JUDGMENT : The present revision petition under Section 397/401 CrPC has been preferred by the petitioner against the judgment dated 12.08.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhinmal, District Jalore (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Appellate Court’) in Criminal Appeal No. 24/2002 vide which the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed and the judgment dated 30.06.2000 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sanchore, District Jalore (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) in Criminal Case No. 348/1999 convicting the accused-petitioner for offences under Sections 279, 304A IPC was upheld. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that on 17.06.1999, the accused, who was the driver of Rajasthan Roadways bus bearing No. RJ-04-P-0234 was parking the bus at Sanchore bus stand when suddenly, a child named Bhanwara came in between a bus which was already parked and the bus being driven by the accused. An accident took place in which the child ultimately died. An FIR was registered against the accused for offences under Sections 279, 304A of IPC. Learned trial Court convicted the accused. The judgment of conviction was upheld by the learned appellate Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned appellate Court and the learned trial Court, the accused-petitioner has preferred the present revision petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court has committed grave illegality while passing the impugned judgments. It is submitted that it is an admitted case of the prosecution that the accident did not take place on a highway, rather it took place at the bus stand where the petitioner was parking the bus. It is further submitted that it is also an admitted position that when the bus was being parked, the deceased came running from behind the bus and was crushed between the two buses, one of which was standstill and the offending vehicle which was being parked near it by the petitioner. Learned counsel further relied upon the statements of PW-6 Ishwar Dan-complainant and the FIR ExP-20 to substantiate his arguments. Lastly, it was prayed that the revision petition may be allowed and the petitioner be acquitted of the offences under Sections 279, 304A IPC. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel further relied upon the statements of PW-6 Ishwar Dan-complainant and the FIR ExP-20 to substantiate his arguments. Lastly, it was prayed that the revision petition may be allowed and the petitioner be acquitted of the offences under Sections 279, 304A IPC. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is submitted that the impugned judgments are well reasoned and do not call for any interference. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. I have perused the FIR (ExP-20), wherein the complainant-Ishwar Dan has stated that when the driver of the bus-Kan Singh was parking it, suddenly a child came in between the bus being driven by the accused and another bus which was already parked and died due to the accident that occurred. 7. I have also perused the statements of the complainant Ishwar Dan (PW 6) wherein he has stated that: ÞMªkboj gekjh cl dk cl dks lkbZM esa /khjs&2 yxk jgk Fkk] rc nksuksa clksa ds chp ,d yM+dk vpkud nkSM+dj vk;k --- ftjg }kjk odhy eqyfte & ;g ckr lgh gS fd yM+dk e`rd vpkud gh vk;k FkkA lkbZM esa cl yxkrs le; ,DlhMsaV gqvk FkkAß 8. Further, the eye-witnesses in the case namely Vardaram (PW 3), Arjun Ram (PW 4) have been declared hostile. 9. The learned trial Court has held that the bus was being parked in the wrong direction and the driver did not take any steps to save the child even though the circumstances were such that the accident could have been prevented. The learned appellate Court, while affirming the judgment of the learned trial court held that the deceased was standing at the side of the already parked bus and did not suddenly came in between the buses. Further, it has also been held that the bus was being parked in the wrong direction. 10. As regards points to be considered for examination of rash and negligent driving, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, reported in MANU/SC/0659/2012 has held as under: “10. Further, it has also been held that the bus was being parked in the wrong direction. 10. As regards points to be considered for examination of rash and negligent driving, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, reported in MANU/SC/0659/2012 has held as under: “10. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of contentions (b) and (c) raised on behalf of the Appellant, it is necessary for the Court to first and foremost examine (a) what is rash and negligent driving; and (b) whether it can be gathered from the attendant circumstances. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to 'rash and negligent driving' within the meaning of the language of Section 279 Indian Penal Code. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words 'manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life'. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated Under Section 279 Indian Penal Code is attracted. 11. 'Negligence' means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the Court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence.” 11. In my opinion, the fact that the bus was being parked in the wrong direction does not by itself amount to negligence or lack of due care and control on part of the petitioner. In a criminal case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the accused is guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. This means that the prosecution must convince the Court that there is no other reasonable explanation that can come from the evidence presented at trial. In the present case, learned appellate Court as well as learned trial Court have failed to properly appreciate the evidence available on record. In his statements, the complainant-Ishwar Dan (PW-6), who is an eye-witness, has stated that the accident occurred while the accused was parking the bus and the deceased came running in between the buses suddenly. Learned appellate Court has held that the testimony of PW-6 is unreliable as he is an interested witness. In my opinion, this finding is incorrect. It is a settled proposition of law that the testimony of witness cannot be discarded merely because the witness is known to accused if it is otherwise cogent and reliable. Further, two eye-witnesses viz. PW-3 (Vardaram) and PW-4 (Arjun Ram) have turned hostile. 12. From the evidence available on record, it is settled that the bus was being driven slowly. As per the testimony of PW-6, which has remained uncontroverted and is also corroborated by the FIR, the child suddenly came running towards the bus. The learned appellate Court has, on the basis of presumption, held that the deceased was standing at the side of the already parked bus when the accident took place. Therefore, the fact that the child came running towards the bus or was standing at the place of incident is not proved. 13. The learned appellate Court has, on the basis of presumption, held that the deceased was standing at the side of the already parked bus when the accident took place. Therefore, the fact that the child came running towards the bus or was standing at the place of incident is not proved. 13. The prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that at the time of the accident, the petitioner was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. 14. In view of the above, the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial court and as affirmed by the learned appellate Court cannot be sustained against the petitioner the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 15. Accordingly, the present revision petition is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner vide judgment dated 30.06.2000 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sanchore, District Jalore in Criminal Case No. 348/1999 and the judgment dated 12.08.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhinmal, District Jalore in Criminal Appeal No. 24/2002 convicting the petitioner for offences under Section 279, 304A of IPC are quashed and set aside. 16. Vide order dated 21.08.2002, the sentence of petitioner was suspended. The petitioner is not required to surrender, if not wanted in any other case. 17. No order as to costs.