JUDGMENT : 1. The appellants/plaintiffs have filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the impugned judgment and decree dated 28-8-2017 passed in Civil Appeal No 34-A/2016 by the learned Additional District Judge, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (Annexure A/1) arising out of judgment and decree dated 22-2-2010 passed by the Civil Judge, Class II, Nagari, District Dhamtari in Civil Suit No.34-A/2008 (Banshilal and others vs. Mohammad Javed Ahmad and others) by which the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs. 2. The names of the parties have been described as per their description in the suit. 3. The facts as reflected from record are that the plaintiffs have filed a suit bearing Civil Suit No 34-A/2008 for declaration of title and permanent injunction with regard to suit property situated at village Mukundpur, Patwahi Halka No.8, RNM Sihava, Tahsil Nagari, District Dhamtari bearing Khasra No. 542, 543, 544 and 545 area 0.10, 0.10, 0.02 and 0.03 respectively total 0.25 RA was recorded in the name of Shakil Ahmed who was father of the defendants No.1 and 2. The said suit property was sold orally by Shakil Ahmad to Budhram who was father of plaintiffs on 11-6-1978 and acknowledgement receipt was also received which is related to one portion of the suit property area .02 decimal and the remaining portion of the suit property was sold by Masood Ahmad with consent of his brother in favour of the plaintiffs and possession has already been given in the year 1978. It was assured that the registration of the sale deed will be done when all the brothers are present within one year but the sale deed has not been executed till the plaintiffs’ father expired. It has also been contended that in the suit property the plaintiffs have already constructed the house and kitchen garden and they are in possession of the suit property for the last 25 years. It has also been contended that the suit property was recorded in the name of Maksud and as the sale deed has not been executed within one year since 1978, but they are in possession of property, as such as per principle of adverse possession, they became property holder of the suit property. It has also been contended that the suit property was recorded in the name of Maksud and as the sale deed has not been executed within one year since 1978, but they are in possession of property, as such as per principle of adverse possession, they became property holder of the suit property. It has also been contended that this fact was known to Masood Ahmad and for more than 12 years, the possession of the property was within the knowledge of the defendants’ father, as such they became owner of the property. It has also been contended that the plaintiffs’ father died prior to 10-12 years and during life time late Budhram has already done oral partition between his son and the possession has been given to the plaintiffs as per the details given in the cause title. Since the plaintiffs are in possession of the property and as per the principle of adverse possession, they became title holder over the property. As such, the suit has been filed for claiming the decree of possession on account of adverse possession and also prayed for grant of permanent injunction by restraining the defendants in interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property. 4. Defendant No.1 has filed written statement as well as counter claim also. It is specifically denied that the defendants’ father sold the property orally to the plaintiffs on 11-6-1978. It has also been denied that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property after sale and it is also denied that no assurance was given to the plaintiffs that the property will be registered after getting consent of all the brothers within one year. It is emphatically denied that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property through his father or themselves since 1978. It has also been contended that the defendants have done demarcation proceedings wherein it was found that for the last few months, the plaintiffs are in illegal possession. In the year 2000 some legal construction was carried out by the plaintiffs in the suit property which was objected in the Panchayat and after interference of Panchayat, the said construction was stopped. It is also denied that the plaintiffs have constructed the house or Badi and they are in possession of the property for the last 25 years. It has also been denied that there was partition between the plaintiffs. It is also denied that the plaintiffs have constructed the house or Badi and they are in possession of the property for the last 25 years. It has also been denied that there was partition between the plaintiffs. It is also contended that the plaintiffs cannot take the plea of adverse possession as plaintiffs are denying the title of the defendants on the pretext that they are in possession of the property as they have purchased the suit property through oral sale which is not permissible under law and would pray for dismissal of the suit. It has also been contended that the plaintiffs are in illegal possession of the suit property for the last three years. 5. The defendants have also filed counter claim contending that on the basis of adverse possession the plaintiffs cannot claim any title over suit property and for that declaration cannot be granted. The defendants have also claimed that the plaintiffs are not entitled to get decree of possession on the count of adverse possession. 6. The plaintiffs have filed written statement to the counter claim denying the allegations. The defendants have also claimed that the plaintiffs are not entitled to get decree of possession on the count of adverse possession. 6. The plaintiffs have filed written statement to the counter claim denying the allegations. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court has framed as many as ten issues which are extracted as under:- ¼1½ D;k elwn vgen [kku us fookfnr Hkwfe 0-28 fMl0 dks oknhx.k ds firk Lo- cq/kjke dks ekSf[kd foØ; dj vfHkLohd`fr i= fu"ikfnr fd;k Fkk\ ¼2½ D;k elwn vgen [kku us viuh 'ks"k Hkwfe dks vU; HkkbZ;ksa dh lgefr ls oknhx.k ds ikl foØ; dj o"kZ 1978 ds iwoZ gh dCtk lkSai pqdk gS\ ¼3½ D;k oknhx.k ds firk Lo- cq/kjke fookfnr Hkwfe esa o"kZ 1979 ls yxkrkj 12 o"kZ rd dCtk gksus ds dkj.k fojks/kh LoRo izkIr dj pqdk Fkk mldh e`R;q i'pkr~ oknhx.k Lokeh gks x;s gSa\ ¼4½ D;k oknhx.k LfkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ikus ds vf/kdkjh gS\ ¼5½ lgk;rk ,oa okn O;;\ ¼6½ D;k izfroknh bl vk'k; dh ?kks"k.kk izkIr djus dh vf/kdkjh gS fd okn xzLr Hkwfe xzke eqdwaniqj i-g-ua- 8 rglhy uxjh dh [kljk ua- 542 jdck 0-15 fMlehy esa ca'khyky dk rFkk [kljk uacj 542 jdck 0-15 fMl0 ,oa [kljk uacj 545 jdck 5-68 oxZehVj esa c`tyky dk] rFkk [kljk uacj 544 jdck 0-18 fMl0 rFkk [kljk ua- 543 jdck 1-36 oxZ ehVj esa yfyr dk] [kljk uacj 543 jdck 0-14 fMl0 ij jkeyky dk voS/k dCtk gSA rFkk izfrdwy dCtk ds vk/kkj ij oknhx.k dks dksbZ LoRo izkIr ugha gksrk gSA ¼7½ D;k izfroknh] oknxzLr Hkwfe [kljk ua- 542] 543] 544] 545 jdck Øe'k% 0-15] 0-15 fMl0] 568 oxZehVj] 0-18 fMl0] 936 oxZ ehVj] 0-14 fMl0] esa oknh }kjk gLr{ksi fd;s tkus ls fu"ksf/kr fd;s tkus gsrq LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk dh vkKIrh izkIr djus dh vf/kdkjh gSA ¼8½ D;k izfroknh oknhx.k ls okn xzLr Hkwfe fLFkr xzke eqdwaniqj [kljk ua- 542] 543] 544 ,oa 545 dk dCtk izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ¼9½ D;k izfroknh dk izfrnkok vof/k ckg; gSA ¼10½ D;k izfroknh us izfrnkok dk eqY;kadu de dj de U;k; 'kqYd pLik fd;k gSA ftlds vk/kkj ij izfrnkok lapkyuh; ugha gSA 7. Plaintiffs to substantiate their case have examined Banshilal (PW/1), Shrawan Kumar (PW/2), Ramdayal (PW/3) and exhibited the documents Kistbandi Katauni (Ex.P/1) and Khasra Panchsala (Ex.P/2). 8. Plaintiffs to substantiate their case have examined Banshilal (PW/1), Shrawan Kumar (PW/2), Ramdayal (PW/3) and exhibited the documents Kistbandi Katauni (Ex.P/1) and Khasra Panchsala (Ex.P/2). 8. The defendants to substantiate their case have examined Shakil Ahmad (DW/1) and Mansoor Ahmad (DW/2) and exhibited documents B-1 (Ex.D/1), Map (Ex.D/2), Map (Ex.D/3), Khasra Panchsala (Ex. D/4 to D/5), Kistbandi Katauni (Ex.D/6), Map (Ex.7 & 8) and Khasra Panchsala (Ex.D/9). 9. PW/1 Banshilal was cross examined wherein he has admitted that the suit property was recorded in the name of Shakil Ahmad in the year 2002. He has also admitted that no objection has been taken in the revenue court about recording the name of Shakil Ahmad. He has also admitted that he has submitted objection which has not been produced before this court. He has also admitted that the decision which has been taken in the revenue court, a copy thereof is also not produced in this case. He has also stated that he is not known to all the brother of Shakil Ahmad. He has also admitted that he has not made Mansoor Ahmad as party to this case. He has also admitted that after recording the name of Shakil Ahmad he has filed a suit and prior to it he has not filed any suit. This witness has stated that in the court of Sub Divisional Magistrate and Collector, the cases were proceeded but he has admitted that he has not produced copy of the order. He has also admitted that Kistbandi Katauni (Ex.D/1) for the year 2002-2003 was recorded in the name of Shakil Ahmad and their names have not been recorded and possession is also not recorded in the revenue records. It is also admitted that Khasra Panchsala for the year 2002-2003 which has been produced in the column of possession, name of Shakil Ahmad has been recorded. He has also admitted that they are in possession over the suit property but no document from Gram Panchayat or Sabha has been produced in this case. 10. PW/2 Shrawan Kumar, Ex. Sarpanch of village Mukundpur has also been cross examined. He has stated that he cannot say that the land in which four persons have constructed the house, belongs to whom. He has also admitted that he has not seen any Patwari record. 10. PW/2 Shrawan Kumar, Ex. Sarpanch of village Mukundpur has also been cross examined. He has stated that he cannot say that the land in which four persons have constructed the house, belongs to whom. He has also admitted that he has not seen any Patwari record. He has also admitted that Patwari has not given any document (Ex.D/1) and Khasra Panchsala as they have also not demanded any document. This witness has admitted that how four persons have acquired the land, is not known to him, but he has admitted that the old persons are saying that they have purchased the property after coming from Dudhava, but how they have purchased property and from whom, they have purchased, is not known to him. 11. PW/3 Ramdayal who in his cross-examination has admitted that he has not produced any certificate from Gram Sabha or Gram Panchayat regarding construction of house in the suit property. He has also admitted that in the revenue record of suit property his name has not been recorded and he has also admitted that in the revenue records his name has not been recorded. He has admitted that in the year 2002 the name of Shakil Ahmad has been recorded and prior to it his brothers’ names were recorded in the revenue records. He has also admitted that he has not raised any objection about recording the name of Shakil Ahmad in the revenue records. He has also admitted that he has not produced any objection before the Tahsildar but he stated that written objection was submitted before the Patwari. 12. DW/1 Shakil Ahmad in examination-in-chief has reiterated the stand taken in the written statement. This witness was cross examined by the plaintiffs wherein he has stated that it is denied that the plaintiffs have taken possession of 62 decimal of land. It is true that information regarding possession was received by him in the year 2000. He has admitted that when demarcation was done, prior to it he was not aware about the possession of the plaintiffs. He has also admitted that the plaintiffs started digging of plinth before two months of demarcation. He has also admitted that when demarcation was done, at that time all the plaintiffs were present. He has denied that the plaintiffs have purchased the suit property. He has also admitted that the plaintiffs started digging of plinth before two months of demarcation. He has also admitted that when demarcation was done, at that time all the plaintiffs were present. He has denied that the plaintiffs have purchased the suit property. He has also denied that the plaintiffs are aware of the information for the last 20 to 25 years. 13. DW/2 Mansoor Ahmad in examination-in-chief has supported the case of the defendants. This witness was cross examined by the plaintiffs wherein he has denied that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property and they have constructed the house. This witness has voluntarily stated that when the demarcation was done in the year 2005 it was revealed to them that the possession of the land has been taken by them. He has also admitted that the defendant Shakil Ahmad was doing agricultural work on the said land. He has also stated that after partition he has also gone to the partition land. He has also stated that whenever he comes to Mukundpur he has seen that land and before demarcation the house was not constructed there and the land was vacant. He has also stated that he is not aware whether his elder brother has sold the property to the plaintiffs’ father and they have not executed the sale deed. He has voluntarily stated that if suit property is sold, then how it can fall within their share. He has denied that the ancestors of the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property when Godava dam was constructed and also denied that the plaintiffs’ house has been constructed in the suit property before demarcation. 14. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence, material on record, has dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 22-2-2010 by deciding issue No.1 to 4 against the plaintiffs and allowing the counter claim of defendant by deciding issue Nos. 6, 7 & 8 in favour of the defendant No. 1. Learned trial Court while deciding issue Nos. 1 and 2 has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs have not produced any documents regarding sale. As such, issues No. 1 and 2 have been decided against the plaintiffs. 6, 7 & 8 in favour of the defendant No. 1. Learned trial Court while deciding issue Nos. 1 and 2 has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs have not produced any documents regarding sale. As such, issues No. 1 and 2 have been decided against the plaintiffs. While deciding issue No.3 and 4, the trial court has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs have claimed title over the suit property on the basis of adverse possession and to decide the said issue, it has to be seen whether plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property for last 12 years then only the plaintiffs can acquire the title otherwise not. To ascertain this issue, the trial court has appreciated the evidence, material placed on record and has given finding that onus of proof lies upon the plaintiffs that they are in possession of the property for the last 55 – 56 years and the plaintiffs have claimed possession over the suit property on account of purchase by them but no documentary evidence has been placed on record to show that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property since 1955 – 1956 years and also have purchased the property in the year 1978. It has also recorded its finding that from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, it is not clear that since long they are in possession of the suit property, in the present suit, the plaintiffs have brought no such evidence to record the findings when the plaintiffs have taken this possession in the suit property. Accordingly, issue No.3 is decided against the plaintiffs and decided issues No 6 & 7 in favour of the defendant No. 1. While deciding issue No. 9 and 10, it has been decided in negative. While deciding issue No. 8, learned trial court has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs have admitted that they are in possession of the suit property, as such it is illegal possession as defendant No.1 is the title holder of the suit property and has wrongly encroached, therefore, defendant No.1 is entitled to get suit property and accordingly, issue No.8 has been decided in favour of the defendant No. 1. The learned trial Court after considering the entire evidence has dismissed the suit and allowed the counter claim filed by the defendants and also directed the plaintiffs to remove the illegal encroachment and to give possession of the suit property. This order is being assailed by the plaintiffs by filing the appeal before the learned District Judge and the learned District Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal on the count of delay of 57 days vide its judgment and decree dated 14-3-2013. The said order was challenged before this court by filing Second Appeal No.331 of 2013. The second appeal was allowed by this court on 2-9-2016 and the learned First Appellate Court was directed to decide the appeal on merit. Thereafter, the First Appeal was decided by the learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 18-8-2017. 15. Learned First Appellate Court while deciding the appeal has recorded its finding in paragraph 15 of the judgment that to get the decree of title on account of adverse possession, it is necessary that the plaintiffs’ knowledge about possession of the suit property should be known to the land owner still it is continued without any objection or hindrance. The plaintiffs have failed to prove its continuity. Learned trial Court has also decided the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC filed by the plaintiffs which are the orders of Naib Tahsildar and Sub Divisional Officer, Nagari and Collector, Dhamtari, according to which the application filed by the defendant No.1 for encroachment under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh land Revenue Code has been rejected. As such, from that document also, it is not clear whether adverse possession has been granted to the plaintiffs/appellants and accordingly it has rejected the appeal. This judgment and decree was assailed before this Court by filing Second Appeal. This court before admission has stayed the judgment and decree. 16. As such, from that document also, it is not clear whether adverse possession has been granted to the plaintiffs/appellants and accordingly it has rejected the appeal. This judgment and decree was assailed before this Court by filing Second Appeal. This court before admission has stayed the judgment and decree. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants reiterating the factual position would submit that the learned courts below have not taken into consideration the demarcation dated 21-6-2002, Panchnama dated 9-6-2022 prepared by the Revenue Inspector and receipt of house tax dated 15/03/1990, certificate issued by the Sarpanch dated 2-1-2007, electricity bill dated 3-7-1991 in the name of Banshilal and information dated 16-8-2011 received by Banshilal from the Junior Engineer, CSPDCL and certificate dated 23-1-2017 issued by Sarpanch explaining that since last 50 years, Banshilal and others are residing in his house and would submit that judgment and decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Court be set aside. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants would submit that both the courts below have rightly dismissed the suit as the plaintiffs are unable to prove that the defendants are having knowledge for more than 12 years regarding the possession of the suit property by the plaintiffs. She would further submit that the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is in conformity with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M. Siddique (died) through Lrs. vs. Mahant Suresh Das and others (Civil Appeal No. 10866-10867) decided on 9-11-2019 and also the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Venugopal Padyachi (dead) through Lrs vs. V. Pichaikaran (dead) through Lrs (Civil Appeal No. 4985/2010) decided on 18-9-2018. 18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the courts below with utmost satisfaction. 19. From the evidence, material placed on record, it is well settled position of law that for claiming decree of title on account of adverse possession, the following conditions as enumerated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Government of Kerala and others vs. Joseph and others (Civil Appeal No 3142 of 2010 decided on 9-8-2023) should have been fulfilled by the plaintiffs. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "20. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "20. The principle of adverse possession has been defined by the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold [1907] A.C. 73 in the following terms: It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of the owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. 21. Before proceeding to do so, it is essential to take note of the law governing such a claim. After a perusal and consideration of various judgements rendered by this Court, the following principles can be observed: 21.1. Possession must be open, clear, continuous and hostile to the claim or possession of the other party; all three classic requirements must coexist- nec vi, i.e., adequate in continuity; nec clam, i.e., adequate in publicity; and nec precario, i.e., adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and knowledge; (a) In Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna MANU/PR/0007/1900, the Privy Council held that- The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. (b) Further, the Council Maharaja Sri Chandra Nandi v. Baijnath Jugal Kishore MANU/PR/0010/1934 : AIR 1935 PC 36 observed-:- It is sufficient that the possession should be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening. (c) A Bench of three judges of this Court in Parsinni v. Sukhi MANU/SC/0575/1993 : (1993) 4 SCC 375 held that Party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession must be 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario' i.e. peaceful, open and continuous The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. (d) In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. (d) In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (two-Judge Bench) MANU/SC/0377/2004 : (2004) 10 SCC 779 it was held: It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. This case was relied on in the case of M. Venkatesh v. Bangalore Development Authority MANU/SC/1081/2015: (2015) 17 SCC 1 (three-Judge Bench), Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur MANU/SC/1053/2019 : (2019) 8 SCC 729 (three-Judge Bench). (e) This Court in a recent case of M. Siddiq (D) through L.Rs. v. Mahant Suresh Das and Ors. MANU/SC/1538/2019 : (2020) 1 SCC 1 (five-Judge Bench) reiterated this principle as under - 748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous - possession which meets the requirement of being 'nec vi nec claim and nec precario'. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. 21.8 A plea of adverse possession must be pleaded with proper particulars, such as, when the possession became adverse. The court is not to travel beyond pleading to give any relief, in other words, the plea must stand on its own two feet. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. 21.8 A plea of adverse possession must be pleaded with proper particulars, such as, when the possession became adverse. The court is not to travel beyond pleading to give any relief, in other words, the plea must stand on its own two feet. This Court has held this in the case of V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava MANU/SC/1057/2003: (2004) 1 SCC 551 (two-Judge Bench): ...A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal… It has also been held in the case of State of Uttrakhand v. Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj MANU/SC/1180/2017: (2017) 9 SCC 579 (two-Judge Bench): ...The courts below also should have seen that courts can grant only that relief which is claimed by the Plaintiff in the plaint and such relief can be granted only on the pleadings but not beyond it. In other words, courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings for granting any relief… Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj (supra) was relied on in Dharampal (Dead) v. Punjab Wakf Board MANU/SC/1204/2017: (2018) 11 SCC 449 (two-Judge Bench) on the same principle. 21.9 Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas. The case of Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil Balwant MANU/SC/0172/1995 : (1995) 2 SCC 543 (two-Judge Bench) elaborated this principle as: 5. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. This principle was upheld in the case of Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar MANU/SC/1039/1996 : (1996) 1 SCC 639 (two-Judge Bench) - 4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. This principle was upheld in the case of Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar MANU/SC/1039/1996 : (1996) 1 SCC 639 (two-Judge Bench) - 4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transfer of bis indessin title of interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the Appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the Appellant. The Court in Uttam Chand (supra) has reiterated this principle of adverse possession. 21.10 Burden of proof rests on the person claiming adverse possession. This Court, in PT Munichikkanna Reddy v Revamma MANU/SC/7325/2007: (2007) 6 SCC 59 (two-Judge Bench), it held that initially the burden lied on the landowner to prove his title and title. Thereafter it shifts on the other party to prove title by adverse possession. It was observed: 34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the Plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned: once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession.…" 20. The record of the case would clearly demonstrate, particularly in cross examination of PW/1 Banshilal wherein he has admitted that the suit property was recorded in the name of Shakil Ahmad in the year 2002. He has also admitted that no objection has been taken in the revenue court about recording the name of Shakil Ahmad. The record of the case would clearly demonstrate, particularly in cross examination of PW/1 Banshilal wherein he has admitted that the suit property was recorded in the name of Shakil Ahmad in the year 2002. He has also admitted that no objection has been taken in the revenue court about recording the name of Shakil Ahmad. He has also admitted that he has submitted objection which has not been produced before this court. He has also admitted that the decision which has been taken in the revenue court, a copy thereof is also not produced in this case. He has also stated that he is not known to all the brother of Shakil Ahmad. He has also admitted that he has not made Mansoor Ahmad as party to this case. He has also admitted that after recording the name of Shakil Ahmad he has filed a suit and prior to it he has not filed any suit. This witness has stated that in the court of Sub Divisional Magistrate and Collector, the cases were proceeded but he has admitted that he has not produced copy of the order. He has also admitted that Kistbandi Katauni (Ex.D/1) for the year 2002-2003 was recorded in the name of Shakil Ahmad and their names have not been recorded and possession is also not recorded in the revenue records. It is also admitted that Khasra Panchsala for the year 2002-2003 which has been produced in the column of possession, name of Shakil Ahmad has been recorded. He has also admitted that they are in possession over the suit property but no document from Gram Panchayat or Sabha has been produced in this case. 21. Thus, after appreciating these facts, learned trial court has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs are unable to prove the requirement of adverse possession and accordingly it has dismissed the suit. He has also admitted that they are in possession over the suit property but no document from Gram Panchayat or Sabha has been produced in this case. 21. Thus, after appreciating these facts, learned trial court has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs are unable to prove the requirement of adverse possession and accordingly it has dismissed the suit. After appreciating the facts on law the First Appellate Court has recorded its finding that the plaintiffs are unable to prove that they are in possession of the suit property even after knowledge of the plaintiffs for more than 12 years as the plaintiffs are claiming possession in the suit property on different stands i.e. on one pretext that the plaintiffs’ father had purchased the property in the year 1978 from the father of the defendants and since then they are in possession of suit property and on the other pretext they are taking stand that they are in possession of the suit property since 1955-1956 but no document with regard to actual date of possession of the suit property has been placed on record and the defendants in their evidence have categorically stated that the possession of the plaintiffs in the suit property was for the last two or three months prior to demarcation was done, as such the plaintiffs are also unable to prove that they are in possession of the suit property for the last 12 years and accordingly it has dismissed the appeal. 22. Learned First Appellate Court also while rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC has categorically recorded its finding that on the basis of these documents, it does not confer that the plaintiffs are in adverse possession of the suit property for more than 12 years. While rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, has recorded its finding that the Tahsildar in its order dated 27-5-2005 has recorded a finding that in the present situation the provisions of Section 250 of the CG Land Revenue Code are not attracted as it is alleged that the plaintiffs have constructed the house in the suit property and accordingly it has rejected the application. These orders have been assailed before the Sub Divisional Officer, Nagari on 5-12-2005 and 30-10-2006 wherein it has been affirmed but it does not decide the ingredients of adverse possession. These orders have been assailed before the Sub Divisional Officer, Nagari on 5-12-2005 and 30-10-2006 wherein it has been affirmed but it does not decide the ingredients of adverse possession. Even otherwise, these documents are not such type of documents without which, the court below could not decide the issue properly. As such, these documents are not necessary and the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in not allowing the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. 23. From the above stated factual matrix, it is quite vivid that there is a finding of fact that the appellants/plaintiffs are unable to prove that they are in possession of the suit property for the last 12 years though the knowledge to the plaintiffs. Both thee Courts below have rightly passed the judgment and decree, as such no substantial question of law is involved. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for admitting the appeal as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Kerala and others vs. Joseph and others (supra) wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "8. For an appeal to be maintainable Under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC', for brevity) it must fulfil certain well-established requirements. The primary and most important of them all is that the appeal should pose a substantial question of law. The sort of question that qualifies this criterion has been time and again reiterated by this Court. We may only refer to Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari MANU/SC/0091/2001 : (2001) 3 SCC 179 (three-Judge Bench) wherein this Court observed as follows: 12. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, Important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law by suffixing the words "of general Importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law by suffixing the words "of general Importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. 14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis (Emphasis supplied) The principles laid down herein stood recently reiterated in Chandrabhan v. Saraswati MANU/SC/1224/2022 (two-Judge Bench). 9. A perusal of the judgement impugned does not reflect any question of law, either substantial or "involving in the case" to have been framed by the Court in the Second Appeal. The Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction is not akin to the Jurisdiction conferred Under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure wherein it is open for the Court to consider both questions of fact and law. The Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction is not akin to the Jurisdiction conferred Under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure wherein it is open for the Court to consider both questions of fact and law. This jurisdiction is exercisable only when the Court is convinced that the dispute at hand involves a substantial question of law, and proceeding under this jurisdiction sans framing questions of such nature renders the proceedings to be "patently illegal." [Umerkhan v. Bismillabi MANU/SC/864/2011 / (2011) 9 SCC 684 (two-Judge Bench) 10. Recently, a Bench of two learned Judges in Singaram v. Ramanathan, held as under: This is undoubtedly subject to various well known exceptions which, however, cannot permit the Second Appellate Court to interfere with the findings of fact as a matter of course. Such restrictions are placed on the High Court in order that there is finality to litigation at a particular level in the hierarchy of Courts. The limitation on the exercise of power by the High Court in the Second Appeal interfering with the judgment of the First Appellate Court is premised on high public policy. This limitation is sought to be secured by insisting upon the requirement that a Second Appeal is considered only when there is a substantial question of law. Therefore, the existence of substantial question of law and the judgment which revolves around answering the substantial questions of law are not mere formalities. They are meant to be adhered to. (Emphasis supplied) 24. In view of the well settled position of law, I do not find any substantial question of law involved in this petition. Accordingly, the instant second appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 25. Interim order passed earlier by this court on 21-9-2017 stands vacated. 26. A decree be drawn up accordingly.