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2024 DIGILAW 1683 (MAD)

General Secretary, Kempf Employees Union Through R. Selvaraj v. Management of Kempf India Limited

2024-07-24

J.NISHA BANU, P.DHANABAL

body2024
JUDGMENT : J.NISHA BANU, J. PRAYER: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters patent to set aside the order of the learned Judge made in W.P.No.9293 of 2020 dated 28.11.2023. Challenging the order made by this Court in W.P.No.9293 of 2020 dated 28.11.2023, wherein, the learned Single Judge has confirmed the Award passed by the Labour Court in holding that the demand made by KEMPF Employees Union/appellant herein to reopen the factory and to reinstate the workers as 'not justified', under Section 10(1)(c) & Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'I.D. Act'), the aggrieved petitioner therein has preferred this appeal. 2. The material facts which need to be summarized for the purpose of the present appeal are thus:- 2.1. KEMPF India Limited, having its registered office at Coimbatore, is into the manufacture of Propeller shafts and Universal Cross Join Kits used in Automobile Industry. It is averred in the petition that due to frequent dissatisfaction displayed by its workers in the form of strikes and accumulating financial losses, the respondent Management sought permission under Section 25-O of the I.D. Act to close down the manufacturing unit in Malumichampatti, Coimbatore. 2.2. The claim of closure putforth by the respondent Management was countered by the appellant Union. The application seeking permission for closure, dated 06.04.1990 was submitted by the respondent Management but the same was refused by the Commissioner of Labour vide order dated 11.06.1990. Aggrieved against such refusal, the respondent Management filed a review application, dated 22.06.1990 under Section 25(5) of the I.D. Act. to the Government of Tamil Nadu. 2.3. After considering the points raised by the respondent Management, the Secretary to Government vide G.O.(ID) No.269, Labour and Employment Department, dated 06.09.1990 referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras with a direction to submit its Award within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of that order. 2.4. The appellant Union challenged the above G.O.(ID) No.269, dated 06.09.1990 by way of filing a writ petition in W.P.No.15835 of 1990 which came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 25.10.1990. Against the order of dismissal of W.P., the appellant Union preferred an appeal in W.A.No.1101 of 1990. 2.4. The appellant Union challenged the above G.O.(ID) No.269, dated 06.09.1990 by way of filing a writ petition in W.P.No.15835 of 1990 which came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 25.10.1990. Against the order of dismissal of W.P., the appellant Union preferred an appeal in W.A.No.1101 of 1990. This Court, vide judgment dated 21.12.1990 allowed the said writ appeal, thereby setting aside the Government order of reference with a direction to the Government to issue notice in the review application to all parties, and to hear them and thereafter pass fresh orders on the review application or on any fresh application made. 2.5. Subsequently, on 17.06.1991, after serving notice to all parties and holding enquiry, the Government passed an order in the Review application granting permission for closure vide G.O.(ID) No.644, Labour and Employment Department. On 25.06.1991, closure notice was sent to all the workmen with closure compensation by cheque and it was duly initimated to the authorities. The appellant Union again challenged the above Government order granting permission for closure, dated 17.06.1991 by way of filing W.P.No.9069 of 1991 and also filed W.M.P.No.13604 of 1991 for stay. In the said stay petition, this Court granted an order of Status Quo, taking note of the fact that closure order has been given effect by paying closure compensation to the workmen by cheques, surrendering the factory license etc. 2.6. Again, this Court vide order dated 17.07.2001 dismissed the writ petition in W.P.No.9069 of 1991, thereby giving liberty to the workmen to work out their remedies by raising necessary dispute as to non-employment or as to other claim before appropriate Authority. No appeal was preferred against this order of this Court. In the year 2013, after 22 years from the date of closure of the respondent Management, the appellant Union came up with a claim petition in I.D.No.34 of 2013 seeking to reopen the factory and to reinstate the workers. The Government vide G.O.(D) No.499 Labour and Employment Department, dated 28.09.2013 referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Chennai for adjudication. 2.7. The Government vide G.O.(D) No.499 Labour and Employment Department, dated 28.09.2013 referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Chennai for adjudication. 2.7. Meanwhile, the respondent Management filed a writ petition in W.P.No.28298 of 2014 challenging the Government Order of reference to the Tribunal dated 28.09.2013, wherein this Court vide order dated 15.10.2019 disposed of the writ petition by holding that the Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition since already the dispute raised in that regard is pending before the Tribunal and therefore, granted liberty to both the parties to raise their grounds before the Tribunal for effective adjudication. 2.8. For the claim petition raised by the appellant Union, an Award dated 20.09.2020 came to be passed by the Industrial Tribunal dismissing the demand raised by the appellant Union. Aggrieved against such dismissal, the appellant Union filed a writ petition in W.P.No.9293 of 2020, whereby this Court vide order dated 28.11.2023 confirmed the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Aggrieved against the concurrent findings rendered by the Industrial Tribunal and this Court, the appellant Union has preferred the present Appeal. 3. Mr.S.N.Ravichandran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit the following:- 3.1. The main contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant Union is that initially the Commissioner of Labour, vide his order dated 11.06.1990 had refused to grant permission to close down the respondent Management's unit in Malumichampatti, Coimbatore while such permission was sought for under Section 25-O of the I.D.Act. That being the case, when the respondent Management preferred a review over such refusal, the said petition has been pending even after completion of one year. Admittedly, the one-year time period came to an end on 11.06.1991. While so, the order of closure passed by the Government vide G.O.((D) No.644 of 1991 dated 17.06.1991 is void ab initio and nonest in the eyes of law. 3.2. Admittedly, the one-year time period came to an end on 11.06.1991. While so, the order of closure passed by the Government vide G.O.((D) No.644 of 1991 dated 17.06.1991 is void ab initio and nonest in the eyes of law. 3.2. The learned counsel for the appellant Union brought to the attention of this Court Section 25-O(4) of the I.D. Act which envisages as under:- “Sec.25-O(4) an order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.” He further submitted that the aforesaid provision would translucently disclose that the same is mandatory in nature and not directory. While so, the very closure of the respondent Manufacturing Unit is not valid and proper one. 3.3. Furthermore, the learned counsel submitted that the address mentioned in the order of closure passed by the Government vide G.O.(ID) No.644 of 1991 dated 17.06.1991 and the address of the respondent Management are different. 3.4. Adding to the above, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent Management has started a sister concern by using the machinery of the closed entity and provided employment to the same workers, except the members of the appellant Union. Hence, according to the learned counsel, the Award of the Tribunal suffers from patent illegality. 3.5. He further contended that the members of the appellant Union have been deprived of their right to life and livelihood and they have not received the closure compensation yet. According to the learned counsel, both the forums failed to consider the above facts and the closure is mainly to victimize and detriment of the workmen. 3.6. The learned counsel for the appellant Union relied upon the following judgments: (i) Britannia Industries Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Manager Kamagar Union in W.P.No.2659 of 2005, wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is not that of a Court sitting in appeal over the order passed by the appropriate Government under section 25-(2) of the I.D.Act. In the present case, according to the learned counsel for the appellant Union, the order of reference made to the Industrial Tribunal was a multi-pronged one, since the reference was exclusively not with regard to the closure of the respondent entity alone but also concerns with regard to depriving the members of the appellant Union to work in the sister concern of the respondent Management. (ii) In Vazir Glass Works Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and another reported in (1996) 2 SCC 118 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that treating an application for review which was pending after the expiry of the said time frame of one year as a fresh application for permission for closure and to treat the order of reference to Industrial Tribunal by the State Government as an order of reference on such fresh application so that the entire exercise made before the Tribunal by both the parties and the Award made by the Tribunal are not rendered abortive. 3.7. To conclude with, the learned counsel for the appellant Union submitted that the closure of the Unit in Coimbatore by the respondent Management was based not on any business interest but merely to get rid of the petitioner Union and therefore, the said act of closure is an unfair labour practice as defined in the I.D.Act and hence, prayed for allowing this writ appeal. 4. Per contra, Mr.P.Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.R.Asokan, learned counsel for the respondent Management submitted the following:- 4.1. First and foremost, the learned Senior Counsel brought to the attention of this Court the judgment of the Bombay High Court made in Ambika Silk Mills Company Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and another reported 1998 (2) L.L.N. 208, wherein it has been held at paragraph no.16 as follows:- “16. 'Closure' is defined in section 2(cc) of I.D. Act which means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof. The order, therefore, passed by the State Government in exercise of its powers under sub-section (7) of section 25-O shall have to be read with reference to closure as defined in section 2(cc) which means permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof. The order, therefore, passed by the State Government in exercise of its powers under sub-section (7) of section 25-O shall have to be read with reference to closure as defined in section 2(cc) which means permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof. Though the order was passed by the State Government permitting the employer company to close down the undertaking for a period of three years from the date of accident yet so long as that order holds and during that time if the services of the employees have been terminated and brought to an end in accordance with law, such closure would in law be permanent closure and it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the employer has indulged in unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. The entire approach of the Industrial Court in that regard, therefore, was wholly misconceived and directed by irrelevant consideration which cannot be sustained. ” In the present case on hand, the closure was once and for all and thereafter, the factory was not reopened/ restarted by the respondent Management. Once the factory / undertaking is closed, the workers are entitled to only the closure compensation and the relationship of employer and employee ceases. Therefore, the dispute raised by the appellant Union after 23 years of closure is unsustainable. 4.2. The learned Senior Counsel enumerated before this Court that initially, the request for closure was made on 16.04.1990 and the Government Order permitting closure of Unit was passed on 17.06.1991, after several rounds of litigations. Therefore, the same cannot be portrayed as a belated order. Even though the order of reference was set aside by this Court vide judgment made in W.A.No.1107 of 1990, thereby remitting the matter back to the Government with a direction to pass fresh orders on the review application filed, after giving opportunity to all the parties concerned, the Government, after taking note of the accumulated loss, continued labour unrest and strained relationship between the workers and Management, has granted the permission for closure on 17.06.1991. Immediately, the respondent Management had also sent the intimation of closure to all the workers, who were on the rolls at that time, along with closure compensation payable to them as per the provisions of Section 25 (O) of the I.D.Act. Immediately, the respondent Management had also sent the intimation of closure to all the workers, who were on the rolls at that time, along with closure compensation payable to them as per the provisions of Section 25 (O) of the I.D.Act. Therefore, the closure was effected once and for all and the Management was not carrying on any manufacturing activity for the past more that 23 years. 4.3. The learned Senior Counsel also emphasized the fact that while the writ petition was pending, some of the workers filed computation petitions before the Labour Court, Coimbatore seeking bonus, wages on the ground that the Management violated the provision of Sections 25 O of the I.D.Act. The claim for wages was negatived by order dated 16.12.1996. Again some of the workers raised industrial disputes before the Labour Court, Coimbatore seeking for reinstatement in service with continuity of service with backwages and the said I.D.'s were also dismissed by order dated 12.06.2001. 4.4. The learned Senior Counsel further unveiled that when some of the workers raised the question on the order passed by the Government with regard to closure as invalid and the non-employment amounts to retrenchment before the Labour Court and sought for their reinstatement with backwages, the respondent Management had opposed by stating that the petitions filed by the workers under Section 2A of the I.D.Act are not maintainable since the undertaking was closed pursuant to the order passed by the appropriate Government under Section 25 O of the I.D.Act and therefore, the question of retrenchment and reinstatement does not arise at all, which was clearly stated by the Labour Court in its Award. 4.5. The learned Senior Counsel further manifested that the closure of the respondent Management was pursuant to the permission granted by the State Government under Section 25(O) of the I.D.Act and the same cannot be held illegal or invlaid. Unless the order granting permission for closure passed by the State Government is declared to be invalid, the closure effected pursuant to the said order cannot be declared as illegal or unlawful. Unless the order granting permission for closure passed by the State Government is declared to be invalid, the closure effected pursuant to the said order cannot be declared as illegal or unlawful. Further the appellant Union which claims that the order under Section 26 O(5) of the I.D.Act was not passed by the State Government within a year as contemplated under Section 25 O of the I.D.Act could have very well raised an industrial dispute challenging the closure immediately on the ground that the closure was illegal and invalid, but no such industrial dispute was ever raised by the appellant Union. Rather the appellant Union has slept over the matter for a period of more than 23 years and now has come up challenging the order passed by the Government granting permission of closure by way of filing writ petition and appeal, which is a mere process due to drag on the legal proceedings of the case. 4.6. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on Gordon Woodroffe Agencies (P) Ltd. vs. the Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court reported in (2004) 8 SCC 90 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that, 'where retrenchment has been properly made and that order has not been set aside, there is no principle which may justify an order directing payment of compensation to employees properly retrenched in addition to the retrenchment compensation statutorily payable.' 4.7. Since the respondent Company was reeling under severe financial distress and labour unrest, the decision of closure was taken and even though permission for closure was initially refused by the Commissioner of Labour, the review petition was immediately filed after the said rejection and therefore, there was no delay. Only because the appellant Union had approached the Court with petitions, the Government was constrained to hold negotiations before deciding on the issue of closure. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent Management was free to reapply for the closure any time and the one year validity was not a bar on reapplying. Moreover, the respondent Management had to be a profit making one and not a charitable institution to concentrate only on the cause of the public, without minding on the profit and hence, the learned Senior Counsel prayed for dismissing the writ appeal, thereby confirming the order passed by the Writ Court as well as the Labour Court. 5. Moreover, the respondent Management had to be a profit making one and not a charitable institution to concentrate only on the cause of the public, without minding on the profit and hence, the learned Senior Counsel prayed for dismissing the writ appeal, thereby confirming the order passed by the Writ Court as well as the Labour Court. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either sides and perused the materials placed before this Court. 6. Admittedly, the definition of the term 'closure' as defined in Section 2(cc) of I.D. Act, means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof. Perusal of records would reveal that the request for closure was made by the respondent Management to the Labour Commissioner in closure application No.2/1990 under Section 25-O of the I.D.Act on 16.04.1990. When the said application was rejected on 11.06.1990, immediately a review petition was filed by the respondent Company on 22.06.1990 with no delay. Meanwhile, it was the appellant Union who preferred a writ petition in W.P.No.15835 of 1990, challenging the order of reference made in G.O.(ID) No.269, Labour and Employment Department, dated 06.09.1990 and subsequently, the W.P. also came to be dismissed by this Court. 7. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to Section 10 (2) of I.D.Act and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “10. Reference of dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. (2) Where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, for a reference of the dispute to a Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] [ Substituted by Act 36 of 1956, for " or Tribunal" Section 7 (w.e.f. 10.3.1957).], the appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party, shall make the reference accordingly. [(2-A) An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section shall specify the period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate Government”. As per the above, only upon being satisfied with the reasons cited by the respondent Management, the Government has issued an order of reference of the dispute before the Industrial Tribunal, in order to give a quietus to the issue. As per the above, only upon being satisfied with the reasons cited by the respondent Management, the Government has issued an order of reference of the dispute before the Industrial Tribunal, in order to give a quietus to the issue. Finding error in such procedure, the appellant Union has approached this Court by way of filing writ petition, challenging the order of reference, which in the considered opinion of this Court is a procedure to stall the legal proceedings. 8. Even though the Writ Appeal filed by the appellant Union against the order of dismissal of the writ petition came to be allowed, this Court has allowed the appeal only with a direction to pass fresh orders on the review application, if so filed by the respondent Management, after affording sufficient opportunity to both sides to putforth their objections, if any. 9. On a perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Management, it can be averred that the respondent Management is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. From the year 1986-87 onwards, the Company has been facing several problems in view of the recession in the automobile industry and due to the non-cooperation of the workers. It is also stated that whenever the respondent Management refused or failed to fulfill the demands of the appellant Union, the workers resorted to strikes and non-cooperation in production by not adhering to the schedules and the quality norms etc. This resulted in delay in supplying the products to the customers and ultimately the respondent Management faced loss. However, the workers continued to indulge in frequent stoppage of work, defying the instructions of the respondent Management, sabotaging production activities, meddling with equipments and threatening the Management staff, which in turn led to the respondent Management's decision to close the manufacturing unit itself. As observed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, no business venture can be run on loss and sustain for the sake of public interest, and the same cannot be found fault with. 10. As observed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, no business venture can be run on loss and sustain for the sake of public interest, and the same cannot be found fault with. 10. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the address of the respondent Management and the one mentioned in the order of closure passed by the Government vide G.O.(ID) No.644 of 1991, dated 17.06.1991 are different has been clarified by the respondent Management by stating that the closure order was for a different unit which has been demolished by the respondent Management, whose registered office is at Mettupalayam Road Coimbatore and for the closure of Maruti Shaft Unit, its registered office is at Malumichampatti, Pollachi Roach, Coimbatore. 11. It is relevant to summarize the fact that the respondent Management closed down the establishment / undertaking in the year 1991 pursuant to the permission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 25-O of the I.D.Act. The entire machineries were removed, factory license surrendered and the closure compensation was sent to all the workmen by cheques. More particularly, after the year 1991, the establishment/ undertaking was not reopened. That being the case, though the order of the Government granting permission for closure was challenged, this Court did not interfere with the order. Therefore, it can be concluded that granting permission for closure holds good till date. 12. The appellant Union, who has made a submission that the order granting permission for closure was valid for a period of one year only, did not take any step to seek reopening of the closed establishment/ undertaking in the past 22 years. It was only in the year 2013, the appellant Union has raised the dispute claiming the order of granting permission for closure as valid for only a period of one year. Thereafter, this issue has been settled by this Court. Therefore, the settled issue cannot be unsettled by raising the present dispute after several years. 13. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case, this Court would come to the conclusion that since the workmen did not agitate the issue for the past 22 years, this Court would presume that they have accepted the closure. A closed establishment/ undertaking cannot be reopened after 22 years of its closure and the workmen cannot be reinstated since there is no establishment to provide employment for them. A closed establishment/ undertaking cannot be reopened after 22 years of its closure and the workmen cannot be reinstated since there is no establishment to provide employment for them. 14. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no reasons to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, thereby confirming the Award passed by the Labour Court in I.D.No.34 of 2013, dated 28.02.2020. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed. No costs.