ORDER : Nupur Bhati, J. 1. The instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner firm, who is involved in the business of cutting and processing the marble tiles. The petitioner was having electricity connection of 88 HP. On 24.07.2003, the factory premises of the petitioner was inspected, wherein certain irregularities were pointed out by the Inspection Team and the inspection report dated 24.07.2003 (Annex.1) was prepared. On the very next day, the team inspected the factory premises of the petitioner and certain readings were taken and a note in this regard was prepared. The representative of the petitioner firm viz. Sh. Manish Jain was present during the inspection. It is stated in the writ petition that the respondents thereafter did not revert back to the petitioner for good three and half years and the petitioner was under the impression that there is nothing adverse against it. 2. On 22.11.2006, the petitioner received a notice (Annex.3) while indicating that on account of inspection conducted on 24.07.2003, the petitioner has been found committing theft of electricity and it is thus liable to pay Rs.4,10,399/- within seven days, else the electricity supply of the petitioner firm would be disconnected. The petitioner being aggrieved of the notice dated 22.11.2006 (Annex.3) has preferred this writ petition. 3. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition, along with which they have placed on record the assessment sheet (Annex.R/1) indicating therein the outstanding amount due against the petitioner, which is to the tune of Rs.4,10,399/-. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said assessment sheet is of 24.07.2003 and the impugned notice has been issued on 22.11.2006; thus the case of the petitioner is hit by sub-Section (2) of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (‘Act’), which inter-alia provided that the respondents cannot recover the arrear of charges of electricity, as it is not recoverable after a period of two years from the date, when such sum became first due and electricity supply could not be disconnected. He also submits that the assessment sheet dated 24.07.2003 (Annex.R/1) was never communicated to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned notice has been issued in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, as the petitioner has not been afforded opportunity of hearing prior to issuing of the impugned notice dated 22.11.2006. He also submits that the assessment sheet dated 24.07.2003 (Annex.R/1) was never communicated to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned notice has been issued in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, as the petitioner has not been afforded opportunity of hearing prior to issuing of the impugned notice dated 22.11.2006. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the respondents in their reply have taken a vague stand that due to oversight the demand could not be raised immediately. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus submits that there was delay in raising the demand, is reflected from their own reply. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently submits that as per the provisions of Section 56 (2) of the Act, the date of knowledge of outstanding amount is required to be considered and in the present case, the knowledge of outstanding amount that was due, is 22.11.2006 (Annex.3). He further submits that the respondents were well within their right to recover the arrear of charges of electricity supplied to the petitioner firm. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner’s contention that it had not been afforded the opportunity of hearing prior to issuance of notice dated 22.11.2006 is misconceived, inasmuch as the joint inspection was conducted in the presence of petitioner’s representative; on the basis of which the joint inspection report dated 25.07.2003 (Annex.2) was prepared, and the petitioner has not given challenge to the same. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner has not disputed the outstanding amount while submitting that the amount has wrongly been calculated and thus even if the petitioner would have been afforded opportunity of hearing, then too, it would not have served any purpose. He also submits that the inspection report dated 24.07.2003 (Annex.1) and joint inspection report dated 25.07.2003 (Annex.2) are having concurrent findings. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon judgment in the case of Assistant Engineer (D 1) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. Rahamatuulah Khan @ Rahamjulla : (2020) 4 SCC 650 and in the case of Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon judgment in the case of Assistant Engineer (D 1) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. Rahamatuulah Khan @ Rahamjulla : (2020) 4 SCC 650 and in the case of Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. : 2021 (4) CCC 277 and submits that in the light of judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prem Cottex (supra), wherein it has been held that electricity charges would become first due only after bill is issued to the consumer, and therefore, no interference to the impugned notice is called for. 7. I have considered the rival submissions made by counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record and the judgments cited at bar. 8. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner for the first time has been served with notice dated 22.11.2006 (Annex.3) demanding the outstanding amount to the tune of Rs.4,10,399/- and the petitioner was granted seven days’ time to deposit the aforesaid sum and aggrieved by issuance of the notice dated 22.11.2006, the petitioner had preferred the instant writ petition on 27.11.2006. 9. In the instant writ petition, a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 29.11.2006 had granted interim order while directing the respondents not to take any coercive action against the petitioner. 10. This fact cannot be denied that an outstanding amount is due came to the knowledge of the petitioner on 22.11.2006 and not by way of assessment sheet dated 24.07.2003 (Annex.R/1). Thus taking into consideration the provision of sub-Section (2) of Section 56 of the Act, the respondents can recover the sum due to the petitioner/consumer after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due. The counsel for the petitioner has also admitted during the course of arguments that the assessment sheet dated 24.07.2003 was never communicated to the petitioner and thus the date when such sum became first due, cannot be said to be 24.07.2003 and the first date, on which the petitioner has come to know of the outstanding amount due, undoubtedly is 22.11.2006 (Annex.3). Section 56 (2) of the Act reads as infra: “56 (Disconnection of supply in default of payment): -- (1) Where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity due from him to a licensee or the generating company in respect of supply, transmission or distribution or wheeling of electricity to him, the licensee or the generating company may, after giving not less than fifteen clear days’ notice in writing, to such person and without prejudice to his rights to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply of electricity and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line or other works being the property of such licensee or the generating company through which electricity may have been supplied, transmitted, distributed or wheeled and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply, are paid, but no longer: Provided that the supply of electricity shall not be cut off if such person deposits, under protest, - (a) an amount equal to the sum claimed from him, or b) the electricity charges due from him for each month calculated on the basis of average charge for electricity paid by him during the preceding six months, whichever is less, pending disposal of any dispute between him and the licensee. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity.” 11. The petitioner has not challenged the joint inspected report and has also not indicated anywhere in the writ petition that the outstanding amount calculated by the respondents is erroneous, thus the contention of the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was afforded prior to issuing of the notice dated 22.11.2006 (Annex.3) is misconceived. 12. The petitioner has not challenged the joint inspected report and has also not indicated anywhere in the writ petition that the outstanding amount calculated by the respondents is erroneous, thus the contention of the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was afforded prior to issuing of the notice dated 22.11.2006 (Annex.3) is misconceived. 12. Taking into consideration the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prem Cottex (supra), this Court also finds that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case held that though the liability to pay arises on the consumption of electricity, the obligation to pay would arise only when the bill is raised by the licensee and that, therefore, electricity charges would become “first due” only after the bill is issued, even though the liability would have arisen on consumption. The precise submission of the petitioner is that the date of knowledge of outstanding amount is 24.07.2003 and, therefore, on account of period of two years being over, the notice dated 22.11.2006 is bad and is in contravention to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 56 of the Act, however same is bereft of any force, inasmuch as the petitioner itself has admitted that the assessment sheet dated 24.07.2003 was never communicated to it and it came to know of the outstanding amount due only by way of impugned notice dated 22.11.2006 (Annex.3); and thus period of two years is required to be calculated w.e.f. 22.11.2006 and not 24.07.2003. 13. In view of above discussion, this Court does not find any force in the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed being devoid of any merit. Stay Petition also stands dismissed.