ORDER : 1. The petitioner has challenged order dated 09.02.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Doda, whereby the said court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, has set aside order dated 16.10.2023 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Doda in terms whereof the petitioner herein has been discharged and the charge sheet has been dismissed. 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on record. 3. It appears that a charge sheet arising out of FIR No. 06/2022 for offences under Sections 357, 323 and 506 IPC was laid before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Doda against the petitioner herein. As per the prosecution case, on 07.01.2022 at around 01.00 pm, when the complainant, Doulat Ram, Assistant Executive Engineer, Jammu Power Distribution Corporation Limited (JPDCL) was discussing certain matter in the office chamber of the petitioner, who happened to be the Executive Engineer, JPDCL Sub Division, Doda at the relevant time, the petitioner started shouting and picked up a wooden rod with which he hit the complainant on his head. This resulted in injuries to the complainant and blood oozed out of his left ear. 4. At the time of considering the question of charge/discharge of the accused, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, concluded that the petitioner/accused has exceeded his powers while discharging his official duty and there is reasonable connection between the alleged act of the petitioner and performance of his official duty. Thus, according to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the petitioner is entitled to protection of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C and without the previous sanction of the Government, prosecution could not have been launched against him. Accordingly, the petitioner was discharged and the charge sheet was dismissed. 5. Against the aforesaid order, a revision petition came to be filed by the respondent-State before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Doda, who vide the impugned order allowed the revision petition and set aside the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. While doing so, the learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that to wield a wooded rod and inflict injuries on a colleague public servant is not a part of official duty of a public servant. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to protection of Section 197 Cr. P.C. 6. While doing so, the learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that to wield a wooded rod and inflict injuries on a colleague public servant is not a part of official duty of a public servant. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to protection of Section 197 Cr. P.C. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that it is the admitted case of the parties that the alleged act took place in the office chamber of the petitioner when certain official matters were being discussed with the complainant. He has further submitted that during the course of this meeting the petitioner is alleged to have beaten up the complainant with a wooden rod and as such, the said act of the petitioner is integrally connected with discharge of his official duty, hence, protection under Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. is available to him. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the raitio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, 2004 (8) SCC 40 . 7. If we have a look at the provisions contained in Section 197 Cr. P.C., it provide that if any person or a public servant not removable from his office except by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty, the Court cannot take cognizance of such offence without the previous sanction. While considering the question whether a particular act of a public servant removable from office with the sanction of the Government is protected by Section 197 of the Cr. P.C, it has to be ascertained whether he has committed such act in discharge of his official duty or in purported discharge of his official duty, meaning thereby that even if, the act complained of, has not been committed by a person in discharge of his official duty but the act is interconnected with performance of his official duty, the provisions of Section 197 Cr. P.C. would get attracted. 8. P.C. would get attracted. 8. To quote an example, if a Police Officer of gazetted rank while interrogating an accused in the Police Station beats him up, it can be stated that the said Police Officer is purported to have acted in discharge of his official duty though, even though strictly speaking beating of an accused is not official duty of a Police Officer. However, his act would be an act of exceeding of official duties and the same would be covered under the provisions of Section 197 Cr. P.C. Take another example, if a Police Officer while chasing an accused uses excessive force to nab him, which results in grievous injuries to the said accused, it would be again a case of using excessive force in discharge of official duty by the Police Officer. This act would also be covered by Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. 9. In the instant case, the petitioner is alleged to have assaulted the complainant by hitting him with a wooden rod, which resulted in injuries to him and blood oozed out of his left ear. The beating up of a subordinate officer by an Executive Engineer in his office chamber is not an action interrelated or interconnected with discharge of his official function. Giving such an interpretation to the expression “acting or purporting to act in discharge official duty” appearing in Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be stretching it too far. 10. In Ganesh Chandra Jew’s case (supra) that has been relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the Supreme Court has held that it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection under Section 197 (1) of the Cr. P.C., but an act constituting an offence directly and reasonably connected with his official duty would require sanction for prosecution. The Supreme Court has further held that the sanction does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions, which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duties and which are done in purported exercise of official duty. The Court went on to explain the issue in the following manners : It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty and without any justification therefor then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari ( AIR 1956 SC 44 ) thus "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ... there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." 11. For the foregoing analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that in order to attract the protection under Section 197(1) Cr. P.C. it has to be shown that act or omission was done by the public servant either in discharge of his official duty or in purported discharge of his official duties but this would not extend to activities of criminal nature committed by a public servant that have no connection with performance of official functions of the said public servant. 12. As already stated, it is none of the duties of an Executive Engineer to physically assault his colleague or subordinate officer. The said act is not at all connected with official functions of the Executive Engineer, even if the same has taken place during an official meeting. Therefore, in the instant case, the petitioner does not enjoy the protection of Section 197(1) of the Cr. P.C. 13. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere with the well reasoned and lucid order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Doda. The same, therefore, deserves to be upheld. 14. Viewed thus, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is accordingly, dismissed.