JUDGMENT : NITIN JAMDAR, C.J. 1. The Appellants have challenged acquisition of their property invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. The challenge before the learned Single Judge failed, and the Appellants are now before us in appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 2. The property in question is 4.5 ares in re-survey No. 54/69 of Meenachil Village in Kottayam District. The Principal Secretary to the Government, Public Works Department, on 14 July 2009, accorded administrative sanction for 258 works. One of the works was the construction of a drain and footpath, as well as connecting the Ramapuram-Pala road to the River View road. The Assistant Executive Engineer addressed a letter to the Executive Engineer, stating that the proposed road is important in Pala town and that its development is essential to reduce traffic congestion, and considering there would be an administrative delay, Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 be invoked. The District Collector also addressed a letter to the property owner under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 on 17 March 2010 (Exhibit P3). 3. Petitioner No. 5 submitted representation on 4 July 2010 (Exhibit P5) which yielded no result. On 5 April 2011, notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 (Exhibit P4) was issued for the acquisition of the subject property. The Petitioners filed W.P. (C) No. 25860/2011 challenging the rejection of representation dated 4 July 2010, the order dated 17 March 2010 invoking the urgency clause, and notification dated 5 April 2011 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894. Refuting the averments in the Writ Petition, a counter affidavit was filed by Respondent No. 4. 4. The learned Single Judge concluded that Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 was rightly invoked and there was no error in proceeding with the acquisition proceedings and dismissed the Writ Petition by judgment dated 27 February 2019. Being aggrieved, the Appellants, who are Petitioner Nos. 3 to 5, and the legal heirs of Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have filed this Appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 5. We have heard Mr. S. Sreekumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellants and Mr. V. Tekchand, learned Senior Government Pleader for the Respondents. 6. 3 to 5, and the legal heirs of Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have filed this Appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 5. We have heard Mr. S. Sreekumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellants and Mr. V. Tekchand, learned Senior Government Pleader for the Respondents. 6. The main contentions of the Appellants are that firstly, dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 should be resorted to in rare circumstances and in this case, no such circumstances exist. Secondly, there was a delay in granting approval after the sanction. Thirdly, the subject matter of acquisition has undergone a change. The Appellants have relied upon the information given to them pursuant to the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. 7. First, we will refer to the relevant statutory provisions and the pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the parameters of judicial review over the decision of the State Government to invoke Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 - referred to as the urgency clause. 8. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 lays down the procedure for the acquisition of land for public purposes. Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, a preliminary notification has to be published in the Official Gazette to the effect that the land in the locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. Under Section 5-A, any person interested in the land which has been notified under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 can object to the acquisition of the land and opportunity has to be given to the objector for being heard. Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 reads thus: “5A. Hearing of objections: (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. (2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. (3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act.” 9. Under Section 6, a declaration that the land is required for a public purpose is issued, followed by a notice to the person interested under Section 9 and under Section 11, an award is declared. Section 17 of the Act of 1894 confers special powers in case of urgency on the Collector to take possession of the land even before the award has been made, and such land shall vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 17 reads as under: “17. Special powers in cases of urgency: (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. (3) In every case under either of the preceding sub-sections the Collector shall, at the time of taking possession, offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24 and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained. (3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3): (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto. (3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3): (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto. (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2) Where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto) shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (3-B) The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3-A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation, required to be tendered under section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collectors award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1).” Therefore, Section 17 confers special powers to deviate from the regular procedure, including a person's right to object and be heard. 10. The interplay between Section 17 and Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 has been considered in various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The parties have placed decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court before us. They are (a) First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 160 , (b) Radhy Shyam (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2011) 5 SCC 553 , (c) Darshan Lal Nagpal (Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 327 , (d) Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Ors. v. Bimal Kumar Shah and Ors. AIR 2024 SC 2819 and (e) Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002 decided on 5 November, 2024. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 327 , (d) Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Ors. v. Bimal Kumar Shah and Ors. AIR 2024 SC 2819 and (e) Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002 decided on 5 November, 2024. 11. In the case of Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, acquisition was resorted to by the State Government for accommodating students of the National Medical College of Calcutta. There were several rounds of litigation, and ultimately, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal and quashed the acquisition proceedings. The Division Bench held that there was no grave urgency or emergency for invoking Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894. Challenging this decision, the State Government approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In paragraph (5) of the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “5. The question of urgency of an acquisition under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues Notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking power under Section 17(4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Any post Notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5(A) by invoking powers under Section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Any post Notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5(A) by invoking powers under Section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except for the grounds already indicated, but the said satisfaction must be of the Appropriate Government and that the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (1971) 3 SCR 871 . Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, if the circumstances of the case in hand are examined it would appear that the premises in question was required for the students of National Medical College, Calcutta and the Notification issued in December 1982 had been quashed by the Court and the subsequent Notification issued on 25.2.1994 also had been quashed by the Court. It is only thereafter the Notification was issued under Section 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act on 29.11.1994 which came up for consideration before the High Court. Apart from the fact that there had already been considerable delay in acquiring the premises in question on account of the intervention by Courts, the premises was badly needed for the occupation of the students of National Medical College, Calcutta. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the decision to invoke the urgency clause is a matter of the subjective satisfaction of the Government, which is ordinarily not subject to judicial scrutiny. Courts may interfere if it is demonstrated that the appropriate authority failed to apply its mind to the relevant factors or acted mala fide. The judicial review is limited to examining whether relevant material was considered and the decision is taken in good faith. Allegations of mala fides must be supported by specific and cogent evidence; a mere assertion is insufficient. If an order invoking power under Section 17(4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a pre or post notification delay does not invalidate the decision unless mala fides are established. 12. In the case of Radhy Shyam, an extensive review of the law on the invocation of powers under sub-section (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act, was undertaken and certain principles were laid down. The decision in the case of Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli was also referred to and considered. In paragraph (77), the Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out the principles from the review of the case law. Paragraph (77) reads thus: “77. From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases, the following principles can be culled out: (i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner's consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good. [Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner's consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good. [Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. AIR 1954 SC 119 , Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995) Supp. (1) SCC 596] (ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State fall in the category of expropriators legislation and such legislation must be construed strictly [DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 622 ; State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336 and Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. Civil Appeal No. 2334 of 2011 decided on 7.3.2011] (iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Government can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of one's property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to scrutinize the action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the land owner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter. (iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the land owner or other interested persons. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even few weeks or months. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even few weeks or months. therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5A, the concerned authority must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired. (vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides or that the concerned authorities did not apply mind to the relevant factors and the records. (vii) The exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5A of the Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his objection. The use of word “may” in sub-section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to the cases covered under Sub-Section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1). (viii) The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Section 5A(1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters. (ix) If land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the Court should view the invoking of Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) with suspicion and carefully scrutinize the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition.” The principles laid down in Radhy Shyam were reiterated and followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal. In the case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that seven principles flow out of Article 300A, which can be termed sub-rights of procedure. These seven principles have become an integral part of the Union and State statutes concerning acquisition. These seven principles are the Right to Notice, the Right to be heard, the Right to a reasoned decision, the Duty to acquire only for public purpose, the Right to restitution or fair compensation, the Right to an efficient and expeditious process, and the Right to conclusion. In the context of the right to be heard, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as follows: “30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a meaningful and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the property - bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham. (ii) S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, S.3(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, S.15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and S.3C of the National Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory embodiments of this right. (iii) Judicial opinions recognizing the importance of this right are far too many to reproduce. Suffice to say that the enquiry in which a land holder would raise his objection is not a mere formality (Footnote No. 7). (iii) Judicial opinions recognizing the importance of this right are far too many to reproduce. Suffice to say that the enquiry in which a land holder would raise his objection is not a mere formality (Footnote No. 7). Footnote No. 6: In Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 125 , it was held that a notification under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, even in urgent cases falling under S.17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the sine qua non of the process of acquisition. In State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib, (1973) 3 SCC 196 , it was held that a notice under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is necessary for completing the land acquisition process. In Narinderjit Singh and Ranjit Singh v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 157 , this Court held that the notice under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory and if no notice is published, the entire process of land acquisition is vitiated. In Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, (2005) 13 SCC 477 , this Court held that if the initial notification under S.3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 is bad, the entire process which is followed in pursuance of it is vitiated. Footnote No. 7: In Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. AIR 1964 SC 1217 , this Court has held the right under S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be a substantial one and it cannot be taken away. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 , this Court has held that the right of submitting objections under S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a valuable right and the hearing given in pursuance of exercise of this right must not be rendered to a mere formality. In Union of India v. Shiv Raj, (2014) 6 SCC 564 , this Court held that the rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, (2005) 13 SCC 477 , this Court observed that in the process from the initial notification to the final declaration, objections play a vital road. In Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, (2005) 13 SCC 477 , this Court observed that in the process from the initial notification to the final declaration, objections play a vital road. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 2 SCC 25, this Court quashed the land acquisition proceedings when a proper hearing under S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not accorded. In Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 16 SCC 660 , this Court held quashed the land acquisition proceedings when it was observed that a mere formality was rendered in the name of a hearing under S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Property Owners Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. expounded the parameters and the scope of Article 39(b) of the Directive Principles contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution of India in the context of private property. Therefore, it is clear that the right to be heard under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 is an important right of the objector and unless circumstances exist to invoke the power under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act of 1894, the right should not be taken away. However, whether such circumstances exist would depend upon the facts of each case. 13. That takes us to the facts and circumstances in the case at hand. Firstly to consider is the contention of the Petitioners that there has been a deviation from the original purpose of acquisition. It is contended that the acquisition was only for footpath and drainage, and thereafter, it is changed to connecting the Pala - Ramapuram Road to River View Road. There is no merit in this contention. The Section 4(1) notification is issued concerning the entire area. The sanction under Section 17 of the Act of 1894 for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A indicates the broad reason for the acquisition. The Petitioners themselves from the inception treated the acquisition proceedings as one for connecting the road. Exhibit-P5 representation dated 4 July 2010 submitted by Petitioner No. 5 (translated version of the document in Malayalam submitted by the Petitioners), reads thus: “Properties in Sy. The Petitioners themselves from the inception treated the acquisition proceedings as one for connecting the road. Exhibit-P5 representation dated 4 July 2010 submitted by Petitioner No. 5 (translated version of the document in Malayalam submitted by the Petitioners), reads thus: “Properties in Sy. No. 53, 54 in Block No. 80 of Lalam Village lying just south of the traffic island situated at Kurisupally Junction, Pala town belong to us and our relatives. It is learnt that the PWD has decided to construct a new road approximately 50 metres long and 15 metres wide extending Pala - Ramapuram road to River View Road and as a part of it stones marked PWD has been installed in our properties. This proposed road is absolutely unscientific and will only worsen the present traffic problem. There is another road in the same direction exiting just 10 metres west of the proposed road connecting to the River View road. A very small piece of land abutting Municipal Town Hall will be needed to widen this road. Presently there are numerous roads from Ettumanoor - Poonjar highway to the River View road parallel to the proposed road and there is no necessity to construct a new road. All the above said existing road can be widened at nominal expenses. So it is humbly prayed that the proposed road extending Pala-Ramapuram road to River View road may be drop as it is unscientific and will cause unnecessary expenditure.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the representation (Exhibit-P5) itself states that the property lies near the traffic island situated at Kurisupally Junction, Pala town and that the P.W.D. has decided to construct a new road extending Pala - Ramapuram road to River View road and had placed stones in the property. Thereafter, they have stated that it is not necessary to construct this road. Respondent No. 4, in its counter, has pointed out that the road suggested by the Petitioners is very narrow, and both sides of the road are heavily built up, as can be seen from the map, and therefore, is unscientific. The photographs placed on record by the Petitioners would demonstrate the position. Thus it is clear that acquisition was for the purpose of connecting two roads. 14. Petitioner in the pleadings in the writ petition has stated that acquisition is for connecting the Ramapuram-Pala road to the River View road. The photographs placed on record by the Petitioners would demonstrate the position. Thus it is clear that acquisition was for the purpose of connecting two roads. 14. Petitioner in the pleadings in the writ petition has stated that acquisition is for connecting the Ramapuram-Pala road to the River View road. Paragraph (1) of the writ petition reads thus: “The petitioners herein are the absolute owners in possession of an extent of 4.5 Ares of land in R.S. No. 54/69 of Meenachil Village. The instant writ petition is preferred by the petitioners deeply aggrieved by the initiation of acquisition proceedings by the respondents for the purported construction of footpath and drainage and for connecting the Ramapuram Pala Road to the river view road. In this connection, the petitioners beg to produce herewith a true copy of the alignment plan of acquisition prepared by the 4th respondent and the same may be marked as Ext.P1. A bare reference to Ext.P1 would show that there is a substantial two storied building covering the entire property belonging to the petitioners’ land proposed to be acquired for the aforesaid purpose. It is also clear from a bare perusal of Ext.P1 that there is already an existing road which can be utilized for the present purpose namely, the construction of drain, footpath and for connecting the Ramapuram Pala Road to the river view road just 10 metres to the west of the petitioners’ property that is sought to be acquired. In this connection, the petitioners beg to produce herewith a few photographs in substantiation of the petitioners submission that there is already an existing road just 10 metres to the west of the petitioners’ property which can be utilized without any expending any funds from the public exchequer for the purpose of connecting the Ramapuram Pala Road to the river view road and the same may be marked as Ext.P2, P2(a), P2(b), P2(c), P2(d), P2(e) and P2(f).” (Emphasis supplied) 15. Even in the answer given to the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, the Petitioners were informed on 17 June 2011 that the acquisition is for the development of a road in continuation of Ramapuram road to Kurisupally Junction. Thus, the contention of the Appellants now orally advanced that the Respondents cannot deviate from the inter-departmental correspondences regarding the purpose is entirely incorrect and is contrary to their own case. 16. Thus, the contention of the Appellants now orally advanced that the Respondents cannot deviate from the inter-departmental correspondences regarding the purpose is entirely incorrect and is contrary to their own case. 16. Now, we turn to the second and main contention of the Petitioner that no grave urgency existed to invoke the Urgency Clause. In the counter affidavit, Respondent No. 4 has given the reasons for invoking the Urgency Clause. The Petitioners' contention that an alternate road exists is negatived, stating that it is incorrect from the standpoint of technical feasibility. It was also pointed out by Respondent No. 4-Assistant Executive Engineer, that both sides of the road are heavily built up. The map/ sketch produced on record by the Petitioners would show that the property lies at the head of a lane which connects two main roads in the city. In the counter affidavit Respondent No. 4 has been pointed out that the Municipal Town of Pala is situated at the intersection point of Punalur-Muvattupuzha State Highway and Ettumanoor-Poonjar State Highway. The town is the Taluk headquarters of Meenachil, and due to its location and offices, markets, shops, other business centres and other establishments, etc., the traffic in town is increasing by day. The problem of the traffic congestion is affecting the public. It is stated that the existing road in the Pala town is very narrow and widening the existing road is not feasible due to the existence of several buildings and other structures and without demolishing the same, the roads cannot be widened. It is evident that the primary concern was the frequent traffic accidents in the town and need to find urgent solution. 17. Thus Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 was invoked by the Respondent since the matter related to the immediate necessity. It was invoked after being satisfied subjectively about the need and necessity to acquire land for immediate need to resolve the traffic issue and prevent further accidents. One of the major concerns emphasised by the Respondents was the frequency of accidents taking place due to the non-availability of sufficient spacious roads, which was enhanced by the fact of large number of vehicles in the town The record establishes that the subject property lies at the intersection and right in the middle of a road, which would connect two main roads. It is not the legal position that a reasoned order akin to a judgment has to be passed while invoking the urgency clause. Neither the decision in the case of Bimal Kumar Shah nor in the decision in Radhy Shyam lay down that detailed reasons will have to be provided. 18. The impugned judgment holds that since it is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the State, it cannot be enquired into. Though this absolute approach is not warranted, the subjective satisfaction of the State cannot be disregarded in every case. In none of the judgments cited supra, which has expounded the law governing the interplay between Sections 5-A and Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894, a proposition is laid down that even if material exists on record to arrive at subjective satisfaction regarding urgency, Section 17 cannot be invoked. Neither Section 17 of the Act of 1894 was declared unconstitutional and struck down. Therefore, the power to invoke the urgency clause existed. In the case at hand, there is no allegation made or proved of any mala fides on the part of the Respondents. The Respondents has placed material on record to arrive at a conclusion that it was necessary to acquire the property urgently in view of the severe traffic congestion issues and the recurrence of accidents on the road. This subjective satisfaction based on the material on record, and the location as can be seen from the map itself, cannot be either considered non-existent or arrived at with mala fides. 19. The third contention of the Petitioners is that there is delay after administrative sanction which will vitiate the invocation of the urgency clause. The contention of the Petitioners is that when the administrative sanction was granted on 14 July 2009, more than 1½ years elapsed without even a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894, and therefore, there was no urgency to invoke Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894. It was later, on 5 April 2011, that notification under Section 4(1) was issued. We find no merit in this contention. The Principal Secretary of the Public Works Department issued a communication on 14 July 2009, requesting administrative sanction for 258 works. The work in question was out of 258 works, which was sanctioned on 14 July 2009. It was later, on 5 April 2011, that notification under Section 4(1) was issued. We find no merit in this contention. The Principal Secretary of the Public Works Department issued a communication on 14 July 2009, requesting administrative sanction for 258 works. The work in question was out of 258 works, which was sanctioned on 14 July 2009. The Assistant Executive Engineer communicated to the Executive Engineer that the administrative sanction is for two years and the procedure be expedited. Based on this request, the Executive Engineer addressed a letter to the Principal Secretary (Revenue) on 24 February 2010, who, on 17 March 2010, accorded sanction to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894. We have already noted that material on record shows that the subjective satisfaction of the State was not perverse. Once the material exists on record, from which subjective satisfaction can be seen regarding the urgency, then the delay on the part of some of the officers of the State cannot imply that the material itself was absent or that subjective satisfaction is flawed. This could at the most a case of negligence of an individual officer. 20. In the case of Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that any post or pre notification of delay by itself will not nullify the decision of the State Government for dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking the powers under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, especially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. We have not been shown any decision wherein this observations in Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli are specifically overruled. The decision in the case of Radhy Shyam, in paragraph 70, the decision in the case of Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli is noted, however, there is no specific deviation from the view taken. In Radhy Shyam, the decision in the case of Anand Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 11 SCC 242 has been referred to, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that as regards the issue whether pre-notification and post-notification delay would render the invocation of urgency power void, the law is not consistent. 21. The future developments that have taken place cannot be ignored. 21. The future developments that have taken place cannot be ignored. The acquisition proceedings were not stayed though there was a prayer for an interim stay and interim order only staying the dispossession of the Petitioner was granted. The preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was published on 23 February 2011. Draft notification under Section 6(1) was approved by the Land Revenue Commissioner. Notice as per Section 9(3) of the Act of 1894 was served on the concerned parties and they appeared in person. The enquiry was conducted on 3 October 2012. The value of the building was assessed by the Assistant Executive Engineer, and the compensation amount has been determined. Since the amount involved in land acquisition cases exceeds ?1 Crore, the Land Revenue Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram, the competent authority, after complying with the statutory requirements, passed an award on 9 May 2013. Pursuant to the award proceedings, the amount is deposited in the court on 1 March 2014. The State had also filed an application for vacating the interim order on the ground that the entire procedure had been completed. Thus during the pendency of the proceedings, since there was no stay, the award is declared under the Act of 1894 on 1 March 2014 and amounts are also deposited. Yet due to this litigation the proposal for acquisition to resolve the traffic issues in the Pala city has not fructified for last almost 15 years. In these circumstances and in view of the above discussion, we find that no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment. 22. The Appeal is dismissed. No costs.