JUDGMENT : Kshitij Shailendra, J. 1. Heard Shri B.D. Pandey, holding brief of Shri Ashok Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for defendant-appellant and Ms. Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent No. 1. 2. A registered agreement for sale dated 03.12.1993 was executed in respect of agricultural land covered by Gata Nos. 547 and 574, measured differently, in between the plaintiff and the defendant. The period for executing the sale deed was agreed upon as one year from the date of agreement. After the said period expired, another registered agreement dated 06.12.1994 was executed in respect of the same property and, thereby too, the defendant agreed to sell the same in favour of the plaintiff, but when the latter did not adhere to the terms of the agreement and, despite notice issued by the plaintiff, sale deed was not executed by the defendant, Original Suit No. 324 of 1996 was instituted by respondent No. 1 claiming a decree for specific performance of registered agreement(s) with an alternative relief of refund of earnest money with interest. 3. The defence of defendant No. 1 (appellant) was that the agreement was not executed for selling the property, but it was a transaction of loan and a sum of Rs.41,000/- was given as loan amount to him, but the plaintiff fraudulently got the said agreement executed as an agreement for sale. 4. The trial court found force in the defence of the defendant as regards the nature of transaction and held that it was an understanding about loan. While reaching to the said conclusion, the trial court referred to different portions of cross-examination of PW-1 much emphasising on that portion of the said cross-examination, in which the plaintiff had stated that interest at the rate of Rs.20/-per Rs.1000/- was agreed upon between the parties. With the said finding, coupled with observation that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the sale deed executed as he was a labourer and stated in his oral testimony that he used to earn meagre wages and all his earnings were deposited by him in the bank, the trial court arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. It, however, vide judgment and decree dated 02.05.2009, decreed the suit for alternative relief directing the defendant to refund a sum of Rs.75,000/- along with 10% interest to the plaintiff. 5. It, however, vide judgment and decree dated 02.05.2009, decreed the suit for alternative relief directing the defendant to refund a sum of Rs.75,000/- along with 10% interest to the plaintiff. 5. Two appeals were preferred against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. While Civil Appeal No. 31 of 2009 was filed by the plaintiff being aggrieved by non-grant of decree for specific performance of the agreement(s), Civil Appeal, being Cross Appeal No. 65 of 2015, was filed by the defendant No. 1(appellant) being aggrieved by the decree of refund of money. 6. The first Appellate Court has allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and dismissed the cross appeal filed by the defendant. It has recorded in the judgment that the defence of defendant No. 1 stating the agreement as a transaction for loan and that he had returned the sum taken from the plaintiff in December, 1995, could not stand substantiated by any oral or documentary evidence. The Appellate Court elaborately dealt with the said defence and also observed that had the defendant returned the amount taken from the plaintiff, he would have taken steps to get the agreement cancelled, but no such step was taken by him. It also recorded that though, according to the defendant, there was a written document executed as regards refund of money, but the same was not filed by him. Accordingly, adverse inference was drawn by the lower Appellate Court against the defendant-appellant. 7. The Appellate Court also noted the defence of the defendant that in the event of execution of sale deed, he would suffer hardship. While discussing the said aspect, the Appellate Court observed that when the plaintiff, apprehending execution of a sale deed by the defendant in teeth of the agreement(s), moved an application and affidavit during the pendency of appeal and sought stay against alienation, the defendant-appellant filed objections paper No. 12-C supported by affidavit paper No. 13-C giving an undertaking that he would never sell the property as the same was the only means for his livelihood. For this reason, no injunction was granted by the Appellate Court against the sale. For this reason, no injunction was granted by the Appellate Court against the sale. The Appellate Court has observed that during the pendency of the appeal, present appellant executed a registered sale deed dated 25.07.2012 in favour of one Guddu (respondent No.2) in respect of 1/8th share in Arazi No. 574 and, therefore, the conduct of the defendant was sufficient to exercise discretion against him as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the Appellate Court has not reversed the findings recorded by the trial court as regards the transaction itself, particularly, when PW-1 himself stated that interest was agreed upon between the parties in relation to the transaction. He, however, admits that sale deed was executed by the appellant during the pendency of appeal but contends that though the agreement was executed in relation to the properties covered by Gata Nos. 547 and 574, only part of Gata No. 574 had been sold out. He also submits that the finding on readiness and willingness has also not been reversed by the Appellate Court and decree for specific performance has been illegally drawn. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the contesting-respondent argues that the conduct of the defendant is apparent on the face of the record. First, he did not cross-examine the remaining witnesses produced by the plaintiff's side, secondly, he did not file any documentary evidence to establish that amount was ever returned to the plaintiff, thirdly, he executed the sale deed violating the undertaking given by him before the Court and, lastly, that the Appellate Court has dealt with the documentary evidence, whereby the plaintiff had ensured his attendance in the Sub-Registrar's office awaiting presence of the defendant as regards execution of sale deed. She further submits that only a very tiny part of the lengthy cross examination of PW-1 has been referred to by the trial court and the entire statement has not been considered, in which, throughout, the transaction in between the parties was stated to be that of an agreement for sale. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the Court finds that in a suit for specific performance of a registered agreement for sale, mainly three things are important. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the Court finds that in a suit for specific performance of a registered agreement for sale, mainly three things are important. First, that the document has to be a registered one, secondly, the plaintiff has to establish that he was ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and, thirdly, the discretion under section 20 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 considering conduct of parties and hardship, if any, to be suffered by the defendant. 11. As regards the agreement, there is no dispute that there were two agreements and both were registered. As regards readiness and willingness, the oral and documentary evidence discussed by the lower Appellate Court is quite satisfactory and this Court finds that the trial court simply, by quoting few lines from the cross-examination of PW-1, arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. As regards discretion, it has already been observed that two pleas were raised by the defendant, one as regards nature of transaction as a loan agreement, which he could not prove either by oral or by documentary evidence and secondly, that the amount taken from the plaintiff was ever returned by the defendant which too he failed to prove. The most important aspect is the defence of hardship, which the Appellate Court has dealt with in relation to execution of sale deed dated 25.07.2012 in favour of defendant No. 2 despite giving an undertaking before the Court that the defendant would never sell the property. 12. Even accepting the submission of appellant that at one place in the cross-examination, PW-1 had stated that interest at the rate of Rs.20/-per Rs.1000/- was agreed upon between the parties, the said situation would not go adverse to the plaintiff for two reasons. First, that the entire statement has to be read as a whole and the court is never justified to tear out one line from the lengthy statement of a witness to arrive at a conclusion. Secondly, so far as admissibility of oral evidence as regards terms of a contract, reference to Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is required to be made. The provisions are reproduced as under : “91. Secondly, so far as admissibility of oral evidence as regards terms of a contract, reference to Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is required to be made. The provisions are reproduced as under : “91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other disposition of property reduced to form of document-When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions herein-before contained.” ...………….. 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from, its terms : Proviso (1). -Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. Proviso (2). -The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document. Proviso (3). -The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved. Proviso (4). In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document. Proviso (3). -The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved. Proviso (4). -The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents. Proviso (5). -Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved :Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract. Proviso (6). -Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. 13. The question of exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence came up for consideration before Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Smt. Gangabail W/o Rambilas Gilda vs. Smt. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (1982 ) 1 SCC 4, and Roop Kumar vs. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595 . In Roop Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court was seized of an appeal filed by the defendant arising out of a suit for possession and for rendition of accounts. The plaintiff claimed that he entered into an agency-cum-deed of license with the appellant-defendant on 15.5.1975 and the terms of such agency-cum-licensing agreement were incorporated in an agreement dated 15.5.1975. The stand of the defendant was that he was in lawful possession as a tenant under the plaintiff. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the transaction between the respondent and the appellant evidenced by the agreement dated 15.5.1975 amounts to license and not subletting. The question was whether relationship between the parties was that of a licensor and licensee or that of a lessor and lessee. The first appeal was dismissed by the High Court. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the transaction between the respondent and the appellant evidenced by the agreement dated 15.5.1975 amounts to license and not subletting. The question was whether relationship between the parties was that of a licensor and licensee or that of a lessor and lessee. The first appeal was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that it is general and most inflexible rule that in respect of written instruments, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them. It was held that section 91 is concerned with the mode of proof of a document with limitation imposed by Section 92 and if after the document has been produced to prove its terms under section 91, provisions of section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. It was further observed that wherever written instruments are executed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It is of principle because such instruments are in their own nature and origin, entitled to a much higher degree of credit than oral evidence. It is of policy because it would be attended with great mischief if those instruments, upon which men's rights depended, were liable to be impeached by loose collateral evidence. The aforesaid judgments have been reconsidered by the Supreme Court in the case of Placido Fransisco Pinto (D) by LRs and another vs. Jose Francisco Pinto and another, 2021 (2) ARC 40 (SC). 14. The aforesaid judgments have been reconsidered by the Supreme Court in the case of Placido Fransisco Pinto (D) by LRs and another vs. Jose Francisco Pinto and another, 2021 (2) ARC 40 (SC). 14. In the present case, though in the written statement, the defendant-appellant took a plea that transaction in between the parties was with regard to taking of loan and a case was sought to be developed as if fraud had been committed with the defendant about which he came to know after institution of the suit, there is nothing on record that such a plea was sufficiently proved by the defendant by leading cogent evidence, particularly, when no documentary evidence was filed as regards return of money to the plaintiff, if, at all, his bald assertion as regards financial assistance is to be accepted. Further, if execution of the agreement(s) was fraudulent or a deceiving act rendering the documents as void/voidable/invalid, nothing precluded the defendant-appellant from either instituting a separate suit seeking such declaration from the Civil Court nor did he prefer any counter claim in the present suit. Mere filing of civil appeal/cross appeal by the defendant being aggrieved by the decree of refund of money would not suffice taking aid of proviso attached to Section 92 of the Evidence Act which, when read with Sections 92 and 91 in toto with the material on record of the case in hand, would not come for rescue of the defendant appellant. 15. During the course of hearing, copies of both the agreements were placed before the Court, from perusal whereof, the Court does not find even a single word, by which it can be inferred that transaction between the parties was a transaction of loan; rather both the documents, in so many words, clearly infer that these were executed as pure agreements for sale of the agricultural land. 16. Last submission of learned counsel for the appellant that entire property covered by agreements or suit itself has not been sold, but only part thereof has been sold, also does not appeal to the Court for the reason that the agreement was in relation to 1/8th share in Gata No. 574 and the entire 1/8th has been sold to defendant No. 2. Irrespective of the fact that Gata No. 547 has or has not been sold, the same would not be read a circumstance in favour of the defendant or against the plaintiff. The defence of hardship stands washed off with execution of sale deed dated 25.07.2012 by the appellant in favour of defendant No. 2 and discretion to pass a decree against him emerges from the sale that was made in violation of the undertaking given by him on oath before the Appellate Court. As far as sale deed dated 25.07.2012, the same is clearly hit by the doctrine of lis pendens covered by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any good ground to interfere with the order of Appellate Court or to upset the findings of fact recorded by it. No substantial question of law arises for consideration by this Court. 18. Second appeal has no force and is, accordingly, dismissed. 19. The decree shall be executed forthwith positively by the end of this year, i.e. 2024.