ORDER : (Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, CJ.) 1. Since these writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India raise common issue of law for consideration, therefore, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common order. For brevity and convenience, wherever necessary, we shall refer to the pleadings and documents placed on record in Shyam Prakash Meena & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14258/2024) and Raja Ram & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6428/2024). I. FACTS: 2. In all these petitions, the petitioners, who are transport operators, have assailed constitutional validity and vires of the provisions contained in Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1989’) as amended vide notification dated 04.10.2021 to the extent it seeks to levy “additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness”. The petitioners are transport operators and they are required to keep their vehicles in a condition fit to operate on roads. The State has opened number of fitness testing centres where the vehicles are required to be subjected to test of fitness as per the norms prescribed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1988’) read with the rules framed thereunder. The competent authority certifies fitness of a transport vehicle for a specified period. The law requires the fitness certificate to be renewed from time to time without which a vehicle cannot be allowed to operate on roads. Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, as amended vide notification dated 04.10.2021 prescribes various regulatory fee as also fee towards providing services. Along with an application for grant/renewal of fitness certificate of a particular motor vehicle, application fee is envisaged under the Rules of 1989. While Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 lays down application fee in the matter of grant/renewal of fitness certificate, Serial No. 11A of Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 seeks to levy additional fee for delay of each day in making an application for renewal. All these petitions seek to challenge imposition of additional fee of Rs. 50/- for delay of each day in submitting application for renewal. All these petitions seek to challenge imposition of additional fee of Rs. 50/- for delay of each day in submitting application for renewal. Accordingly, Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 as amended vide notification dated 04.10.2021 to the extent it incorporates a provision with regard to levy of additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay as provided under Serial No. 11A thereof is under challenge in these petitions. II. SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS: 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Central Government derives its power to levy fee within the scope and ambit of fee that may be levied under the provisions of the Act of 1988 including Section 211 thereof. Moreover, the Central Government is empowered to make rules under Section 64 of the Act of 1988 which includes the power to levy fee for certain matters. The power to levy fee, therefore, is referable to the scheme of the Act of 1988 and no fee can be levied which is not provided under the Act of 1988. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that while power to levy fee is traceable to the rule making authority as contained in Section 64 of the Act of 1988 read with Section 211, which provides for general power to levy fee, it does not confer power to levy fee on the ground that there is delay in submission of application for renewal of fitness certificate. Prescription of the rule that additional fee shall be leviable for each day of delay in submission of application partakes the nature of fine or penalty as the delay in submission of application for renewal is sought to be penalised. This, therefore, it is contended, is not fee because it is not connected with any regulatory exercise or towards rendering services but in substance, a penal action, penalising the transport operators for not submitting applications within the prescribed period seeking renewal of fitness certificates. The provisions of the Act of 1988 do not confer any such power on the Central Government to penalise the transport operators for delay in submission of applications for renewal of fitness certificates. The provisions of the Act of 1988 only allow the Central Government to levy fee in respect of certain matters which are expressly enumerated therein. They are regulatory in nature and clearly prescribed. The provisions of the Act of 1988 only allow the Central Government to levy fee in respect of certain matters which are expressly enumerated therein. They are regulatory in nature and clearly prescribed. In addition, fee could be levied in lieu of certain services rendered on quid pro quo basis. 4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Act of 1988 does not empower the Central Government to levy any penalty or fine for an act or omission. The Legislature, it is contended, while enacting the Act of 1988 provided for offences, penalties and procedure under Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988. Any fine or penalty could be levied only under those provisions in the manner prescribed therein. In the absence of any penalty or fine provided in the parent enactment, i.e., the Act of 1988 for delayed submission of application for renewal of fitness certificate, the Central Government in the garb of rule making power for levy of fee, could not levy additional charge which is not fee, but in essence and substance, a fine or a penalty. Such substantive power has not been conferred on the Central Government under the provisions of the Act of 1988 or the rules framed thereunder. In support of their submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of The State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. K. Satyanarayana & Others, AIR 1968 SC 825 ; Bimal Chandra Banerjee Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh Etc., (1970) 2 SCC 467 ; Jantia Hill Truck Owners Association Vs. Shailang Area Coal Dealer & Truck Owner Association & Others, (2009) 8 SCC 492 ; B. Premanand & Others Vs. Mohan Koikal & Others, (2011) 4 SCC 266 ; State of M.P. & Others Vs. Rakesh Sethi & Anr., AIR 2020 SC 4156 ; Union of India Vs. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India & Others, (2020) 3 SCC 525 ; State of Goa Vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others, (2023) 7 SCC 791 ; Union of India & Others Vs. K. Pushpavanam & Others, AIR 2023 SC 3827 ; Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1841 and decision of Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City Auto Ootunargal Sangam Vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others, (2023) 7 SCC 791 ; Union of India & Others Vs. K. Pushpavanam & Others, AIR 2023 SC 3827 ; Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1841 and decision of Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City Auto Ootunargal Sangam Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways & Others, W.P. No. 1598 of 2017 and other connected matters decided on 03.04.2017. III. SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS: 5. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of respondents-Union of India and its authorities as also learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents-State and its authorities opposed the relief sought in the writ petitions. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India would firstly submit that the challenge to validity of Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, as amended vide notification dated 04.10.2021, has been made without any factual foundation and the challenge is in vacuum and, therefore, writ petitions are liable to be dismissed only on this ground. It is further contended that levy of additional fee is nothing, but part of the fee structure in the matter of grant of fitness certificate. Merely because some additional fee is being charged on delayed submission of applications for renewal of fitness certificates, it does not become a penalty or a fine. In fact, the regulatory mechanism under the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the rules framed thereunder by the competent authority like the Central Government and the State Government seeks to regulate operation of motor vehicles including the transport vehicles. It is argued that the Act of 1988 mandates that the vehicles have to remain in fit condition before they are allowed to operate on roads. Detailed provisions have been made in the Act of 1988 and the rules framed thereunder by the Central Government and the State Government to ensure that all those vehicles which are operated on roads comply with various safety conditions and also mandatory provisions to limit and control fuel emission which pollutes the environment. The regulatory mechanism requires a vehicle to be regularly tested as to whether it is fit to be operated on road in terms of the provisions contained in the Act of 1988 and the Rules of 1989. The regulatory mechanism requires a vehicle to be regularly tested as to whether it is fit to be operated on road in terms of the provisions contained in the Act of 1988 and the Rules of 1989. Thus, testing of vehicles and grant of fitness certificate being part of regulatory mechanism, no exception can be taken to levy of fee or additional fee. 6. According to learned Additional Solicitor General of India, notification dated 04.10.2021 incorporating amendment in Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 came into force with effect from 01.04.2022 after inviting objections. The power to levy fee is traceable to the provisions contained in Section 64, 210C(c) read with Section 211 of the Act of 1988. The Central Government and the State Governments are empowered to make rules under Section 64 and 65 respectively read with Section 110 of the Act of 1988. They are also empowered to provide for levy of fee for doing various acts such as processing application for issuance of fitness certificate, licence, permits etc. for which power is derived from Section 211 of the Act of 1988. Section 211 of the Act of 1988 specifies various services in the first category such as levy of fee in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits etc., however, in the later part of Section 211 of the Act of 1988, occurs the phrase, “for any other purpose or matter involving the rendering of any service” and accordingly, Section 211 of the Act of 1988 contains specific reference to involvement of rendering any service other than those mentioned in earlier part of Section 211 of the Act of 1988. Therefore, the rules can also be made for any other purpose. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India would further submit that Section 211 of the Act of 1988 uses phrase, “notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect” and hence, even if the said Section does not specifically provide for levy of additional fee, it is well within the power and authority of rule making body to prescribe for levy of additional fee. Since application/prayer for renewal of certificate is processed and considered even after expiry of period of renewal prescribed in the Act of 1988/the Rules of 1989, such rendering of services is covered by the phrase, “for any other purpose or matter involving the rendering of any service”, occurring in Section 211 of the Act of 1988 and, therefore, the rue making authority is well within its jurisdiction, power and authority to levy additional fee for processing delayed applications or prayers made for renewal of fitness certificates. Rendering of services cannot be the sole criterion for levy of fee as the distinction between a tax and fee has substantially been effaced in the development of constitutional jurisprudence as in the case of fee, exaction must be of truly voluntarily in nature. Before publication, mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 212 of the Act of 1988 was fully complied with. Notification dated 04.10.2021 as prescribed, was made available to the public for suggestions from the persons likely to be affected well within prescribed time span vide notification dated 15.03.2021. Since there were no suggestions received or objections raised by stakeholders in respect of the proposed amendment, the amendment was published. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India would further submit that the scheme of levy of fee satisfies the test of proportionality also. It is highlighted that the proposed action imposing additional fee was necessary for legitimate aim. Firstly, the primary objective of imposing additional fee is to encourage vehicle owners to renew their fitness certificates on time. Timely renewal of fitness certificates ensures that vehicles on the roads are legally registered and meet the necessary regulatory and safety requirements which helps in maintaining an up-to-date database of active vehicles essential for effective traffic management and law enforcement. Secondly, imposition of additional fee acts as a deterrent against delaying the renewal process. Thirdly, imposition of additional fee helps in enforcement of the Rules of 1989 relating to vehicle registrations and it sends a clear message that non-compliance of the rules will not be tolerated and there will be consequences of non-renewal of fitness certificates on time. 7. Secondly, imposition of additional fee acts as a deterrent against delaying the renewal process. Thirdly, imposition of additional fee helps in enforcement of the Rules of 1989 relating to vehicle registrations and it sends a clear message that non-compliance of the rules will not be tolerated and there will be consequences of non-renewal of fitness certificates on time. 7. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India as also learned Additional Advocate General referred to the provision contained in Section 210 C(c) of the Act of 1988 and highlighted that the said provision empowers the Central Government to frame rules regarding matters falling in Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 dealing with offences, penalties and procedure. Therefore, it is argued, the composite scheme of regulatory mechanism under the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the Rules of 1989 framed thereunder, legally and validly empowers the Central Government to levy additional fee in case of delayed submission of application for renewal of fitness certificate. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India has further emphasised that once the power of the Central Government is traceable to the provisions contained in Section 211, Section 64, Section 211 read with Section 210C of the Act of 1988, a harmonious construction is required and extended meaning has to be given to the statutory mandate so as to hold that notification was issued in valid exercise of powers conferred under the enabling Act. In support of their arguments, learned Additional Solicitor General of India as also learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bharat Singh & Others Vs. State of Haryana & Others, (1988) 4 SCC 534 ; Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners’ Association & Others Vs. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad & Another, (1999) 2 SCC 274 ; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others Vs. P.Laxmi Devi (Smt.), (2008) 4 SCC 720 ; M. Rathinaswami & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Others, (2009) 5 SCC 625 ; Delhi Race Club Limited Vs. Union of India & Others, (2012) 8 SCC 680 ; Dharmendra Kirthal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2013) 8 SCC 368 ; Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India & Others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary & Others), (2017) 9 SCC 1 ; Jalkal Vigbhag Nagar Nigam & Others Vs. Union of India & Others, (2012) 8 SCC 680 ; Dharmendra Kirthal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2013) 8 SCC 368 ; Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India & Others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary & Others), (2017) 9 SCC 1 ; Jalkal Vigbhag Nagar Nigam & Others Vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation & Another, (2021) 20 SCC 657 ; Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India Vs. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641 and decision of Bombay High Court in the case of ‘K’ Savakash Auto Rickshaw Sangha represented through its Trustee Mr. Pradeep Shankar Bhalerao Vs. Union of India through Ministry of Road Transport and Highways & Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 970. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully considered the rival submissions made in extenso. IV. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION: (A) STATUTORY SCHEME OF LEVY OF FEE UNDER THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 & THE CENTRAL MOTOR VEHICLES RULES, 1989: 9. We shall first refer to the provisions contained in the Rules of 1989 which is under challenge in these petitions. Vide notification dated 04.10.2021, the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 64 of the Act of 1988 amended the Rules of 1989. Amongst other provisions, Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 also underwent extensive amendment. While making amendment under various clauses of the said Rule prescribing fee for different purposes, Serial No. 11A was inserted after Serial No. 11 of Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989. Amongst other provisions, Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 also underwent extensive amendment. While making amendment under various clauses of the said Rule prescribing fee for different purposes, Serial No. 11A was inserted after Serial No. 11 of Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989. Notification dated 04.10.2021, as published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, is extracted as below: “ “MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 4th October, 2021 G.S.R. 714(E).-Whereas certain draft rules further to amend the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, were published, as required under subsection (1) of section 212 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), vide notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways number G.S.R. 191 (E), dated the 15th March, 2021, in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section (i), inviting objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be affected thereby before the expiry of the period of thirty days from the date on which copies of the Gazette containing the said notification were made available to the public; And, whereas, copies of the said Gazette notification were made available to the public on the 15th March, 2021; And, whereas, the objections and suggestions received from the public in respect of the said draft rules have been duly considered by the Central Government; Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules further to amend the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, namely:- RULES 1. Short title and commencement.-(1) These rules may be called the Central Motor Vehicles (Twenty Third Amendment) Rules, 2021. (2) They shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of April, 2022. 2. In the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the said rules), in rule 47, in sub-rule (1), after clause (m), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:- “(n) Certificate of Deposit, if available: Explanation: For the purposes of these rules, the expression “Certificate of Deposit” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (c) of subrule (1) of rule 3 of the Motor Vehicles (Registration and Functions of Vehicle Scrapping Facility) Rules, 2021.”. 3. 3. In the said rules, in rule 81,- (i) after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:- “Provided further that, in case the vehicle is registered on submission of ‘Certificate of Deposit’, the fee for issue of certificate of registration shall not be levied.”; (ii) in the TABLE,- (a) For serial number (4) and the entries relating thereto, the following shall be substituted, namely:- Sr. No. Purpose Amount Rule Section (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) “4. Issue of certificates of registration and assignment of new registration mark or renewal of certificate of registration:- 47(1) 52(1) 54(1) 76(1) 78(1) (a) Invalid carriage Fifty rupees (b) Motor cycle: (1) New registration (2) Renewal of registration (1) Three hundred rupees (2) One thousand rupees (c)Three wheeler/ Quadricycle: (1) New registration (2) Renewal of registration (1) Six hundred rupees (2) Two thousand five hundred rupees (d) Light motor vehicle: (1) New registration (2) Renewal of registration (1) Six hundred rupees (2) Five thousand rupees (e) Medium Goods/Passenger vehicle (f) Heavy Goods/Passenger vehicle One thousand rupees One thousand five hundred rupees (g) Imported motor vehicle (Two or Three wheeled): (1) New registration (2) Renewal of registration (1) Two thousand five hundred rupees (2) Ten thousand rupees (h) Imported motor vehicle (Four or more wheeled): (1) New registration (2) Renewal of registration (1) Five thousand rupees (2) Forty thousand rupees (i) Any other vehicle not mentioned above: (1) New Registration (2) Renewal of registration (1) Three thousand rupees (2) Six thousand rupees Note 1: Additional fee or two hundred rupees shall be levied if the certificate of registration is a smart card type issued or renewed in Form 23A. Note 2: In case of delay in applying for renewal of certificate of registration, an additional fee of three hundred rupees for delay of every month or part thereof in respect of motor cycles and five hundred rupees for delay of every month or part thereof in respect of other classes of non-transport vehicles shall be levied.”; (b) after serial number (10) and the entries relating thereto, the following shall be inserted, namely:- “10A. Conducting test of a vehicle for grant and renewal of certificate of fitness for motor vehicles older than 15 years: 62(2) (a) Motorcycle (i) Manual: Four hundred rupees (ii) Automated: Five hundred rupees (b) Three wheeled or light motor vehicle or quadricycle (i) Manual: Eight hundred rupees (ii) Automated: One thousand rupees (c) Medium goods or passenger motor vehicle (i) Manual: Eight hundred rupees (ii) Automated: One thousand three hundred rupees (d) Heavy goods or passenger motor vehicle (i) Manual: One thousand rupees (ii) Automated: One thousand five hundred rupees.”; (c) after serial number (11) and the entries relating thereto, the following shall be inserted, namely:- “11A. Grant or renewal of certificate of fitness for motor vehicles (transport) older than 15 years: 62(2) (a) Motorcycle One thousand rupees (b) Three wheeled or quadricycle Three thousand five hundred rupees (c) light motor vehicle Seven thousand five hundred rupees (d) Medium goods or passenger motor vehicle Ten thousand rupees (e) Heavy goods or passenger motor vehicle Twelve thousand five hundred rupees Note: Additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness shall be levied.”. [No. RT-23013/2/2021-T] Amit Varadan, Jt. Secy. Note: The principal rules were published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section(i) vide notification number G.S.R. 590(E), dated the 2nd June, 1989 and last amended vide notification number G.S.R. 676(E), dated the 29th September, 2021.” 10. The challenge in these petitions is in the matter of renewal of certificate of fitness for transport motor vehicles older than 15 years, for which different slabs of fee have been provided in respect of motorcycle, three wheeled or quadricycle, light motor vehicle, medium goods or passenger motor vehicle and heavy goods or passenger motor vehicles. A note has been appended thereto which provides that additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness shall be levied. It is this levy of additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness which is under challenge in these petitions. 11. The Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. It repealed the earlier Motor Vehicles Act, 1929. 11. The Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. It repealed the earlier Motor Vehicles Act, 1929. The legislation of Motor Vehicles, enacted by the Parliament, is referable to entry 35 of List-III (Concurrent List) of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Act of 1988 is a comprehensive legislation dealing with all the aspects relating to operations, maintenance, registration, licence, insurance, claims adjudication, penalties and levy of fee in so far as motor vehicles are concerned. Provisions have been made in the Act of 1988 with regard to licence, registration, control of motor vehicles including transport vehicles. In Addition, provisions have also been made in the Act of 1988 with regard to control of traffic, construction, equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles. The Act of 1988 also provides for insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks. For adjudication of claims, provisions have been made in the Act of 1988 for establishment of Claims Tribunals. Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 provides for offences, penalties and procedure. 12. Amongst various provisions, Chapter IV of the Act of 1988 deals with registration of motor vehicles. Section 56 of the Act of 1988 mandates that subject to the provisions of Sections 59 and 60 of the Act of 1988, a transport vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered for the purposes of Section 39, unless it carries a certificate of fitness in such form containing such particulars and information as may be prescribed by the Central Government, issued by the prescribed authority, or by an authorised testing station mentioned in sub-section (2), to the effect that the vehicle complies for the time being with all the requirements of the Act of 1988 and the rules made thereunder. Therefore, every transport motor vehicle is mandatorily required to be possessed of fitness certificate without which it shall not be deemed to be validly registered, meaning thereby that it cannot ply on road. Section 64 of the Act of 1988 empowers the Central Government to make rules to provide for matters enumerated therein, particularly the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Act of 1988 relating to registration of motor vehicles. Section 64 of the Act of 1988 empowers the Central Government to make rules to provide for matters enumerated therein, particularly the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Act of 1988 relating to registration of motor vehicles. In particular, the Central Government is empowered to frame rules providing for fee to be charged for issuance or renewal of fitness certificate of motor vehicles. Clause (o) of Section 64 of the Act of 1988 reads as under: “64. Power of Central Government to make rules.— The Central Government may make rules to provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— (a) …… (b) …… (o) the fees to be charged for the issue or renewal or alteration of certificates of registration, for making an entry regarding transfer of ownership on a certificate of registration, for making or cancelling an endorsement in respect of agreement of hire-purchase or lease or hypothecation on a certificate of registration, for certificates of fitness for registration marks, and for the examination or inspection of motor vehicles, and the refund of such fees. (oa) ……… (ob) …….. (p) ……….” 13. The authority to levy fee for issuance of fitness certificate is, therefore, traceable to the provisions contained in Clause (o) of Section 64 of the Act of 1988. 14. Under every chapter of the Act of 1988, various provisions have been made with regard to registration, licence and other matters in respect of motor vehicles and corresponding power to make rules in respect of the matters enumerated in that particular chapter has been conferred on both Central Government as well as State Government. 15. Section 211 contains provisions generally empowering the Central Government to levy fee. For ready reference, Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is reproduced as below: “211. 15. Section 211 contains provisions generally empowering the Central Government to levy fee. For ready reference, Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is reproduced as below: “211. Power to levy fee.- Any rule which the Central Government or the State Government is empowered to make under this Act may, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect, provide for the levy of such fees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates, countersignatures, authorisation, supply of statistics or copies of documents or orders and for any other purpose or matter involving the rendering of any service by the officers or authorities under this Act or any rule made thereunder as may be considered necessary: Provided that the Government may, if it considers necessary so to do, in the public interest, by general or special order, exempt any class of persons from the payment of any such fee either in part or in full.” 16. A reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that though the Central Government and State Government have been empowered to make rules in respect of the matters enumerated in the particular chapter wherein power to make rule has been delegated by the Parliament to the Central Government as well as State Government. Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is in the nature of residuary power to levy fee conferred on the Central as well as State Government. It provides that any rule which the Central Government or the State Government is empowered to make under the Act of 1988 may, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect, provide for the levy of such fees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits, etc. and for any other purpose or matter involving the rendering of any service by the officers or authorities under the Act of 1988 or any rule made thereunder as may be considered necessary. The proviso appended to Section 211 of the Act of 1988 empowers the Government to exempt any class of persons from the payment of any such fee either in part or in full, if considered necessary in public interest by issuing a general or special order. 17. The proviso appended to Section 211 of the Act of 1988 empowers the Government to exempt any class of persons from the payment of any such fee either in part or in full, if considered necessary in public interest by issuing a general or special order. 17. In exercise of its rule making power, the Central Government has framed the Rules of 1989 providing for all those matters as enumerated under the provisions of the Act of 1988. Rule 81 of the Act of 1988 provides for fee which shall be charged under the provisions of Chapter III of the Rules of 1989 dealing with registration of motor vehicles including trade certificate, registration, certificate of fitness and State register of motor vehicles. Rule 62 to Rule 74 of the Rules of 1989 deal with certificate of fitness. The period of validity of certificate of fitness has been prescribed under Rule 62 of the Rules of 1989. Different periods of validity have been prescribed for new transport vehicles and the vehicles which are not new. Rule 63 of the Rules of 1989 provides for regulation and control of authorised testing stations. Rule 63 to Rule 74 of the Rules of 1989 lay down regulatory mechanism in respect of authorised testing stations. (B) LEVY OF ADDITIONAL FEE IS ULTRA VIRES RULE MAKING POWER: 18. Unquestionably, Section 64, Clause (o) of the Act of 1988 read with Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 empowers the Central Government to frame the rules providing for levy of fee in the matter of issuance and renewal of fitness certificates for motor vehicles including transport motor vehicles. In that context, the provisions contained in Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, in various columns, referred to hereinabove, prescribe fee for grant or renewal of certificate of fitness for motor vehicles older than 15 years as provided under newly inserted Clause 11A to Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989. However, in the note appended to Clause 11A, it has been provided that an additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness shall be levied. This means that in case where a certificate of fitness of transport motor vehicle has expired and the same has not been renewed before its expiry, the levy in the nature of additional fee of rupees fifty for each day of delay is provided. This means that in case where a certificate of fitness of transport motor vehicle has expired and the same has not been renewed before its expiry, the levy in the nature of additional fee of rupees fifty for each day of delay is provided. Therefore, the question which arises for consideration is whether charging additional levy of fee for delay in seeking renewal after expiry of the validity of certificate of fitness is in the nature of fee or an impost in the nature of fine or penalty. 19. Normally, when an application for grant or renewal of certificate of fitness of motor vehicle is presented, the provisions contained in Section 64, Clause (o) of the Act of 1988 clearly empowers the Central Government that the fee could be levied for issuance of certificate of fitness. This would include renewal also. But where the owner of a transport vehicle fails to get the certificate of fitness renewed before expiry of its validity, whether it empowers the Central Government to levy a fee only for rendering services or for issuance of certificate of fitness upon failure to seek renewal of certificate of fitness before expiry of its validity and can it be said that the Central Government has acted beyond its rule making authority to levy a fee for a purpose not otherwise enumerated under Section 64, Clause (o) or under any other provisions of the Act of 1988. 20. In a recent authoritative pronouncement in the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), dealing with competence of the Bar Council of India towards charging of fee by framing rules in exercise of power of delegated legislation, their Lordships in the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that although delegated legislation enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, it does not enjoy the same immunity as the parent legislation. Referring to settled legal position laid down in plethora of decisions including Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , it was declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that delegated legislation can be challenged on the following grounds: “28. Referring to settled legal position laid down in plethora of decisions including Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , it was declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that delegated legislation can be challenged on the following grounds: “28. ………..: (i) lack of legislative competence to make delegated legislation; (ii) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution; (iii) violation of any provision of the Constitution; (iv) failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act; (v) repugnance to any other enactment; and (vi) manifest arbitrariness.” Challenge to the impugned rule to the extent it provides for levy of additional fee for delay in applying for renewal after expiry of validity period of certificate of fitness of motor vehicle is under challenge in present petitions on the ground of failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or that it exceeds the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act, i.e., the Act of 1988. 21. The constitutional and legal position with regard to power to levy fee also fell for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra). In the above decision, reference was made to three Judge Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. McDowell & Co. Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 755 which enunciated the principles for interpreting Article 265 read with Article 266(28) of the Constitution of India as below: “31. ………. 21. "Tax", "duty", "cess" or "fee" constituting a class denotes various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression denotes different kinds of impost depending on the purpose for which they are levied. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestations only under any law authorising levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the expression that no "tax" shall be levied and collected except authorised by law. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestations only under any law authorising levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the expression that no "tax" shall be levied and collected except authorised by law. It in its elementary meaning conveys that to support a tax legislative action is essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union or Article 162 by the State.” It was further enunciated as below: “32. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution differentiates between taxing entries and general entries. Subjects pertaining to the levy of taxes must be traced to specific taxing entries enumerated in either List I or List II. In addition, Parliament has the residuary power under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I to legislate on matters not enumerated in List II or List III, including on matters of taxation. The power of the legislature to levy fees is dealt with under separate heads: (i) Entry 96 of List I empowers Parliament to levy fees in respect of any matters in List I; (ii) Entry 66 of List II empowers the State legislatures to levy fees in respect of any matters in List II and (iii) Entry 47 of List III empowers both Parliament and the State legislatures (subject to Article 254) to levy fees for any matter enumerated in List III. Parliament has prescribed an enrolment fee under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act under Entry 96 of List I.” 22. The principle with regard to levy of fee generally was also discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as below: “33. The legislature can delegate its power to levy fees. Since a fee is an impost and a compulsory exaction of money, the power of a delegate to levy fees must flow from the express authority of law. In Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla this Court observed: "7.[...] In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope for implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. In Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla this Court observed: "7.[...] In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope for implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power." 34. The principles that flow from the above discussion are: (i) a fee is an impost in terms of Article 366(28); (ii) the expression "tax" occurring in Article 265 means all imposts, including fees and therefore any fee must be levied by the authority of a valid law; (iii) fees being a compulsory exaction of money, the power to levy fees cannot be implied; (iv) delegation of the power to levy fees to a delegate of the legislature should be specifically provided for under the parent legislation and (v) the delegate must strictly act within the parameters of the legislative policy laid down by the parent legislation when levying fees and taxes.” 23. The nature of impost as regulatory fee was discussed and explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with reference to earlier decisions as below: “35. Article 110 of the Constitution, though in a different context, recognizes that that fees imposed under the authority of law may include (i) fees for licences; and (ii) fees for service. In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, a Constitution Bench explained the concept of licence fees thus: "47. [...] In the first class of cases, the Government simply grants a permission or privilege to a person to do something, which otherwise that person would not be competent to do and extracts fees either heavy or moderate from that person in return for the privilege that is conferred. A most common illustration of this type of cases is furnished by the licence fees for motor vehicles. A most common illustration of this type of cases is furnished by the licence fees for motor vehicles. Here the costs incurred by the Government in maintaining an office or bureau for the granting of licences may be very small and the amount of imposition that is levied is based really not upon the costs incurred by the Government but upon the benefit that the individual receives. In such cases, according to all the writers on public finance, the tax element is predominant, and if the money paid by the licence-holders goes for the upkeep of roads and other matters of general public utility, the licence fee cannot but be regarded as a tax" In Shirur Mutt (supra), it was held that a fee is money taken by the Government "as the return for the work done or services rendered." Therefore, a fee was characterised by an element of quid pro quo between the payer and the public authority. 36. In a series of subsequent decisions, this Court held that a levy can be regarded as a fee if it has a "reasonable relationship" with services rendered by the public authority. The traditional view that there must be an actual quid pro quo for a fee has not been applied in the strict sense in subsequent decisions of this Court. It has been held that the relationship between the levy of a fee and services rendered is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. 37. In Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, a Constitution Bench observed that licence fees are not necessarily charged in return for services rendered. This Court referred to a Privy Council decision which inter alia held that licence fees could be charged to defray the costs of administering the local regulations. In Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners’ Association v. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, this Court observed that licence fees could broadly be classified as either regulatory or compensatory. It was observed that licence fees are regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given are required to be regulated or controlled. It was further held that the fees charged for regulation of activities could be validly classified as fees although no service is rendered. It was observed that licence fees are regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given are required to be regulated or controlled. It was further held that the fees charged for regulation of activities could be validly classified as fees although no service is rendered. A regulatory fee such as a licence fee enables authorities to supervise, regulate, and monitor the activity related to which the licence has been issued and to secure proper enforcement of the legal provisions.” 24. From the enunciation of law as recapitulated from legal position propounded in various decisions referred to hereinabove, it is abundantly clear that since a fee is an impost and in a give case, a compulsory exaction of money, the power of a delegate to levy fee must flow from the express authority of law. Such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope for implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. The delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and there is no scope to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. 25. It is also settled principle that the fee imposed under the authority of law may include (i) fee for licence and (ii) fee for service. In case of levy of fee for licence, the Government simply grants a permission or privilege to a person to do something, which otherwise that person would not be competent to do and extracts fees either heavy or moderate from that person in return for the privilege that is conferred. Levy of fee for issuance of licence for motor vehicles is an incidence of such regulatory fee. The costs incurred by the Government in maintaining an office or bureau for the granting of licences may be very small and in case the amount of imposition that is levied is based really not upon the costs incurred by the Government but upon the benefit that the individual receives, in such cases, the tax element is predominant, and if the money paid by the licence-holders goes for the upkeep of roads and other matters of general public utility, the licence fee cannot but be regarded as a tax. (as held in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) 1 SCC 412). In was held in the aforesaid case that a fee is money taken by the Government “as the return for the work done or services rendered.” Therefore, a fee was characterised by an element of quid pro quo between the payer and the public authority. 26. However, in several decisions, the evolution of principle with regard to quid pro quo as the feature characteristic of fee, it has been held that a levy can be regarded as a fee if it has a “reasonable relationship” with services rendered by the public authority. The traditional view that there must be an actual quid pro quo for a fee has not been applied in the strict sense in subsequent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held that the relationship between the levy of a fee and services rendered is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. Further, in the case of H H Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 302, it was observed that a levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of service. If with a view to provide a specific service, levy is imposed by law and expenses for maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there being a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses incurred for rendering the service, the levy would be in the nature of a fee and not in the nature of a tax. 27. In another Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of Calcutta Vs. Liberty Cinema, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65, it was observed that licence fees are not necessarily charged in return for services rendered and licence fees could be charged to defray the costs of administering the local regulations. 28. In the case of Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners’ Association & Others Vs. Liberty Cinema, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65, it was observed that licence fees are not necessarily charged in return for services rendered and licence fees could be charged to defray the costs of administering the local regulations. 28. In the case of Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners’ Association & Others Vs. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad & Another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that licence fees could broadly be classified as either regulatory or compensatory. It was further observed that licence fees are regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given are required to be regulated or controlled. It was also held that the fees charged for regulation of activities could be validly classified as fees although no service is rendered. 29. Keeping in forefront the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decisions and pronouncement of law referred to and relied upon in the decision of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), we shall now examine with reference to the statutory scheme of the Act of 1988, particularly the provisions relating to levy of fee as to whether the levy of additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of the validity period of certificate of fitness is a fee either in the nature of being a regulatory fee or in the nature of fee for rendering service on quid quo pro basis, having reasonable relation with the services rendered or it is in the nature of a fine or penalty for failing to apply and not getting renewed the certificate of fitness before expiry of its validity. 30. A motor vehicle cannot be allowed to operate on roads unless various statutory compliances and regulatory measures as provided under the Act of 1988 read with the Rules of 1989 are fulfilled. Section 39 of the Act of 1988 declares that no person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with the Chapter IV of the Act of 1988 and the certificate of registration of the vehicle has not been suspended or cancelled and the vehicle carries a registration mark displayed in the prescribed manner. Section 56 of the Act of 1988 mandates that every transport motor vehicle to be plied on road must carry a certificate of fitness as provided under the law. It clearly provides that a transport motor vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered for the purposes of section 39, unless it carries a certificate of fitness in the manner prescribed under the law. Thus, a conjoint reading of Sections 39 and 56 of the Act of 1988 makes it clear that if a transport motor vehicle does not carry a certificate of fitness as required under the law, the vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered and, therefore, plying of that vehicle on the road would be prohibited under Section 39 of the Act of 1988. 31. The provisions contained in Section 56 of the Act of 1988 are regulatory in nature as it regulates plying of a transport motor vehicle on road only when the vehicle is otherwise certified to be fit in all respects under the norms provided in the law. A certificate of fitness may be issued either by the prescribed authority or by authorised testing station. Moreover, it provides that such certificate shall remain effective for such period as may be prescribed by the Central Government. The prescribed authority has been empowered to cancel a certificate of fitness at any time if it is satisfied that the vehicle, to which it relates, no longer complies with all the requirements made under the Act of 1988 and the rules made thereunder and on such cancellation, the certificate of registration shall also be deemed to be suspended until a new certificate of fitness is obtained. 32. In exercise of its rule making power, the Central Government has made provisions in the Rules of 1989 providing for issuance and renewal of a certificate of fitness. Rules 62 to 73 of the Rules of 1989 deal with the procedure and regulatory mechanism of certificate of fitness. Rule 62 of the Rules of 1989, provides for issuance of certificate of fitness or renewal thereof for a period in different situations. It further provides that renewal of a fitness certificate shall be made only after an inspecting officer or authorised testing station has carried out tests specified as per the Rules of 1989. It contains number of details and check lists which are required to be verified. It further provides that renewal of a fitness certificate shall be made only after an inspecting officer or authorised testing station has carried out tests specified as per the Rules of 1989. It contains number of details and check lists which are required to be verified. There are provisions which regulate and control operation of authorised testing stations also. 33. It is, thus, clear that in the matter of issuance of certificate of fitness, an element of service is involved. Issuance of certificate of fitness confers a benefit on certificate holder to ply the vehicle on road. Levy of fee for issuance of fitness certificate as provided under Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, therefore, appears to have reasonable correlation with the services rendered and satisfies the requirement of quid pro quo. 34. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India, by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jalkal Vigbhag Nagar Nigam & Others Vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation & Another (supra), is right in submitting that distinction between a tax and a fee has substantially been effaced in the development of our constitutional jurisprudence and there need not be any exact correlation between the expenditure which is incurred in providing a service and the amount which is realised by the State. A broad correlation would provide justification for levying a fee for providing a service or in defraying expenses of maintaining regulatory mechanism provided it is not excessive. A fee may involve an element of compulsion and need not be of voluntary in nature in all cases. On such consideration, levying of fee for issuance of certificate of fitness, no doubt, is not only a particular amount of fee as provided in Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 for the purposes of issuance of certificate of fitness with varying slabs for different kinds of vehicles, but also a valid piece of delegated legislation. Levy of fee for issuance of certificate of fitness is expressly authorised under Section 64(o) of the Act of 1988. 35. A wide power for levying fee is also engrafted under Section 211 of the Act of 1988. The aforesaid provision came up for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. & Others Vs. Rakesh Sethi & Anr. (supra). 35. A wide power for levying fee is also engrafted under Section 211 of the Act of 1988. The aforesaid provision came up for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. & Others Vs. Rakesh Sethi & Anr. (supra). Analysing the scope and ambit of Section 211 of the Act of 1988, it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court thus: “29. This Court is of the opinion that the High Court, in its impugned judgement, lost sight of the true import of Section 211. The existence of specific provisions empowering the State (such as Sections 41(13), 47(7), 49(4) and 50(5)), means that the power of the State to claim or charge amounts is specifically recognized by express provisions. Further, there are certain services and functions for which the State is empowered to levy fees. It is precisely to cover these contingencies, i.e. where the service is rendered or some function performed, that the State is empowered by a residual provision (much like the Central Government with which it shares the power concurrently) to levy fees. In this respect, it would be useful to note that Section 211 is cast in wide terms and that any rule which the Central Government or the State Government is empowered to make under this Act may, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect, provide for the levy of such fees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates, counter- signatures, authorisation, supply of statistics or copies of documents or orders and for any other purpose or matter involving the rendering of any service. Clearly, therefore, the Parliament intended that contingencies not covered by a specific power to levy fees or amounts, which entailed some activity on the part of the State, including rendering of any service could be legitimately charged or subjected to the levy of fee or amounts.” 36. The residuary power reserved with the Central Government under Section 211 can be taken recourse to levy any other regulatory/compensatory fee. The aforesaid provision, however, does not constitute a source of authority to levy anything which is not in the nature of fee. 37. The residuary power reserved with the Central Government under Section 211 can be taken recourse to levy any other regulatory/compensatory fee. The aforesaid provision, however, does not constitute a source of authority to levy anything which is not in the nature of fee. 37. However, if the provision impugned in these petitions is analysed, it is found that an additional charge of fifty rupees under the nomenclature “additional fee” is leviable for each day after expiry of validity of certificate of fitness, declaring it to be a case of delay. Therefore, charge of additional fifty rupees does not bear any correlation with the services rendered, nor there is anything under the provisions of the Act of 1988 or relevant rules relating to issuance of certificate of fitness to reveal that if application for renewal is not filed before expiry of the period of fitness certificate, any additional exercise, over and above what is required to be undertaken while granting or renewing a fitness certificate before expiry of its validity, would be required to be undertaken. Neither there is any provision contained in Section 56 of the Act of 1988, nor the provisions contained in Rules 62 to 73 of the Rules of 1989, which delineate as to what difference would it make if an application for renewal is filed before expiry of the validity of the certificate of fitness or after the expiry, may be one day, few days, weeks or months. There is conscious use of the word, “delay”, which denotes that according to rule making authority, there is a mandate under the law to get the certificate of fitness renewed before its expiry. However, we do not find either in the provisions contained in Section 56 of the Act of 1988 or in any of the relevant rules referred to hereinabove which obliges the owner of the transport vehicle to get the certificate of fitness renewed before expiry of the validity period, much less any penal consequences flowing from such failure to get the certificate of fitness renewed before its expiry. We have gone through the provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 which deals with offences, penalties and procedure. We have gone through the provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 which deals with offences, penalties and procedure. There is no punitive provision contained therein which declares that if the certificate of fitness is not renewed before its expiry, delay will invite any penalty or fine or that the delay would constitute any offence. 38. What may be the contravention of the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the Rules of 1989 would be that where the validity of fitness certificate of a transport vehicle has expired and without getting it renewed in accordance with law, the transport vehicle owner plies that transport vehicle in any public place or any other place. In view of the provisions contained in Section 39 and 56 of the Act of 1988, in the absence of a valid fitness certificate, that transport vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered and without valid registration, plying of vehicle on road is prohibited under Section 39 of the Act of 1988. 39. There is no provision under the Act of 1988 mandating renewal of certificate of fitness before expiry, nor penalty or fine has been provided under the substantive law, in the event of failure to seek renewal of fitness certificate before expiry. Under the rule making power, as conferred under Section 64 or Section 65 of the Act of 1988, neither the Central Government, nor the State Government have been conferred any power to levy fine or penalty for not getting fitness certificate renewed before its expiry. Therefore, charging additional fee of fifty rupees for each day after expiry of validity of fitness certificate does not bear any correlation with rendering services but it seeks to penalise the transport owner for his failure in getting the certificate of fitness renewed before its expiry. Use of the word, “delay” has to be understood in this context. Therefore, additional charge for every day after the expiry of the fitness certificate is punitive and partakes the nature of fine or penalty. 40. One could understand that non-renewal before expiry of the certificate of fitness is declared to be in contravention inviting fine or penalty under the substantive law and the power conferred on the Central Government to prescribe the rate of fine or penalty as delegate of Legislature through rule making exercise. 40. One could understand that non-renewal before expiry of the certificate of fitness is declared to be in contravention inviting fine or penalty under the substantive law and the power conferred on the Central Government to prescribe the rate of fine or penalty as delegate of Legislature through rule making exercise. However, there is no express authority conferred under Section 64 of the Act of 1988 on the Central Government to levy something in the nature of fine or penalty in a contingency where an owner of transport vehicle fails to get fitness certificate renewed before its expiry. Characteristically, fee and fine are two different kinds of levy. While purpose of levying fee is to provide service or as a regulatory control, the purpose of fee is punishment for some contravention and as a measure of deterrence. In case of fee, there is implied or direct service exchange either compensatory or regulatory, but in cases of fine, there is no service or benefit provided. Fine is punitive in nature and imposed as punishment without there being any reciprocal benefit to the payer and is primarily aimed at deterrence. Penalty is broader concept which also is in the nature of punishment and serves as deterrence, it can be monetary and non-monetary. Moreover, fine and penalty are involuntary in nature. Fine/penalty proceeds on the premise that there has been violation or contravention of law and, therefore, one is required to pay fine or face penalty. It is imposed as a consequence of violating rules or laws and there is no element of quid pro quo and unlike, fees, fines are not linked to any service or benefit. Even in cases where the fees are regulatory in nature in the sense that they are involuntary, it is not imposed as penalty and the punitive element is absent. 41. We have dealt with the settled legal position that the Government acts as a delegate of Legislature in exercise of its rule making power and it cannot travel beyond the express authority conferred on it by the Legislature. In the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the power of the Bar Council of India to levy fee in exercise of power of delegated legislation, relying upon its decision in the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail Vs. In the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the power of the Bar Council of India to levy fee in exercise of power of delegated legislation, relying upon its decision in the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail Vs. State of H.P., (2000) 3 SCC 40 , held thus: “58. While acting as a delegate of Parliament, the SBCs and the BCI can frame rules under the Advocates Act. However, any rule enacted by the SBCs is only ancillary and cannot be so exercised to bring into existence substantive rights, obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the parent enactment. Further, the rules must align with the object and purpose of the Advocates Act, namely, the creation of a common bar and regulation of legal practitioners and their qualifications, enrolment, right to practice, and discipline.” In the above case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), it has been further explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as below: “59. A legislation can confer the power to make subordinate legislation upon a delegate. In conferring such powers, the legislation has to specifically law down the policy, principles, and standards that will guide the subordinate authority. The legislative policy can be determined from the preamble and the provisions of an enactment. The delegate derives its legislative powers from the parent statute. Unlike the Legislature, which has sovereign legislative powers derived from the Constitution, the delegated authority is conferred powers by the parent enactment. Therefore, delegated authority must strictly conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed. A delegate cannot alter or change the legislative policy. A delegate cannot override the provisions of the parent enactment either by exceeding the legislative policy or making provisions inconsistent with the enactment.”. 42. Therefore, by charging additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay in seeking renewal after expiry of the validity period of fitness certificate, something in the nature of fine or penalty is sought to be imposed that too without any valid authority of law and in the garb of power to levy fee. Levy of additional fee for each day of delay does not bear any correlation or connection with expenses in administering the regulations to say that the fee could be levied purely as a regulatory measure. Levy of additional fee for each day of delay does not bear any correlation or connection with expenses in administering the regulations to say that the fee could be levied purely as a regulatory measure. Therefore, it cannot even be treated as a part of regulatory measure. In the case of State of U.P. & Others vs. Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. & Others, AIR 2003 SC 4650 , the aforesaid legal position was explained thus: “44. The question is (to borrow the language in Synthetics) whether in the garb of regulations a legislation which is in pith and substance, as we look upon the instant legislation, a fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or expenses administering the regulation, can be imposed purely as a regulatory measure. Judged by the pith and substance of the impugned legislation, we are definitely of the opinion that these levies cannot be treated as part of regulatory measures." The State has not produced any material to show that it was incurring any additional cost for any further regulation of denatured spirit. Any trace of a lingering doubt as to the propriety of the levy under R. 3(a) must be taken to have been noted off effectively with the order passed by three-Judges of this Court in the writ petition filed by Synthetics challenging the same levy as we have noted earlier. That order has resulted in granting Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. relief from payment under R. 3(a). The only distinction between the present respondents' cases and Synthetics was that the respondents chose to challenge the levy before the High Court. That could be no rational basis for denying the respondents who are otherwise identically situated, the same relief. (See Anil Kumar Neotia v. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 587). In the absence of any such correlation the fee under R. 3 is not a fee at all levied for the purpose of additional regulation or for any service rendered but is really a tax in the garb of a fee.” 43. What, therefore, the provision of levy of additional fee seeks to do is to adopt a punitive measure for not getting fitness certificate renewed before its expiry. A provision of late fee is in the nature of fine or penalty. In the case of Union of India Vs. What, therefore, the provision of levy of additional fee seeks to do is to adopt a punitive measure for not getting fitness certificate renewed before its expiry. A provision of late fee is in the nature of fine or penalty. In the case of Union of India Vs. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India & Others (supra), a provision of late fee, in case a customer fails to pay the bill within due date, was treated as penalty. Following pertinent observations were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “146. Late fee is a penalty charged by the licensee in case customer fails to pay the bill within the due date. Sometimes late fee is waived off by the licensee as a goodwill gesture at the time of payment. The submission raised on behalf of the licensee is that the licence fee should be payable on the realised revenue. What has not been realised, cannot form part of revenue.” 44. In fact, the reply/counter affidavit filed by the respondent- Union of India in the case of Raja Ram & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6428/2024) states that the proposed action of imposing additional fee was considered necessary, amongst other things, as a deterrent against delaying the renewal process. The relevant extracts of the reply filed in the above writ petition are reproduced hereinabelow: “……. (ii) the proposed action of imposing additional fees was necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim, as described as under: a) Timely Renewal: The primary objective of imposing additional fees is to encourage vehicle owners to renew their Fitness Certificates on time. Timely renewal ensures that vehicles on the roads are legally registered and meet the necessary regulatory and safety requirements. This helps in maintaining an up-to-date database of active vehicles, which is essential for effective traffic management and law enforcement. b) Promoting Compliance: The imposition of additional fees acts as a deterrent against delaying the renewal process. It encourages the vehicle owners to comply with the legal requirements of renewing their RCs within the specified time frame. This helps in reducing the number of vehicles operating with expired registrations, which can pose safety risks and lead to legal complications. c) Enforcement of Rules: The imposition of additional fees helps in enforcing the Central Motor Vehicles Rules relating to vehicle registrations. This helps in reducing the number of vehicles operating with expired registrations, which can pose safety risks and lead to legal complications. c) Enforcement of Rules: The imposition of additional fees helps in enforcing the Central Motor Vehicles Rules relating to vehicle registrations. It sends a clear message that non-compliance of the Rules will not be tolerated and that there will be consequences of non-renewing the Fitness Certificate on time.” 45. From the reply filed by the respondent-Union of India, the policy behind levy of additional fee which includes as one of its objectives as deterrent object itself makes the provision punitive. In the absence of there being a legislative policy under the Act of 1988 mandating renewal of fitness certificate before its expiry, what has been stated as objective behind levying additional fee shows that the rule making authority has gone beyond its rule making power to insist on renewal before expiry of the certificate of fitness. As we have already held hereinabove that non-renewal before expiry of fitness certificate by itself does not result in contravention of the provisions of law, but it is only when a vehicle without registration certificate is plied on road, the violation of law takes place. 46. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India has laid much emphasis on the provisions contained in Section 210C(c) and Section 211 of the Act of 1988 to firstly submit that in view of wide powers conferred on the Central Government under Section 211 of the Act of 1988 to levy any other fee for the purposes of the Act, challenge to levy of additional fee for delay in renewal of fitness certificate could not be sustained on the ground that the levy is ultra vires Section 64 of the Act of 1988. Alternative submission of learned Additional Solicitor General of India is that even if the levy is punitive in nature, as a measure of deterrent, in any case after insertion of Section 110C, which finds place in Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 relating to offences, penalties and procedure, the power of the Central Government extends to making such a provision as a deterrent measure to ensure that owners of the transport vehicles get fitness certificates renewed before expiry. Placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of M. Rathinaswami & Others Vs. Placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of M. Rathinaswami & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Others(supra); Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others Vs. P.Laxmi Devi (Smt.) and Dharmendra Kirthal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another(supra), it is contended that harmonious interpretation of the provisions contained in Sections 64, 210C and 211 of the Act of 1988 has to be drawn which empower the Central Government to make such provision. 47. True it is that Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is couched in very wide words and is a source of residuary power in the hands of the Central Government to levy fee in exercise of the rule making power notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect in any other provision of the Act of 1988. However, the controlling and qualifying clause in Section 211 of the Act of 1988 makes it clear that such wide power can be exercised for levy of such fees in respect of applications, amendments of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates, countersignatures, authorisation, supply of statistics or copies of documents or orders and for any other purpose or matter involving rendering of any service by the officers and authorities under the Act of 1988 or any other rule made thereunder as may be considered necessary. Therefore, the power, howsoever wide it can be, has to be exercised for the purpose of levy a fee. We have already referred to hereinabove the interpretation placed on Section 211 of the Act of 1988 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. & Others Vs. Rakesh Sethi & Anr. (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Parliament intended that contingencies not covered by a specific power to levy fees or amounts, which entailed some activity on the part of the State, including rendering of any service could be legitimately charged or subjected to the levy of fees or amounts. That means, impost has necessarily to be in the nature of fee. Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is not a source of authority for levying any punitive charge or fine or penalty on the basis of any failure to do something which otherwise is not provided under the scheme of the Act of 1988. 48. That means, impost has necessarily to be in the nature of fee. Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is not a source of authority for levying any punitive charge or fine or penalty on the basis of any failure to do something which otherwise is not provided under the scheme of the Act of 1988. 48. We are unable to countenance the submission based on the provisions contained in Section 210C(c) of the Act of 1988. The aforesaid provision was introduced by an Amendment Act (No. 32 of 2019) with effect from 01.10.2020. The aforesaid provision forms part of statutory scheme of offences, penalties and procedure provided under Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988. Section 210C of the Act of 1988 confers power on the Central Government to make rules for the purposes enumerated in clause (a), (b) and (c) thereof. Substantive provisions relating to penalty are contained in Sections 177 to 198A and Section 200 of the Act of 1988. Sections 199 and 199A and 200 of the Act of 1988 provide for offences and composition of certain offences. Section 199B of the Act of 1988 provides for revision of fines. Section 202 of the Act of 1988 provides for power to arrest without warrant. Sections 203 and 204 of the Act of 1988 provide for breath test and laboratory test. Section 205 of the Act of 1988 deals with presumption of unfitness to drive. Power has been conferred on the police to impound document and detain a vehicle used without certificate of registration, permit etc. under Sections 206 and 207 of the Act of 1988. Section 208 of the Act of 1988 deals with summary disposal of cases by the court upon taking a cognizance. Section 210A of the Act of 1988 deals with power of the State Government to increase penalties whereas Section 210B of the Act of 1988 provides that any authority that is empowered to enforce the provisions of the Act, if such authority commits an offence under the Act, shall be liable for twice the penalty corresponding to that offence under the Act of 1988. Close reading and analysis of various provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 relating to offences, penalties and procedure reveals the legislative scheme that the Legislature has consciously not delegated any power to either Central Government or State Government to levy a new fine or penalty for any particular kind of contravention or violation of any provisions of the Act of 1988. But, wherever the Legislature found it necessary, it has specified as to which kind of contravention would attract punitive consequences in the nature of fine or penalty or even offences. To begin with, the Legislature has also laid down the amount of fee or penalty leviable or contraventions which attract fine or penalty. A limited power has been delegated to the Governments to revise or multiply the fine already specified in that Chapter. Section 199B of the Act of 1988 provides for revision of fines by such amount not exceeding ten percent in value of the existing fines, on an annual basis on 1st day of April of each year from the date of commencement of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019, as may be notified by the Central Government. Similarly, Section 210A of the Act of 1988 provides that subject to the conditions made by the Central Government, a State Government, shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify a multiplier, not less than one and not greater than ten, to be applied to each fine under the Act and such modified fine, shall be in force in such State and different multipliers may be applied to different classes of motor vehicles as may be classified by the State Government for the purpose of that Section. Therefore, it is not within the domain of the Central Government or the State Government to levy a new fine other than those provided under Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 but the obligation is only to the extent of revision or increase in the manner prescribed under the provisions as stated hereinabove. Section 210C of the Act of 1988 empowers the Central Government to make rules for design, construction and maintenance standards for national highways; such other factors as may be taken into account by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 198A and any other matter which is, or has to be, prescribed by the Central Government. Section 210C of the Act of 1988 empowers the Central Government to make rules for design, construction and maintenance standards for national highways; such other factors as may be taken into account by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 198A and any other matter which is, or has to be, prescribed by the Central Government. Therefore, the power to frame rules under Section 210C(c) of the Act of 1988, though broad and general in nature, has to be exercised as delegate of the Legislature in respect of any matter which is or has to be prescribed by the Central Government under the scheme of the provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 relating to offences, penalties and procedure. We could not find any provision under Chapter XIII relating to penalties which empowers the Central Government to levy fine or penalty only on the basis that owner of a transport vehicle has failed to get fitness certificate renewed before expiry of the same. Penalties, which have been specified under the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988, amongst other things, provide for penal consequences for using a motor vehicle without registration. As we have already discussed hereinabove, a conjoint reading of Sections 39 and 56 of the Act of 1988 would show that where the fitness certificate of a transport vehicle expires, its registration is deemed to be not validly registered and, therefore, it cannot be operated and plied on the road. In such an eventuality, where without getting the fitness certificate renewed, a transport vehicle is plied on road, it would invite penal consequences under Section 192 of the Act of 1988. In such an eventuality, the Central Government could frame appropriate rules in exercise of powers under Section 210C(c) of the Act of 1988 providing appropriate mechanism for imposition of fine provided under the law. The rule making power is only ancillary to the substantive provisions contained in the enabling Act and in the garb of rule making power, no punitive measures can be taken for something which is not declared to be in contravention of the provisions of the law inviting any punitive measure by imposition of fine or penalty. The rule making power is only ancillary to the substantive provisions contained in the enabling Act and in the garb of rule making power, no punitive measures can be taken for something which is not declared to be in contravention of the provisions of the law inviting any punitive measure by imposition of fine or penalty. If the substantive provisions contained in the Act of 1988 do not provide for any penal consequence for not getting the fitness certificate renewed before expiry of its validity period, a punitive provision for failure to get the fitness certificate renewed before expiry could not be provided in the garb of rule making power. The argument based on harmonious construction relying upon several decisions, therefore, must fail. 49. In the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), the principles with regard to limitation of rule making power were clearly delineated, as held in Para 58 and 59 thereof, quoted hereinabove. Rule making power is only ancillary and cannot be so exercised to bring into existence substantive rights, obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the parent enactment and the rules must align with the object and purpose of the Act. It has been highlighted that the delegate derives its legislative powers from the parent statute. Unlike the Legislature, which has sovereign legislative powers derived from the Constitution, the delegated authority is conferred powers by the parent enactment and, therefore, delegated authority must strictly conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed. A delegate, therefore, cannot alter or change the legislative policy. A delegate cannot override the provisions of the parent enactment either by exceeding the legislative policy or making provisions inconsistent with the enactment. In the garb of additional fee, a legislative policy of fine has been introduced in the absence of there being any such scheme of fine on failure to apply for renewal of fitness certificate before its expiry. 50. Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City Auto Ootunargal Sangam Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways & Others(supra). 50. Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City Auto Ootunargal Sangam Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways & Others(supra). In that case, amendment made in Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 in the year 2016 levying additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness was under challenge mainly on the ground that such levy was in the nature of a fine or penalty over and above the prescribed fee whereas the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the Rules of 1989 do not authorise such punitive levy. While examining the challenge to the validity, observations and recommendations of a Committee constituted to consider the revision of fee was taken into consideration which recorded that as there is no fine prescribed for non-renewal of fitness certificate before its expiry, there is likelihood of such vehicles plying on expired certificates of fitness. Therefore, to curb that tendency, it was considered necessary to levy a fine for nonrenewal of fitness certificate in time. That constituted principal basis for the Madras High Court to come to the conclusion that the levy was punitive. The contents of the reply/counter affidavit filed by the respondent-Union of India in Raja Ram & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6428/2024), if juxtaposed with the recommendations/ observations of the Committee, as considered in para 13 of the decision by Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City Auto Ootunargal Sangam Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways & Others(supra), it would be clear that the objective remains one and the same even for continuing the scheme of levy of additional fee impugned in these petitions. Therefore, the impost undoubtedly is punitive in nature. 51. In view of our discussions, analysis and conclusion, with utmost humility, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of ‘K’ Savakash Auto Rickshaw Sangha represented through its Trustee Mr. Pradeep Shankar Bhalerao Vs. Union of India through Ministry of Road Transport and Highways & Others (supra). 52. 51. In view of our discussions, analysis and conclusion, with utmost humility, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of ‘K’ Savakash Auto Rickshaw Sangha represented through its Trustee Mr. Pradeep Shankar Bhalerao Vs. Union of India through Ministry of Road Transport and Highways & Others (supra). 52. In the result, we declare that the note appended to Serial No. 11A of Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 is ultra vires Section 64(o) read with Section 211 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the same is, therefore, declared inoperative in law. In the matter of consideration of application for renewal of fitness certificate filed by the petitioners, the respondents shall not levy any additional fee for each day of delay after expiry of validity period of fitness certificate. 53. All the writ petitions are, accordingly, allowed. 54. There shall be no order as to costs. 55. Registry is directed to place a copy of this order in the record of each writ petition.