ORDER : 1. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.02.2024 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 25939 of 2022, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed being hopelessly time barred and that no case was made out to entertain the writ petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The learned single Judge has rejected all the claims of the writ petitioners being poor and illiterate, not aware of the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which have led to passing of the order, noticing that the petitioners have been indolent and cannot be permitted to invoke the equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court after waking up from slumber, without offering plausible explanation. 3. There is no dispute about the fact that in the proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 30.06.1990. The challenge in the writ petition was to the proceedings undertaken under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the first order under Section 8(4) of the Act being dated 06.09.1986 and the last notice under Section 10(5) of the Act dated 30.06.1990. Further challenge was to the communication dated 09.07.1999 issued by the Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad whereby the Appeal came to be returned in light of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. A declaration has been sought by the petitioners to the effect that the possession of the land-in- question has not taken in a manner known to law. 4. The land-in-question belonged to the predecessor of the petitioner namely Dharmabhai Madhabhai, who had filled Form No. 1 on 30.08.1976 declaring the land-in-question and Survey No. 89/1 of Village Tragad as agricultural lands. Notification dated 12.06.1987 under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came to be issued during the life time of the predecessor of the petitioners namely Dharmabhai Madhabhai. After his death on 12.04.1988, with the heirship entry made in the revenue records vide Entry No. 825, the name of the petitioners were mutated. The notice under sub-section (5) of Section 10 came to be issued on 30.06.1990 directing the petitioners to surrender the land within 30 days. After his death on 12.04.1988, with the heirship entry made in the revenue records vide Entry No. 825, the name of the petitioners were mutated. The notice under sub-section (5) of Section 10 came to be issued on 30.06.1990 directing the petitioners to surrender the land within 30 days. On 26.09.1990, the Panchnama was drawn. The Revision Application filed by the legal heirs under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came to be rejected by the State Government. Thereafter, an order was passed under Section 11 awarding compensation for the surplus land, which as per the case of the petitioners, noted by the learned single Judge, was not accepted by them. The Appeal was filed on 09.07.1999, which was returned by the Appellate Authority in view of the Repeal Act namely the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. 5. After almost more than three decades, the petitioners have filed the writ petition with the reliefs as noted hereinabove. 6. It was sought to be argued by the learned senior advocate Mr. Yatin Oza assisted by Mr. Masoom Shah appearing for the appellants that the learned single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay instead of going into the merits of the claims of the petitioners, which were agitated before the writ court. The submission is that the land-in-question being an agricultural land, was illegally declared as surplus and the decision of the competent authority that since the land-in-question lying in the residential area, it cannot be exempted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is erroneous. It was argued that it was not permissible for the competent authority to consider the land-in-question as ‘urban land’ so as to declare it as ‘surplus’ under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. 7. In this regard, it was noted by the learned single Judge that the claim of the petitioners about the status of the land-in-question being an agricultural land cannot be appreciated, inasmuch as, there is no formal order of exemption in place. It was argued before the learned single Judge that the petitioners were aggrieved by the order on merits and they were not seeking the benefits of the Repeal Act, 1999 nor they had challenged the notices issued under the provisions of Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It was argued before the learned single Judge that the petitioners were aggrieved by the order on merits and they were not seeking the benefits of the Repeal Act, 1999 nor they had challenged the notices issued under the provisions of Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The contention of the learned senior advocate for the petitioners before the learned single Judge was that the very basis of the order of declaration of the land-inquestion as surplus treating them as urban land, itself is illegal. The result is that once the basis of the order goes, all the subsequent steps taken by the respondent authorities would not survive. 8. Dealing with this contention of the learned senior advocate for the petitioners, the learned single judge has noted that the petitioners being legal heirs had submitted an application/revision on 21.08.1990 under the provisions of Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which came to be rejected by the State Government. The said order has attained finality as no further steps had been taken by the petitioners. Thus, it is clear that they had accepted the decision of the State Government. However, the challenge to the order dated 06.09.1986 in Appeal under Section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has not been adjudicated upon enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999. The appeal was returned vide communication dated 09.07.1999 issued by the Deputy Collector, Urban Land Tribunal. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have not received the orders of rejection of Revision dated 24.04.1992 or the decision of the appellate authority to return the appeal vide communication dated 09.07.1999. The fact remains that the petitioners did not take the proceedings further. No explanation has been offered by the petitioners for keeping silence for about more than three decades. 9. As recorded by the learned single Judge, we may also take note of the assertion in paragraph Nos. ‘2.31’ and ‘2.32’ of the original writ petition, which read as under: “2.31 That some representations were made to the State of Gujarat over the years, under advice and guidance of some elderly and wise relatives, but the petitioners are unaware as to what happened to the said representations and are not having any copies or proof in relation to them. 2.32 One important fact is required to be brought to the notice of this Hon’ble Court that some land grabber was trying to grab the land and he created a forged letter of revenue department that the government had not taken possession of the land and proceedings had lapsed in 1999. Some police investigation was initiated as regards the forged letter, wherein petitioners were called upon to make statements before the police. The police were satisfied with the statements of the petitioners and, no FIR was registered against the Petitioners, but it was actually case where fraud as attempted against the Petitioners also.” 10. A careful reading of the aforesaid paragraphs indicate that the original petitioners have not come with the clean hands as they have not disclosed clearly as to what was happened after rejection of Revision by the State Government vide order dated 24.04.1992. The Panchnama was drawn on 26.06.1990, which fact is admitted to the petitioners, but there is nothing on record which would indicate that any steps had been taken by the petitioners after enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999 to seek release of the land-in-question with the aid of the provisions of the Repeal Act. There is no disclosure of the date of representations, allegedly made by the petitioners to the State of Gujarat over the orders. From the averments made in paragraph No. ‘2.32’ of the writ petition noted hereinabove, it seems that there were some third party rights created over the land-in-question that some land grabber was trying to grab the land and he created forged letter of the Revenue Department. Some police investigation was initiated as regards the forged letter and the petitioners were called upon to make statement before the police. For the vague assertion made in paragraph Nos. ‘2.31’ and ‘2.32’, it is difficult for us to draw any inference or conclusion about the events occurred over the course of time after 24.04.1992. 11. In a vague manner, it is stated in paragraph No. ‘2.23’ while assailing the act of the State Government in drawing the Panchnama that even today the legal heirs of late Dharmabhai Madhabhai are in possession of the land-in-question. 11. In a vague manner, it is stated in paragraph No. ‘2.23’ while assailing the act of the State Government in drawing the Panchnama that even today the legal heirs of late Dharmabhai Madhabhai are in possession of the land-in-question. The said statement made in paragraph No. 2.23(i) of the writ petition cannot be accepted as a statement of fact about the petitioners being in possession of the land-in-question or that no third party rights have been created over the land-in-question. The assertion in the writ petition that the petitioners are poor and illiterate people cannot be accepted to grant any indulgence for the simple reason that the petitioners themselves were contesting the proceedings after the death of their predecessor namely Dharmabhai Madhabhai on 12.04.1988 as the petitioners have undertaken further proceedings by filling Revision under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which was dismissed on 24.04.1992. It cannot be accepted that the petitioners did not know as to what further action was to be taken in the matter of land-in-question. 12. The fact remains that the land-in-question has been acquired by the State Government by virtue of Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and shall be deemed to have been vested with the State Government absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances, much prior to the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999. We do not find any error in the observations of the learned single Judge that it was difficult to accept the submission of the learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioners that no third party rights had been created over the period of almost three decades when the notice under Section 10(5) calling upon the petitioners to handover the possession was issued on 30.06.1990 and the Panchnama was drawn on 26.09.1990 after expiry of the period prescribed in the notice. The fact that the notice under Section 10(6) was not issued would not make any difference for the simple reason that the requirement of issuance of notice under Section 10(6) was in an eventuality when there is resistance and the State Government had not been able to obtain possession of the vacant land inspite of the service of notice under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. 13. 13. After almost three decades, it is not possible for us to say or accept that the petitioners have remained in the possession of the land-in-question in absence of any clear averments in the writ petition and that they can be permitted to seek relief of quashing of the proceedings undertaken under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The decision of the learned Single Judge in rejecting the prayers for quashing of the proceedings beginning from the order dated 08.06.1986 under Section (4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 culminating in the order of rejection of Revision dated 24.04.1992, cannot be said to suffer from any perversity or error of law. 14. From the relief Clause (D) in the para ‘9’ of the Prayer Clause of the writ petition seeking declaration that the possession of the subject matter agricultural land was not taken by the respondent in the manner known to law, it is evident that the petitioners had not been in possession of the lands-in-question since after 26.09.1990 when the Panchnama was drawn. Further relief in Prayer Clause (E) wherein a declaration has been sought to the effect that the possession is with the petitioners and is deemed to be with the petitioners, subject land being agricultural land and not excess vacant land, is a further proof of the fact that the petitioners had been dispossessed at the time of drawing of Panchnama on 26.09.1990 and with the rejection of the Revision under Section 34 vide order dated 24.04.1992, the proceedings under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 had been brought to their logical end. The legality or illegality of order passed by the competent authorities during the proceedings under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was not open for scrutiny. Moreover, a careful perusal of the prayer Clauses in the writ petition indicate that the order of the State Government dated 24.4.1992 of rejection of the Revision under Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has not been challenged before the writ court. The other reliefs claimed in the writ petition are misconceived in view of the above noted facts. 15. The other reliefs claimed in the writ petition are misconceived in view of the above noted facts. 15. The result is that the contention of the learned senior advocate appearing for the appellants namely the original petitioners that the land-in-question was an agricultural land and the competent authorities had erred in refusing to grant exemption, is not open for scrutiny after the proceedings were brought to its logical end and there was no challenge for a period of more than three decades. As regards the0 application of the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, suffice it to say that the petitioners have not pressed any argument in this regard before the learned single Judge and rather it was argued by the learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioners before the writ court that the petitioners were not invoking the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999 to seek any relief. 16. From the averments made in the writ petition and the facts noted hereinabove, as also from the order passed by the learned single Judge, it is evident that since the petitioners were not in physical possession of the land-in-question after drawing of Panchnama on 26.09.1990, there was no question of the Repeal Act, 1999 being attracted or made applicable to the land-in-question. It seems that for this reason, the petitioners did not seek the relief of abatement of the ceiling proceedings by invoking the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999. 17. The decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellants in the two compilations passed on to us, some of which have been placed before the learned single Judge as well, are of no help to the petitioners. We do not find any reason or purpose to burden this judgment with the appreciation of each and every decision placed before us by the learned senior advocate during the course of the hearing of the present appeal. 18. For the above discussion, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the delay in filling the writ petition would not have bearing on the merits of the case of the petitioners who are agitating to assail the initial order of declaration of land-in-question as surplus treating them as urban land, though being agricultural land, is liable to be turned down. 19. 19. For the above noted facts, we find no error in the judgment of the learned single Judge. The Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed being devoid of merits. The Civil Application for stay also stands disposed of, accordingly.