ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that the respondents be directed to provide dependent employment and also directed to provide monetary compensation to the petitioner’s family equal to the minimum wage per month from the date of the death of the father of the petitioner i.e., on 12-8-2008 till the dependent employment is provided to the petitioner and also prayed that the payment of compensation which shall be recovered from the erring officials of the respondent company. 2. Brief facts as reflected from the record are that the petitioner’s father late Jogiram was working as sweeper in the Main Hospital of South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL) in Korba and he died due to illness on 12-8-2008 in the Apollo Hospital, Bilaspur. As such, in terms of Clause 9.3.0 read with Clause 9.4.0 of the National Coal Wages Agreement (NCWA) VI and in terms of Clause 9.3.0 (I) of the NCWA, the petitioner’s brother has filed an application for dependent employment. On 8-8-2013 the petitioner’s mother namely Vijaya Bai was informed by the respondents that Mahesh Kumar Daharia who is elder brother of the present petitioner is not entitled to get dependent employment in place of the ex-employee as his wife is already in service. The petitioner has also annexed the document dated 08.07.1999 to show that similarly situated persons have been granted dependent employment, but the case of the petitioner, has not been considered. In the year 2016 elder brother of the petitioner obtained employment in place of their mother who took voluntary retirement from service of SECL. As such, petitioner’s family decided to pursue the matter for dependent employment to the petitioner as per the terms of NCWA VI & VII, which was applicable at the time of death of the petitioner’s father. Thus, he has submitted representation on 19.11.2018 and 23.06.2018 for grant of compassionate appointment, which has not been considered, therefore, he has filed present petition and has prayed for grant of dependent employment. 3. Respondents/SECL has filed their return contending that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the count of delay and latches as the petitioner has filed the writ petition after 11 years of death of his father for grant of dependent employment. 3. Respondents/SECL has filed their return contending that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the count of delay and latches as the petitioner has filed the writ petition after 11 years of death of his father for grant of dependent employment. It has been further contended by the respondents-SECL in their return that at the time of death of father of the petitioner, petitioner's mother namely Vijaya Bai was also in service in same place ie., main hospital, Korba, SECL. After death of petitioner’s father, elder son Mahesh Dahariya who is elder brother of the petitioner was nominated by his mother for compassionate appointment in the SECL, but as per rule and prevailing practice as well as after detailed examination of the proposal/decision of competent authority, the claim of the elder brother of the petitioner was rejected on the basis of the service of his mother. Needless to say that the above decision was communicated to the claimant by specific remark that “compassionate appointment is meant for immediate hardship of family of the deceased employee and in the instant case, wife of ex-employee is already working in the company, hence employment in respect of Mahesh Kumar Dahariya cannot be considered as family is not in the immediate hardship”. It has been further contended that in the year 2016 the petitioner’s elder brother Shri Mahesh Kumar Dahariya got employment in the company against Female Voluntary Retirement Scheme (FVRS) floated by the SECL as his mother Smt. Vijaya Bai opted FVRS. It has been further contended that since the matter relates to Company’s Centralized Policy Board Decision, therefore, the matter was placed before the 80th Director (Personnel) Meeting wherein it has been clarified that in case of wife of deceased employee is already in employment, the question of further employment or cash compensation in lieu of employment does not arise. Copy of decision is also enclosed along with return. The operative part of the Minutes of Meeting reads as under:- 7. Eligibility for monetary in lieu of employment to the only female dependant already employed. It was informed that scheme of providing employment and/or payment of monetary compensation in lieu of employment was meant to mitigate the immediate hardship of the family of the deceased employee. The operative part of the Minutes of Meeting reads as under:- 7. Eligibility for monetary in lieu of employment to the only female dependant already employed. It was informed that scheme of providing employment and/or payment of monetary compensation in lieu of employment was meant to mitigate the immediate hardship of the family of the deceased employee. It was clarified that in case wife of the deceased employee is already employed, the question of further employment or cash compensation in lieu of employment does not arise. On above factual foundation, the respondent would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Avinash Salomon vs. SECL and others (WPS No 832 of 2012 decided on 30-11-2015) has considered the provisions of NCWA and has held that this agreement is binding in nature and this Court has directed to consider the petitioner’s application for grant of dependent employment in accordance with NCWA which was prevalent at the time of death of the father of that petitioner on its own merit, within forty-five days from the date of passing of the order. He would further submit that the petitioner made representations for grant of compassionate appointment, but it has not been considered. He would further submit that the action of the respondents suffers from arbitrariness, malafide and illegality and would pray for grant of dependent employment when his father died on 12-8-2008 in Apollo Hospital, Bilaspur. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents/SECL would submit that the name of the petitioner has been deleted from the list of employment service scheme after receipt of marriage advance and that has been done on 21-8-2008. He would further submit that the petitioner’s elder brother Mahesh Kumar Dahariya applied for employment on the basis of prevailing policy but it was rejected and the same order was not assailed by the petitioner’s brother. He would further submit that on 21-11-2008 prior to death of petitioner’s father, name of Umesh Dahariya was deleted from the list of dependent by his father late Jogiram on account of his marriage and thus as per rules, the petitioner Umesh Dahariya was no more dependent upon his father due to deletion of his name from service record for all facilities like LTC and medical etc., as such the writ petition is also not maintainable. He would further submit that on 12-8-2008 the petitioner was not minor at the time of death of his father. As per the official record, petitioner’s date of birth is 30-6-1986, hence during that time the petitioner had not only attained majority i.e., 22 years and he was also married in the year 2008, as such he cannot depend upon earning of his father. It has been further contended that the petitioner has mentioned above two cases; one is Amita Singh d/o. Kisanlal, Ex-employee and another one is Avinash Salomon vs. SECL and others. However, the said two cases are different from the facts of the present case. It has been further submitted that the petitioner has approached this court with huge delay and it is well settled position of law that the compassionate appointment cannot be allowed on the count of delay and latches. To substantiate his arguments, he has referred to the judgment of this court in WPC No. 7 of 2012 wherein this court has held that since the petitioner has approached the High Court in belated stage, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches only. He would further submit that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has also dismissed the appeal stating that the compassionate appointment cannot be granted after 28 years and accordingly it has dismissed the writ appeal. Thus, he would pray for dismissal of this writ petition. 6. He would further submit that the Division Bench of this Hon’ble High Court has passed the order in Writ Appeal No. 20 of 2016 (Avinash Saloman vs. SECL and others) against that order the respondent/SECL has preferred SLP which is now converted into Civil Appeal No 8728 of 2018 (South Eastern Coalfield Ltd and others vs. Avinash Soloman) and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stayed the order dated 24-8-2016 passed by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed the order on 20.02.2023. The operative portion of the order dated 20-2-2023 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 8728 of 2918 is extracted as under:- “5. It reveals from the record that at the motion stage, the Division Bench, after hearing the parties while admitting the appeal, declined to grant interim relief prayed for by the appellants. The operative portion of the order dated 20-2-2023 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 8728 of 2918 is extracted as under:- “5. It reveals from the record that at the motion stage, the Division Bench, after hearing the parties while admitting the appeal, declined to grant interim relief prayed for by the appellants. At the same time, directed the appellants to ensure compliance of the Order which was impugned before the Division Bench in writ appeal. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal dated 24th August, 2016 came to be challenged in appeal before us. “6. The stay is operating in the instant appeal since 8th May, 2017. At one stage, we were of the view to decide the appeal on merits rather to relegate the parties to get the writ appeal examined on merits by the High Court but after we have looked into the records, we are of the view that it may be advisable and in the interest of justice that the writ appeal pending before the High Court may be heard on merits”. In pursuance of remand order of the Hon’ble the Supreme Court the writ appeal has been again decided on 11.10.2023 and the Hon’ble Division Bench has dismissed the writ appeal affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. On the pleadings of the parties the following point emerged for determination by this court is :- “Whether the petitioner is entitled to get dependent employment on account of death of his father as per Clause 9.3.0 and 9.4.0 of NCWA?”. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondents/SECL has not considered the case of the petitioner for dependent employment as provided under Clause 9.3.0 of NCWA which is binding settlement and which nowhere excludes the dependent employment on the ground of one of the family members of the dependent employee on employment is ex-facie illegal and plainly arbitrary. Thus, this issue has been squarely covered by the judgment passed by this court and would pray for allowing the writ petition. Thus, this issue has been squarely covered by the judgment passed by this court and would pray for allowing the writ petition. He would further submit that this court has directed that the authority to consider the petitioner’s application for grant of dependent employment in accordance with the provisions of NCWA which was prevalent at the time of death of the petitioner’s father in the year 2008 and would draw attention of this Court towards 9.3.0 of NCWA which reads as under:- 9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependent (i) The clauses 9.3.0, 9.4.0 & 9.5.0 of NCWA[VI will be operative in NCWA-VII till a revised scheme is jointly prepared keeping in view the various verdicts of Hon’ble Supreme Court at the earliest. (ii) The dependants appointed under the provision of NCWA-VI and presently on stipend as on 15-7-05 i.e. the date of signing NCWA-VII agreement shall be regularized in Cat.1. (iii) The dependants who shall be appointed under NCWAVII provision after 15.7.05 shall be appointed on basic wage of Cat.1 as Trainee for a period of six months. However, during training period they will have the status of permanent employees. On completion of statutory training they shall be regularized as Cat.1 employees. They shall undergo Vocational Training under the statutory provisions from the date of appointment. (iv) In case of discrepancies, if any, the matter will be discussed in Standardization Committee”. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents/SECL would submit that the order passed by the Single Bench as well as the Hon’ble Division of this Court in case of Avinash Soloman vs. SECL and others has been assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which is registered as Civil Appeal No. 8728 of 2018 and the issue is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as such it cannot be said that the order has attained finality. He would refer to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari and others (2023 SCC Online SC 219) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any policy compassionate appointment cannot be granted and also held that no redeeming purpose to direct that the applications for appointment on compassionate grounds be considered and decided several years after they were filed. Relevant paras 55 and 60 of the said judgment are extracted as under:- “55. Relevant paras 55 and 60 of the said judgment are extracted as under:- “55. Further, applications for compassionate appointment are to be considered in light of the policy holding the field on the date on which the application is filed. In the present case, the applications were filed in the year 2006. Therefore, they would have to be decided in light of Circular No. 97-Emp. read with Circular No. 142-Emp. Given that the said Circular does not govern compassionate appointment to posts under local authorities, compassionate appointment cannot be granted to posts under local authorities. 60. In fine, the present appeals succeed on two counts: first, there was no policy existing to govern compassionate appointment to posts under local authorities in the State of West Bengal and hence, in the absence of such a policy, compassionate appointment cannot be granted; second, assuming that there was such a policy, it would be of no redeeming purpose to direct that the applications for appointment on compassionate grounds be considered and decided several years after they were filed”. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost satisfaction. 11. Before considering the factual matrix of the case, it is expedient for this court to examine the nature of NCWA, its legal status and binding effect as per the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 12. The NCWA is a settlement under Section 2(p) of the said Act of 1947. Section 2 (p) states as follows:- "settlement' means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to [an officer authorized in this behalf by] the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer." 13. The NCWA is binding under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1957. Section 18(3) states as follows :- "18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding 1. xx xxxxx xxxx 2. The NCWA is binding under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1957. Section 18(3) states as follows :- "18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding 1. xx xxxxx xxxx 2. xx x x x x x xx (3) 4 ] A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act 5 or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of section 10A] or 6 an award 7 of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable) shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, 5 arbitrator.] 8 Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause: (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates. (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.” 14. From perusal of the above stated legal position and considering the judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto v. Mis. Central Coal Field Ltd & Ors., reported in 2008 (7) Supreme 525 wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has examined the binding nature of NCWA at paragraph 2 & 10 which reads as under:- "2. Appellant's father Rameshwar Mahto was employed as a Fitter, Category IV, in a coal mine belonging to the respondent known as Kuju Colliery. He died in harness on 23.02.1997. The terms and conditions of the service of the workmen working in coal mines are inter alia governed by a 'Settlement' known as National Coal Wage Agreement (N.C.W.A.) V. Indisputably, the said settlement, in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is binding on the parties… 10. He died in harness on 23.02.1997. The terms and conditions of the service of the workmen working in coal mines are inter alia governed by a 'Settlement' known as National Coal Wage Agreement (N.C.W.A.) V. Indisputably, the said settlement, in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is binding on the parties… 10. A settlement within the meaning of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on both the parties and continues to remain in force unless the same is altered, modified or substituted by another settlement. No period of limitation was provided in the settlement. We would assume that the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate ground. But, such circular was not only required to be strictly complied with but also was required to be read keeping in view the settlement entered into by and between the parties. The expanding definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act would confer a right upon the appellant to obtain appointment on compassionate ground, subject, of course, to compliance of the conditions precedent contained therein.” 15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Motor Industries vs. Management of Motor Industries, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 13 held that a settlement under Section 2 (p) of the said Act of 1947, is a binding nature on the workmen and the management. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as paragraph 5 as under:- "5...There can be no doubt that the settlement was one as defined by s. 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and was binding on the workmen under s. 18 (3) of the Act until it was validly terminated and was in force when the said strike took place. The strike was a lightning one, was resorted to without notice and was not at the call of the association and was, therefore, in breach of cl. 5." 16. In view of above stated legal position, it is quite vivid that the NCWA is biding in nature for the workman and the management. The strike was a lightning one, was resorted to without notice and was not at the call of the association and was, therefore, in breach of cl. 5." 16. In view of above stated legal position, it is quite vivid that the NCWA is biding in nature for the workman and the management. Even otherwise, it is also well settled position of law that the object of grant of dependent employment is to get relief from immediate hardship to the family, the compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and criteria laid down in the rules and schemes applicable must be satisfied by all aspirants. The record of the case would clearly demonstrate that petitioner’s father expired in the year 2008 and at that time the petitioner was 22 years of age and he already attained the majority. The petitioner’s elder brother had applied for compassionate appointment which was not considered by the management of respondents/SECL and thereafter his elder brother was granted dependent employment in view of the scheme provided by the SECL known as Female Voluntary Retirement Scheme (FVRC) and again one of the family members of the deceased employee has become employee of SECL. Thus, the family of late Jogiram Dahariya cannot be said to be facing hardship. The issue of compassionate appointment has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of Baroda and others vs. Baljit Singh 2023 SCC Online SC 745 wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- “12. It is necessary to reiterate that the appointment of a candidate on compassionate basis does not create any vested right and that it is only when a candidate is covered under all clauses of the Scheme applicable at the relevant point of time that he/she could be considered for compassionate appointment. 13. In Balbir Kaur v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (supra) it was observed that the family benefit scheme assuring monthly payment to the family of deceased employee on the facts therein was not a substitute for compassionate appointment by the Steel Authority of India - Respondent in the said case. The said case proceeds on its own facts. 13. In Balbir Kaur v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (supra) it was observed that the family benefit scheme assuring monthly payment to the family of deceased employee on the facts therein was not a substitute for compassionate appointment by the Steel Authority of India - Respondent in the said case. The said case proceeds on its own facts. The said judgment can be distinguished from the facts of the instant case as the 1998 Scheme specifically disentitles a candidate for compassionate appointment benefit on the application of the formula for calculation of monthly income if the same is less than 60% of the total emoluments which the deceased was drawing at the time of his death. The object is that it is only when a deceased employee's family is in penury and without any source of livelihood when the employee died in harness, compassionate appointment can be considered. Since appointment on compassionate basis is an exception to the general rule for appointment by an open invitation, the exception has to be resorted to only when the candidate and his family is in penury so as to provide immediate succor on the death of the employee in harness. The same has been observed in General Manager (D&PB) v. Kunti Tiwary (supra). In N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka (supra) a three Judge Bench of this Court reiterated that appointment on compassionate basis is a concession and not a right and the criteria laid down in the Rules and Schemes applicable must be satisfied by all aspirants. Therefore, the case for compassionate appointment has to be considered in accordance with the prevalent Scheme. Similarly, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shashi Kumar, (supra), this Court has observed that compassionate appointment being an exception to the general rule, the dependents of deceased government employee are made eligible by virtue of the policy of compassionate appointment and they must fulfill the terms of the policy which are framed by the States/Employers. 14. It is to be noted that in the instant case, the respondent filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction seeking appointment on compassionate basis which was decreed by the Trial Court and upheld and affirmed by the High Court. 14. It is to be noted that in the instant case, the respondent filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction seeking appointment on compassionate basis which was decreed by the Trial Court and upheld and affirmed by the High Court. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parkash Chand reported in (2019) 4 SCC 285 , it has been categorically held that a direction by a High Court to consider cases for compassionate appointment dehors the terms of the policy is impermissible as it would amount to re-writing the terms of the policy. This aspect has been overlooked by the High Court in the instant case. In a similar vein, in Indian Bank v. Promila reported in (2020) 2 SCC 729 , it has been observed that eligibility for compassionate appointment must be as per the applicable scheme and the courts cannot substitute a scheme or add or subtract from the terms thereof in exercise of judicial review. The aforesaid dicta would also apply to a suit filed seeking the relief of compassionate appointment. 15. In this regard, reference could be made to the judgment of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shashi Kumar reported in (2019) 3 SCC 653 wherein at Paragraphs 18-19 the aforesaid terms have been clearly stated. 16. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the Scheme which is applicable to the respondent in the instant case. It is not in dispute between the parties that the Scheme dated 18.09.1998 which has been issued by way of a Circular is applicable to the case of the respondent. Under the said Scheme, both the educational qualification as well as qualification vis-a-vis the income of the candidate making an application for compassionate appointment have been prescribed and they are to be considered by the employer. In this context, it would be useful to refer the judgment of the High Court which has raised two questions of law which are as follows: (i) Whether the case of the appellant can be considered for compassionate employment vis-a-vis the Scheme which was in vogue at the time when Balbir Singh died or subsequent to that? (ii) Whether advancement of family pension can be the ground for non-suiting the case of compassionate employment? 17. While answering the second question, the High Court has referred to a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Mohd. (ii) Whether advancement of family pension can be the ground for non-suiting the case of compassionate employment? 17. While answering the second question, the High Court has referred to a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Mohd. Farooq Bhati v. S.B.B.J. reported in (2009) 2 SCT 353 which had relied upon the judgment of this Court in Balbir Kaur (supra) to hold that the objection with regard to the family income cannot be really considered as an objection to deny compassionate appointment. As far as the first question of law is concerned, the High Court has simply stated that the effective date of consideration of the application for compassionate appointment would be the date on which the respondent's father died. The High Court has stated that the 1998 Scheme was in force as on the date when the respondent's father died and, therefore, the said Scheme would be applicable. However, we find that while answering the questions of law, the High Court has erred on both counts”. 17. Further contention of the petitioner is that one Amita Singh was provided dependent employment in similar situation, cannot be considered in view of the fact that no material was placed before this Court by the petitioner to establish that he is similarly situated person, as such he must be treated similarly when this fact was disputed by the respondents/SECL. It is well settled position of law that the person claiming parity should plead and prove that he is similarly situated person. This issue has comp up for consideration before Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Punjab Electricity Board and others Vs. Thana Singh & others reported in (2019) 4 SCC 113 wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 19, 20 & 26 which read as under:- “19. The person claiming parity must produce material before the court to prove that the nature of duties and functions are similar and that they are entitled to parity of pay scales. After referring to number of judgments and observing that it is the duty of an employee seeking parity of pay to prove and establish that he had been discriminated against, this Court, in SAIL, held as under:- “22. After referring to number of judgments and observing that it is the duty of an employee seeking parity of pay to prove and establish that he had been discriminated against, this Court, in SAIL, held as under:- “22. It is the duty of an employee seeking parity of pay under Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India to prove and establish that he had been discriminated against, as the question of parity has to be decided on consideration of various facts and statutory rules, etc. The doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” as enshrined under Article 39(d) of the Constitution read with Article 14 thereof, cannot be applied in a vacuum. The constitutional scheme postulates equal pay for equal work for those who are equally placed in all respects. The court must consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, the qualifications, the nature of work, the value thereof, responsibilities, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other words, the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scales only when there is wholesome/wholesale identity between the holders of two posts. The burden of establishing right and parity in employment is only on the person claiming such right. (Vide U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. and Another v. Sant Raj Singh and Others (2006) 9 SCC 82 , Union of India and Another v. Mahajabeen Akhtar (2008) 1 SCC 368 , Union of India v. Dineshan K.K (2008) 1 SCC 586 , Union of India and Others v. Hiranmoy Sen and Others (2008) 1 SCC 630 , Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1 , U.P. SEB and Another v. Aziz Ahmad (2009) 2 SCC 606 and State of M.P. and Others v. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai (2009) 13 SCC 635 )”. 20. Burden of establishing parity in pay scale and employment is on the person claiming such right. There were neither pleadings nor any material produced by the respondents to prove that the nature of work performed by the Sub Fire Officers is similar with that of the Head Clerks and the Internal Auditors to claim parity of pay scale. As pointed out earlier, the burden lies upon the party who claims parity of pay scale to prove similarity in duties and responsibilities. As pointed out earlier, the burden lies upon the party who claims parity of pay scale to prove similarity in duties and responsibilities. In the writ petition, respondents have only claimed parity of pay scale with those of the employees working under the Punjab Government which was not accepted by the learned Single Judge. Determination of parity or disparity in duties and responsibilities is a complex issue and the same should be left to the expert body. When the expert body considered revision of pay for various posts, it did not revise the pay scale of Sub Fire Officers. When the expert body has taken such a view, it is not for the courts to substitute its views and interfere with the same and take a different view. 26. Respondents have not produced any material to show that there is any similarity/identity between the posts of Sub Fire Officers and the Head Clerks, Head Clerk-cum-Divisional Accountants and Internal Auditors in terms of the nature of duties, responsibilities, qualifications and mode of recruitment etc. to apply the principle of parity of pay scale. The learned Single Judge did not keep in view that the nature of duties and responsibilities performed by the Sub Fire Officers are different and parity cannot be claimed merely on the ground that they are categorized in one group. The judgment of the learned Single Judge and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside.” 18. From the above stated analysis of the facts and law, it is quite vivid that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in the year 2019 i.e., after 11 year of death of his father as dependent employment of the petitioner was also negatived by the SECL on the count that his mother is already in service. This order has not been assailed by the elder brother of the petitioner. Though subsequently after obtaining voluntary retirement scheme by the mother of the petitioner the benefit of dependent employment has been granted to his elder brother which again mitigate the hardship, if any arises in the family. This order has not been assailed by the elder brother of the petitioner. Though subsequently after obtaining voluntary retirement scheme by the mother of the petitioner the benefit of dependent employment has been granted to his elder brother which again mitigate the hardship, if any arises in the family. It is also clear that NCWA settlement provides for grant of dependent employment but considering the fact that the petitioner has filed this petition after 11 years of death of his father and survived for 11 years, as such, it cannot be said that petitioner’s father died in harness, as appointment on compassionate basis is an exception to the general rule for appointment by an open invitation, the exception has to be resorted to only when the candidate and his family is in penury so as to provide immediate succor on the death of the employee in harness. As such, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the dependent employment can be considered, deserves to be rejected. 19. Now considering this aspect of the matter, the judgment of Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court (Avinash Soloman vs. SECL and others) is distinguishable from the facts of the case as in that case, the claimant after attaining the age of majority moved an application for appointment on 30.11.2011 whereas in the present case the SECL in their return has taken specific stand that the age of the petitioner was 22 years when petitioner’s father expired on 12.08.2008 and his mother is already in service with SECL when his father expired on 12.08.2008, as such, I am of the view that the petitioner has not made out a case for issuance of writ of mandamus to the respondents/SECL to issue compassionate appointment or to consider the reliefs as prayed for in the writ petition. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 21. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.