ORDER : Nupur Bhati, J. 1. Though the matter was listed in the 'Fresh' category, upon the joint request of both the counsel, the matter was heard finally on 27.11.2024. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 01.07.2024 passed by the respondent no. 2, Joint Secretary-cum-Deputy Commissioner (Enquiry), Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department, Jaipur, whereby the petitioner has been suspended from the post of Sarpanch. 2. The writ petition has been preferred with the following prayers:- “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and by any other appropriate writ, order or direction: (A) The impugned order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3) passed by the respondent no.2 may kindly be quashed and set aside; (B) Any other appropriate order, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be passed in favour of petitioner. (C) Allow cost of the writ petition to the petitioner.” 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was elected as Ward Panch while his wife was elected as the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Ghanerao, in 2015. On 01.04.2015 (Annex.1), an FIR was lodged against both the petitioner and his wife alleging that his wife did not have the requisite educational qualification of having passed Class VIII and that, while submitting the nomination form of the wife of the petitioner, she submitted a transfer certificate of Class VIII, which was allegedly a forged document. 4. Thereafter, charges were framed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Desuri against the petitioner and his wife vide order dated 10.01.2018 (Annex.2), against which the petitioner and his wife filed a revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bali which was allowed vide order dated 19.03.2019 while setting aside the order dated 10.01.2018 (Annex.2), however, the learned Revisional Court had remanded the matter back to the learned Trial Court for fresh consideration. The complainant thereafter challenged the order dated 19.03.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bali in 2023 before this Court, which came to be allowed by this Court, while observing that there was no need for the learned Revisional Court regarding the framing of charges and the learned Trial Court was directed to commence the trial in accordance with law. In the meanwhile, the petitioner and his wife were suspended vide order dated 07.03.2018 and 16.03.2018, respectively. 5. Subsequently, the petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Ghanerao, Panchayat Samiti Desuri, Zilla Pali, in the elections conducted on 22.01.2020, however vide order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3), the respondent no.2 suspended the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch. Thus, aggrieved of the order passed by the respondent no.2, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submitted that this Court vide order dated 18.11.2024, in the S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 8135 of 2024, titled Santosh Kumari and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. has quashed the FIR and all other criminal proceedings initiated thereto, against the petitioner and his wife on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties to the proceedings and therefore, the suspension order passed by the respondent no.2 is left with no substance inasmuch as the respondent no. 2 has suspended the petitioner on the ground of pending criminal proceedings, which have already been quashed by a coordinate bench of this Court vide order dated 18.11.2024. 7. Per contra, learned AAG raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition, as the appropriate authority which is empowered for revision or review of the impugned order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3), is the State Government as mentioned under Section 97 of the Act of 1994, and therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable before this Court. 8. In his rejoinder to the submissions made by the learned AAG, learned senior counsel submitted that the impugned order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3) is passed by the respondent no.2, i.e. the State Government itself and Section 97 of the Act of 1994 grants the power to the State Government to call for and examine the record of a Panchayati Raj Institution or of a Standing Committee or Sub-Committee thereof, which is not the case here. He also submitted that there is no provision for review of an order which is passed by the State Government itself and thus, the writ petition is maintainable before this Court. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused material available on record and judgments cited at the Bar. 10. This Court, at this juncture, finds it apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused material available on record and judgments cited at the Bar. 10. This Court, at this juncture, finds it apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 97 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 reads as under: “97. Power of revision and review by Government.- (1) The State Government may, either of its own motion or on an application from any person interested, call for and examine the record of a Panchayati Raj Institution or of a Standing Committee or Sub-Committee thereof in respect of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein or as to the regularity of such proceedings and, if in any case, it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass order accordingly: Provided that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) The State Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order prejudical to any party, pending the exercise of its powers under sub-section (1) in respect thereof. (3) The State Government may, of its own motion or on an application received from any reason interested, at any time within ninety days of the passing of an order under Sub-sec. (1), review any such order if it was passed by it under any mistake, whether of fact or of law or in ignorance of any material fact. The provisions contained in the proviso to Sub-sec. (1) and in Sec. (2) shall apply to a proceeding under this sub-section.” It is evident from the bare perusal of Section 97 (1) of the Act that the State Government has the power of revision, however the scope of revision under this sub-section is limited to call for or examine the record of- (i) Panchayati Raj Institution; or (ii) Standing Committee or Sub-Committee. Further, Section 97 (3) of the Act provides for the power to the State Government to review an order passed by it, however the same is limited to the orders passed by it under sub-section 1 of Section 97 of the Act. Further, Section 97 (3) of the Act provides for the power to the State Government to review an order passed by it, however the same is limited to the orders passed by it under sub-section 1 of Section 97 of the Act. Thus, the conjoint reading of Section 97 (1) and 97 (3) of the Act makes it evident that the power of review that is available to the State Government under Section 97 (3) of the Act is limited to the orders passed by it while exercising power of revision under Section 97 (1) of the Act against the decisions or orders of Panchayati Raj Institution or Standing Committee or Sub- Committee thereof. However, in the present case the impugned order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3) was passed by the State Government itself, thus, the power under Section 97 (1) of the Act cannot be invoked against the order dated 01.07.2024 and in sequitur the power of review under Section 97 (3) of the Act as well cannot be exercised against the said order. 10.1. This court further takes into consideration Section 38 of the Act, which is reproduced as under: “38. Removal and Suspension.- (1) The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him and opportunity of being heard and making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove from office any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, who- (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct : Provided that any enquiry under this sub-section may, even after the expiry of the term of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned be initiated or, if already initiated before such expiry, be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing, record its findings on the charges levelled. (2) ... (3) … (4) The State Government may suspended any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under Sub-sec. (2) ... (3) … (4) The State Government may suspended any member including a Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under Sub-sec. (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offense involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension : Provided that the State Government may also suspend any Panch on the recommendation of the Ward Sabha or a Sarpanch on the recommendation of the Gram Sabha, but the State Government shall do so only when a resolution to that effect passed by a Ward Sabha, or a Gram Sabha, as the case may be, is referred by the State Government to the Collector for convening a special meeting of the Ward Sabha or the Gram Sabha, as the case may be, for finally ascertaining the wished of the members and the members present in the meeting so convened by the Collector and presided over by his nominee, reaffirm the resolution seeking suspension of the Panch or the Sarpanch, as the case may be, by a majority of two-third of the members present and voting : Providing further that no resolution seeking suspension of the Panch or Sarpanch shall be moved or passed before the completion of a tenure of two years by a Panch or a Sarpanch, as the case may be. (5) The decision of the State Government on any matter arising under this section shall, subject to any order made under Sec. 97, be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.” It is clear from the bare perusal of Section 38 of the Act that under Section 38 (4) of the Act, the State Government may suspend any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, if the conditions mentioned thereunder, are met. 10.2. 10.2. Further, the conjoint reading of Section 38 (5), Section 97 (1) and Section 97 (3) of the Act makes it evident that the State Government has no power to review an order of suspension passed by it under Section 38 (4) of the Act as the power of review that is available to the State Government under Section 97 (3) of the Act is limited to the orders passed under Section 97 (1) of the Act. This position further fortifies from the fact that there is no mention of an order passed under Section 38 in Section 97 of the Act. Though, from the phrase, “subject to any order made under Sec. 97”, as used in Section 38 (5) of the Act, it appears that there is some link between Section 38 and Section 97 of the Act, however, the controversy in this regard is no more res integra as a Coordinate Bench of this Court has already settled this issue in Magna Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2004 SCC OnLine Raj 519, wherein a similar issue arose before this Court as to whether State Government, under Section 97 of the Act, has power to review an order passed by it under Section 38 of the Act. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, after an erudite discussion of the relevant provisions of the Act, held that even on the conjoint reading of Section 38 (5) and Section 97 (3) of the Act, it cannot be said that the State Government has power to review any order passed by it under Section 38 of the Act. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under: “83. On the face of the language of this provision, if the power to review any order passed under Section 38(1) is conceded, it would render the words “an order under sub-section (1)” appearing in Section 97(3) redundant, or otiose, which on the above principles cannot be permitted. When under Section 97(3) the power of review has been expressly conferred, only with respect to the orders passed under Subsection (1), in my humble opinion, by resorting to the principles of interpretation, this power cannot be extended to be available, qua the orders passed under Section 38(1), or for that matter under any other provision of the Act. 84. When under Section 97(3) the power of review has been expressly conferred, only with respect to the orders passed under Subsection (1), in my humble opinion, by resorting to the principles of interpretation, this power cannot be extended to be available, qua the orders passed under Section 38(1), or for that matter under any other provision of the Act. 84. The question then arises is, as to what is the effect of Section 38 (5), whereunder the decision of the State Government on any matter arising under Section 38, is to have a finality, subject to any order made under Section 97? As this is the main plank of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. 85. In my view, as noticed above, under Section 97(1) the State Government has the power of revision, to examine the record, in respect of any proceeding of any Panchayati Raj Institution, or Standing Committee or Sub Committee, and to satisfy itself, as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein, or as to regularity of the proceedings. It is required to be visualized, that any order passed by any Panchayati Raj Institution or a Standing Committee or a Sub Committee thereof, or any proceedings of any of the above, may be suffering from the vices of incorrectness, impropriety, or illegality, and any of such vices may tantamount to rendering the Chairperson or Dy. Chairperson or member of any Panchayati Raj Institution to be guilty of misconduct in discharge of his duties, or to be guilty of any disgraceful conduct, or may; show his refusal to act, or his having become incapable of acting as such. In such circumstances, the State Government may exercise powers under Sub-section (1) qua such orders or proceedings, notwithstanding the Chairperson or Dy. Chairperson, or member of any Panchayati Raj Institution, having been found guilty under clause (a) or (b) of Section 38(1). In the event of this eventuality taking place, and the State Government may either uphold the order or proceeding or may modify, annul or reverse it, or may remit it for reconsideration, and exercise of such power, in any of the manner, may not have material effect, on any order, that may have been passed under Section 38(1) or Section 38 (2), likewise there may be yet another eventuality, viz. that in the very aforesaid circumstances, if any order is passed by the State Government under Section 97(1), and exercise of that power in any of the manner, has material effect on any order, that may have been passed under Section 38(1) or 38(2). In either of that event, since by virtue of Section 97(3), qua such orders, as has been passed under Section 97(1), the State Government is conferred the power of review, capable of being exercised, within the specified time, and on specified grounds, in case, the State Government chooses to exercise such powers, under Section 97(3), it obviously is to materially affect the order, that may have been passed under Section 97(1), and which, on the above reasoning, may have a material effect, or bearing, on the order that may have been passed by the State Government under Section 38(1) or 38(2). It is in order to take care of this situation, that, the provision is made under Section 38(5), providing, that the decision of the State Government, on any matter arising under that section is, subject to any order, made under Section 97 of the Act. 86. It is required to be comprehended, that the enquiry, that may be got conducted under Section 38(1) is to be regarding the delinquencies contemplated by clauses (a) and (b), and while making that enquiry, the correctness, legality or propriety of any decisions or orders passed, or the regularity of the proceedings of any Panchayati Raj Institution or a Standing Committee or a Sub Committee thereof, is not permissible to be gone into, and therefore, on the face of any decision or order passed, or on the basis of any proceedings of any Panchayati Raj Institution or a Standing Committee or a Sub-Committee, the order may be required to be passed under Section 38 (1) or (2), but then at the same time, such an decision or order passed or proceedings of any Panchayati Raj Institution or a Standing Committee or a Sub Committee, may be sub-judice under Section 97 (1) or 97(3), and in exercise of either of the powers, such decision or order or proceedings may be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted, with the result, that the very basis, on which the order was made under Section 38(1) or (2), is wiped out. Obviously, such wiping out, in accordance with law, is also required to be given effect to, and, it is, in order to give such effect, that provision has been made under Section 38(5), making the decision of the State Government, on any matter arising under Section 38, to be final, subject to any order made under Section 97. 87. Thus, even on the theory of purposive construction of the statute, it cannot be said, that Section 38(5) and Section 97(3), read together, confer any power on the State Government to review any order passed by it under Section 38 of the Act of 1994. Likewise the above interpretation does give full effect to every word of Section 38(5) and Section 97(3) as well, and does not render any part of the statute redundant or meaningless or otiose.” Thus, the position of law is clear that the State Government does not have any power to review an order passed under Section 38 of the Act as the power of review under Section 97 (3) of the Act is limited to the orders passed by the State Government under Section 97 (1) of the Act. And as in the present case suspension order has been passed by the State Government under Section 38 (4) of the Act, there is no alternative remedy of review available to the Petitioner. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned AAG in this regard does not have any force. 11. Now coming to the issue of suspension, this Court finds that vide impugned order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3), the petitioner has been placed under suspension and he has been restrained from participating in any proceedings of the Gram Panchayat during the said period by the State Government, while exercising the powers under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994. This court, upon perusal of the order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3), finds that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 07.03.2018 on account of framing of charges by a competent court of law in a criminal case for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC. The petitioner had preferred a criminal revision (Cri. Revision No.02/2018) before the competent court laying a challenge to order dated 10.01.2018 and vide order dated 19.03.2019, the order dated 10.01.2018 was quashed. The respondents then revoked the order of suspension dated 07.03.2018. The petitioner had preferred a criminal revision (Cri. Revision No.02/2018) before the competent court laying a challenge to order dated 10.01.2018 and vide order dated 19.03.2019, the order dated 10.01.2018 was quashed. The respondents then revoked the order of suspension dated 07.03.2018. The Complainant had thereafter challenged the order dated 19.03.2019 by way of filing a revision before this Court being S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.386/2023. In the aforesaid criminal revision petition, this Court vide order dated 24.05.2023 quashed the order dated 19.03.2019 while upholding the order dated 10.01.2018. The respondent then again vide the impugned order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3) placed the petitioner under suspension. Thus, it is clear that on account of criminal case pending against the petitioner, the petitioner has been again placed under suspension. 12. Further, this Court takes into consideration the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Krishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7132 of 2019 decided on 24.05.2019], wherein the Court has held that in order to suspend a Sarpanch under Section 38(4) of the Act, two essentials have to be satisfied, which include either such person is facing criminal trial with regard to the offences involving moral turpitude or, an inquiry against him is initiated under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994. The relevant para of the judgment rendered in Krishan Lal (supra) is reproduced as under: “9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case, this Court is of the opinion that Section 38 Sub-section (iv) of Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 carries two essential conditions for suspending an elected Sarpanch. The two requisite conditions are that the person would be facing criminal trial with regard to offence involving moral turpitude or an inquiry against home has been initiated under Section 38 of Sub- section 1 by the State Government. Admittedly, in the present case, there is no order of State Government initiating any inquiry against the present petitioner and nor the FIR has culminated into a trial, as the investigation is still going on.” 12.1. This court finds that the charges and the related criminal proceedings against the petitioner have been quashed by virtue of the order dated 18.11.2024, passed by a coordinate bench of this Court in Santosh Kumari and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. [S.B. Criminal Misc. This court finds that the charges and the related criminal proceedings against the petitioner have been quashed by virtue of the order dated 18.11.2024, passed by a coordinate bench of this Court in Santosh Kumari and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. [S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 8135 of 2024, decided on 18.11.2024]. The relevant part of the aforesaid order is as under: “8. Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous Petition is allowed and the further proceedings of CRO No.756/2015 pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Desuri, District Pali and any other proceedings arising out of FIR No. 46/2015 registered at Police Station Desuri, District Pali are hereby quashed and set aside. The accused are acquitted from the charge and their bail bonds are discharged.” Thus, applying the principle propounded in Krishan Lal (supra) to the instant case, it is seen that, the requirements stipulated under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 are not met, inasmuch as neither the petitioner is facing criminal trial with regard to the offences involving moral turpitude, nor an inquiry is initiated against him under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994, therefore, the suspension order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3), was required to be revoked by the State Government and the same deserves to be set aside. 13. Moreover, this Court also takes into account the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sonam Lakra v. State of Chattisgarh, SLP(C) No. 7279/2024 [Decided on 14. 11.2024], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that there is a fundamental distinction between an elected representative and a selected public servant and it is pertinent to give due regard to the elected representative on account of the democratic legitimacy i.e. conferred upon the person, by the election. The relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered in Sonam (supra) is reproduced as under: “12. The administrative authorities, with their colonial mindset, have regrettably failed yet again to recognize the fundamental distinction between an elected public representative and a selected public servant. Invariably, elected representatives like the appellant are often treated as subordinate to bureaucrats compelled to comply with directives that serve to encroach upon their autonomy and impinge their accountability. This misconceived and self styled supervisory power is asserted with an intention to equate elected representatives with public servants holding civil posts, completely disregarding the democratic legitimacy conferred by election.” 14. Invariably, elected representatives like the appellant are often treated as subordinate to bureaucrats compelled to comply with directives that serve to encroach upon their autonomy and impinge their accountability. This misconceived and self styled supervisory power is asserted with an intention to equate elected representatives with public servants holding civil posts, completely disregarding the democratic legitimacy conferred by election.” 14. Accordingly, in the light of the discussion made hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed and the suspension order dated 01.07.2024 (Annex.3), passed by the State Government is set aside. Any application (s), if pending, shall also stand disposed of. No order as to the cost.