JUDGMENT : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.08.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 736 of 2010 wherein and whereby, the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the Union and has quashed and set aside the communication dated 20.11.2009 whereby, the appropriate Government has refused to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By the order dated 20.11.2009, the appropriate Government has refused to refer the dispute for adjudication on the ground that the dispute has been raised after a lapse of 17 years and is belated and stale. The learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside such decision. 2. At the outset, learned Senior Advocate Mr. R.R. Marshall appearing for the appellant- ONGC by placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and others, (2000) 2 SCC 455 , has submitted that the stale case cannot be referred by the appropriate Government and the same is appropriately done however, the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the said communication dated 20.11.2009. 3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. R.R. Marshall has submitted that initially, there was an industrial dispute of appellant- ONGC with its employees, 269 in number, who were appointed for seasonal work of survey which culminate into reference proceedings. He has submitted that before the Labour Court, it was reduced to 189 and ultimately, when the dispute landed before the Supreme Court, the issue of regularisation was confined to only 153 seasonal workers. It is submitted that the name of the respondents were not included in those 153 workmen and after the Supreme Court passed the said order, the dispute has been raised seeking regularisation of the services, after they completed 240 days in the years 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-1990 and 1990-91. Thus, it is submitted that this vital aspect has not been appropriately dealt with by the learned Single Judge and hence, it is urged that the said judgment and order may be quashed and set aside. 4. Thus, it is submitted that this vital aspect has not been appropriately dealt with by the learned Single Judge and hence, it is urged that the said judgment and order may be quashed and set aside. 4. Vehemently opposing the present appeal, the learned advocate Mr.Rajesh Mankad appearing for the respondent-Union has submitted that all the respondents have completed 240 days in the years 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-1990 and 1990-91 and since the issue got finally settled by the Supreme Court, they made a demand before the appropriate Government however, the same was rejected by the impugned communication dated 20.11.2009 and hence, the workmen were constrained to file the writ petition. Learned advocate Mr.Rajesh Mankad by supporting the findings of the learned Single Judge has submitted that it is settled legal proposition that while considering the demand/ dispute raised by the workmen, appropriate Government cannot adjudicate the same and hence, it was not open for the appropriate Government to reject the demand for regularisation of services of 13 workmen. It is submitted that the respondents-workmen along with other workmen, total 269 in numbers had raised the issue of regularisation before the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal had confined the same only to 153 workmen and ultimately, the Supreme Court has issued the direction with regard to 153 workmen and since the present workmen are identically situated to those 153 workmen, they cannot be denied the benefit of regularisation. Thus, it is urged that the present appeal may not be entertained. 5. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. It is not in dispute and is an established fact from the pleadings that all the respondent- 13 workmen were appointed as seasonal workers for doing geological and geophysical surveys for the exploration of petroleum. It is the case of the workmen that all of them have completed 240 days in the years 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-1990 and 1990-91. Such facts are incorporated in the demand dated 24.07.2007. By the order dated 20.11.2009 appropriate Government rejected their demand by recording that “The dispute has been raised after a lapse of 17 years. The dispute is therefore, belated and stale.” In order to appreciate the reason of rejection on the ground of delay, it is necessary to refer to the background of the demand. 6. By the order dated 20.11.2009 appropriate Government rejected their demand by recording that “The dispute has been raised after a lapse of 17 years. The dispute is therefore, belated and stale.” In order to appreciate the reason of rejection on the ground of delay, it is necessary to refer to the background of the demand. 6. The Engineering Mazdoor Sangh on behalf of 269 casual and seasonal, contingent workers which included the respondents engaged in Western Region by the appellant- ONGC raised an industrial dispute for regularisation of service on 14.03.1999. The dispute was adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal, Central at Vadodara under Reference (ITC) No. 6 of 1991 and accordingly, the Tribunal passed an award on 06.06.1994 restricting the demand of regularation for those workmen, whose names appeared in the Schedule to the affidavit at Exh-48. It appears that during the pendency of the reference proceedings, the ONGC sought permission to terminate the workmen from services. The Tribunal directed to terminate the services of 189 out of 269 workmen. The Tribunal restricted its award to only 189 workmen. It is also not in dispute and is an admitted fact by learned advocate Mr.Rajesh Mankad that the names of the respondents, though were included in those 269 workmen, were not included in the list of 189 workmen, who were finally ordered to be regularized. Ultimately, the dispute landed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 20.11.2006 passed in Civil Appeal No. 6607 of 2005 issued the following directions: “We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and we are unable to agree with the reasoning both of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court in firstly directing that the concerned 153 workmen be treated at par with regular employees as far as all benefits are concerned, except for being given permanent status and the subsequent direction of the Division Bench directing that they be treated as having been notionally regularized with effect from 1st May, 1999. Having regard to the nature of employment and the period during which these field workers are employed, it would create various difficulties if the seasonal workmen were to be treated at par with regular employees as directed by the learned Single Judge. Having regard to the nature of employment and the period during which these field workers are employed, it would create various difficulties if the seasonal workmen were to be treated at par with regular employees as directed by the learned Single Judge. It would be even more difficult for the appellant to adjust the workmen in permanent employment when the need for them was only seasonal. Admittedly, these workmen who are employed for field survey work are employed for about six months in a year between November and May. If at all they are to be regularized, the appellant will have to find work for them during the months when their services would otherwise have not been required. As pointed out by Mr. Salve, previously the appellant had monopolistic control over geological survey work for oil and natural gas but today the scene had changed and it is just another competitor along with others, notwithstanding the fact that they are a government company. The appellant is now required to compete with others in securing exploration work and can only recruit field workers as and when required. Even then the learned Tribunal found a via media in directing that the 153 workmen who had admittedly completed 240 days and had acquired a temporary status be regularized against vacancies as and when such vacancies became available. We are of the view that the directions given by the learned Tribunal are reasonable and should be allowed to stand as against the directions given by the High Court, firstly to treat the said 153 workmen at par with the regular employees and thereafter to treat their services as having been notionally regularized from 1st May, 1999. We can, of course, add a few further safeguards in order to protect the interests of the said 153 workmen so that they are assured of employment as before. We, accordingly, dispose of this appeal by setting aside the judgments and orders of both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and restoring the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal. We, however, add that till such time as these 153 workmen are not absorbed against regular vacancies in the concerned category no recruitment from outside will be made by the appellant. We, however, add that till such time as these 153 workmen are not absorbed against regular vacancies in the concerned category no recruitment from outside will be made by the appellant. Furthermore, even in matters of seasonal employment, the said 153 workmen or the numbers that remain after regularization from time to time, shall be first considered for employment before any other workmen are engaged for the same type of work in the field. The appellant should make a serious attempt to regularize the services of the workman concerned, in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal, as quickly as possible, but preferably within a period of two years from the date of this order. There will be no order as to costs. Having regard to this order, no further orders are required to be passed on the Contempt Petition which is disposed of accordingly. I.A. Nos. 7, 8 and 9 are also disposed of by this order.” 7. Thus, the Supreme Court has categorically held that looking to the nature of employment of the workmen, who were employed for doing seasonal work, various difficulties would be created, if they are treated at par with regular employees, as directed by the learned Single judge. It is further held that it would be even more difficult for the appellant - ONGC to adjust the workmen in permanent employment when the need for them was only seasonal. 8. In order to further safeguard the interest of the workmen so that they were assured employment, the Supreme Court has confined the directions to only 153 workmen. It was directed that till these 153 workmen were not absorbed against regular vacancies in the concerned category, no recruitment from outside will be made by the appellant- ONGC. Further, it was observed that even in the matter of seasonal employment, the said 153 workmen or the numbers that remain after regularisation from time to time, shall be first considered for employment before any other workmen are engaged for the same type of work in the field and the appellant- ONGC should make a serious attempt to regularise the service of the workmen concerned in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal. 9. Unquestionably, the names of the workmen do not figure in these 153 workmen. 9. Unquestionably, the names of the workmen do not figure in these 153 workmen. By the initial award itself, the Tribunal had restricted its directions for regularization to 189 workmen and the present respondents-employees were not included in the list. The said deletion and non-inclusion of their names were never questioned by them in any proceedings, and only after the Supreme Court disposed of the Civil Appeal and that too, after a period of more than 2 years in the year 2009, they raised the demand contending that since they had completed 240 days in the year 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-1990 and 1990-91, they are required to be regularised. Thus, the demand itself was ill-conceived as the workmen failed to get any relief either from the Tribunal till the Supreme Court. 10. Hence, we find that the appropriate Government has precisely rejected their demand. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra), in which, the Supreme Court has held as under: “6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute. Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that it is certainly subject to judicial review limited though it might be. High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In national Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1999) 9 SC 377 this Court observed: “24. High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In national Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1999) 9 SC 377 this Court observed: “24. It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the industrial dispute, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the industrial tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate government lacks power to make any reference.” 11. Thus, it is held by the Apex Court that the law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act, and it is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled, and such power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as “industrial dispute.” It is also asserted by the Supreme Court that the Central Government lacks power to make reference if there is no industrial dispute in existence or even apprehended. 12. In the present case, as noticed hereinabove, the demand itself was ill-conceived as the Supreme Court had confined the directions to 153 workmen and the present respondents did not assail the non-inclusion of their names in the list of those 153 workmen before any forum, nor any application was filed before the Supreme Court seeking clarification as to whether the directions issued in favour of 153 workmen, would also govern their fate. 13. We do find merits in the appeal. 13. We do find merits in the appeal. Learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the correct facts as mentioned hereinabove and hence, we are inclined to quash and set aside the impugned judgment dated 27.08.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 736 of 2010. The same is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal succeeds. 14. Civil Application (for stay) No. 1 of 2022 also disposed of accordingly.