JUDGMENT : HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR 1. Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and the Standing counsel for the respondents. 2. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is an elected Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Fatehpur Sangat, Block and Tehsil Jaisinghpur, District Sultanpur being elected in 2021 and was discharging her duties of the said post. Certain complaints were made with regard to her discharge of duties and working and conduct as Pradhan. It was alleged that despite the public money being allocated the work of re-boring of the hand pump and also the work of interlocking and supply of Hume Pipes was not got done as per the prescribed specifications and there were allegations of defalcation of State funds and consequently preliminary inquiry was conducted against the petitioner by District Panchayati Raj Officer, District Sultanpur. In the said inquiry the allegations were found to be substantiated and accordingly in exercise of the powers under Section 95 (1) (g) of Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947 the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner were seized by means of the order dated 4.11.2023. 3. The petitioner had approached this Court by filing writ petition against the aforesaid order being writ C No.10633 of 2023 which was disposed of by this Court by means of order dated 7.12.2023 granting liberty to the petitioner to raise all the objections and grounds which was legally permissible before the competent authority. It has been submitted that the petitioner submitted detailed objections before District Magistrate, Sultanpur. The final inquiry was also conducted and report was submitted on 15.4.2024 which was placed before the District Magistrate, who in pursuance of the report issued show cause notice to the petitioner on 27.4.2024 and the petitioner had again knocked the doors of this Court assailing both the orders in writ C No.4434 of 2024. The said writ petition was allowed and this Court was of the view that the inquiry was not conducted in accordance with law and proper opportunity was not given to the petitioner and accordingly the State respondents were directed to proceed afresh in accordance with law. It has been submitted that in pursuance of the judgment and order of this Court dated 22.5.2024 the proceedings are still pending and have not attained finality. 4. It has been submitted that in pursuance of the judgment and order of this Court dated 22.5.2024 the proceedings are still pending and have not attained finality. 4. It is in aforesaid facts and pendency of the regular inquiry against the petitioner under Section 95 (1) (g) that the present writ petition has been filed seeking a direction to the District Magistrate to restore her final and administrative powers. 5. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the inquiry proceedings have to be concluded within a period of six months as provided for in Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up -Pradhans and Members) Inquiry Rules, 1997(hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1997) where in Rule 8 it is provided that the inquiry officer shall conclude the inquiry within six months from the date of receipt of the complaint and forward to the State Government. He submits that despite expiry of more than six months the inquiry has not been concluded and consequently the proceedings initiated against the petitioner should be dropped and her financial and administrative powers deserves to be revived. It has been further submitted that the period of six months as provided for in Rule 8 of the Rules of 1997 is mandatory in nature and accordingly, further conduct of the proceedings beyond the period of six months are illegal and arbitrary. 6. Learned Standing counsel, on the other hand, has opposed the writ petition. He submits that in pursuance of the judgment and order of this Court dated 22.5.2024 the matter was remanded back to the District Magistrate to proceed afresh from the stage of conduct of final inquiry and the proceedings are underway and under the law the proceedings shall be conducted with expedition. He further submits that the ground raised by the petitioner have no legal backing in as much as the order dated 4.11.2023 was challenged by the petitioner before this Court and this Court had not interfered with the said order and once challenge to the said order has failed then during the conduct of regular inquiry the petitioner cannot be given financial and administrative powers till conclusion of the final inquiry by the District Magistrate as per the provisions contained under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Rules of 1997. 7. I have heard the rival contentions. 7. I have heard the rival contentions. The only question which calls for consideration before this Court is as to whether there is any power to any authority to restore the financial and administrative powers to the petitioner during pendency of the regular inquiry. Under the peculiar facts of the present case, it is noticed that by means of order dated 4.11.2023 the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner was seized and the petitioner had assailed the said order before this Court by filing writ C No. 10633 of 2023 where this Court did not interfere with the order dated 4.11.2023 but gave liberty to the petitioner to raise all the grounds legally permissible during the regular inquiry. 8. Again after submission of the final inquiry report the petitioner had successfully approached this Court by filing writ bearing Writ C No.4434 of 2024 which was allowed and the final inquiry report submitted by the District Inspector of Schools was set aside solely on the ground that the said inquiry has been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and there was no mention to supply all the relevant documents to the petitioner during the said inquiry and liberty was granted to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with the Rules of 1997, particularly, Rule 6 and 7 thereof. No doubt that the period of six months as provided under Rule 8 has lapsed and it has been vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioner that once the period of six months have lapsed then the District Magistrate becomes functus officio to proceed further with conduct of the inquiry against the Village Pradhan under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act of 1997. 9. A perusal of Rule 8 of the Rules of 1997 clearly indicates that there is direction of six months' time for conduct of the inquiry but there is no consequence given in case the said inquiry is not conducted within six months. There is no dispute with regard to interpretation of the said provision particularly with the time period fixed for taking decision by any authority but where the authority has consistently failed to proceed with the said inquiry no consequence is given of not deciding the same within the stipulated period of time as provided for under the Act or the Rules. 10. 10. The issue as to whether time limit fixed for performance of a public duty without consequence being specified is directory or mandatory has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments. Here it would be pertinent to refer to the case of, where Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "9. The question as to whether, a time-limit fixed for a public officer to perform a public duty is directory or mandatory has been examined earlier by the courts as well. A question arose before the Privy Council in respect of irregularities in the preliminary proceedings for constituting a jury panel. The Municipality was expected to revise the list of qualified persons but the jury was drawn from the old list as the Sheriff neglected to revise the same. It was in these circumstances, the decision of the jury drawn from the old list became the subject-matter of consideration by the Privy Council. It was thus held that it would cause greater public inconvenience if it were held that neglecting to observe the provisions of the statute made the verdicts of all juries taken from the list ipso facto null and void so that no jury trials could be held until a duly revised list had been prepared [Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, 1917 SCC OnLine PC 3 : AIR 1917 PC 142 ]. 10. The Constitution Bench of this Court held that when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold acts done in neglect of this duty as null and void, would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, the practice of the courts should be to hold such provisions as directory [Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, (1952) 1 SCC 372 : AIR 1952 SC 181 : 1952 Cri LJ 955]. In a seven-Bench judgment, this Court was considering as to whether the power of the Returning Officer to reject ballot papers is mandatory or directory. In a seven-Bench judgment, this Court was considering as to whether the power of the Returning Officer to reject ballot papers is mandatory or directory. The Court examined well-recognised rules of construction to observe that a statute should be construed as directory if it relates to the performance of public duties, or if the conditions prescribed therein have to be performed by persons other than those on whom the right is conferred [Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 ]. 11. In a judgment reported as Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen [Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224 ], Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for consideration. The argument raised was that the time-limit of 30 days of publication of award by the Labour Court is mandatory. This Court held that though Section 17 is mandatory, the time-limit to publish the award within 30 days is directory inter alia for the reason that the non-publication of the award within the period of thirty days does not entail any penalty. 12. In T.V. Usman v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality, (1994) 1 SCC 754 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 187, the time period during which report of the analysis of a sample under Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 was to be given, was held to be directory as there was no time-limit prescribed within which the prosecution had to be instituted. When there was no such limit prescribed then there was no valid reason for holding the period of 45 days as mandatory. Of course, that does not mean that the Public Analyst can ignore the time-limit prescribed under the Rules. He must in all cases try to comply with the time-limit. But if there is some delay, in a given case, there is no reason to hold that the very report is void and, on that basis, to hold that even prosecution cannot be launched. 13. He must in all cases try to comply with the time-limit. But if there is some delay, in a given case, there is no reason to hold that the very report is void and, on that basis, to hold that even prosecution cannot be launched. 13. This Court distinguished between failure of an individual to act in a given time-frame and the time-frame provided to a public authority, for the purposes of determining whether a provision was mandatory or directory, when this Court held that it is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified [Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 ] . 14. In P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, (2003) 8 SCC 498 , this Court examined the effect of non-publication of final electoral rolls before the time of acceptance of nomination papers. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 516, para 48) "48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory. (See Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate, 1965 SCC OnLine Pat 43 : AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436, Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B., 1999 SCC OnLine Cal 235 : (1999) 2 Cal LJ 21 and Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana, 1996 SCC OnLine Cal 209 : (1997) 1 CHN 189 ].)" 11. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana, 1996 SCC OnLine Cal 209 : (1997) 1 CHN 189 ].)" 11. In the present case, the time prescribed for concluding the final inquiry is six months as per Rule 8 but there is no consequence in case the prescribed authority does not take a decision within six months in usual course and in case the decision is not taken within six months it is always open to the delinquent/petitioner to approach Writ Court seeking a direction to the prescribed authority to take decision within a stipulated period of time. The argument of the petitioner that in case the appeal is not decided within the stipulated time period as per Rule 8 the proceedings would lapse and the benefit of the same should be given to the petitioner, is rejected. It is further noticed that once the order dated 4.11.2023 is in existence and the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner has been seized no direction can be given by this Court during currency of the aforesaid order permitting the petitioner to revive her administrative and financial powers. 12. In light of the above, no ground for interference has been made out. Accordingly, the petition being bereft of merit is dismissed. 13. However, it is provided that the District Magistrate shall proceed to conclude the inquiry expeditiously, say within a period of two months in case there is no other legal impediment, in accordance with law.