ORDER : 1. RULE. Learned advocates waive service of Rule on behalf of the respective respondents. 2. Challenge in this Revision Application is given to the order dated 15.10.2018 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharuch in Criminal Case no.4170 of 2015 as well as the order dated 31.7.2024 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Bharuch in Criminal Appeal no.127 of 2018. 3. Mr. P.A. Pathan, learned advocate for the applicant submitted that cross case had been filed for the incident alleged to have taken place on 11.5.2015 being CR no.I-63/2015 registered with Bharuch City “A” Division Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 324, 326 of IPC and Section 135 of Gujarat Police Act and CR no.109/2015 was filed with Bharuch City “A” Division Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 324, 504, 506(2), 114 of the IPC and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. Mr. Pathan submitted that pursuant to the offence bearing CR no.109/2015, Criminal Case no.1119/2016 was settled and by way of settlement, all the three accused i.e. deceased Ambalal Mafatlal Vaghela and both his sons Dineshbhai and Ajaybhai were acquitted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharuch on 3.8.2021 while the proceedings against the present applicant earlier resulted into conviction by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharuch on 15.10.2018 for the offence punishable under Sections 324, 326 of IPC and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The conviction was challenged before the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal no.127/2018 and on 31.7.2024, the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Bharuch rejected the appeal confirming the conviction except setting aside conviction for Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act and confirmed the sentence of other sections. 3.1 Mr. Pathan submitted that in the subsequent proceedings in Criminal Case no.1119/2016, the parties before the Court had filed a purshis at Exh.44 for the settlement. Mr. Pathan submitted that before the learned Appellate Court, a purshis was filed at Exh.29 making a prayer by the complainant to give the benefit of probation to the accused. The Probation Officer’s report was produced at Exh.33. Considering Section 326 of IPC invoked in the present matter, the learned Appellate Court has not found it fit to compound the case. 4. Mr. The Probation Officer’s report was produced at Exh.33. Considering Section 326 of IPC invoked in the present matter, the learned Appellate Court has not found it fit to compound the case. 4. Mr. Hardik Mehta, learned APP for the respondent– State submitted that Section 326 of IPC is invoked which invites the punishment to life imprisonment and submitted that it is an offence for causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon and thus, stated that the offence would not be compoundable. Learned APP further submitted that ten prohibition cases, one IPC case, one Arms Act case and one Gujarat Police Act case have been registered against the present accused. 5. Learned advocate for heirs of respondent no.2 has placed on record the affidavits of settlement filed by Babliben Ambalal Vaghela, Dineshbhai Ambalal Vaghela and Ajaybhai Ambalal Vaghela who are present before this Court and the heirs of respondent no.2 have affirmed the contents of the affidavits who are identified by learned advocate for respondent no.2. The same is taken on record. Learned advocate seeks permission to file Vakalatnama. Let Vakalatnama be accepted. 6. It is true that certain section of IPC is non- compoundable and that the other sections could be compounded with the permission of the Court. Considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303 , the present matter would fall under the criteria laid down therein. In paragraph-61 of the said judgment, it has been observed thus:- “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 7. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 , the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the issue as to whether an FIR lodged for the 2 offences punishable under sections 307 and 34 IPC could be quashed on the basis of the settlement between the parties. While considering the said issue, the Apex Court observed in para-13 thus:- “13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: (i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non- compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; (ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; (iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; (iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/ delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; (v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.” 8. Considering the facts of the case, the weapon which was used is iron pipe and not any instrument which would be used for shooting, stabbing or cutting and since cross complaints have been filed against each other, the applicant in the present matter had compounded the offence against all the three persons. Considering this fact that the peace would prevail by way of settlement and that would also help in maintaining the law and order and since the applicant is already in jail, the matter is considered as compounded. Mother of the applicant-accused is present before this Court. Considering this fact that the peace would prevail by way of settlement and that would also help in maintaining the law and order and since the applicant is already in jail, the matter is considered as compounded. Mother of the applicant-accused is present before this Court. She has also ensured that there has been peaceful settlement of the matter and her son has compounded the offence against the deceased complainant and his sons. 9. In aforesaid view of the matter, the order dated 15.10.2018 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharuch in Criminal Case no.4170 of 2015 as well as the order dated 31.7.2024 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Bharuch in Criminal Appeal no.127 of 2018 are quashed and set aside. The applicant stands acquitted. 10. Accordingly, the present application is allowed in the above terms. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.