It indicates that Ext.A1 is a lease and not a license. It is specifically stated that the land is entrusted on a lease, and the consideration is rent. In the plaint also, the amount payable by the 1st defendant is stated as ‘Tharappattom” which means ground rent. No control is reserved in favour of the land owner in Ext.A1. It indicates that Ext.A1 is a lease and not a license. The Question of law No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the appellant. Question of Law No. 2 13. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the sale of the dilapidated building situated in the plaint schedule property and the lease of the plaint schedule property are distinct and separate in Ext.A1. With respect to land, the lease is given, allowing him to put up constructions either by repairing the shops sold to him or by constructing a new one. In either case, the construction is made by the lessee on a vacant land leased to him. Ext.A1 itself would show that the nature of construction in the plaint schedule property was shop rooms. It is in evidence that Sivarama Panicker constructed shop rooms, and he had been conducting textile business and banking business, though he was an advocate. Since the lease was given for commercial purposes and Sivarama Panicker constructed the building for commercial purposes before 20.05.1967, the lessee is entitled to get a fixity of tenure. The learned Counsel cited the decision of this Court in Idreesu Kunju Shawkath Ali vs. Nafeesa Beevi, 1973 KLT 808 , in which it is held that a lessee is entitled to get protection under S.106 of the KLR Act if the lessee had obtained a lease to construct a shop on the foundation which was in existence at the time of the lease in the plaint schedule property which belonged to the landlord. 14. It is true that the purpose of the lease was for commercial purpose as defined under Section 2(5) of the KLR Act. The oral evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and Exts.A2, A3, A6, and A7 produced before the Land Tribunal proves that Sivarama Panicker had been conducting textile business in the plaint schedule property. In Ext.A1 itself, it is evident that the nature of constructions therein are shop rooms. Hence, I am of the view that the lease as per Ext.A1 was for commercial purpose. 15. In Ext.A1 itself, it is evident that the nature of constructions therein are shop rooms. Hence, I am of the view that the lease as per Ext.A1 was for commercial purpose. 15. But as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, what is entrusted to Sivarama Panicker is not land alone but land with building thereon. Learned Counsel took me to the Schedule of Ext.A1 in which both land of 6 ½ cents and the building therein are stated. The heading of the schedule is shown as ‘Details of the shop.’ As per the terms of Ext.A1, it is the scheduled property, which is to be surrendered, which includes buildings also. It is clear from Ext.A1 that the existing dilapidated shop rooms are given to Sivarama Panicker for a consideration of Rs.3,00/- allowing him either to repair and continue the said building or to construct another building after removing the existing building. Admittedly, a building was situated in the property at the time of execution of Ext.A1. In the Schedule to Ext.A1 also, land and the building therein are included. It is specifically provided in Ext.A1 that after the expiry of the period prescribed in Ext.A1, Sivarama Panicker has to vacate the scheduled property, which includes land and building and not land alone. When there exists a building on the leased land, the lessee is not entitled to get protection under S.106 of the KLR Act. It is immaterial whether the lessee is given the right to demolish the existing construction and to construct a new one or not. The fact that the existing building was sold to the lessee for the purpose of demolition is irrelevant while considering a claim of the lessee for protection under S.106 of the KLR Act. It is well settled by the decision this Court in Jacob vs. Joseph, 1987 (1) KLT SN 7 (Case No. 16) cited by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents that a lessee of land and building cannot claim protection under S.106 of the KLR Act and that leases of land alone satisfying the requirement of the 106 of KLR Act will come within the purview of that Section for the purpose of enabling the lessee to claim immunity from eviction. Hence, I am of the view that the defendants are not entitled to get the benefit under Section 106 of the KLR Act and the Land Tribunal rightly found that the defendants are not entitled to get fixity of tenure. The Question of Law No. 2 is answered in the negative and in favour of the contesting respondents. Question of Law No. 3 16. The suit as framed is for the relief of mandatory injunction after entering a finding that the arrangement is license. When a prayer is made to enter a finding that the arrangement is license, it is in the nature of a declaratory relief. In such cases, the plaintiff has to pay court fees under Section 25 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959. The plaintiffs have not paid court fees under Section 25. 17. I have already found that the arrangement is a lease. Then, the question is whether a suit for mandatory injunction is maintainable to evict a lessee from the leased premises. It is settled law by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262 and ICICI v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 708 that in the case of lease, an interest in favour of the lessee is created and in the case of license, no such interest is created. In the case of a license, the licensee is only in a permissive occupation and not in legal possession, and the legal possession is always with the licensor. A person who is in legal possession of land cannot be evicted through a suit for mandatory injunction, and such a person can be evicted only through a properly framed suit for recovery of possession. In the case of a license, the licensee can be evicted through a mandatory injunction as he does not have legal possession over the land. In the case of a lease, the lessee is in legal possession of the land, and he can be evicted only through a suit for recovery of possession of the leased premises. The nature and character of a suit for recovery of possession and a suit for mandatory eviction are entirely different. The court fee payable is also different. The relief of recovery of possession shall not be granted in a suit for mandatory injunction. The nature and character of a suit for recovery of possession and a suit for mandatory eviction are entirely different. The court fee payable is also different. The relief of recovery of possession shall not be granted in a suit for mandatory injunction. The First Appellate Court acted illegally in granting the relief of recovery of possession in favour of the plaintiffs in a suit for mandatory injunction after holding that the arrangement between the parties is a lease. The suit for mandatory injunction filed by the plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed as the arrangement between the parties is a lease. 18. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents contended that this Court has ample power under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC to mould reliefs when it is found that the continuation of the defendants in the premises is unjustified and the relief could not be granted for want of proper prayer. The learned Counsel cited the decision of the Patna High Court in Kashi Choudhary vs. Mujataba Hassan & Others, AIR 1982 Patna 42 to substantiate, in which it was held that all that R.8 of O.7 of Civil P.C. provides is that the plaintiff should state the grounds on which he seeks relief; that it does not mean that equitable relief under O.7, R.7 cannot be given if all the grounds are not mentioned, otherwise, there will be no scope for the Court to grant equitable relief. The learned Counsel cited the decision of this Court in George vs. John, 1984 KLT 179 and argued that since the plaintiffs had filed the suit within a reasonable time before the licensee became a trespasser, the licensee‘s occupation did not become hostile possession necessitating suit for recovery of possession. The learned Counsel contended that the present suit is of the year 1985, and hence, it is highly unjust to direct the plaintiffs to file a new suit for recovery of possession. 19. The learned Counsel contended that the present suit is of the year 1985, and hence, it is highly unjust to direct the plaintiffs to file a new suit for recovery of possession. 19. The learned Counsel for the appellant cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad and Others, 2018 (7) SCC 646 in which it is held that no relief can be granted to a party without pleadings as pleading are meant to give each side, intimation of the case of the other for that it may be met to enable the courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties. 20. The learned Counsel for the appellant cited the decision of this court in Anil Kumar K. v. Ajith Kumar and Others, 2012 (4) KLT 545 in which it is held only in exceptional circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to get reliefs which are not prayed for and that an exceptional circumstance would arise if among others, the following conditions are satisfied: (1) when the claim had been admitted by the defendant (2) no injustice could possibly result to the defendant by granting such relief (3) the relief was one which the plaintiff could have made. 21. Long pendency of the suit alone would not justify this Court to mould and grant reliefs to the plaintiffs. A new relief of recovery of possession could not be moulded in a suit where the pleadings are to the effect that the arrangement between the parties is a license. In the case on hand, it is not a case of the absence of proper prayer alone. The pleadings supporting the prayer of recovery of possession are conspicuously absent. A new relief of recovery of possession could not be moulded in view of the pleadings in the plaint in the present suit. The relief of recovery of possession is contradictory to the declaratory relief that the arrangement is license, prayed for by the plaintiffs. 22. In the case of a lease, a suit could not be brought without serving a Termination Notice as required under Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act. Ext.A5 is not a Notice of Termination as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 22. In the case of a lease, a suit could not be brought without serving a Termination Notice as required under Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act. Ext.A5 is not a Notice of Termination as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Chand Makhan and Others v. Govardhan Das Byas and Others, 1984 (1) SCC 369 in which it is held that a suit for recovery of possession of the leased premises is not maintainable without determination of the lease by service of notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. I am of the view that without proper termination of lease as per Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act also, the relief of recovery of possession could not be moulded and granted in a suit for mandatory injunction. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents cited the decision of this Court in Kochu Krishna Pillai vs. Ammalu Ammal, 1972 KLT 223 to substantiate the point that sufficiency of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be raised for the first time in appeal. The said decision is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the present case, the pleadings of the plaintiffs are to the effect that the arrangement is license, and hence, there was no occasion for the defendants to contend that the lease is not terminated in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by issuing Termination Notice. 23. In Madhu Gupta v. K.T. Hassan Koya, 2019 (5) KHC 42 , cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant, this Court held that there are two elements which govern S.39 of the Specific Reliefs Act for the grant of mandatory injunction - Necessity to prevent breach of an obligation by the intervention of the court and Such acts should be capable of enforcement by the Court. This Court held that in the matter of a decree of eviction or a decree of recovery of possession, there is no scope of exercising judicial discretion, but in the case of grant of the mandatory injunction, it should be amenable to the exercise of judicial discretion. This Court held that in the matter of a decree of eviction or a decree of recovery of possession, there is no scope of exercising judicial discretion, but in the case of grant of the mandatory injunction, it should be amenable to the exercise of judicial discretion. A suit for decree of eviction and a decree of recovery of possession are separately dealt with under the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959 on the reason that the areas which govern a relief of recovery of possession & eviction and mandatory injunction are different in their very nature. In the present suit, no prayer for recovery of possession is sought, and no court fee under S. 30 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act is paid. The pleadings also do not support the prayer for recovery of possession. If this Court moulds and allows a relief for recovery of possession, it would, in effect, allowing the plaintiffs to obtain a relief even without payment of court fees. The moulding of relief has to be restricted in the absence of payment of court fee for the same. 24. Even assuming that the arrangement between the parties is a license, the present suit for mandatory injunction is not maintainable as there is an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs to file the suit for mandatory injunction. It is well settled that if the licensor does not bring a suit for a mandatory injunction within a reasonable time, he has to file a suit for recovery of possession. In the case on hand, the arrangement was for three years from 10.08.1955 as per Ext.A1, though it is alleged that the arrangement was terminated as per Ext.A5 Notice dated 19.07.1984. The plaintiffs could not adduce any evidence to prove that they have been exercising any control over the plaint schedule property after the expiry of the alleged license. Hence, this Court would not be justified in moulding and allowing the relief of recovery of possession in favour of the plaintiffs. The Question of law No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the appellant. 25. In the light of the answers to the aforesaid substantial questions of law, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is unsustainable, and the suit is liable to be dismissed. The Question of law No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the appellant. 25. In the light of the answers to the aforesaid substantial questions of law, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is unsustainable, and the suit is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, this Regular Second Appeal is allowed without costs, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and dismissing the suit.