JUDGMENT : Vaibhavi D. Nanavati, J. 1. Heard Mr. H.D. Vasavada, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, Mr. A.K. Clerk, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 and Ms. Nidhi Vyas, the learned AGP appearing for the respondents No.3 to 5. 2. By way of present petition, the petitioner herein has challenged the impugned CAV common judgment and order dated 17.10.2003 passed below Application Nos.249/2001, 261/2000 and Appeal No.3/2002 by the learned Gujarat Higher Secondary Education Services Tribunal whereby by the said order the Tribunal has declined to interfere in the decision of the respondents No.1 and the petitioner – applicant was held guilty of misconduct and further directed to consequent punishment. Pursuant to the said impugned order passed by the Tribunal dated 17.10.2003 the respondents No.1 and 2 passed the order of dismissal qua the petitioner herein. 3. Briefly stated, the petitioner herein was an employee of the respondents No.1 and 2, imparting service as a teacher in the respondent School. The petitioner herein filed complaints against the Principal of the School and the School Management before the District Education Officer i.e. respondent No.3 (at page-145) and Charity Commissioner – respondent No.5 (at page-167). 3.1 Pursuant to the aforesaid complaints, the petitioner herein also filed a Public Interest Litigation being Special Civil Application No.7565 of 1999 on the same allegations which came to be disposed of by order dated 11.10.1999 wherein the said Special Civil Application was not entertained, however liberty was reserved in favour of the petitioner herein to prefer representation to the District Education Officer, Ahmedabad city and the Charity Commissioner, wherein the said representations were pending. Accordingly both the authorities considered the complaint filed by the petitioner herein and both the authorities held that upon inquiry no irregularity or infirmity could be said to have been committed by the respondents No.1 and 2. 3.2 In light of the aforesaid facts, which are undisputed the respondents No.1 and 2 initiated inquiry against the petitioner herein from 4.10.2001 till 30.4.2002 (Annexure-J) page-435. The Inquiry Report is duly produced at page-438 of the petition, wherein in the findings recorded in the Inquiry Report the petitioner to be guilty. In view thereof, upon approval by the District Education Officer (page-351) the respondents No.1 and 2 ordered termination of service of the petitioner on 23.8.2002 (page-364). The Inquiry Report is duly produced at page-438 of the petition, wherein in the findings recorded in the Inquiry Report the petitioner to be guilty. In view thereof, upon approval by the District Education Officer (page-351) the respondents No.1 and 2 ordered termination of service of the petitioner on 23.8.2002 (page-364). 3.3 Being aggrieved by the impugned order of termination dated 23.8.2002 the petitioner herein approached the Tribunal challenging the said order. 3.4 The Tribunal had upon considering the facts, position of law and the evidence on record thought it fit not to interfere in the decision of the petitioner by order dated 23.8.2002, as referred above. 4. In view thereof, the petitioner is constrained to approach this Court and has prayed for the following reliefs :- “(A) to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or the like by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 17.10.2003 (CAV) passed as a common judgment below Application Nos.249/2001, 261/2000 and Appeal No.3/2002 by the Ld. Gujarat Higher Secondary Education Services Tribunal Judge Mr. D.V. Mehta, J. and/or. (B) Your Lordships be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order of illegal termination passed by the School Management Authorities and approved by the Higher Education Commissioner with further direction to the respondent school management authorities to forthwith reinstate the petitioner to his original post with retrospective effect and with arrears of wages alongwith reasonable interest on the same with continuity of service, etc., and/or (C) during the pendency of this writ petition, by way of interim relief Your Lordships be pleased to grant interim relief by directing the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner to his original post till final disposal of this petition. and/or (D) any other relief that Your Lordships deem fit looking to the peculiar facts of the case of the petitioner may kindly be granted; and/or (E) costs of this petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner.” 5. Mr. H.D. Vasavada, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner herein placed reliance on the contentions raised in the petition and submitted that the petitioner herein is erroneously terminated by the respondent School Management. It is submitted that the termination is illegal and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Mr. H.D. Vasavada, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner herein placed reliance on the contentions raised in the petition and submitted that the petitioner herein is erroneously terminated by the respondent School Management. It is submitted that the termination is illegal and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 5.1 It is also submitted that it is erroneously opined by the competent authority that the petitioner herein is instrument in encouraging other teachers against the respondent School Management. 5.2 It is submitted that the petitioner herein only brought on record the irregularities that were committed by the respondents No.1 and 2 for which the petitioner is required to suffer the order of dismissal. 5.3 It is submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner by the respondents No.1 and 2 are such that the same should not have resulted in the order of dismissal. 5.4 Mr. Vasavada, the learned advocate has also relied on the orders passed by the learned Charity Commissioner and the District Education Officer. Mr. Vasavada, the learned advocate submitted that the charge of misconduct cannot be attributed to the petitioner herein and is required to be quashed and set aside. 5.5 It is submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal also requires to be interfered with wherein the Tribunal has concurred with the order passed by the respondent School Management. 5.6 It is submitted that the prayers as prayed for in the present petition are required to be granted. It is submitted that the punishment of dismissal is harsh and in view thereof the punishment be appropriately reduced in view of the fact that, as such the charge of misconduct, is erroneously levelled against the petitioner as such is not proved. 6. Mr. A.K. Clerk, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 submitted that no interference is called for in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal which is reasoned order. 6.1 It is submitted that this Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere in the order passed by the learned Tribunal while exercising extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6.2 It is submitted that it is not even the case of the petitioner that the impugned order suffers from any malafide or is beyond the jurisdiction or is ex-facie illegal. To substantiate the above submissions, Mr. 6.2 It is submitted that it is not even the case of the petitioner that the impugned order suffers from any malafide or is beyond the jurisdiction or is ex-facie illegal. To substantiate the above submissions, Mr. Clerk, the learned advocate placed reliance on the following decisions:- (a) In the case of Indian Overseas Bank vs. I.O.B. State Canteen Workers’ Union and Anr., reported in (2000) 4 SCC 245 . (b) In the case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 192 . (c) In the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Narain Singh, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 11 . (d) In the case of M.H. Devendrappa vs. Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 732 . (e) In the case of M.P. Electricity Board vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401 . (f) In the case of Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Employees Co.Op. Vividh Karyakari vs. Nilesh M. Delhiwala, reported in 2009 (5) GLR 4380 . 6.3 Mr. Clerk, the learned advocate also relied on the orders passed by the District Education Officer dated 25.2.2000 and 5.12.2001 and the learned Charity Commissioner dated 8.8.2001 and submitted that upon proper inquiry both the competent authorities have held that the charges levelled by the petitioner herein against the respondent authorities are not proved. 6.4 It is submitted that upon proper inquiry and after following due principles of natural justice the impugned order of termination is passed by the respondent authority on 23.8.2002 and the same is approved by the District Education Officer on 19.8.2002 (page-351). 6.5 It is submitted that the Tribunal while passing the impugned order has taken into consideration all the aforesaid aspects wherein the Tribunal has also held that, both the authorities have considered the orders passed by the District Education Officer as well as the Charity Commissioner and held that the orders passed by the respondent No.1 do not require any interference that the petitioner – applicant committed misconduct and in view thereof, the respondent authority proceeded to pass the order of dismissal. He lastly submitted that the petition requires to be dismissed. 7. Ms. Nidhi Vyas, the learned AGP appearing for the respondents No.3 to 5 in rejoinder reiterated the contentions and submissions advanced by Mr. Clerk, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2. He lastly submitted that the petition requires to be dismissed. 7. Ms. Nidhi Vyas, the learned AGP appearing for the respondents No.3 to 5 in rejoinder reiterated the contentions and submissions advanced by Mr. Clerk, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2. Reliance is also placed on the order passed by the District Education Officer and the learned Charity Commissioner dated 25.2.2003, placing reliance on the same it is submitted that considering the allegations levelled by the petitioner herein against the respondent School Management taking into consideration the documents on record and the evidence on record, both the authorities proceeded to hold that the charges levelled against the respondents are not proved and require no interference. It is submitted that present petition be dismissed accordingly. 8. Mr. Vasavada, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner herein in rejoinder reiterated the contentions raised earlier and submitted that the charges that are levelled against the petitioner would not in any way hold the petitioner guilty of misconduct. In light of the aforesaid, it is submitted that the prayers as prayed for be allowed. In the course of hearing it is submitted that the petitioner herein has expired and in view thereof is represented by the legal heirs of the petitioner. Analysis :- 9. It is apposite to refer to the position of law as laid down in the case of Harjinder Singh Versus Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 192 , paragraphs 6, 7, 11, 13 to 16, 20 and 21 read thus :- “6. The corporation challenged the award of the Labour Court in Writ Petition No.372/2001 mainly on the grounds that the dispute raised by the appellant could not be treated as industrial dispute because the termination of his service was covered by Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act; that the appellant was not a regular employee and he was not working against any sanctioned post; that the appellant had not worked for a period of 240 days and that there was no post against which he could be reinstated. 7. The learned Single Judge rejected the plea that the termination of the appellant's service is covered by Section 2(oo) (bb) by observing that from the evidence produced before the Labour Court, it was clearly established that the work against which the appellant was engaged was still continuing. 7. The learned Single Judge rejected the plea that the termination of the appellant's service is covered by Section 2(oo) (bb) by observing that from the evidence produced before the Labour Court, it was clearly established that the work against which the appellant was engaged was still continuing. The learned Single Judge also agreed with the Labour Court that the action taken by the corporation was contrary to Section 25-G of the Act. He however, did not approve the award of reinstatement on the premise that initial appointment of the appellant was not in consonance with the statutory regulations and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and, accordingly, substituted the award of reinstatement with 50% back wages by directing that the appellant shall be paid a sum of Rs.87,582/- by way of compensation. 11. We have considered the respective submissions. In our opinion, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the ground that while interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution - Syed Yakoob V/s. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 and Surya Dev Rai V/s. Ram Chander Rai. 13. In Surya Dev Rai's case, a two-Judge Bench, after threadbare analysis of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and considering large number of judicial precedents, recorded the following conclusions: "(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction -- by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction -- by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 14. A reading of the impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge did not find any jurisdictional error in the award of the Labour Court. He also did not find that the award was vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record or that there was violation of rules of natural justice. As a matter of fact, the learned Single Judge rejected the argument of the corporation that termination of the appellant's service falls within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, and expressed unequivocal agreement with the Labour Court that the action taken by the Managing Director of corporation was contrary to Section 25G of the Act which embodies the rule of last come first go. Notwithstanding this, the learned Single Judge substituted the award of reinstatement of the appellant with compensation of Rs.87,582/- by assuming that appellant was initially appointed without complying with the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the relevant regulations. While doing so, the learned Single Judge failed to notice that in the reply filed on behalf of the corporation before the Labour Court, the appellant's claim for reinstatement with back wages was not resisted on the ground that his initial appointment was illegal or unconstitutional and that neither any evidence was produced nor any argument was advanced in that regard. Therefore, the Labour Court did not get any opportunity to consider the issue whether reinstatement should be denied to the appellant by applying the new jurisprudence developed by the superior courts in recent years that the court should not pass an award which may result in perpetuation of illegality. This being the position, the learned Single Judge was not at all justified in entertaining the new plea raised on behalf of the corporation for the first time during the course of arguments and over turn an otherwise well reasoned award passed by the Labour Court and deprive the appellant of what may be the only source of his own sustenance and that of his family. 15. Another serious error committed by the learned Single Judge is that he decided the writ petition by erroneously assuming that the appellant was a daily wage employee. 15. Another serious error committed by the learned Single Judge is that he decided the writ petition by erroneously assuming that the appellant was a daily wage employee. This is ex facie contrary to the averments contained in the statement of claim filed by the workman that he was appointed in the scale of Rs.350-525 and the orders dated 3.10.1986 and 25.2.1987 issued by the concerned Executive Engineer appointing the appellant as Work Munshi in the pay scale of Rs.355-525 and then in the scale of Rs.400-600. This was not even the case of the corporation that the appellant was employed on daily wages. It seems that attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to the relevant records, else he would not have passed the impugned order on a wholly unfounded assumption that the appellant was a daily wager. 16. It is true that in the writ petition filed by it, the corporation did plead that the dispute raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute because he had not worked continuously for a period of 240 days, the learned Single Judge rightly refused to entertain the same because no such argument was advanced before him and also because that plea is falsified by the averments contained in para 2 of the reply filed on behalf of the corporation to the statement of claim wherein it was admitted that the appellant was engaged as work charge Motor Mate for construction work on 5.3.1986 and he worked in that capacity and also as Work Munshi from 3.10.1986 and, as mentioned above, even after expiry of the period of three months' specified in order dated 5.2.1987, the appellant continued to work till 5.7.1988 when first notice of retrenchment was issued by the Managing Director of the corporation. Therefore, it was not open for the corporation to contend that the appellant had not completed 240 days service. Moreover, it is settled law that for attracting the applicability of Section 25-G of the Act, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of 'last come first go' without any tangible reason.” 10. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, it emerges that the petitioner herein preferred complaints against the Principal and School Management to the District Education Officer as also the Charity Commissioner and filed Public Interest Litigation before this Court being Special Civil Application No.7565 of 1999, the same was not entertained, liberty was reserved in favour of the petitioner to espouse the grievance wherein the representations of the petitioner were pending before the competent authorities, as referred above. 10.1 On perusal of the documents on record, it is apposite to refer to the order passed by the District Education Officer dated 31.5.2000 which is duly produced at page-144 to the petition. The same was passed pursuant to the complaint filed by the petitioner herein. 10.2 It is apposite to refer to the findings arrived at by the District Education Officer at page-149 “1. The school will charge the fees from the students under the rules only and the receipt thereof be issued. No additional amount shall be charged. 2. Intervention by the applicant in the school administration does not appear appropriate. 3. On informing about not examining the answer sheets of weekly test, the applicant shows misconduct. The applicant has been away from even the humanitarian activities of kargil contribution. In spite of issuing the circular in the matter, non-compliance thereof does not appear just. Considering the facts stated by the applicant and the details produced by the Principal, the allegations levelled by the applicant against the Principal appear lacking in substance. Thus, although no action is to be taken at our end, the applicant has not participated in any educational activities of the students and having only the attitude of gaining, he does not appear useful for the school. The School Trust is hereby directed to take into consideration and to decide on the representation made by the applicant and the statement in corroboration thereof, for the reason he is an employee of the school, under intimation to this office.” 10.3 The order passed by the Charity Commissioner pursuant to the complaint filed by the petitioner herein dated 25.2.2003 at page-158 para-33 read thus :- “(33) The allegations regarding all the issues including the above discussed points as well as allegations levelled regarding other issues have been verified by me on the basis of more than one thousand pages of inquiry. I do not feel it necessary to note down here all the details regarding the same. But, the end of the entire inquiry, it is not proved that any malpractice regarding the monies of the trust has been committed or any act has been committed which may cause any harm to the interest of any beneficiary or the Trust. The report of the District Education Officer shall be relied upon for the issues, which fall within the scope of inquiry conducted by the District Education Officer. Under such circumstances, no further action remains to be taken upon the application dated 17/09/1999 of Mr. Anil J. Chauhan and the same is ordered to be filed.” 10.4 Upon the aforesaid orders passed by the respondent authorities, the respondent authority initiated inquiry against the petitioner herein. The findings of the Inquiry Report read thus :- “(1) The Inquiry Committee was formed to inquire into the indiscipline committed by Mr. Anilbhai by violating the rules of the school by making baseless allegations against the Principal and the Trust. In this regard, the Inquiry Committee has given sufficient opportunity to both the parties and has completed the inquiry within the time-limit. (2) Mr. Anil is himself the applicant in the petition. It is clear that the type of the Co-ordination Committee mentioned by him does not exist after the decision of the District Education Officer and Charity Commissioner. Non teaching staff and staff of Technical Department were not with him in this complaint. All the teaching staff of the Secondary Department had withdrawn their signatures and consent after the Competent Authority had disposed of the complaint. It is found that only some teachers of Higher Secondary Division were with him. It is natural the teachers of the same division would support him being the employee of the same division. If Mr. Anilbhai had desired, during the examination of witnesses he could have presented two members of Co-ordination Committee, in place of Mr. Pravinbhai Pancholi and Mr. Rajnikant. But looking to the above noting, it is clear the Co-ordination Committee no longer exists. (3) It is clarified in the letters dated 1-12-2001 and 6-10-200 of the teachers produced vide Exh. - 103 to 104 in connection with the complaint made by Mr. Anilbhai that whatever has happened with the Principal and the Trust is painful and now, they are no more in support of the complaint. (3) It is clarified in the letters dated 1-12-2001 and 6-10-200 of the teachers produced vide Exh. - 103 to 104 in connection with the complaint made by Mr. Anilbhai that whatever has happened with the Principal and the Trust is painful and now, they are no more in support of the complaint. Moreover, the other retired teachers of the school, who do not have any fear of the Principal or the Trust after the retirement, have also given letters that they have removed their support and withdrawn their signatures and it is clear from the representations made in the letters that the chief conspirator of the complaint is only Mr. Anilbhai Chauhan. (4) Mr. Anilbhai Chauhan always tried to drag the procedure of the Inquiry Committee during the proceedings of the Inquiry Committee and at times, he also behaved in a manner which violated the dignity of the Inquiry Committee. This attitude was seen during the procedure of the Inquiry Committee. (5) Instead of performing his duty as code of conduct of a teacher, Mr. Anilbhai Chauhan paid attention towards the work of the Principal and the Trust and it can be stated that nature of work is this kind of Modus Operandi. (6) Mr. Anilbhai Chauhan has not submitted any cogent evidences or proof regarding the allegations regarding financial transactions of Kalupur Commercial Bank, United Commercial Bank and other banks, made by him in the Petition filed before the Hon’ble High Court. Hence, such serious allegations are baseless and without any substance and therefore, such behaviour cannot be acceptable. (7) Mr. Anilbhai and Teachers initiated their complaint at the beginning by mentioning the name of Mr. D.M. Patel, the Principal of Diwan Ballubhai Secondary High School, Paldi and this itself proves that the motive of their complaint is not bonafide and it is driven by prejudice and vengeance. (8) In his representation, cross-examination and examination-in-chief, Mr. Anilbhai has submitted only the fact which are printed regarding the school activities expenditure i.e. as educational publications, literature exhibition tour, science fair, blood donation camp etc. but he has not submitted any solid evidences or proof as to what kind of malpractice has been committed therein and how the prices were high and that no accounts were maintained and audit was not carried out. He has only stated that “this has happened as per his knowledge and belief’. but he has not submitted any solid evidences or proof as to what kind of malpractice has been committed therein and how the prices were high and that no accounts were maintained and audit was not carried out. He has only stated that “this has happened as per his knowledge and belief’. Therefore, the allegations levelled by him are baseless and without any substance and it is similar to committing misconduct in the school by violating the discipline rules of the school. (9) The Proprietary High School Trust manages two schools namely Diwan Ballubhai High School Kankariya and Paldi. The educational literature publications, daily diary, identity card, science practical general book, question papers and exercise books are prepared and printed common for both the schools. Therefore, the allegations made in this regard only for Kankariya School, are prejudiced and baseless. (10) Mr. Anilbhai Chauhan earlier joined as a Teacher in Higher Secondary Division of Vivekanand Vidhyalal Satyambagar, Amraiwadi. His five year service tenure in this school from the year 1985-86 to 1990 was such that caused alleged indiscipline and causing damage to the discipline of school by provoking the students, parents and teachers by taking lead in sabotage activities. Instead of performing duty in his continuous service tenure till date, he has adopted such method and had indulged into sabotage and questionable activities to put undue pressure on the responsible Principals and Head of the School in order to get his desired work done. Thus, his service tenure of this school and the previous school are tarnished with serious and horrible misconduct and this can be found from the letters submitted regarding his previous service tenure. Decision:- Mr. Anilbhai Chauhan had levelled baseless allegations against the Trust, committed misconduct and violated rules and this Inquiry Committee, formed for inquiry into such allegations, had forwarded to him clear and detailed charge-sheet at the end of first four meetings. All charges levelled against him in this charge-sheet are proved and it is proved that Mr. Chauhan has committed misconduct by violating the Rules of Discipline. Mr. All charges levelled against him in this charge-sheet are proved and it is proved that Mr. Chauhan has committed misconduct by violating the Rules of Discipline. Mr. Chauhan could not prove before this committee the charges levelled by him against the Principal and Trust of the School.” 10.5 The respondents No.1 and 2 thereafter sent the same for approval to the District Education Officer which came to be approved by the District Education Officer by order dated 19.8.2002 (at page-351), resultantly the order of termination came to be passed by the respondent No.1. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner herein approached the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal while passing the impugned order also took into consideration all the aforesaid aspects, as referred to above by this Court. 10.6 It is apposite to refer to page-29 to 33 of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal which read thus :- “The question before the Tribunal is that as the charges are proved by the disciplinary authorities up to what extent the Tribunal can interfere with it 2 In the Judgement of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India recorded in JT 95(8) SC p.65, it is held hat findings of disciplinary authorities must be based on some evidence. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review should not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of the facts. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of the evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/Tribunal. it was further held that High Court/Tribunal while exercising the power of judicial wing cannot normally substitute its own conclusion of penalty unless it shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal. In AIR 95 5C p.565 the Apex Court has held that findings reached by the Inquiry authority, Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit over it, as an Appellate authority. In AIR 1989 SC p.1185 it held that when the penalty is imposed on the delinquent employee by the competent authority, Tribunal cannot interfere with it on the ground that it is not commensurate with delinquency of employee. In AIR 1989 SC p.1185 it held that when the penalty is imposed on the delinquent employee by the competent authority, Tribunal cannot interfere with it on the ground that it is not commensurate with delinquency of employee. In the Judgment reported in JT 1994 (1) SC p. 217 it is reported that in the mater of imposition of punishment or penalty, which is imposed for proved misconduct of the employee, Tribunal or High Court has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the disciplinary authority. In 1997 (1) GLH 652 it is held that in the departmental inquiry only fair opportunity to the delinquent must be given. The strict rules of evidence do not apply in such inquiry. Here, in this case, it is clear that the applicant has made allegations against the Principal and the school management before two public authorities, i.e. District Education Officer and the Charity Commissioner of Gujarat State in writing. One public interest litigation was also filed which was not entertained on merits and disposed of by the honourable High Court of Gujarat. Whether this amounts to misconduct of the applicant. In the judgment reported in 1998 (3) SCC 732 M.H. Davendrappa Vs. Karnataka State Small industries Development Corporation, the applicant was the union leader and he wrote a letter to the Governor without permission, alleged mal-functioning of the employer Corporation and penalty was imposed. He alleged bad administration, corruption, and nepotism in the Corporation, He made allegations against the Chairman. He also wrote about nexus between contractors for various projects and the management of the Corporation. There were allegations regarding purchase of cement by the Corporation and malpractices in the dealing. There were other charges also. But, the main charge and the discussion on this have been made in the judgment. He was charge-sheeted, punished, order of dismissal was challenged before the Civil Court, thereafter before the High Court, and then before the Division Bench of the High Court. AIl these three Courts have dismissed the petition of the applicant. There were other charges also. But, the main charge and the discussion on this have been made in the judgment. He was charge-sheeted, punished, order of dismissal was challenged before the Civil Court, thereafter before the High Court, and then before the Division Bench of the High Court. AIl these three Courts have dismissed the petition of the applicant. Thereafter, the honourable Supreme Court also confirmed the views and it was held that when the applicant made direct public attack on the head of the organization, he had also in the letter wrote to the Governor made allegations against various officers of the Corporation with whom he had to work and his conduct was clearly detrimental to the proper functioning of the organization or its internal discipline. The appeal was rejected. In the present case, the applicant has made several allegations against his superior officer I.e. the Principal and his employer i.e. the school management before the public authorities, which he failed to prove. Making of such allegations against the Principal and the school management involving once moral character, which can be punished under Criminal law and making such allegations itself is the misconduct The school is a public body. The Principal is idol of imagination in the eyes of students. Thousand of students are studying in the school and they are part of the society. The sentiments of the students, parents, family members, and their relatives are attached with the school. Therefore, any activity, which lower downs their image in the eye of society, is the misconduct. To point out the irregularities committed by the Principal or the school management is not misconduct but when a person who is making allegations must be aware of its consequence. He must be in a position to prove the allegations with some sort of evidence, which can justify his gesture. Here, the applicant has failed to prove any one of his allegations before the administrative officers who are used to examine such documents day to day. In fact, it is their duty to observe the activities of the school and d out irregularities. Both the authorities i.e, the District Education Officer and the Charity Commissioner of Gujarat State have examined the relevant documents produced by the school management and the applicant. In fact, it is their duty to observe the activities of the school and d out irregularities. Both the authorities i.e, the District Education Officer and the Charity Commissioner of Gujarat State have examined the relevant documents produced by the school management and the applicant. They have also examined the audit report for the last several years and cane to the conclusion that there is no financial irregularity committed by the Principal and the school management as alleged by the applicant. The school management itself appointed three members Committee of their trustees for internal inspection of the charges also came to the conclusion that there i is no irregularity as alleged by the applicant. Presuming that this Committee might be under the influence of the school management even though the other two Government authorities who are independent authorities and in charge of the inspection of the activities of the school and who give grants and sanctions of the expenditures they cannot be said to be under any influence of the Principal or the school management. So far as the point of tuition fees is concerned, in the hearing on 25-2-2000 on the point of tuition fees, the school management produced accounts of the lump sum amount collected from the students for tuition fees, Identity Cards, Rojnishi, progress report and logo of the school to be attached on the uniform and the receipts of the remaining amount refunded to the students. On that point the D.E.0. advised to recover tuition fees as per rule and give receipt of the same. It does not mean the school has committed any irregularity. The school has produced every account and the receipts of the amount refunded and paid to the students. In the same report, it has been observed that the applicant teacher's interference in the administrative method is not proper, he is creating indiscipline, he is not examining answer sheets of weekly tests of the students and he is behaving with non-cooperation in the activities like Kargil fund donation. The applicant is having negative attitude. The Inquiry Committee was constituted as per law. The inquiry was held properly. The applicant has been given adequate chance to defend himself in the departmental inquiry. The principle of natural justice has been followed. The departmental Inquiry Committee has found that the applicant has committed misconduct. The applicant is having negative attitude. The Inquiry Committee was constituted as per law. The inquiry was held properly. The applicant has been given adequate chance to defend himself in the departmental inquiry. The principle of natural justice has been followed. The departmental Inquiry Committee has found that the applicant has committed misconduct. The allegations made against the principal of the school and the school management have been proved false and the charges against the applicant have been proved by the departmental inquiry. The approval of the action has been obtained from the Commissioner of Schools under Sec. 14(5) for the suspension and under Sec. 14(1) (b) for the termination. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the Tribunal does not see any reason to interfere with the decision of the school management that the applicant has committed misconduct and the consequent punishment. Therefore, both the applications and the appeal are hereby rejected.” 11. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and the documents produced on record, it emerges that the petitioner herein had alleged allegations against the Principal and School Management before the two public authorities i.e. DEO and the Charity Commissioner, as referred above. The petitioner also preferred one PIL which was not entertained, however liberty was reserved to pursue the representations made by the petitioner herein which were pending before the aforesaid competent authorities. The petitioner had made several allegations against his superior officer i.e. the principal and the employer i.e. the School Management before the public authority which the petitioner failed to prove. 11.1 Considering the aforesaid aspects, the Tribunal held that to point out the irregularities committed by the principal or the School Management is not misconduct but, the person making such allegations must face the consequence. If such allegations would have been proved with some evidence, it would have been justifiable gesture. 11.2 In the facts of the present case as held by the Tribunal the petitioner herein has failed to prove any of the allegations before the competent authorities. The Tribunal has further held that both, the DEO and the Charity Commissioner examined the relevant documents produced by the School Management and the applicant. The audit report for several years was also verified and it was concluded that there was no financial irregularity committed by the principal and the School Management as alleged by the petitioner herein. The Tribunal has further held that both, the DEO and the Charity Commissioner examined the relevant documents produced by the School Management and the applicant. The audit report for several years was also verified and it was concluded that there was no financial irregularity committed by the principal and the School Management as alleged by the petitioner herein. The School Management itself appointed three Members Committee of their trustees for internal inspection of charges which concluded that there was no irregularity as alleged by the petitioner herein. 11.3 The Tribunal considering the aforesaid aspect held that presuming the Committee might be under the influence of the School Management, however there were two Government authority, who were independent and incharge of inspection activities of the school and who give grant and sanction expenditure of the school, they could not be said under the influence of the principal or the School Management. 11.4 The Tribunal further held that with respect to the tuition fees, the School Management during the hearing which held on 25.2.2000 produced accounts of lumpsum amount collected from the students for the tuition fees, identity card, rojnishi, progress report and logo of the school attached to the school uniform and the receipt of the remaining amount that was refunded to the students. On the aforesaid point, the DEO advised to recover the tuition fees as per the rule and give receipt for the same. It is the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal that the aforesaid cannot be held to be irregularity committed by the school. Considering the fact that the school produced every account and the receipt of the amount refunded and paid to the students. 11.5 The Tribunal considered the said report wherein it was observed that the petitioner’s interference in the administrative matter is not proper and the aforesaid results in creating indiscipline, the petitioner was not examining the answer-sheets of the weekly test of the students and non-cooperating by indulging in the activity of Cargil-fund donation and the petitioner herein has negative attitude. 11.6 Considering the aforesaid aspects, the Tribunal further held that the Inquiry Committee was constituted in accordance with law and the same was conducted in proper manner upon adequate chance to the petitioner to defend himself in the inquiry proceeding. The inquiry was conducted upon following the principles of natural justice. 11.6 Considering the aforesaid aspects, the Tribunal further held that the Inquiry Committee was constituted in accordance with law and the same was conducted in proper manner upon adequate chance to the petitioner to defend himself in the inquiry proceeding. The inquiry was conducted upon following the principles of natural justice. The said Inquiry Committee found that the petitioner had committed misconduct. The allegations levelled on the principal of the school and the School Management weer proved to be false and charges against the petitioner were proved in the said departmental inquiry. The approval of action was duly granted by the Commissioner of Schools under Section 14(5) for the suspension and under Section 14(1)(b) for termination. 12. In light of the aforesaid, the Tribunal held that there was no reason to interference in the decision of the School Management that the petitioner had committed misconduct and consequent punishment. Upon considering the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, this Court is not inclined to interfere exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the present petition stands dismissed.