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2024 DIGILAW 1700 (GUJ)

AULIYAE DEEN COMMITTEE v. HARJIBHAI K VADHVANIYA

2024-08-09

A.Y.KOGJE, SAMIR J.DAVE

body2024
JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. RULE. Learned AGP Mr. Vinay Vishen waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. Manish Shah waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 2. 2. This petition is filed seeking direction to take action against the respondents under the provisions of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act allegedly for deliberate breach of order dated 19.01.2016 passed below Exh.5 in Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015 passed by 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Veraval. 3. By the aforesaid order, temporary injunction was granted against the defendants restraining them from not to undertaking any construction activities or to interfere or obstruct the usage of land bearing Chalta No. 26 and revenue survey No. 1853 and Chalta No. 358, revenue survey No. 1852 popularly identified as “Mangroli Shah Kabrastan.” 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Hakim for the petitioner submitted that revenue survey No. 1852, admeasuring 4 acres and 23 gunthas was allotted to the Trustees/Mutawallis Peer Salarshah Dargah through settlement deed and the said Trust has been managed by hereditary mode of succession. In the land bearing revenue survey No. 1852, there is some encroachment by certain individuals who have constructed makeshift hutments. The aforesaid two parcels of land, i.e. revenue survey No. 1852 and revenue survey No. 1853 are the subject matter of Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015. 4.1 It is submitted that since land bearing revenue survey No. 1853 was recorded as Government land in the revenue records and since the Government initiated actions to remove Dargahs and graves from the said land the construct Government offices on the said lands, the petitioner along with other plaintiffs preferred suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015 before the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Veraval. 4.2 It is submitted that along with the plaint/suit, the applicant filed application for drawing panchnama. Accordingly, the Court appointed Court Commissioner to draw the panchnama, which was prepared and placed on record. 4.3 It is submitted that the suit was filed as a representative suit, where public notice was published. No one appeared from public, but the defendant State filed reply contesting the suit, contending inter alia that the suit land is in fact a Government land as per the revenue records. 4.3 It is submitted that the suit was filed as a representative suit, where public notice was published. No one appeared from public, but the defendant State filed reply contesting the suit, contending inter alia that the suit land is in fact a Government land as per the revenue records. 4.4 It is submitted that after considering the contentions of the State and also considering the panchnama, the Civil Court had granted stay. The respondent herein, being party to the suit, the direction was binding to the respondents. 4.5 It appears that the suit was proceeded with. Issues ere framed vide Exh.48. The evidence of the plaintiff was completed and evidence of the defendant was in progress. It is at this stage that the suit was transferred to Waqf Tribunal. 4.6 The suit was transferred and therefore, notices were also issued to the defendants including the Collector-respondent No. 2. 4.7 It is submitted that despite order dated 19.01.2016 injucting respondent No. 1-Collector, Gir Somnath from interfering in any manner in the possession of the suit lands, on 07.10.2023, respondent No. 1-Collector issued notices to the encroachers on the land survey No. 1853 for immediately removing the makeshift hutments. 4.8 It is submitted that on 08.10.2023, respondent No. 1-Collector along with police protection removed the encroachments from the land survey No. 1853 and not only removed the encroachments but also caused damage to graves. Further, on 09.10.2023, respondent No. 1-Collector constructed fencing within the land survey No. 1853 and also put up board declaring that the land survey No. 1853 is Government land. 4.9 Learned Advocate for the petitioner has thereafter taken this Court through the photographs at Annexure-B indicating the status of the land in dispute and the ongoing procedure and thereafter, display of board on the same land. 4.10 It is therefore submitted that such action is clearly in breach of the directions of the Court and therefore, contemptuous. 5. 4.9 Learned Advocate for the petitioner has thereafter taken this Court through the photographs at Annexure-B indicating the status of the land in dispute and the ongoing procedure and thereafter, display of board on the same land. 4.10 It is therefore submitted that such action is clearly in breach of the directions of the Court and therefore, contemptuous. 5. As against this, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent has at the outset submitted that the application is filed without disclosing the correct facts and contending that the case was transferred to the Waqf Tribunal, whereas the fact is that the applicant had filed an application vide Exh.101 before the Civil Court for return of the plaint to file it before appropriate forum and the Civil Court, on the application, had passed order dated 18.01.2020 ordering return of the plaint, to be filed before the Waqf Tribunal. 5.1 Learned Advocate General submitted that upon order dated 18.01.2020, the effect of the same is that order dated 19.01.2016 of the Civil Court will not remain effective as all the proceedings before the Civil Court stood terminated including order dated 19.01.2016. 5.2 It is submitted that the applicant has deliberately not placed on record the application Exh.101 and the order of the Civil Court below it. Had this development been placed on record, no cause of action would have arisen for maintaining the present application. 5.3 It is submitted that the alleged action by the respondent was taken on 09.10.2023, where there was no order of any Court in operation including order dated 19.01.2016. 5.4 It is submitted that even before the Tribunal, there is no application for injunction or any order passed. In fact, even when the present application was filed, it is stated in the application on affidavit that such an application is in contemplation. 5.5 Reliance is placed on the decision of the Culcutta High Court in case of Axis Bank Ltd. Vs. MPS Greenery Developers Ltd. 2010 SCC Online Cal. 1717, to contend that any interim order passed in a suit will automatically be vacated upon an order of return of plaint. 5.6 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Jehal Tanti & Ors. Vs. Negeshwar Singh (Dead) through LRs. MPS Greenery Developers Ltd. 2010 SCC Online Cal. 1717, to contend that any interim order passed in a suit will automatically be vacated upon an order of return of plaint. 5.6 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Jehal Tanti & Ors. Vs. Negeshwar Singh (Dead) through LRs. in Civil Appeal No. 3937 of 2013 dated 18.04.2013, to contend that the interim order will loose efficacy when the Court passing it looses jurisdiction, just like in the present case, where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was banned under Section 85 of the Waqf Act. 5.7 Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Exl Careers & Anr. Vs. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited, (2020) 12 SCC 667 , to contend that once order is passed under O-7, R-10, R-10-A, the proceedings comes to an end and thereafter, subsequent proceedings before the appropriate forum is de novo. 5.8 Learned Advocate General has also relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in case of M/s. Om Sakthy Agencies (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Harsha Estates & Ors. in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 33902 of 2018 dated 14.01.2019 and contended that once the suit is directed to be presented before an appropriate forum, there the discretion to grant interim relief is on the transferee Court, which, in the present case, is Waqf Tribunal and no such interim relief is granted so far by the Tribunal. 6. In rejoinder, learned Advocate for the petitioner has argued that when order dated 19.01.2016 was passed by the Civil Court, it had the jurisdiction to pass the order below Exh.5. Therefore, the order of the Civil Court was not without jurisdiction. Therefore, the order of the Civil Court does not loose efficacy. 6.1 It is also argued that the Waqf Tribunal was functional with effect from 08.02.2016 as per one communication of this Court on administrative side dated 01.03.2016, by which cases pertaining to Waqf Act and pending in any Civil Court came to be transferred to the Waqf Tribunal. 6.2 It is submitted that the proceedings before the Civil Court were transferred to Waqf Tribunal by operation of law. Hence, it cannot be treated as an order under O-7, R-10, R-10-A and therefore, the order of interim injunction was operative. 6.2 It is submitted that the proceedings before the Civil Court were transferred to Waqf Tribunal by operation of law. Hence, it cannot be treated as an order under O-7, R-10, R-10-A and therefore, the order of interim injunction was operative. 6.3 It is further argued that judicial order does not become ineffective or non-est in law unless the same is declared by any judicial pronouncement. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Anita International Vs. Tungabadra Sugar Works Mazdoor Sangh & Ors. (2016) 9 SCC 44 . 6.4 Learned Advocate for the petitioner has then contended that if an order under O-7, R-10 is passed then the proceedings before the transferee Court have to be de novo, but in the facts of this case, the proceedings before the Waqf Tribunal are not de novo and for this, learned Advocate has produced before this Court photocopy of the “Rojnama” (Court proceedings) of the Waqf Tribunal for perusal and submitted that first exhibit given in the Rojnama of Waqf Tribunal is Exh.101 and hence, the proceedings are required to be treated as transferred to the Waqf Tribunal and not returned under O-7, R-10 and R-10-A. 7. Having heard learned Advocates for the parties and having perused documents on record, it appears that the issue relates to land bearing Chalta No. 26 and revenue survey No. 1853, admeasuring 57 acres and 1 guntha (2,30,780 sq. mtr.) and Chalta revenue survey No. 1852, admeasuring 1 acre and 35 gunthas (7582 sq. mtrs.) of Prabhas Patan, Tal. Gir Somnath, which, as per the revenue record, is running as Government land. 8. On 28.04.2015, plaintiff Nos.1 to 6 stated to be the trustees of Auliyae Deen Committee and petitioner herein filed Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Juge, Veraval praying for declaration that the graveyard land of Mangrolishah be declared to be of the ownership of Muslim residents of Prabhas Patan along with injunction below Exh.6. 9. 9. On 19.01.2016, Additional Senior Civil Judge passed order allowing the injunction application below Exh.5 filed in Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015, directing that the defendants therein-Collector and other defendants working thereunder, the officers or labourers would not carry out any type of construction in the subject land nor would the graveyard thereat be dug out or no interference or hurdles be created against the plaintiff in the matter of the land of graveyard. 10. On 18.01.2020, application under O-7, R-10 of the Civil Procedure Code on behalf of the plaintiff was given before the Civil Court stating that the Gujarat State Waqf Tribunal at Gandhinagar has been entrusted to conduct cases relating to Waqf Board and that therefore, the suit papers along with the aforesaid suit be returned. In view of the above, the Civil Court passed order returning the case papers of Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015 under O-7, R-10 along with certified copies of exhibits to the plaintiff for being presented before the Waqf Board or any other parallel body constituted for the said purpose within 30 days. 11. On 07.10.2023, Mamlatdar, Veraval City issued notice to the encroachers directing them to remove the encroacuments from the land in question. 12. The cause of action to file the application arose on 19.12.2023, for which the petitioner herein filed the present petition against respondent No. 1-Collector alleging contempt of the above referred order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the Civil Court below Exh.5 in Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015 on the ground that despite the injunction order dated 19.01.2016 of the Civil Court, respondent No. 1-Collector with police protection removed encroachments from the land survey No. 1853, cause damage to the graves, constructed fence and put up board declaring that the land of survey No. 1853 is Government land. 13. The question that arises is that whether the action of the respondent as mentioned in the preceding paragraph can be treated as in breach of direction in order dated 19.01.2016, operative part of which reads as under: “(A) The injunction application of the plaintiff vide Exh-5 is hereby allowed. (B) The graveyard of the plaintiffs in this case, known as Mangroli Shah graveyard, bearing chalta no. 26, revenue survey no. 1853, ad-measuring A.G. 57-01, is situated within the limit of Prabhas Patan Taluka-Veraval Village. (B) The graveyard of the plaintiffs in this case, known as Mangroli Shah graveyard, bearing chalta no. 26, revenue survey no. 1853, ad-measuring A.G. 57-01, is situated within the limit of Prabhas Patan Taluka-Veraval Village. The respondents, their subordinate officers, employees or laborers shall not carry out any kind of construction in the aforesaid land of graveyard and the graveyard land bearing chalta no. 358, revenue survey no. 1852, ad-measuring Acre-1-35-Guntha. Moreover, the graves situated at the aforesaid land of graveyard shall not be dug out. The interim injunction order is passed in favor of the plaintiff and against the respondents, that the respondents shall not cause any kind of hindrance, prevention or interference to the plaintiffs, until the final disposal of this suit. (C) The cost of the application shall be subject to the final outcome of the suit.” 14. From the record, it appears that pending Civil Suit No. 51 of 2015 at the stage of evidence of the defendant, an application Exh.101 came to be filed by the plaintiff (petitioner). The specific prayer was by invoking Section 85 of the Waqf Act barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, praying for transfer of the case to Waqf Tribunal or to pass order to return the entire papers for presenting the same before the Waqf Tribunal. The Civil Court, after quoting O-7, R-10/10-A, passed order on 18.01.2020, the operative part of which reads as under: “In view of the section-85 of The Wakf Act, 1995, as discussed above, the aforesaid suit is barred by jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Therefore, in accordance with the provision of Order 7 Rule 10 of the C.P.C., upon submission of the certified copies of all the Exhibits in the aforesaid suit, the entire record except Rojkam, shall be returned to the plaintiffs, to submit the same before the Wakf Board having jurisdiction or the concerned authority conferred with the jurisdiction by the applicable Act, within 30 days. Further, it is ordered to expedite the process of submitting the certified copies of the Exhibits in the aforesaid case by the plaintiffs. Moreover, the time- limit shall be expedited upon submission of all the certified copies.” 15. The Court may first deal with the issue of the status of interim injunction order dated 19.01.2016 after order dated 18.01.2020 below Exh.101. 16. Moreover, the time- limit shall be expedited upon submission of all the certified copies.” 15. The Court may first deal with the issue of the status of interim injunction order dated 19.01.2016 after order dated 18.01.2020 below Exh.101. 16. The Culcutta High Court in case of Axis Bank Ltd. (supra) has held that the effect of return of the plaint is that the interim order will automatically terminated. The Culcutta High Court has held that: “If at that stage, the Court prima facie finds that from the averments made in the plaint itself, the Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit in accordance with law, it should not consider the other two factors and reject the application on the ground of absence of prima facie jurisdiction of the Court to give the ultimate relief to the plaintiff. We are unable to accept the extreme submission of Mr. Roychowdhury that at the stage of grant of ad interim injunction, the Court is not required to see the prima facie jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit until the other side appears and complains about such lack of jurisdiction. As provided in Order VII Rule 10 of the Code “the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted.” The language employed therein is imperative in nature and the legislature did not permit the Court to unnecessarily be burdened with a suit over which it has no jurisdiction giving the Court the authority of returning the plaint without waiting for trial if it appears from the averments made in the plaint itself that it has no jurisdiction. The effect of an order of return of plaint is that the interim order, if any, passed in the suit automatically is vacated and unless the plaintiff gets the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit may even be barred by limitation on the date of representation before the appropriate Court.” 16.1. Learned Advocate for the petitioner tried to distinguish this judgment on the ground that the decision was on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. However, as order dated 18.01.2020 is specifically under O-7, R-10, 10-A, the effect will be of return of plaint. 17. Learned Advocate for the petitioner tried to distinguish this judgment on the ground that the decision was on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. However, as order dated 18.01.2020 is specifically under O-7, R-10, 10-A, the effect will be of return of plaint. 17. The Apex Court on the same issue in case of Jehal Tanti & Ors (supra), in Para-9, while discussing the facts of the case, observed that, “It is not in dispute that as on 9.11.1973, i.e. the date on which the sale deed was executed, the order of injunction passed by the trial Court in Suit No. 49 of 1970 was operative. It is also not in dispute that the order of injunction remained effective till 1976 when the plaint was returned for presentation before the competent Court” and then went on to rely upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Tayabbhai M.Bagasarwalla & Anr. Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 443 and quoted paras of that judgment, where it is stated that, “A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions.” Accordingly, in the facts of the present case also, post order dated 18.01.2020, the temporary injunction order dated 19.01.2016 would come to an end. 18. The Apex Court in case of M/s. Om Sakthy Agencies (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held as under: “In our considered view, while the suit was directed to be presented before the Court of competent territorial jurisdiction, the granting of interim order or otherwise should have been left to the discretion of the transferee Court.” 19. 18. The Apex Court in case of M/s. Om Sakthy Agencies (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held as under: “In our considered view, while the suit was directed to be presented before the Court of competent territorial jurisdiction, the granting of interim order or otherwise should have been left to the discretion of the transferee Court.” 19. The aforesaid would mean that after order dated 19.01.2016 looses efficacy on the return of the plaint, it is for the Waqf Tribunal alone which had jurisdiction as is stated on affidavit in the petition that:- “(7)............Petitioner will be preferring Application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC before the Hon’ble Waqf Tribunal but since one of the member of the Hon’ble Waqf Tribunal has resigned on 20/07/2024 and therefore, the Hon’ble Waqf Tribunal is not functioning since 20/07/2024.” 20. Hence, thereafter there is no order of injunction which was operational on 09.10.2023, when the respondent took action, impugned herein. 21. The Court may deal with the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the transfer of the case to the Waqf Tribunal is only a “Transfer’ and the proceedings are to progress from the stage at which it was pending in the Civil Court and therefore, the order of the Civil Court will not loose its efficacy. Therefore, Rojnama of the Tribunal (which is shown to the Court today) would indicate that the first exhibit given by the Tribunal is Exh.101 onwards. In support, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied upon decision of the Apex Court in case of Rashid Wali Beg Vs. Farid Pindari & Ors. (2022) 4 SCC 414 , particularly drwaing attention to para-70. In this judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court was examining the issue regarding the words ‘Waqf’ or ‘Property’ and ‘Waqf property’ and when the dispute regarding the same can be subject matter of ‘Waqf Tribunal’. The Apex Court was to analyze Sections 6(1) and 7(1) vis-a-vis Section 83 and concluded in Para-68 that: “68. The dichotomy created in some decisions of this court, between the properties which are admitted to be waqf properties and properties which are disputed to be so, is on account of the misapplication of the two limited questions in Sections 6(1) and 7(1) to the whole of the Act including section 83. The dichotomy created in some decisions of this court, between the properties which are admitted to be waqf properties and properties which are disputed to be so, is on account of the misapplication of the two limited questions in Sections 6(1) and 7(1) to the whole of the Act including section 83. At the cost of repetition we should point out that Section 83(1) provides for the determination of any dispute, question or any other matter (i) relating to a waqf and (ii) relating to a waqf property. This prescription cannot be taken to have been curtailed or circumscribed by Sections 6(1) and 7(1), to come to the conclusion that the Tribunal will assume jurisdiction only when a property is disputed to be a waqf property.” 21.1 Thereafter, the Apex Court took cognizance of the stage of proceedings and directed in para-70 that the proceedings transferred to Waqf Tribunal to progress from the stage of transfer. In this connection, the Court would accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that such directions are issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, whereas the law on the issue of status and stage of proceedings after order under O-7, R-10, R-10-A, the proceedings are de novo. This is held by the Delhi High Court (though by the learned Single Judge) in case of Vogel Media International Gmbh & Anr. Vs. Jasu Shah & Ors. ILR (2004) II Delhi 560, where, para-13 reads as under: “13. For the forgoing reasons, this Court must conclude: (i) The suit which is instituted on the representation of the plaint in the competent court after its return by the Court which lacked the jurisdiction is a freshly instituted suit within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and shall be governed by the provision of Order VII Rule 10 and 10A. Such a suit will be tried de nove in accordance with the provisions of the Code. (ii) Any proceedings taken up and orders made in the suit during its pendency before the court which lacked necessary jurisdiction come to an end as soon as the order for the return of the plaint is made by the said court. Such a suit will be tried de nove in accordance with the provisions of the Code. (ii) Any proceedings taken up and orders made in the suit during its pendency before the court which lacked necessary jurisdiction come to an end as soon as the order for the return of the plaint is made by the said court. (iii) If the plaintiff on the return of the suit consider it necessary that any interim protection granted to him under the orders of the Court which lacked jurisdiction should be continued, he must approach the competent Court with a fresh application for grant of such a relief and it will be for the said Court to consider the application on its merits. (iv) The return of the plaint for want of jurisdiction whether pecuniary or territorial cannot be equated to the transfer of the suit or proceedings either by virtue of Section 24 CPC or owing to any other statutory change.” 22. Even Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in case of Kitex Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Miss. D. Suekha & Anr. 1992 SCC Online Ker. 99, has held in Paras-11 and 12 as under: “11. In a case where Court issued injunction in excess of jurisdiction or where there has been complete want of jurisdiction, the Court should in appropriate cases exercise its inherent powers in the interest of justice and remedy the wrong for which Court is responsible. In short, merely because injunction was already granted, it cannot be allowed to be continued on the ground that only the Court having competent jurisdiction to try the suit alone can consider it. It is also not possible to hold that the Sub-Judge's function was only to return the plaint and connected papers including interlocutory applications and orders thereon to the proper Court and the latter Court alone was competent to deal with the matter. 12. What the Sub-Judge has found is that he has no jurisdiction to hear the matter and so the ad interim injunction already granted has to be vacated. Counsel for the plaintiffs could not establish from the evidence on record that any part of the transaction between the parties arose within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Ernakulam. 12. What the Sub-Judge has found is that he has no jurisdiction to hear the matter and so the ad interim injunction already granted has to be vacated. Counsel for the plaintiffs could not establish from the evidence on record that any part of the transaction between the parties arose within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Ernakulam. As the plaintiffs could not establish that the cause of action has arisen at least partly within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Ernakulam, the Sub-Judge was justified in passing the impugned order. We find to reason to interfere. The C.M.A. is dismissed. No costs.” 23. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has argued that even if the Civil Court looses the jurisdiction to the Waqf Tribunal in an ongoing proceeding due to Section 85 of the Waqf Act, it cannot be said that the order becomes void and for treating the order as void, there has to be a judicial decision of the order having become void. In support, he has relied upon decision of Anita International (supra), first relying upon para-48 and thereafter, paras-53 and 54. 23.1 It would be relevant to focus on the controversy before the Apex Court, where facts involved were Deve Sugars Ltd. was ordered to be wound up on 16.4.1999 (in Company Petition No. 170 of 1995). The Official Liquidator took possession of the assets of Deve Sugars Ltd. situated at Harige on 28.9.1999. The State Bank of Mysore filed Company Application Nos. 1251-1253 of 1999, in the then pending Company Petition No. 170 of 1995. Through the above applications, the State Bank of Mysore sought leave of the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, to pursue the recovery proceedings before the DRT, Bangalore. On 10.3.2000, the Company Court granted leave “....subject to the condition that.....no coercive steps are taken against the assets of the company during or after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Tribunal......” After the DRT, Bangalore issued the recovery certificate dated 15.5.2002, the State Bank of Mysore filed Company Application No. 1300 of 2003, with a prayer that the bank be permitted to seek execution of the recovery certificate. It is not a matter of dispute, that the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, neither heard nor passed any order on the above application. It is not a matter of dispute, that the Company Court in the High Court at Madras, neither heard nor passed any order on the above application. The admitted position is, that the Registry of the High Court, at its own, returned the above Company Application No. 1300 of 2003, by recording an endorsement, that leave of the High Court was not necessary. The Recovery Officer thereafter proceeded with the sale of the properties of Deve Sugars Ltd. 23.2 It is in the background of two simultaneous and parallel proceedings, it was contended before the Apex Court that the principal debate raised before this Court, revolves around the cause and effect of the order dated 10.3.2000, passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the above order dated 10.3.2000 being wholly void and non est could not have any bearing on the proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer, including the sale of the properties of Deve Sugars Ltd. on 11.8.2005, and also, the confirmation thereof by the Recovery Officer on 12.9.2005. According to the respondents, who support the impugned order dated 17.9.2009, the order dated 10.3.2000 was valid, and had a binding effect. And because, the proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer were in total disregard of the order dated 10.3.2000, it was submitted, that the impugned order was well founded. 23.3 In para-53, the Apex Court held as under: “53. Despite our above conclusion, it is imperative for us to notice, that for recovery of a debt due to a bank or a financial institution, the concerned bank or financial institution, can legitimately initiate proceedings, by filing a winding up petition before the jurisdictional Company Court, or alternatively, intervene in a pending winding up petition. Since there is no bar restraining a bank or a financial institution from approaching a Company Court, by filing a winding up petition, it is not possible to conclude, that the jurisdictional Company Court, is not possessed with the determinative authority/ competence to entertain a claim raised by such bank or financial institution. In view of the above, it is not possible for us to accept, as was suggested on behalf of the appellants, that the order passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras dated 10.3.2000, lacked the jurisdictional authority. In view of the above, it is not possible for us to accept, as was suggested on behalf of the appellants, that the order passed by the Company Court in the High Court at Madras dated 10.3.2000, lacked the jurisdictional authority. Since we have concluded that the Company Court which passed the order dated 10.3.2000 did not lack jurisdiction, we hereby hold, that in the facts of this case, the above order dated 10.3.2000 was neither invalid nor void.” 24. In case before the Apex Court, there was no bar of jurisdiction and both the forums had jurisdiction which were operating in independent spheres. Such is not the case here. There were no parallel proceedings in the present case nor overlapping of jurisdictions. 25. Moreover, while examining the status of order in contempt jurisdiction, the scope of interpretation is further narrowed down to examine as to whether the order continues to exist, remain operational or it looses the efficacy. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Court is of the view that once the order dated 18.01.2020 is passed below Exh.101 filed by the applicant and the Civil Court below Exh.101 exercised power under O-7, R-10, R-10A, order dated 19.01.2016 of the Civil Court will become non-existent and loose its efficacy and thereafter, it is not open for even the Civil Judge to extend it or pass order to keep it operational. In the facts of the case, it is an admitted position that there is no similar order passed by the Waqf Tribunal. 27. This Court having held that the order dated 19.01.2016 is non-existent and looses its efficacy, the action dated 09.10.2023 by the respondent cannot be termed as in breach of the directions under order dated 19.01.2016 or contemptuous. 28. Before parting, the Court deprecates the practice of the applicant of not bringing most relevant fact of order dated 18.01.2020 below Exh.101 on the record on its own, but was pointed out by the respondent. This act could be held to be deliberate attracting strict remarks of this Court, however, as is requested by learned advocate on record, presently the Court refrains from making any further comments. 29. The petition stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs.