JUDGMENT : Vaibhavi D. Nanavati, J. 1. By way of the present petition under Article-226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner herein has prayed for the following reliefs: “(19) The petitioner, therefore, prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, direction or order: (A) Quashing and setting aside the order dt.24.7.2010 terminating the service of the petitioner as also the appellate order dt.9.10.2010, as also the order of dismissal dt. 21.10.99, and to reinstate the petitioner in service, with all benefits including back wages with 12% interest. (B) During the pendency and final disposal of this petition, the Respondent may be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service. (C) To grant such and further relief as may be deemed fit and proper.” 2. Heard Mr. P.A. Jadeja, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, learned advocate appearing for Nanavati Associates for the respondents. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present Petition reads thus: 3.1. The petitioner was appointed on 01.03.1978 as Shroff / godown Keeper by the respondent – Bank and had served, till the petitioner came to be dismissed from service by order dated 21.10.1999. On being convicted by the trial Court for the offences under Sections 506(2) and 332 of the Indian Penal Code by judgment dated 21.10.1999, the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1999 before the Sessions Court at Gondal, wherein, by an order dated 15.02.2001, the Sessions Court set aside the order passed by the Magistrate and remanded the matter back for de-novo trial. After de-novo trial, by judgment dated 14.10.2005, the Magistrate convicted the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 332, 323 and 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to various terms of imprisonment. 3.2. The petitioner herein preferred Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005 before the Sessions Court, Dhoraji. By an order dated 07.01.2010, the appeal came to be allowed and the petitioner herein came to be acquitted. 3.3. After the acquittal, the petitioner made representation on 27.01.2010 to the respondents requesting to reinstate him in service and pay all the benefits including wages. The petitioner herein preferred Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005 before the Sessions Court, Dhoraji. By an order dated 07.01.2010, the appeal came to be allowed and the petitioner herein came to be acquitted. 3.3. After the acquittal, the petitioner made representation on 27.01.2010 to the respondents requesting to reinstate him in service and pay all the benefits including wages. Since the petitioner was not reinstated in service, Special Civil Application No. 3850 of 2010 had been filed before this Court praying to review the order of the dismissal dated 21.10.1999 and to reinstate the petitioner in service. The said petition came to be disposed of by an order dated 04.05.2010, directing the respondents to decide the case of the petitioner for reinstatement within 12 weeks. The said order is duly produced at Annexure-E. 3.4. Instead of reinstating the petitioner in service, the respondent no.2 issued a show cause notice dated 01.07.2010 calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why his service should not be terminated in connection with the charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988. The Inquiry Report dated 30.06.2010 was also accompanied with the said notice. The petitioner replied to the said show cause notice on 13.07.2010. 3.5. After considering the reply, the respondent no.2 by order dated 24.07.2010 terminated the services of the petitioner, w.e.f. 21.10.1999, i.e. date of dismissal. 3.6. The petitioner preferred Appeal, challenging the said order before the appellate authority, which came to be dismissed by order dated 09.10.2010. 3.7. In view of the aforesaid, petitioner herein has approached this Court and prayed for the reliefs as stated herein above. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 4.1. Mr. P.A. Jadeja, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that pursuant to the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner by the respondent bank, charge-sheet came to be issued to the petitioner on 30.11.1988 for holding the departmental inquiry on the allegation that the petitioner misbehaved with one Shri S.A. Kanabar, Manager of Dhoraji branch of the respondent – Bank on 17.05.1988. The petitioner’s service came to be suspended by order dated 28.11.1988 in the said connection. Upon completing the said departmental inquiry, by order dated 14.10.1991, the punishment of stoppage of two increments with future effect was imposed. 4.2. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the petitioner’s services were terminated w.e.f. 21.10.1999. The petitioner’s service came to be suspended by order dated 28.11.1988 in the said connection. Upon completing the said departmental inquiry, by order dated 14.10.1991, the punishment of stoppage of two increments with future effect was imposed. 4.2. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the petitioner’s services were terminated w.e.f. 21.10.1999. The impugned order dated 24.07.2010 of termination with retrospective effect is null and void, since the petitioner was already dismissed from service as back as on 21.10.1999. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the petitioner was terminated in view of Clause-3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002. The order of termination is liable to be set aside on the ground that in respect of the same charge, the petitioner was imposed penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect by order dated 14.10.1991, after holding full-fledged departmental inquiry. Once the petitioner was imposed the penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect by said order, as a result of which, by charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988, it was not permissible for the respondents to hold fresh departmental inquiry. The penalty imposed, i.e. dismissal and termination is harsh, excessive, disproportionate having regard to 32 years of services. No valid reasons are given for terminating the services, though the reasons were given for dismissal, i.e. conviction by the trial court, which would fail into insignificance, the conviction having set aside. 4.3. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the order of termination is liable to be quashed and aside on the ground of delay. The charge-sheet is dated 30.11.1988 and the order of termination is dated 01.07.2010. The inquiry officer was appointed in the year 2010, who submitted his report on 30.06.2010 and as stated in the inquiry report itself that three important witnesses, viz. (1) Shri S.A. Kanabar, Branch Manager, (2) Shri J.A. Gandhi, Deputy Manager and (3) Shri P.R. Rachcha, Manager could not be examined as witnesses, since they had expired in the meantime, which caused great prejudice to the case of the petitioner. 4.4. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the petitioner had filed Civil Suit No. 267 of 1999 in the Civil Court, Jetpur challenging the order of dismissal dated 22.09.1999, which came to be withdrawn on 26.02.2010, as the petitioner was acquitted by the concerned Sessions Court. 4.4. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the petitioner had filed Civil Suit No. 267 of 1999 in the Civil Court, Jetpur challenging the order of dismissal dated 22.09.1999, which came to be withdrawn on 26.02.2010, as the petitioner was acquitted by the concerned Sessions Court. The petitioner had also filed Special Civil Application No. 3850 of 2010 praying for reinstatement, which came to be disposed of, on 04.05.2010. 4.5. Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate placed reliance on the following decisions : I. For the principle of res-judicata – (2006) 4 SCC 683 in the case of State of Karnataka V/s. All India Manufactures Organization. II. Doctrine of finality – (2002) 10 SCC 471 in the case of Union of India v/s. K.D. Pandey and 2011 (10) SCC 249 in the case of State Bank of India v/s. Ram Lal Bhaskar. III. Principle of Natural Justice and fairness – (1999) 4 SCC 10 in the case of Rattan Lal Sharma v/s. Managing Committee, Dr. Harim Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and (1994) AIR 1074 in the case of ECIL, Hyderabad v/s. B. Karunkar. IV. Abuse of process of law – (2014 SCC OnLine Guj. 7654 in the case of Rashikbhai J. Chaudhary v/s. State of Gujarat. V. Efficiency in Administration – (2006) 1 SCC 123 in the case of S.B.I. v/s. Rakesh Kumar Tewari and (1996) 6 SCC 417 in the case of State of Rajasthan v/s. B.K. Meena. 4.6. In light of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate submitted that the present petition be allowed. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS: 5.1. Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, learned advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner himself had preferred Petition being Special Civil Application No. 3850 of 2010, praying for a direction to review the earlier order of dismissal dated 21.10.1999 and for a further direction to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. Mr. Devnani, learned advocate submitted that vide order dated 04.05.2010, this Court had been pleased to direct the respondents to decide the case of the petitioner for reinstatement within 12 weeks from that date. Placing reliance on the said order, it was submitted that the respondent Bank initiated appropriate inquiry proceedings and more particularly, vide notice dated 01.06.2010, informed the petitioner about the aforesaid facts and circumstances and called upon the petitioner to remain present in the inquiry proceedings. 5.2. Placing reliance on the said order, it was submitted that the respondent Bank initiated appropriate inquiry proceedings and more particularly, vide notice dated 01.06.2010, informed the petitioner about the aforesaid facts and circumstances and called upon the petitioner to remain present in the inquiry proceedings. 5.2. It was submitted that the said inquiry proceedings were conducted, in view of the fact that earlier charge no.1 of the charge-sheet dated 30.11.1998 was not inquired into, during the earlier inquiry proceedings, in view of the fact that the criminal proceedings were pending against the petitioner. 5.3. It was submitted that the inquiry proceedings were held by the Inquiry Officer and detailed report of findings dated 30.06.2010 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority. The disciplinary authority after considering the same, issued a show cause notice dated 01.07.2010 to the petitioner and the inquiry report was also supplied thereto, to the petitioner calling upon the petitioner to make appropriate representation / reply to the same. It was submitted that vide reply dated 13.07.2010, petitioner denied the charges. 5.4. It was submitted that, after considering the same, the disciplinary authority on 24.07.2010, passed an order terminating the services of the petitioner. The said order was also confirmed by the Appellate Authority by order dated 09.10.2010 and the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 5.5. It was submitted that, the respondent-Bank has preferred the Criminal Revision Application No. 598 of 2010 before this court, challenging the order dated 07.01.2010 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005 by the Additional Sessions Judge & Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Gondal at Dhoraji, whereby, the petitioner was acquitted, the said proceedings are pending adjudication before this Court. It was submitted that, the petitioner is not honorably acquitted, but acquitted on the benefit of doubt. 5.6. It was submitted that, the inquiry held by the respondent-Bank is after following the due procedure of law and principles of natural justice and in the true spirit. All the documents relied upon by the respondent-Bank have been supplied to the petitioner. All the documents that were produced have never been objected to by the petitioner and / or his defence representative. It was submitted that, at any given point of time, petitioner has never requested to cross-examine the author of the concerned documents. It was submitted that the petitioner has even cross-examined the management witnesses. 5.7. All the documents that were produced have never been objected to by the petitioner and / or his defence representative. It was submitted that, at any given point of time, petitioner has never requested to cross-examine the author of the concerned documents. It was submitted that the petitioner has even cross-examined the management witnesses. 5.7. It was submitted that during the course of inquiry, petitioner has been found guilty of following charges : “(1) CSE had exhibited drunkennsess and/or riotous and or disorderly and/or indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank. (2) CSE had exhibited willful insubordination and/or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior. (3) CSE had done acts prejudicial to the interest of the bank, and/or gross negligence and/or negligence involving and/ or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.” 5.8. Placing reliance on the same, it was submitted that both the competent authorities have concurrently held against the petitioner and in view thereof, this Court may not interfere under Article-226 of the Constitution of India in the concurrent findings arrived at by the competent authorities, taking into consideration all the documents on record and following due principles of natural justice. It is reiterated that Clause-17.6(a) of the bipartite settlement dated 14.12.1966 as amended from time to time, provides for discretion to the respondent – Bank either to reinstate the delinquent – employee or to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee, on being acquitted from the criminal charges levelled against the said employee. It is submitted that the respondent bank choose to initiate disciplinary proceedings to continue with the disciplinary inquiry, for the charge no.1, which was not proceeded to inquire into, in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings. On criminal proceedings being concluded, the respondent – Bank was entitled to open inquiry qua charge no.1. It was submitted that, being arrived at the impugned findings, while passing the impugned order of termination, it was held that the petitioner is guilty under charge no.1 and is rightly terminated from the services, w.e.f. the date of dismissal i.e. 21.10.1999, as per Clause-17(b)(d) of the Bipartite settlement dated 14.12.1966, between the petitioner and its workman, as amended upto date and Clause-3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002 between the bank and its workman as amended upto date. The petitioner was rightly held not to be entitled for any salary or allowance from 21.10.1999. 5.9. Mr. Devnani, learned advocate placed reliance on the following decisions : I. In the case between State of Haryana & Anr. v/s. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491 . II. In the case between Ajay Kumar Singh v/s. Flag Officer Commanding-in-chief and others reported in (2016) 9 SCC 179 . III. In the case between Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited, represented by Managing Director (Administration and HR) v/s. C. Nagaraju and Anr. reported in (2019) 10 SCC 367 . 6. In rejoinder, Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the action taken by the respondent – Bank of initiating the disciplinary inquiry, after acquittal is void and non-est in eye of law. Once the petitioner was acquitted, the petitioner is required to be reinstated in service, in line of the order passed in Special Civil Application No. 3850 of 2010 dated 04.05.2010. The petitioner is put to be in double jeopardy and the aforesaid exercise undertaken by the respondent bank authority is barred by res-judicata. In light of the aforesaid submission, the order of dismissal dated 21.10.1999 and the order of termination dated 09.10.2010 is liable to be quashed and set aside and the respondent – Bank be directed to reinstate the petitioner with all the benefits including back-wages. 7. Having heard the learned advocate appearing for the respective parties. 7.1. The petitioner was appointed as Shroff / Godown Keeper on 01.03.1978 by the respondent Bank and served as such till petitioner came to be dismissed from the service by the order dated 21.10.1999 on being convicted by the trial Court for offences under Sections 506(2) and 332 of the Indian Penal Code by judgment dated 22.09.1999. 7.2. The petitioner preferred an Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1999 before the Sessions Court at Gondal, whereby, the order of conviction passed by the trial Court dated 22.09.1999 was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Magistrate for de-novo trial. After the de-novo trial, by judgment and order dated 14.10.2005, the petitioner was convicted by the Magistrate for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 332, 323 and 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. After the de-novo trial, by judgment and order dated 14.10.2005, the petitioner was convicted by the Magistrate for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 332, 323 and 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005 before the Sessions Court, Dhoraji, which came to be allowed and the petitioner herein came to be acquitted by judgment order dated 07.01.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions judge, main Fast Track Court, Dhoraji, on the ground of benefit of doubt. Against the said decision, the respondent – Bank filed Criminal Revision Application and the same is pending adjudication before this Court. 7.3. In the aforesaid set of facts, the respondent – Bank initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner herein, wherein, charge-sheet came to be issued on 30.11.1988. The petitioner came to be suspended by an order dated 26.11.1988 and was the charge-sheeted for the reported acts of commission and omission, while serving as a Shroff / Godown Keeper at Dhoraji Branch of the respondent – Bank, wherein, it was charge-sheeted for the 8 charges as stated in the said charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988, charge-sheet is duly produced at Annexure-K (Pg.69-74), wherein, charge nos. 2 to 8 stood proved. 7.4. 2 to 8 stood proved. 7.4. The said charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988 stated that if the said charges were proved in inquiry against the petitioner, the petitioner would be held guilty of gross misconduct in terms of Clauses 17.5(C), 17.5(e) and 17.5(j) of Bipartite Settlement between the bank and its workmen, as amended upto date, which read as follows : “If the above charges were proved in any inquiry you will be held guilty of gross misconduct in terms of clauses 7.5(C), 17.5(e) and 17.5(k) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 between the bank and its workman as amended upto date which read as follows: 17.5(c) “Drunkenness or riotous or disorderly and indecent behavior on the premises of the bank’ 17.5(e) ‘Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior.’ 17.5(j) ‘doing any any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank, or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.’ You are required to forward your reply to the above allegations to me within 10 days from the date of receipt of this charge sheet, failing which further action will be taken as deemed fit.” 7.5. On 29.07.1991, show cause notice – enquiry was held, in pursuance to the charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988 and on perusal of the same at Annexure-L (Pg.75) Inquiry Officer was instructed not to inquire into charge no.1 in the charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988, as the same was relating to an incident on 17.05.1988 and the police had registered the criminal case against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer found charge no.2 to 7 as established. Charge no.8 was partly established. In view of the aforesaid charges, having established against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority by order dated 03.09.1991 proposed to award punishment of dismissal without notice in terms of Clause-17.6(a) of the Bipartite settlement dated 14.12.1966 as amended upto date. 7.6. Pursuant to the notice dated 29.07.1991, the disciplinary authority while passing the final order dated 14.10.1991 decided to reduce the proposed punishment, whereby, petitioner was punished for stoppage of two annual increments, when they were falling due for payment with cumulative effect in terms of Clause-17.6(d) of Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966, as amended upto date (Pg. 80, Annexure-M). 7.7. Subsequent thereto, on initiation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner, services of the petitioner came to be terminated by an order dated 14.10.1991. 80, Annexure-M). 7.7. Subsequent thereto, on initiation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner, services of the petitioner came to be terminated by an order dated 14.10.1991. The disciplinary proceedings were finalized on 14.10.1991 by awarding punishment of stoppage of two annual increments of pay, when they were falling due for payment with cumulative effect for all the other charges, excluding charge no.1, for which criminal case no. 433 of 1988 was pending. 7.8. The petitioner herein came to be convicted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhoraji by order dated 22.09.1999. Pursuant thereto, petitioner came to be dismissed from the services with immediate effect as provided under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The said Section 10(1)(b)(1) of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 reads thus : “No Banking Company shall employ, or continue the employment of any person who is or has been convicted by Criminal Court of an offences involving moral turpitude” 7.9. Upon being acquitted by the Sessions Court by an order 07.01.2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005, the petitioner herein preferred Special Civil Application No. 3850 of 2010 seeking review of the order of dismissal dated 21.10.1999 as provided in Bipartite settlement and to further direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. By an order dated 04.05.2010, the respondent authority was directed to decide the case of the petitioner for reinstatement within 12 weeks from the date of the order. The said order is duly produced at Page-28, which reads thus : “The petitioner has prayed to direct the respondents to review the order of dismissal dated 21st October 1999 of the petitioner as provided in the Bipartite Settlement, and further direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all the consequential benefits. In view of the fact that the petitioner is acquitted and the petitioner was dismissed without departmental inquiry, the respondents are directed to decide the case of the petitioner for reinstatement within 12 weeks from today. Liberty to revive if the decision is not taken within 12 weeks. With the above observation this petition stands disposed of accordingly. Direct service is permitted.” 7.10. Liberty to revive if the decision is not taken within 12 weeks. With the above observation this petition stands disposed of accordingly. Direct service is permitted.” 7.10. The respondent bank issued show cause notice on 01.07.2010 to continue the departmental proceedings against the petitioner herein in relation to the charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988, wherein, discretion lies with the respondent Bank either to reinstate the delinquent – employee or to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee under Clause-17.6(a) of bipartite settlement dated 14.12.1966. The petitioner was charged with the following, which reads thus : “You are found guilty of ; (1) refusing to sign office orders dated 02.06.1988, 22.06.1988. 02.07.1988. (2) pressuring the Branch Manager Mr. S.A. Kanabar to remove the Manager's remark from the officer orders dated 02.06.1988, 22.06.1988, 02.07.1988. (3) abusing and assaulting Mr. S.A. Kanabar on 17.05.1988 in Dhoraji branch premises resulting in Sri. S.A. Kanabar sustaining bleeding injuries on his upper lip, cheek and left hand. (4) threatening Sri. S.A. Kanabar that he will be killed if he reported the incident to higher authorities. (5) trying to run over Sri. S.A. Kanabar with CSE's speeding moped when Sri. S.A. Kanabar was going to his residence alongwith Sri. P.R. Rachcha around 7 p.m. on the same day near the statue of Maharaja Bhagavatsinghji causing serious injury on the right leg of Mr. S.A. Kanabar. Etc. You are found guilty of the following charges. (1) You had exhibited drunkenness and/or riotous and/or disorderly and/or indecent bahaviour on the premises of the Bank. (2) You had exhibited willful insubordination and/or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior. (3) You had done acts prejudicial to the interests of the bank, and/or gross negligence and/or negligence involving and/or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.” 7.11. The petitioner replied to the said show cause notice on 13.07.2010, denying the charges levelled against the petitioner, wherein, in reply, the petitioner had raised the contentions that the petitioner was dismissed from the service from 21.10.1999 and in view thereof, the relationship of master-servant did not exist and that the show cause notice itself was invalid and cannot be acted upon, since a dismissed employee cannot be terminated. The petitioner also replied on merits as stated in para-5 to 8 of the said reply. 7.12. The petitioner also replied on merits as stated in para-5 to 8 of the said reply. 7.12. On considering the reply filed by the petitioner herein, the disciplinary authority held that the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved beyond reasonable doubt. 7.13. The disciplinary authority while passing the said order dated 13.06.2010, relied upon the evidence of two management witnesses, Shri Gopalkrishna Purohit and Shri M.S. Makwana. While charge nos. 2 to 8 were established against the petitioner on 29.07.1991, the inquiry was only with respect to charge no.1 in relation to the alleged incident. The said charge no.1 stood proved in the said proceedings, whereby, the competent authority terminated the services of the petitioner. 7.14. By order dated 24.07.2010, the services of the petitioner came to be terminated, whereby, the appeal also came to be dismissed by order dated 09.10.2010, relevant part of the same reads thus : “My comments & Findings: Your statement that your record is unblemished is contrary to facts. Even assuming, without admitting, that your past record is blemishless, a solitary instance like the incident of assault of your superior, who happened to be head of the branch you were working and a Public Servant, by you is sufficient to justify a punishment of dismissal from service.' I am not able to comprehend the meaning of the word 'prithee mentioned by you and hence I am not able to comment on the same. Your reply is not acceptable and do not merit any consideration by me due to aforesaid reasons and accordingly I am proceeding further. The evidence led in the departmental enquiry, assessment of evidence and findings of the Enquiry Officer have been dealt with very extensively in the Report of Findings of the Enquiry Officer furnished to you and I do not feel the necessity to repeat the same again in this order. As already mentioned in the show-cause notice, I am in complete agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. In addition to establishment of the charges by independent evidence led in the departmental enquiry held on 16.06.2010, you were also found guilty of imputation No.1 of chargesheet dated 30.11.1988 by the Criminal Court beyond all reasonable doubt by ME XVII i.e. warrant of punishment pronounced in the court on 22.09.1999 by Hon'ble Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhoraji in case No. 433/88. In the said order of punishment the Hon'ble Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhoraji has found that "with the malafide intention to prevent the complainant. Shri. Shantilal Aruflal Kanabar, the Manager of Dhoraji branch of Indian Overseas Bank, from discharging his duties, you had committed at 17.50 p.m. on 17.05.1988, a criminal offence under section 506(2) and 332 by beating him with closed fingers and giving threat of killing, by holding him from the collar of shirt and by compelling him to tear the office order issued by the complainant. For having committed an offence under Section 506 (2) of Indian penal Code and as per Section 248 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, you were declared guilty." Imputation No. 2, which was an aftermath of imputation No.1, was found to be fact as per ME XVI viz. show-cause notice dated 29.07.1991 issued to CSE in respect of imputations 2 to 8 proposing the punishment of dismissal without notice. In ME XVI the then Disciplinary Authority has found that imputation No. 2 regarding an incident on 18.05.1988. was fully established. Imputation No.1 have been found to be a fact in the enquiry by documentary evidence ME I to ME XVII and testimony of MW 1 and MW 2. You are found guilty of : (1) refusing to sign office orders dated 02.06.1988, 22.06.1988 and 02.07.1988. (2) pressurising the Branch Manager Mr. S.A. Kanabar to remove the Manager's remark from the office orders dated 02.06.1988, 22.06.1988, 02.07.1988. (3) abusing and assaulting Mr. S.A. Kanabar on 17.05.1988 in Dhoraji branch premises resulting in Sri. S.A. Kanabar sustaining bleeding injuries on his upper lip, cheek and left hand. (4) threatening Sri. S.A. Kanabar that he will be killed if he reported the incident to higher authorities. (5) trying to run over Sri. S.A. Kanabar with CSE's speeding moped when Sri. S.A. kanabar was going to his residence alongwith Sri. P.R. Rachcha around 7 p.m. on the same day near the statue of Maharaja Bhagavatsinghji causing serious injury on the right leg of Mr. S.A. Kanabar. Etc. In a criminal case the charges has to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental enquiry the charges should be reasonably proved i.e. there should be preponderance of probability. P.R. Rachcha around 7 p.m. on the same day near the statue of Maharaja Bhagavatsinghji causing serious injury on the right leg of Mr. S.A. Kanabar. Etc. In a criminal case the charges has to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental enquiry the charges should be reasonably proved i.e. there should be preponderance of probability. The minimum requirement of rules of natural justice is that the Enquiry Officer should arrive at his conclusion on the basis of some evidence i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points out to the guilt of the delinquent. Applying the above principle, you are found guilty of the following charges. (1) You had exhibited drunkenness and/or riotous and/or disorderly and/or indecent bahaviour on the premises of the Bank. (2) You had exhibited willful insubordination and/or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior. (3) You had done acts prejudicial to the interests of the bank, and/or gross negligence and/or negligence involving and/or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. You are found guilty of 'gross misconduct' under clauses 17.5(c), 17.5(e) and 17.5(i) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 between the Bank and its workmen as amended uptodate and clauses 5 (d). (e) and li) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-04-2002 between the Bank and its workmen as amended uptodate. It is for the management to distribute work equitably amongst the employees with a view to ensuring that everyone has a full day's work. The question of fixing any arbitrary ceiling on quantum of work or choosing the type of work by the employees themselves does not arise. Refusal to sign the office order and failure to perform the duty allocated amounts to willful disobedience of the lawful and reasonable order of the management and willful insubordination. The right to control employees is a distinguishing feature of the contract of employment. Insubordination is inconsistent with the relationship of a subordinate with his superior. The right to control implies the right to ask the servants what to work, within hours of service, or what not to work, and to do it within the terms of such service. If the right to control is a distinguishing feature, then the employee must subject himself to the said control and behave accordingly. The right to control implies the right to ask the servants what to work, within hours of service, or what not to work, and to do it within the terms of such service. If the right to control is a distinguishing feature, then the employee must subject himself to the said control and behave accordingly. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery and not violative of one's natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of the organisation as well as its employees. As an obedient employee you should have instantly obeyed the order of the Management by signing the office order and then taken up with the Management separately later in case you had any difficulty to perform the job assigned to you or you had any grievance against the orders of the Management. By your aforesaid acts, you have displayed your unwillingness to submit to the authority of the superior. By your act of abusing and assaulting physically the Branch Manager on 17.05.1988 and threatening to kill him if he did not comply with your demand destroy the office order containing the Manager's remark, you had subverted discipline in the Bank. You have shown utter disregard to maintenance of decency and decorum in the office. Your act of threatening and abusing the Branch Manager is a complete negation of respect due to the position of a superior officer and a manifest defiance of his authority. If such conduct is not dealt with very severely, there would not be safety for the superiors and no discipline can be maintained in the Institution. The object of your act was to instill fear in the mind of your superior so that he will not dare to question the misconducts indulged in by you. The supervision over the workmen in the office would be seriously prejudiced if a threat of attack on the supervisor for non-performance of duty by you remains unpunished. Your acts were inconsistent and incompatible with the due or peaceful discharge of your duty to your superior. There cannot be any doubt that the assault and attack on the managerial personnel by you, which entails 'dismissal from service', cannot be condoned or compromised. The offence of assaulting a superior is further aggravated when the superior is beaten and injury inflicted on him. There cannot be any doubt that the assault and attack on the managerial personnel by you, which entails 'dismissal from service', cannot be condoned or compromised. The offence of assaulting a superior is further aggravated when the superior is beaten and injury inflicted on him. Assault with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm is as obviously as inconsistent with employment discipline as with public peace. Where an employee threatens or intimidates with violence a superior officer on account of some grievance connected with his work, whether it is during office hours or out of office hours, or whether it is in the bank premises or outside of it, it is a misconduct. A misconduct is a misconduct regardless of its time and place. The making of threat of physical violence by you to a superior, such as threatening to assault him even if intended to be carried out outside the employer's premises, is grave insubordination. Making an indirect threat to a superior is negation of respect due to the position of a superior and a manifest defiance of his authority and such threats cannot go unpunished. The fact that you were the union representative did not exempt you from showing proper respect to the authority of your superior. Even though you were an office-bearer of the Union and as such consider yourself to hold an exulted position, you are first of all an employee and as such bound to behave in a disciplined manner and is amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bank. In fact you ought to behave in a much more restrained and responsible manner than an ordinary worker. You, as an office-bearer of a union, did not enjoy any special privilege or immunity and if you are found guilty of misconduct you are liable to be proceeded against, just as any other workman. The judgment dated 22.09.1999 of the criminal court convicting you is a relevant and admissible evidence. It certainly could furnish good material to the Bank to form a prime facie opinion about the merits of the allegation. When you have been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, then you were not acquitted within the meaning of clause 17.3(c)of the Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 / clause 3(c)of the Memorandum of settlement 10.04.2002. It certainly could furnish good material to the Bank to form a prime facie opinion about the merits of the allegation. When you have been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, then you were not acquitted within the meaning of clause 17.3(c)of the Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 / clause 3(c)of the Memorandum of settlement 10.04.2002. As your acquittal in the criminal case on appeal is on legal issues / technical grounds and there remains sufficient material and suspicion against you to indicate that you are not a person fit to be continued in Bank's service. Even assuming without admitting that your acquittal was honourable, it does not bar the Bank from coming to the conclusion that the assault was established and dealing with you accordingly. The offence committed by you involved moral turpitude and naked display of insubordination of the highest order for which the most appropriate punishment is "dismissal" from the Bank's service. The established charges are very serious in nature and I am of the opinion that it is not desirable to reinstate you and continue you in the service of the Bank. In your reply to the show-cause notice, you have not submitted any new/ valid grounds to reconsider the proposed ' termination of your service.' Accordingly, I 'terminate your services' with effect from the date of dismissal viz. 21.10.1999 as per clause 17 3(d) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 between the Bank and its workmen as amended uptodate and clauses 3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-04-2002 between the Bank and its workmen as amended uptodate. Please note that you are not eligible for any salary or allowances from 21.10.1999.” POSITION OF LAW: 8.1. In the case between Ajay Kumar Singh v/s. Flag Officer Commanding-in-chief and others reported in (2016) 9 SCC 179 , wherein, relevant Paras-25 to 27 read thus : “25. It is fairly well settled that acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. [vide Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 764 , T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 SCC 255 ] 26. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to automatic reinstatement. In Union of India and Anr. [vide Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 764 , T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 SCC 255 ] 26. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to automatic reinstatement. In Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC 385 , it was held as under:- “5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary government servant, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a government servant accused of defalcation of public money. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.” 27. Only if the employee had been honourably acquitted, could he make a claim for reinstatement. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.” 27. Only if the employee had been honourably acquitted, could he make a claim for reinstatement. In the case in hand, the tribunal acquitted the appellant-DK Singh:-(i) as in the case of AK Singh and UK Singh, tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellant-DK Singh by PW-14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) and (ii) the weapons that were alleged to have been recovered on the basis of confession of DK Singh on 12.08.1998 appears to have been photographed on 29.07.1998 by the prosecution, the tribunal thus rejected the prosecution case that weapons, bag and suitcase were recovered on the basis of confession given by DK Singh. Unlike AK Singh and UK Singh’s case, DK Singh did not have incriminating fingerprint evidence at the scene of occurrence and DK Singh raised defence plea of alibi.” 8.2. In the case between State of Haryana & Anr. v/s. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491 , relevant Para-4 reads thus : “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a ending is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has elevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground. 8.3. In the case between Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited, represented by Managing Director (Administration and HR) v/s. C. Nagaraju and Anr. reported in (2019) 10 SCC 367 , wherein, relevant para-10 and 13 reads thus : “10. ….In the present case, the prosecution witnesses turned hostile in the criminal trial against Respondent No.1. He was acquitted by the Criminal Court on the ground that the prosecution could not produce any credible evidence to prove the charge. On the other hand, the complainant and the other witnesses appeared before the Inquiry Officer and deposed against Respondent No.1. The evidence available in the Departmental Inquiry is completely different from that led by the prosecution in criminal trial. 13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the judgment of the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. It is settled law that the acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the judgment of the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a Departmental Inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the Criminal Court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.” 9. In light of the aforesaid undisputed facts and considering the position of law as referred above, upon issuance of the charges levelled against the petitioner herein on 30.11.1988, the charge nos. 2 to 8 came to be proved against the petitioner and in view of the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner herein, wherein, petitioner was convicted by an order dated 21.10.1999, petitioner came to be dismissed from services under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The petitioner himself approached the Court seeking reinstatement in service. Upon which the Court directed the respondent – Bank to decide the case of the petitioner for reinstatement within a period of 12 weeks. The discretion lies with the respondent Bank either to reinstate the delinquent – employee or to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee. The Bank chose to continue with the departmental proceedings with respect to charge no.1 and issued show cause notice to the petitioner on 01.07.2010. Upon issuance of show cause notice as referred above, petitioner was granted opportunity of hearing and after following due procedure of law, the petitioner was held guilty for the charges framed by the respondent Bank and the order was passed, terminating the services of the petitioner, w.e.f. the date of dismissal/ i.e. w.e.f. 21.10.1999. 10. This Court has also considered the charges levelled against the petitioner, whereby, (I) the petitioner had exhibited drunkenness and/or riotous and or disorderly and/or indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank. 10. This Court has also considered the charges levelled against the petitioner, whereby, (I) the petitioner had exhibited drunkenness and/or riotous and or disorderly and/or indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank. (II) the petitioner had exhibited willful insubordination and/or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior, and (III) the petitioner had done acts prejudicial to the interest of the bank, and/or gross negligence and/or negligence involving and/ or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. 11. The aforesaid charges having been proved against the petitioner, and the same having been confirmed by the Appellate Authority, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the aforesaid findings arrived at by the competent authorities. Further, the petitioner was dismissed from services on 21.10.1999 and was not an employee of the bank. As stated by the petitioner himself, having accepted that if the petitioner is not the employee of the bank, the question of reinstatement would also not arise. However, the bank thought it fit to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and give the petitioner a fair chance in the said proceedings, in view of the fact that, on an order of conviction passed against the petitioner, the petitioner’s services were dismissed by the respondent – Bank under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. 12. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Clause-17.5(c), 17.5(e) and 17.5(j) of the Memorandum of Settlement arrived at, on 14.12.1966 between the management of the Bank and their workmen, which reads thus : “17.5(c) “Drunkenness or riotous or disorderly and indecent behavior on the premises of the bank’ 17.5(e) ‘Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior.’ 17.5(j) ‘doing any any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank, or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss.” 13. At this stage it is apposite to refer to the Bipartite settlement dated 19.10.1966, more particularly, Chapter-XIX – Disciplinary Action and Procedure Therefor’ which reads thus : “(d). At this stage it is apposite to refer to the Bipartite settlement dated 19.10.1966, more particularly, Chapter-XIX – Disciplinary Action and Procedure Therefor’ which reads thus : “(d). If he prefers an appeal or revision application against his conviction and is acquitted, in case he had already been dealt with as above and he applies to the management for reconsideration of his case, the management shall review his case and may either reinstate him or proceed against him under the provisions set out in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge, and the provision set out above as to pay, allowances and the period of suspension will apply, the period up-to-date for which full pay and allowances have not been drawn being treated as one of suspension. In the event of management deciding, after enquiry not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months’ pay and allowance in lieu of notice, as directed above.” 14. In the facts of the present case, bipartite agreement enables the respondent bank either to reinstate the petitioner or initiate the departmental inquiry. It is apposite to refer to Clause-3(d) of the Bipartite settlement stated 10.04.2002, i.e. ‘Disciplinary Action against Workmen Staff and Procedure therefore’, which reads thus : “3(d). If he prefers an appeal or revision application against his conviction and is acquitted, in case he had already been dealt with as above and he applies to the management for reconsideration of his case, the management shall review his case and may either reinstate him or proceed against him under the provisions set out in Clauses 11 and 12 infra relating to discharge and the provision set out above as to pay, allowances and the period of suspension will apply the period up-to-date for which full pay and allowances have not been drawn being treated as one of suspension. In the event of management deciding, after enquiry not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months pay and allowance in lieu of notice, as directed above.” 15. In view of the aforesaid reliance placed on the judgments, referred to above by Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, would not be applicable in the facts of the present case. In view of the aforesaid reliance placed on the judgments, referred to above by Mr. Jadeja, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, would not be applicable in the facts of the present case. (I) In the case reported in (2006) 4 SCC 683 (supra) reiterates the principle of res-judicata and its applicability in administrative proceedings. Emphasizing that once the matter is adjudicated, it cannot be reopened to ensures certainty and finality. In the facts of the present case, bipartite agreement enables the respondent bank either to reinstate the petitioner or initiate the departmental inquiry. (II) In the case reported in (2002) 10 SCC 471 (supra) and 2011 (10) SCC 249 (supra), in the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court underscored the importance of finality in administrative decisions, discouraging the reopening of cases once they are concluded. In the facts of the present case, petitioner’s services were dismissed, in light of the criminal proceedings, pending against the petitioner, charge nos. 2 to 8 stood proved, however, qua charge no.1, the same was not adjudicated, and upon petitioner’s representation the same came to be adjudicated by the competent authority and after proper inquiry, having held that the charges are proved against the petitioner. (III) In the case reported in (1993) 4 SCC 10 (supra), (1994) AIR 1074 (supra), (2006) 1 SCC 123 (supra) and (1996) 6 SCC 417 (supra), the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions emphasizes the procedural fairness and principles of natural justice to be followed in administrative inquiries, disciplinary proceedings ensuring fairness to the accused employee. In the fact of the present case, the aforesaid principles have been scrupulously followed by the inquiry officer and in view thereof, the same are not applicable in the present case. (IV) In the case reported in 2014 SC OnLine Gu. 7654 (supra), wherein, it is held that reopening a concluded inquiry amounts to harassment and an abuse of the process, supporting finality and fairness in administrative actions. In the facts of the present case, the Rules provide for initiating departmental inquiry and in view thereof, it was always open for the respondent bank to open the inquiry, which was closed, in view of the order of conviction dated 07.01.2020 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005 by the Sessions Court, Dhoraji. 16. In the facts of the present case, the Rules provide for initiating departmental inquiry and in view thereof, it was always open for the respondent bank to open the inquiry, which was closed, in view of the order of conviction dated 07.01.2020 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2005 by the Sessions Court, Dhoraji. 16. In light of the aforesaid ratio as referred above, wherein, it is well settled that acquittal by a Criminal Court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. Acquittal in a criminal case does entitle a person automatic reinstatement. It is open for the respondent – Bank under Clause-3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002 that the acquittal of the petitioner in the Criminal Case in Appeal was on a legal issue / technical grounds, and without entering into the arena, whether the acquittal was honourable, the same does not bar the respondent Bank from coming to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner were established and resultantantly, the impugned order came to be passed. While passing the impugned order, the respondent Bank has held that for the offences committed by the petitioner involved moral turpitude and display of insubordination of the highest order, for which the most appropriate punishment is "dismissal" from the service of the Bank. The same having been established, the respondent Bank was not desirable to reinstate the petitioner and continue him in the service of the Bank. Considering the reply to the show-cause notice by the petitioner, no new grounds having been proposed by the petitioner, the services of the petitioner came to be “terminated”, w.e.f. the date of dismissal, i.e. 21.10.1999 as per Clause 17.5(c), 17.5(e) and 17.5(j) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 between the Bank and its workmen as amended upto date and clause 3(d) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002 between the Bank and its workmen as amended uptodate. 17. In light of the aforesaid findings and for the foregoing reasons, no interference is called for in the impugned orders passed by the competent authorities, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the present Petition stands dismissed accordingly. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. Pending application/s, if any also, stand/s disposed of, accordingly.