ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The original plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Smt. Anand Kaur brought Civil Original Suit No. 17/2007 for specific performance of contract against the defendant-appellants. The suit was decreed by the learned trial judge by judgment and decree dated 08.12.2008. The decree and judgment of the trial judge was challenged by the defendant in Civil Appeal No. 01/2009, which was also dismissed on 28.03.2023. Hence, this second appeal by the defendants. 3. Now the question for consideration is whether this second appeal involves any substantial question of law. 4. A brief fact of this case is that late Shri Krishan Vyas (father of the appellants) had entered into a written agreement dated 17.07.1983. The agreement (Ex.1) discloses that late Krishna Vyas agreed to sale his plot No. 319 in Sector A, Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur to original plaintiff late Smt. Anand Kaur. The agreement further depicts that entire consideration money of Rs.12,000/- was received by the vendor and possession of the plot under sale was handed over to the purchaser. It was further stipulated that the vendor would execute the registered sale deed, as and when the purchaser would ask, in the name of purchaser or in the name of person suggested by the purchaser. 5. It is specifically stated that there would be no time limit for registration of the sale deed. The legal heirs/representatives of the vendor, in the event of death of vendor, would also be bound to execute the sale deed. It is further mentioned that all the documents in respect of the land under transfer was handed over to the purchaser. The suit was filed on 26.04.1995. It is stated that the vendor had promised that he had already applied for allotment letter in respect of the transferred plot to the authority concerned and as soon as would get the allotment letter, he would execute the sale deed. The allotment letter (Ex.16) was issued by Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur on 17.02.1984. The suit was filed on 26.04.1995. It is stated that the vendor had promised that he had already applied for allotment letter in respect of the transferred plot to the authority concerned and as soon as would get the allotment letter, he would execute the sale deed. The allotment letter (Ex.16) was issued by Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur on 17.02.1984. The allotment letter is titled as license in favour of the vendor, however, besides other conditions of making of construction of house after leaving certain area, condition No. 9B reads as follows: “The allottee shall not transfer the plot before expiry of ten years from the date of allotment and transfer after ten years shall be subject to such levy or impose as may be prescribed from time to time by the Government in this behalf.” Evidently, the document was not a mere license, but was a transfer deed with right to sale the said property after expiry of the stipulated period. 6. Learned trial court accepted that the agreement between the parties is a valid agreement. The trial judge further found that since the transaction of sale was complete on the date of agreement itself, in as much as, the whole consideration was paid to the vendor and possession of the land was given to the vendee. There was no other part to be performed in pursuance of the contract by the purchaser/plaintiff to require a case for readiness or willingness to perform her part. The first appellate court dismissed the challenge of the decree of the trial judge. 7. The appellants have raised the following questions as substantial questions of law in this second appeal: “(i) Whether the Exhibit 1 was an agreement to sale or something else, and can the instant suit be decreed in the backdrop of the same? (ii) Whether the Exhibit-1 was valid and duly executed, passing the threshold of having any sanctity in law or the same was void and unlawful in the teeth of various statutory provisions? (iii) Whether on true and correct interpretation of the Exhibit-16 dated 19.02.1984 issued in the name of the father of the appellant, the same can be termed as a license or a lease? (iii) Whether on true and correct interpretation of the Exhibit-16 dated 19.02.1984 issued in the name of the father of the appellant, the same can be termed as a license or a lease? (iv) Whether the incessant readiness and willingness from the plaintiff was required to be proved from the inception of the alleged agreement to sale till the final decree was passed in the instant suit. (v) Whether the issue of possession was relevant for the purpose of the instant suit and has the same adjudicated as per the settled law? (vi) Whether the agreement to sale Exhibit-1 being determinable in nature was not specifically enforceable? (vii) Whether the appellate decree passed without bringing all the legal representatives of the deceased on record is null and void? (viii) Whether grant of damages rather than specific performance is more appropriate remedy in view of the established facts and circumstances of the case at hand?” 8. None of the questions aforesaid are substantial questions of law, rather, they are mixed questions of law and fact, which cannot be gone into by the second appellate court. 9. Besides the aforesaid, learned counsel for the appellants contends that the courts below failed to consider that on the date of agreement, the vendor or the plaintiff had not acquired title over the plot under transfer, hence, the only remedy was for recovery of consideration money along with interest. 10. The party under obligation cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. A person, who posing as title holder entered into an agreement to sale his property cannot be allowed to assert subsequently that he had no title over the property. The principle of estoppel would apply. Moreover, on the date of filing of the suit and the date of decree, the vendor had already acquired title. The time limit for non transfer had already expired. Hence, for this reason, the judgments of the courts below cannot be faulted with. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants next contends that under Order XXII Rule 5 CPC, courts should have determined the heirs of late Anand Kaur. Only Omprakash has been transposed as son of late Anand Kaur. Identity of other legal heirs was not established. The legal heirs left out would have right to claim right in the property given to Omprakash in pursuance of the impugned judgment and decree. Only Omprakash has been transposed as son of late Anand Kaur. Identity of other legal heirs was not established. The legal heirs left out would have right to claim right in the property given to Omprakash in pursuance of the impugned judgment and decree. Outsiders cannot be allowed to defend rights of unknown heirs of the purchaser. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants next contends that the plaintiff did not appear in the witness box, hence, the plaintiff failed to prove the facts pleaded. Therefore, adverse inference would be drawn for non appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box. 13. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar Vs. Anand Kumar & Ors. vide Civil Appeal No. 7840 of 2023 decided on 17.05.2024 and Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao & Anr. AIR 1999 SC 1441 decided on 17.05.1999. In Rajesh Kumar’s Case (supra), the agreement to sale the property was entered on total consideration money of Rs.4,41,000/-. The part consideration money which was paid at the time of agreement was 41,000/- and the rest amount was agreed to be paid on the date of registration of the sale deed. Since the plaintiff of the case had yet to perform his part of contract by making full payment of consideration money, the case is distinguishable one; as in the case on hand, no part was left to be performed by the plaintiff as she had already paid the entire consideration money to the vendor and had taken possession of the land. The registered sale deed could not be executed as the vendor stated that he was going to receive allotment letter in respect of the plot under transfer and after getting the same he would execute the registered sale deed. The registered sale deed could not be executed as the vendor stated that he was going to receive allotment letter in respect of the plot under transfer and after getting the same he would execute the registered sale deed. Even in the case of Rajesh Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the law in Para-12 as follows: “.......we are of the view that in view of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in a suit for specific performance wherein the plaintiff is required to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, a power of Attorney Holder (of the plaintiff) is not entitled to depose in place and instead of the plaintiff (principal).” Evidently, in the case on hand, the plaintiff has pleaded that she had already paid the entire consideration money and taken possession in pursuance of the agreement. The plaintiff was not required to prove her readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract. In the circumstance, if the plaintiff was not examined, rather, her husband and other deposed who where conversant with the facts of the agreement, it would not be fatal for the plaintiff’s case. 14. Likewise, learned counsel for the appellants next contends that suit was filed after long delay of more than 11 years. The courts below have not properly considered that the suit was itself barred by limitation, hence, not maintainable. 15. As noticed above, the agreement itself says that no time limit would be there for execution of the sale deed. The document in the nature of license (Ex.16) shows that there was restriction on transfer of the said property for ten years. If the period in between is counted, it cannot be said that the suit was filed after limitation allowed by the law. 16. Article 54 of the Limitation Act, which is applicable in the fact and circumstance of this case reads as follows: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run For specific performance of a contract Three Years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused 17. Evidently, no time is fixed in the agreement for performance of the contract. Evidently, no time is fixed in the agreement for performance of the contract. In that circumstance, the plaintiff would bring the suit when she had notice that the performance is refused. 18. In the present case, even after expiry of the period of ten years, put as an embargo by the Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur, the vendor/their legal representatives did not execute the sale deed, then the plaintiff got cause of action for the suit. 19. Therefore, this Court does not find any merit in this Second Appeal as it does not involve any substantial question of law. Accordingly, this Civil Second Appeal stands dismissed.