ORDER : 1. Instant revision petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 24.04.2024 & 02.05.2024 passed by learned Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Cases, Bikaner whereby, the trial court framed charges against the petitioners No. 1 to 3 for offences under Sections 13(1)(c)(d), 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act’) and Section 409, 467 IPC and against petitioner No. 4 for offence under Section 120B IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case are that complainant one Narpat Singh submitted a complaint before ACB, Jaipur alleging illegality and misappropriation of public fund in the development work conducted in Gram panchayat, Rajiyasar. It was alleged that no construction work of Jal Grahan Koop was made in the Gram panchayat but the accused persons in connivance forged the record and misappropriated huge sum of money. 3. After usual investigation, the Anti Corruption Bureau filed a challan against accused persons for offence under Sections 13(1) (c)(d), 13(2) of PC Act and Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120B IPC. Thereafter, arguments upon charge were heard and by way of impugned orders dated 24.04.2024 and 02.05.2024, charges were framed by the trial court. Hence, this revision petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners wants to withdraw the criminal revision to the extent of petitioners No. 2, 3 & 4. Hence, the criminal revision petition is dismissed qua petitioners No. 2 Bhanwar Singh S/o Prabhu Singh, petitioner No. 3 Mohan Lal Jat S/o Kana Ram and petitioner No. 4 Rajendra Singh S/o Kesar Singh. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner no. 1 Kesar Singh submits that on perusal of FIR as well as the challan papers, there is no evidence whatsoever to frame charges against the petitioner for aforesaid offences. It is argued that upon inquiry, it was found that Jal Grahan Koop was in fact constructed but it was being used as a tubewell due to shortage of water. It is further argued that although the petitioners have not misappropriated any public fund but in pursuance of recovery order dated 13.06.2019 issued by the District Collector, Churu, the petitioners no. 1 to 3 have deposited the recovery amount of Rs. 1,69,950/-. It is further argued that the petitioners have not prepared any forged documents nor cheated anyone, therefore, no offence under Sections 409, 467 and 120B IPC is made out against them. 1 to 3 have deposited the recovery amount of Rs. 1,69,950/-. It is further argued that the petitioners have not prepared any forged documents nor cheated anyone, therefore, no offence under Sections 409, 467 and 120B IPC is made out against them. Lastly it is argued that so far as the petitioner no. 1 Kesar Singh is concerned, he was the Sarpanch at the relevant time, and shall be deemed to be a public servant and therefore, he could not be prosecuted without the sanction of the State Government under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and charges could not be framed against him. It is therefore, prayed that the impugned orders framing charges against the petitioner No. 1 Kesar Singh is liable to be set aside. The counsel placed reliance on the judgments passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Aadram Vs. State of Rajasthan (Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3408/2017) decided on 25.05.2018, Gurnaam Kaur Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2017 Supreme (Raj.) 250, Prabhu Dayal Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Supreme (Raj.) 523, Mangilal Kothari Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Supreme (Raj.) 730, Pukhraj Vs. Ummaidram and Others, AIR 1964 Rajasthan 174. 6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor supported the order passed by the learned Trial Court and argued that the ACB after thorough investigation submitted challan against the petitioner no. 1 Kesar Singh and the trial court after going through the entire record, has framed charges against the petitioners. It is argued that there is serious allegation against the present petitioner No. 1 Kesar Singh for misappropriating public funds and receiving money, therefore, the order of framing charge passed by the learned Court below does not suffer from any infirmity and all other questions raised in regard to the present case are to be considered by the learned Trial Court at the appropriate stage. 7. I have thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. 7. I have thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. It is not in dispute that the petitioner No. 1 was the Sarpanch at the relevant time, and combined reading of Section 2 (1)(viii) read with Section 108 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides that the members (including a Sarpanch), officers and servants of a Panchayati Raj Institution and a Standing Committee or Sub-Committee thereof shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Sec. 21 of the Indian Panel Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of 1860). Now, the question is whether the learned court below was justified in framing the charges against the petitioner No. 1-Kesar Singh under Sections 13(1)(c) (d), 13(2) of the PC Act, without prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act. 9. Sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, which is relevant for the controversy in dispute, reads as under: 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution: (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under [Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15] [Substituted sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018] alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction: (a) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed] [Substituted ‘who is employed by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018] in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government. (b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed] [Substituted ‘who is employed by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018] in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with sanction of the State Government, of that Government. (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. 10. In enacting the aforementioned provision, the legislature sought to afford reasonable protection to public servants in the execution of their official duties. (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. 10. In enacting the aforementioned provision, the legislature sought to afford reasonable protection to public servants in the execution of their official duties. The intent was to enable them to carry out their responsibilities with due diligence, without being impeded by baseless or malicious prosecutions. This safeguard was established to ensure that public servants can perform their functions effectively, free from the threat of undue legal challenges that may arise from vexatious or unnecessary prosecutions. The Sub-Section outlines that prosecution sanctions must be granted to accused, and only after sanction is granted then the Court can take cognizance. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Dilwar Singh Vs. Pervinder Singh @ Iqbal Singh & Anr. (2005) 12 SCC 709 while observing that the section restricts the Court’s ability to take cognizance of offenses committed by public servants, except with prior sanction from a competent authority has held: “This section creates a complete bar on the power of the Court to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of this Sub-Section. If the Sub-Section is read as a whole, it will clearly show that the sanction for prosecution has to be granted with respect to a specific accused and only after sanction has been granted that the Court gets the competence to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by such public servant.” 11. Thus, the prior sanction for proceeding against a Government servant for offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 & 15 of the PC Act is mandatory in nature. Now, the question arises as to whether prosecution sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C. is also necessary where the Government servant has been charged under section 409 and 467 of IPC also. Sub-Section (1) of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. which is relevant for the controversy in dispute, reads as under: 197. Now, the question arises as to whether prosecution sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C. is also necessary where the Government servant has been charged under section 409 and 467 of IPC also. Sub-Section (1) of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. which is relevant for the controversy in dispute, reads as under: 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants: (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his officer save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction: (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government. (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State of the State Government. 12. Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. provides that when any person who is or was a public servant, not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or State Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence, except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government. Article 311 of the Constitution of India states that no person, who is a member of a civil service of the Union or State or holds a civil post under the Union of State, shall be removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 13. Therefore, it follows that protection of Sub-Section (1) of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is available only to public servants whose appointing authority is the Central Government or the State Government and his act in discharge of his official duties. 14. 13. Therefore, it follows that protection of Sub-Section (1) of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is available only to public servants whose appointing authority is the Central Government or the State Government and his act in discharge of his official duties. 14. In the case of S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “The words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Amal Kumar Jha Vs. State of Chhatisgarh & Anr. 2016 (3) Supreme (SC) 226 has observed: “11. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dubey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 thus: “The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty...there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” (Emphasis supplied) If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed.” 12. In State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta, 2004 (2) SCC 349 this Court in regard to official duty has laid down thus: “11. Such being the nature of the provision, the question is how should the expression, “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” be understood? What does it mean? “Official” according to the dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity.” 13. In State of Orissa & Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, 2004 (8) SCC 40 this Court has laid down that protection under section 197 would be available only when the act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty. This Court has laid down thus: “7. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.” 14. In K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 2005 (4) SCC 512 this Court has observed that official duty implies that an act or omission must have been done by the public servant within the scope and range of his official duty for protection. This Court has laid down thus: “12. In K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 2005 (4) SCC 512 this Court has observed that official duty implies that an act or omission must have been done by the public servant within the scope and range of his official duty for protection. This Court has laid down thus: “12. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed. xxx xxx xxx 15. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where offences under the Act are concerned, the effect of Section 197, dealing with the question of prejudice has also to be noted.” 16. In the case of Prabhu Dayal (Supra) the Hon’ble coordinate bench of this court has observed that: “4. I agree with the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner cannot be punished under section 409 Indian Penal Code without prior sanction of the State Government under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat. The case of the prosecution was that the accused- petitioner did not give wheat to the labourers as wages under the National Rural Employment Scheme. Therefore, when the offence was committed by the accused-petitioner he was Sarpanch, there, fore, the provisions of Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code is attracted. It will be seen from the perusal of the judgment of trial court, which runs in 11 typed pages, that the petitioner was Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of Lalpura, and therefore, he was a public servant, and it can be said that the accused had received the wheat in the capacity of a public, servant. Under Section 78 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 the Sarpanch is deemed to be public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Section 78 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 the Sarpanch is deemed to be public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. This court has to examine the question whether a court can take cognizance for an offence against a Sarpanch or Panch in respect of any offence alleged to be committed while he was a public servant. Whether the prior sanction of the State Government is not necessary. In the case of Pukhraj v. Ummaid Ram, AIR 1964 Raj. 174 : 1964 RLW 238, a Division Bench of this court had taken the aforesaid view. In the case of Ramdutt and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 Raj. 125 , this court said that: “It is well settled that the Sarpanch. Up-sarpanch and Panchas is a public servant and cognizance could only be taken against him with previous sanction of the State Government under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code. It must be established that there is a reasonable connection between act and discharge of duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could led a reasonable, and not a pretended or fanciful, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” 5. There was reasonable connection between the act and complained of discharging the duty as a Sarpanch. Learned trial court did not found him guilty of 60 quintal wheat and held it was the duty of the accused to give the wheat to the labourers as wages under the scheme. Therefore, it can hardly be disputed that the offence which is purported to be committed by the petitioner Sarpanch was committed while discharging the official duties and, therefore, section 197(1) was attracted and the previous sanction of the State Government was necessary. It is not the case of the State that any sanction was sought or obtained before the charge-sheet had been filed. A bare reading of Section 197 show that no court shall take cognizance of any offence except with the previous sanction against a public servant.” 17. The coordinate bench of this court in the case Aadram (Supra) has observed that: “Be that as it may, this court cannot be swayed by the defects of pleadings of the parties when substantial justice is required to be done. The coordinate bench of this court in the case Aadram (Supra) has observed that: “Be that as it may, this court cannot be swayed by the defects of pleadings of the parties when substantial justice is required to be done. Manifestly, the petitioner’s prosecution in this case is being undertaken for the acts defined as offences by or relating to a public servant as defined in Section 166, 166-A and 167 IPC. Clearly, the nature of the offending acts by itself makes it obligatory that before seeking prosecution of the public servant charged with such offences, the prosecution must invariably seek sanction to prosecute such public servant before the prosecution can proceed even to the stage of taking cognizance. Since in the case at hand, it is an admitted position that no sanction was either sought or was attempted to be procured before launching the prosecution against the petitioner, manifestly, the case including the order taking cognizance has to fail. The issue presented in the matter is squarely covered by both the judgments relied upon by Mr. Pankaj Gupta, representing the petitioner.” 18. In the case of Mangi Lal Khothari (Supra) the coordinate bench of this court has observed that: “4. I perused the material on record including the statements of Mr. Nawal Khan, wherein, he admits that he worked as mason in construction of School building of the Panchayat concerned and he was paid for that purpose. But whether he gave any receipt to the petitioner? He denied. The disputed amount is only 500/- rupees and the incident had taken place in the year 1974. The petitioner is 70 years of age and out of 19 witnesses only 8 witnesses have been examined so far. Even the payment of Rs. 500/- has not been denied by Mr. Nawal Khan. The continuance of such criminal proceeding against the petitioner is not in the interest of justice. Moreso, the payment has been made by the petitioner in capacity of Sarpanch and Sarpanch is a Public Servant, within the meaning of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The section 26 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 also provides that Sarpanch is a Public Servant. The continuance of such criminal proceeding against the petitioner is not in the interest of justice. Moreso, the payment has been made by the petitioner in capacity of Sarpanch and Sarpanch is a Public Servant, within the meaning of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The section 26 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 also provides that Sarpanch is a Public Servant. Therefore, while the petitioner was discharging his duties as Sarpanch and if any offence has been committed, no Criminal proceedings can be initiated without sanction as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C. This view has also been taken in the case of Birbal v. Smt. Jamna, 1989 (1) RLW 43. Admittedly, no sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. has been obtained in this case.” 19. From the documents on record, it is evident that the allegation against the present petitioner No. 1-Kesar Singh is of misappropriation of public funds by forging the documents, verifying, and obtaining money which was committed by the petitioner Sarpanch while discharging the official duties and therefore, Section 19 of P.C. Act and Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. was attracted and previous sanction of the State Government was necessary. It is not the case of the State that sanction was sought or obtained before the chargesheet was filed. On the basis of the documents collected and the statement of various witnesses, challan was filed against the petitioner No. 1 and after perusing the documents and studying the evidence collected during the investigation, this Court is of the opinion that since no prosecution sanction was obtained by the authorities under Section 19 of PC Act and Section 197 Cr.P.C. trial court has erred in framing charges for the offences mentioned above qua petitioner No. 1-Kesar Singh. 20. Accordingly, the present revision petition is partly allowed. The order dated 24.04.2024 & 02.05.2024 passed by learned Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Cases, Bikaner whereby, the trial court framed charges against the petitioner No. 1 Kesar Singh for offences under Sections 13(1)(c) (d), 13(2) of PC Act and Section 409, 467 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside qua petitioner no. 1-Kesar Singh. 21. Stay petition also stands disposed of.