JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIREN VAISHNAV) 1. First Appeal No. 3914 of 2017 is filed by Dr. Jyotiben, wife of Sanjay Vitthalrav Devre. She has challenged the judgment and order dated 28.10.2017 passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Vadodara in Family Suit No.294 of 2012. By the aforesaid order, the Family Suit of the wife (appellant in First Appeal No. 3914 of 2017) requesting the Court for granting a decree of divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, was dismissed. 2. First Appeal No.3916 of 2017 has been filed by the husband. He had approached the Family Court at Vadodara by filing Hindu Marriage Petition No.1389 of 2010 under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. The Family Court vide order dated 28.02.2017 rejected the Family Suit. 3. For the purposes of this common judgment and order, we will take the facts from First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 filed by the wife. Briefly stated the facts are that the marriage between the parties took place on 24.02.1999, according to Hindu rites and customs at Vadodara. Out of the wedlock, daughter Rishita was born on 27.07.2001 and daughter Manasvi was born on 22.03.2005. In the petition for divorce filed by the wife, it was her case that she was subjected with physical as well as mental cruelty on the ground that the family wanted a son. The birth of two daughters had brought forth upon her cruelty by the husband and in-laws. On 14.11.2008, she was compelled to consume sleeping pills. Subsequently, she left her matrimonial home to stay with her parents. An FIR for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 506 and 114 of the I.P.C. was filed by the wife, which was registered as Criminal Case No.43 of 2008 before the Bhachau Police Station. The wife also filed another complaint being I-C.R. No.03 of 2012 before Lakadiya Police Station at Gandhidham under Sections 406, 506(2) and 114 of the I.P.C. The marriage having failed, she went to Samkhiyali village where she would reside with her parents and daughters since year-2009. Thereafter being a professional, practicing in the field of Homeopathy, she shifted to Vadodara. It appears that in the year-2010, the husband filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, claiming that the wife had unjustifiably left the matrimonial home. Thereafter being a professional, practicing in the field of Homeopathy, she shifted to Vadodara. It appears that in the year-2010, the husband filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, claiming that the wife had unjustifiably left the matrimonial home. Since the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed prior to the Family Suit for divorce, by an order approximately eight months before the divorce suit was decided, the petition for restitution of conjugal rights at the hands of the husband, was dismissed. Then followed the order by which, the wife’s claim for separation/dissolution of marriage was decided by the order of 28.10.2017. 4. Mr. Rajpurohit R. Bhawarlal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant of First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 (that of wife challenging the decree rejecting her petition for divorce) would submit as under: 4.1 There was ample evidence on record to suggest that the wife suffered mental as well as physical cruelty at the hands of the husband and the in-laws. A criminal complaint under Section 498(A) was filed in the year-2008. Reading the plaint for divorce, would indicate that a narration in the plaint indicated that as a result of the birth of two girl children in the family, the in-laws as well as husband inflicted cruelty on her as a result of which, she was compelled to consume sleeping pills in the year-2008. 4.2 Mr. Rajpurohit, learned counsel for the appellant-wife, would take us through the testimony of the wife at Exh.42 and her crossexamination to support his submission that a case for mental cruelty was made out and the trial court, therefore, committed an error in not accepting the stand of the wife-appellant of First Appeal No.3914 of 2017. He would also invite our attention to the additional affidavit filed in the court, pursuant to the order passed on 01.03.2023 and show us a bill of one Dr. Goswami certifying that the wife had been admitted to a hospital in the year-2008 for the period from 13.11.2008 to 15.11.2008. 5. Mr. P.V. Patadiya, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband in First Appeal No.3916 of 2017 and contesting the First Appeal No.3914 of 2017, would submit that there were justifiable reasons for the husband to file an application for restitution of conjugal rights. 5. Mr. P.V. Patadiya, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband in First Appeal No.3916 of 2017 and contesting the First Appeal No.3914 of 2017, would submit that there were justifiable reasons for the husband to file an application for restitution of conjugal rights. The wife having left the matrimonial home without any reasonable cause, the trial court committed an error in rejecting the application for restitution. Mr. Patadiya, learned counsel, however would support the order of trial court, by which, the wife’s petition for divorce was rejected. He would take us through the written statement filed by the husband before the trial court. Reading the written statement and the written arguments filed by the husband, Mr. Patadiya, learned counsel, would submit that it was a case where the husband denied the stand of the wife and the story that the husband and in-laws inflicted cruelty, was not accepted rightly by the trial court. Reading the wife’s cross-examination, Mr. Patadiya, learned counsel, would submit that during the cross-examination too, the wife had not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt and the trial court was, therefore, right in its finding that there was no evidence to show that the wife had suffered cruelty at the hands of the husband. Though an FIR was filed under Section 498(A) of the I.P.C., it had subsequently resulted into an acquittal by the judgment of the competent court. Then, therefore, this too warranted dismissal of the First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 and allowing the First Appeal No.3916 of 2017. 6. Having considered the submissions made by learned counsels for the respective parties, and having examined the record and proceedings of the trial court, which have been placed before us, reading of Section 13 would indicate that the wife was constrained to approach the Family Court claiming the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelties on notably two counts: (A) It was her case that as a result of the birth of two daughters in the family, the in-laws would inflict mental and physical cruelty on her. As a result of such behaviour on the part of her in-laws, she was constrained to consume sleeping pills on 14.11.2008. As a result of such behaviour on the part of her in-laws, she was constrained to consume sleeping pills on 14.11.2008. (B) In the application under Section 13, a specific reference was made to filing of a criminal complaint being Criminal Case No.43 of 2008 under Sections 498(A), 506 and 114 of the I.P.C. Reference is also made to another criminal complaint filed under the provisions of Sections 406, 506(2) and 114 of the I.P.C. The first information report in context of allegations under Section 498(A) is also on record. 7. Reading of the FIR would indicate that it was the case of the wife that after the marriage, she found that her husband was not really gainfully employed. That the husband would inflict mental torture in terms of requesting that they may separate. That the mother-in-law and the father-in-law would inflict physical cruelty on her. That the entire family would depend upon her income as she was a qualified Homeopathic doctor. That on 14.11.2008, as a result of having lost her patience on account of the torture that the family inflicted, she consumed sleeping pills. That she was shifted to a Hospital at Gandhidham, and thereafter, her parents took her to Vadodara for treatment. The father-in-law and the mother-in-law would call up impressing upon them to break the matrimonial ties, but she would resist as a result of the fact that she had two daughters out of the marriage. The wife was examined before the trial court and when her examination-in-chief was recorded at Exh.42, the version that the narrative unfolds in the plaint has been set out in her evidence. The FIR was produced on record. In the cross-examination of the wife, she did admit that she had no evidence to show that she was compelled to undergo an abortion and also any evidence to suggest that she had consumed sleeping pills. When this evidence on record is considered in light of the stand of the husband, who contested the divorce petition by filing a written statement, we note the fact that the husband never stepped into the witness box and examined himself or offered himself even for cross-examination. 8. We have to view this stand of the husband to oppose the divorce petition in light of his petition filed for restitution of conjugal rights before the trial court in the year-2010. 8. We have to view this stand of the husband to oppose the divorce petition in light of his petition filed for restitution of conjugal rights before the trial court in the year-2010. In the petition so filed for restitution of conjugal rights as pointed out by Mr. Rajpurohit, learned counsel for the appellant-wife in First Appeal No.3914 of 2017, the husband has categorically made a statement of fact in the application under Section 9, that the wife on 14.11.2008 had consumed the sleeping pills. Going through the reasonings of the trial court while deciding the application for restitution of conjugal rights, which was rejected, the trial court was influenced by the fact that the husband did not deserve a decree of restitution, especially when it had come on record that the wife had to undergo mental cruelty, and therefore, there was no reasonable cause that the husband deserved restitution. The trial court while deciding the application for restitution was also weighed by the testimony of the wife’s father- Sureshchandra Patil at Exh.38 who unequivocally stated that the daughter was inflicted with mental and physical cruelty. 9. Here is a case, where therefore, when we examine the judgment of the trial court in the divorce petition, which considered the documentary evidence in the form of a criminal complaint FIR No.143 of 2008 filed under Section 498(A) of the I.P.C, the trial court fell short of accepting the stand of the wife only on the ground that the criminal case under Section 498(A) is pending. The other ground which weighed with the trial court to quote in the words of the trial court itself “considering all attending circumstances of the case on hands and the evidence which brought on record………… the case which put forward by the wife appears not bona fide.” 10. Unfortunately, the trial court appears to have lost sight of fact that when a plain and simple application under Section 13(1) was filed by the wife narrating an incident albeit in short that she was inflicted with mental and physical cruelty, as a result of the birth of girl children namely Rishita and Manasvi, she had to face wrath of her in-laws and her husband. We have also read the first information report, which is on record. We have also read the first information report, which is on record. This piece of evidence, which was filed before the trial court, when examined in light of the statement of the husband in the restitution petition confirming that the wife had consumed sleeping pills in the year-2008, should have been a sufficient enough ground for the trial court to grant decree of divorce. In our opinion, dealing with the submissions of learned counsel for the husband that he was acquitted in the 498(A) proceedings would not impress us. 11. The meaning of “cruelty” is defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. N. G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane reported in (1975) 2 SCC 326 where it is observed that “the question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts.” The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances. 11.1. While dealing with the question of “standard of probability” in dealing with the aspect of cruelty vis-a-vis civil and criminal cases, the Supreme Court had observed that the normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. In civil cases, the standards of proof to apply for finding cannot be the same as in criminal trials where what is required, is proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is proof by higher standards. Paras 24 to 27 of the decision in the case of Dr. N. G. Dastane (supra) read as under: “24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. Paras 24 to 27 of the decision in the case of Dr. N. G. Dastane (supra) read as under: “24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A. prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he links that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note : "the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue" Per Dixon, J. in Wright v. Wright (1948) 77 C.L.R. 191 at p. 210; or as said by Lord Denning, "the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear" Blyth v. Blyth [1966] 1 A.E.R. 534 at 536. But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged. 25. But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged. 25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vascillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature. 26. Neither Section 10 of the Act which enumerates the grounds on which a petition for judicial separation may be presented nor Section 23 which governs the jurisdiction of the court to pass a decree in any proceeding under the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is "satisfied" on matters mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of the section. Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word "satisfied" must mean "satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities" and not "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt". Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases. 27. The misconception regarding the standard of proof in matrimonial cases arises perhaps from a loose description of the respondent's conduct in such cases as constituting a "matrimonial offence". Acts of a spouse which are calculated to impair the integrity of a marital union have a social significance. To marry or not to marry and if so whom, may well be a private affair but the freedom to break a matrimonial tie ' is not. The society has a stake in the institution of marriage and therefore the erring spouse is treated not as a mere defaulter but as an offender. To marry or not to marry and if so whom, may well be a private affair but the freedom to break a matrimonial tie ' is not. The society has a stake in the institution of marriage and therefore the erring spouse is treated not as a mere defaulter but as an offender. But this social philosophy, though it may have a bearing on the need to have the clearest proof of an allegation before it is accepted as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage, has no bearing on the standard of proof in matrimonial cases. 12. Once again, the Supreme Court in the case of Shoba Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi reported in AIR 1988 SUPREME COURT 121, dealing with the concept of cruelty in light of it being considered under Section 498(A) of the I.P.C., observed thus: 9. A new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty. Explanation to Sec. 498 A provides that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute cruelty. Such wilful conduct which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical of the woman) would also amount to cruelty. Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security would also constitute cruelty. 10. We are, however, not concerned with criminal offence either under the Dowry Prohibition Act or under the Indian Penal Code. We are concerned with a matrimonial conduct which constitutes cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage. Such cruelty if not admitted requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. This Court has not accepted the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As said by Chandrachud, J. in Dastane case (Ibid at p. 976): "Neither section 10 of the Act which enumerates the grounds on which a petition for judicial separation may be presented nor section 23 which governs the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree in any proceedings under the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is "satisfied" on matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the section. Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word "satisfied" must mean "satisfied" on a preponderance of "probabilities" and not "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt". Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases." 13. Noteworthy, it is that, when we consider the submissions of the learned counsel for the husband that his acquittal in the 498(A) proceedings should dilute the aspect of the cruelty cannot be accepted, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shoba Rani (supra) and we quote “we are concerned with the matrimonial conduct which constitutes cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage. Such cruelty if not admitted, requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.” That, provisions under Section 498(A) had to be invoked by estranged wife against the husband levelling serious imputations as harassment as a result of the birth of girl children and the narrative of the FIR was in lines with the one made in the plaint under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 14. In our opinion, the trial court failed in its duty to reach out to the wife in accepting her stand that cruelty in fact, was inflicted, by merely not extending that hand of justice by holding that the criminal case was still pending. Even the subsequent event of the acquittal in that case would not be any of assistance to the husband as we have set out hereinabove showing that the standards of proof in a civil and a criminal case are different. Here was a wife who had come for narrating the instance of cruelty supported by an FIR and even the husband’s narrative in the restitution petition supported her stand. The trial court, in our opinion, created a serious error in not accepting the stand of the wife. 15. At this stage, we would also be benefited by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Jayachandra vs. Aneel Kaur reported in (2005) 2 SCC 22 , which read as under: 10. The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. 15. At this stage, we would also be benefited by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Jayachandra vs. Aneel Kaur reported in (2005) 2 SCC 22 , which read as under: 10. The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as willful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of his spouse same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, a proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes. 11. The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes. 11. The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted (See Sobh Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121 ). 12. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. 13. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent. 14. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent. 14. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exaggerated and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case and as noted above, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A too technical and hyper-sensitive approach would be counter- productive to the institution of marriage. The Courts do not have to deal with ideal husbands and ideal wives. It has to deal with particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a mere ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to Matrimonial Court. 16. The Supreme Court has observed and we quote “in a delicate human relationship like matrimonial, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife…………………..in cases when there is no direct evidence, courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence.” It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes. 17. During the course of submissions, both the learned counsels have addressed us on the aspect of maintenance/alimony under Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It has been pointed out to us, that during the wedlock, both the parties had properties in their joint names; one was a property namely plot nos.2 and 5 at village Samkhiyali of which a sale deed dated 23.02.2005 has been produced before the trial court. The sale deed indicates that the property was purchased in the joint names of the wife and the husband respectively. These are two plots as described in the sale deed. The sale deed indicates that the property was purchased in the joint names of the wife and the husband respectively. These are two plots as described in the sale deed. The second property, which was purchased in the joint names by a sale deed dated 27.04.2006 is Shop No.11, Sai Rachna Complex, Babujipura, Vadodara. 18. Apparently, these two properties are in the joint names of the contesting parties. During the course of the arguments, it appears that the learned counsel for the appellant-wife of First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 had made an offer that she would let go her share in the property of Vadodara, if properties of Kutchh as described in the sale deed dated 23.02.2005 are transferred exclusively in her name so that she can independently deal with the properties including carrying out the sale of such properties so as to attend to the needs of herself and her two daughters, who are Rishita and Manasvi aged about 23 years and 19 years respectively. 19. Having considered the issues on hand, we are of the opinion that the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2017 passed in Family Suit No.294 of 2012 deserves to be quashed and set aside. Order accordingly. With the aforesaid observation, First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 is allowed. For the reasons stated above, First Appeal No.3916 of 2017 would stand dismissed. 20. Having reversed the decree of refusing grant of divorce to the appellant-wife of First Appeal No.3914 of 2017, we need to consider the aspect of alimony that needs to be granted to the wife, who has two daughters to look after and maintain. Without opining on the proceedings under Section 127 of the Cr.P.C. pending before the trial court, we direct that the wife-Jyotiben on signing a release deed in favour of her husband vis-a-vis Vadodara’s property, the husband is directed to see that the properties named in the sale deed dated 27.04.2006, which are at Samkhiyali village in the joint names are transferred exclusively in favour of Jyotiben to enable her to deal with such properties, according to her own free will. 21. 21. It is clarified that once the release deeds as aforesaid for the Vadodara property in favour of the husband and the property at Kutchh in favour of wife are made, it will be open for the appellant wife of First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 to deal with her properties including selling the same, so as to obtain such consideration, which shall exclusively be utilized for the growth and development of her daughters Rishita and Manasvi. 22. It is pointed out that appellant-husband of First Appeal No.3916 of 2017 is an arrears of maintenance of more than Rs.4 Lakhs, which is disputed by Mr. P.V. Patadiya, learned counsel for the husband. It is directed that amount of outstanding towards maintenance shall be deposited within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order, before whom Section 125(3) proceedings are pending. 23. With the aforesaid orders, First Appeal No.3914 of 2017 is allowed and First Appeal No.3916 of 2017 is dismissed.