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2024 DIGILAW 1755 (ALL)

I. R. Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashpal Khullar

2024-07-29

KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA

body2024
JUDGMENT : (Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.) : 1. The instant second appeal has been filed by two defendants of the Original Suit No.482 of 2002 assailing the judgment and decree dated 17.01.2017 whereby learned Additional District Judge, First, Gautam Budh Nagar, has allowed Civil Appeal No.19 of 2013 filed by the plaintiff-respondent no.1, set aside the judgment of the trial court dated 23.03.2013 and decreed the suit granting various reliefs to the plaintiff-respondent no.1. PLAINT CASE 2. As per plaint case, a residential plot No.122, Block-E, Measuring 180 sq. mtrs situated at Sector 41, Noida had been allotted by defendant no.4, i.e. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (for short ‘NOIDA’) in favour of one Shadi Lal Mehra (for short ‘SLM’) who executed a registered agreement for sale dated 24.11.1995 in favour of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, SLM had delivered possession of plot to him. The plaintiff also pleaded about a registered Will dated 24.11.1995 and certain other documents, like power of attorney etc, executed by SLM in his favour. SLM died on 11.02.1996, consequent upon which, the plaintiff became owner of the plot to the divestment of defendants no.2 and 3, who are respectively widow and son of SLM. The plaintiff could not inform NOIDA about the rights acquired by him at the strength of the Will and other documents but, on 12.12.2002, when he found the defendant no.1 (I.R. Constructions Pvt Ltd) (appellant no.1 herein) raising constructions over the plot, on being asked from the appellant no.1, he was informed about execution of certain documents by the defendants no.2 and 3 in favour of defendant no.5-Devendra Kumar (appellant no.2 herein) and also a registered lease deed dated 28.05.2001 for 90 years by NOIDA. The plaintiff stated all the documents executed inter se defendants as null and void by relying upon the agreement for sale and Will dated 24.11.1995 in his favour by SLM and, consequently, prayed for a decree for specific performance of the agreement directing the defendants no.2, 3 and 5 to execute sale deed in his favour, grant of which if not possible, a decree restraining the defendant no.1 from raising constructions and demolition of constructions raised so far; declaring all documents executed amongst the defendants as null and void; declaring the plaintiff as owner of the disputed plot at the strength of the Will dated 24.11.1995 with a further decree that possession of the plot be directed to be delivered to the plaintiff. CONTEST BY DEFENDANTS 3. The defendants no.1 and 5 (appellants herein) pleaded in written statement that a Will dated 10.01.1996 was executed by SLM in favour of defendant no.5; the said defendant applied before NOIDA for entering his name in the records and for getting a lease deed executed; NOIDA executed a registered lease deed on 28.05.2001 in favour of defendant no.5 and also delivered its possession to him, whereafter the defendant no.5 executed documents in favour of defendant no.1 and also handed over its possession to the said defendant. It was further pleaded that the defendant no.1 raised constructions over the plot and had also obtained a completion certificate from NOIDA prior to institution of the suit. They disputed the sustainability of the Will dated 24.11.1995 by referring to proceedings of a probate case filed by the plaintiff which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 30.08.2003 by the District Judge, Ghaziabad. Certain other documents executed amongst the defendants were also pleaded with a further stand that the suit was filed at a very belated stage after the title stood vested in the defendants. Wife of late SLM and his son were defendants no.2 and 3 against whom suit had proceeded ex-parte, as would be apparent from the appellate court’s judgment and the main contest was made by the present appellants, who were respectively, defendants no.1 and 5 in the suit. TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 4. Wife of late SLM and his son were defendants no.2 and 3 against whom suit had proceeded ex-parte, as would be apparent from the appellate court’s judgment and the main contest was made by the present appellants, who were respectively, defendants no.1 and 5 in the suit. TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 4. The trial court framed nine issues and the main issues were to the effect as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to get the relief of the declaration of his rights at the strength of Will dated 24.11.1995 and further a decree of cancellation of all documents including lease deed executed in favour of the defendant no.5. The trial court, after discussing oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the suit by judgment and order dated 23.03.2013 by raising serious doubts on the execution of Will dated 24.11.1995 by SLM on the ground that neither disclosure of natural successors of SLM was given in the Will nor was any circumstance disclosed as to why bequeath in favour of a stranger (plaintiff) by divesting the natural heirs was justified. The plaintiff’s plea of possession was also discarded by the trial court and it gave weightage to the Will dated 10.01.1996 relied upon by the defendant no.5 in his favour claiming it to have been executed by SLM. The trial court observed that in view of the subsequent Will of 1996, the previous Will of 1995 automatically stood nullified and, consequently, the plaintiff’s claim for any relief was turned down. FIRST APPELLATE COURT'S JUDGMENT 5. The plaintiff filed Civil Appeal No.19 of 2013, which has been allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar by the impugned judgment and decree dated 17.01.2017. In order to adjudge the entire controversy involved, it would be quite apt to quote the operative portion of the decree drawn by the lower appellate court, which reads as under:- ADMISSION ORDER PASSED IN INSTANT SECOND APPEAL 6. The instant second appeal was admitted by a Coordinate Bench by order dated 05.02.2020 on the following substantial questions of law:- “(i) Whether the Will dated 10.01.1996 has a specific stipulation superseding earlier Will dated 24.11.1995 ? (ii) Whether the defendant could prove his Will before the court of law so to sustain his claims as have been bestowed on him subsequently on the basis of such Will ? (ii) Whether the defendant could prove his Will before the court of law so to sustain his claims as have been bestowed on him subsequently on the basis of such Will ? (iii) Whether Will dated 10.01.1996 could have superseded earlier Will dated 24.11.1995 despite the fact that plaintiff did not challenge the cancellation of the Will dated 10.01.1996 before the Court of competent jurisdiction ? (iv) Whether the letter of allotment creates any transferable right in favour of the allottee which can be transferred through a Will or not ? 7. I have heard Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants and Sri Swapnil Kumar, assisted by Sri Prem Chandra and Sri Virendra Singh Tomar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent and have carefully perused the original records of both the courts below. 8. In order to answer the questions so framed, this Court needs to examine the rival claims set up by both sides at the strength of various documents, such as registered Will dated 24.11.1995, power of attorney of the same date, an unregistered Will dated 10.01.1996, certain No Objection Letters issued in favour of defendant no.5 by the heirs of late SLM, registered lease deed dated 28.05.2001, letter of allotment issued by NOIDA in favour of SLM on 22.06.1991 and membership of SLM with a Co-operative Housing Society, namely, Paradise Co-operative Housing Building Society Ltd, reference whereof has come on record in various documents and proceedings. SUBMISSION OF APPELLANTS 9. SUBMISSION OF APPELLANTS 9. Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants argued that no title ever vested in SLM as there was merely an allotment letter dated 22.06.1991 executed by NOIDA in his favour which did not confer ownership on SLM; power of attorney executed by SLM in favour of plaintiff on 24.11.1995 lost its efficacy and significance after death of SLM which occurred on 11.02.1996; even otherwise, no action was taken by the plaintiff at the strength of the Will or power of attorney, either during lifetime or after demise of SLM and, therefore, the documents remained of no significance; on 14.03.2000, NOIDA cancelled the allotment made in favour of SLM and, thereafter, executed registered lease deed in favour of appellant no.2 on 28.05.2001 after the said appellant had been inducted as a member in the Co-operative Society; cancellation order dated 14.03.2000 was never assailed by the plaintiff; the suit as framed was not maintainable as the plaintiff was out of possession on the date of institution of suit but no relief of dispossession of the defendants was claimed; for the same reason suit for injunction was also not maintainable; the plea of plaintiff that SLM had delivered him actual and physical possession over the plot was not tenable as per the defence taken by the NOIDA in its written statement that possession could not be delivered to him for want of execution of lease deed and since SLM never came in possession over the plot, there was no question of handing over possession by SLM to the plaintiff. 10. As regards Will dated 10.01.1996 executed by SLM in favour of defendant no.5, Sri Agrawal admitted that it was an unregistered document and only its photostat copy was brought on record from the defendants’ side. He, however, submits that even if the Will of 1996 is ignored for all purposes, the alleged weakness of the defence case on that basis would not strengthen the plaintiff’s case and he would have to stand on his own legs to get a decree in his favour. SUBMISSION OF RESPONDENT 11. He, however, submits that even if the Will of 1996 is ignored for all purposes, the alleged weakness of the defence case on that basis would not strengthen the plaintiff’s case and he would have to stand on his own legs to get a decree in his favour. SUBMISSION OF RESPONDENT 11. Sri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel the plaintiff-respondent no.1, on the other hand, has vehemently opposed the submissions and argued that the entire case of the defendant was based upon an alleged Will dated 10.01.1996 which was manufactured for the purposes of the case after the death of SLM and, even otherwise, its photostat copy was brought on record which would not fall in the category of either primary or secondary evidence and, consequently, the defence case falls on this ground alone. He further submits that even if ownership did not vest in SLM, admittedly, there being an allotment order of 22.06.1991 in his favour, whatever rights SLM possessed at the strength of such allotment order, the same stood devolved by testamentary succession upon the plaintiff at the strength of registered Will dated 24.11.1995. He further submits that all the defendants colluded amongst themselves to deprive the plaintiff of his right to get the lease deed executed and even the officer of NOIDA, who had appeared as a witness, concealed material information by stating that the record was not available in office. He submits that natural heirs of SLM did not contest the proceedings and the entire circumstances and chain of dates and events apparently suggest only one thing that rights acquired by plaintiff were sought to be nullified by the defendants by manufacturing fabricated documents which included obtaining ‘No Objection’ from the Co-operative Society as regards transfer of membership in favour of the defendant no.5 and all the defendants succeeded in their evil design. It was further argued that the trial court discarded the registered Will and accepted the photostat copy of an unregistered Will as having more evidentiary value over a registered document and, consequently, the lower appellate court has rightly set aside the trial court’s judgment and granted a lawful decree. ANALYSIS OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS 12. In order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the suit has been rightly decreed by the lower appellate court, it would be necessary to carefully examine the documents relied upon by both the parties. ANALYSIS OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS 12. In order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the suit has been rightly decreed by the lower appellate court, it would be necessary to carefully examine the documents relied upon by both the parties. From the original record, it is apparent that the land earlier belonged to Paradise Co-operative Housing Building Society Ltd, and was acquired by NOIDA, as is apparent from the statement of DW-2 Mr. R.P. Dilwali, President of the said Society in which he stated that NOIDA made allotments to the members of the said Society. There is no dispute that SLM was a member of the said Co-operative Housing Society and original Share Certificate dated 02.11.1974 is on record of the trial court as Paper No.151/1. It is also not in dispute that at the strength of membership of the Society, allotment of disputed plot was made by NOIDA in favour of SLM on 22.06.1991. The allotment letter, being Paper No.152, contained a clear stipulation amongst others that after completion of various formalities, lease deed would be executed and possession would be delivered thereafter. Admittedly, during lifetime of SLM, the lease deed was not executed by NOIDA and, therefore, the question of delivery of actual and physical possession by NOIDA to SLM could never arise. 13. The plaintiff’s claim was based upon a registered Will and registered agreement for sale, both dated 24.11.1995 and executed by SLM in his favour. The original Will being Paper No.9-Ka on record, is a one page document executed in a printed proforma. It was termed by SLM as his LAST IRREVOCABLE WILL/ TESTAMENT. He claimed to be owner of the disputed plot and stated that he wanted to immediately relinquish all the rights and ownership in the said property in favour of the plaintiff and that after his death, the plaintiff would become the sole and absolute owner thereof. Admittedly, on the date of execution of Will, no document of title was executed by NOIDA in favour of SLM. Admittedly, on the date of execution of Will, no document of title was executed by NOIDA in favour of SLM. There was a mere allotment letter dated 22.06.1991 existing in favour of SLM which, in no way, can be treated as a document of ownership and, hence, the statement made in the Will, though in a printed proforma, as regards ownership of SLM would, in itself, be not sufficient to reach to a conclusion that in case the Will stands proved, ownership would vest in the beneficiary, i.e. the plaintiff. Apart from this, there was no mention of natural successors of SLM in the Will except a printed paragraph stating that “any objection to be raised by my wife/ husband/ children (major or minor, married or unmarried), brothers, sisters or any legal heirs/ representatives regarding this “Will” shall be deemed as null and void and ineffective and that his heirs and legal representatives shall have no rights or any interest in the property which he had purchased independently out of his self-earned income." No reason was assigned as to why there being natural successors i.e. wife and sons what was the justification for depriving them of the rights in property and executing a Will in favour of a stranger, i.e. the plaintiff. 14. Even if this Court finds that the trial court, while holding the registered Will dated 24.11.1995 as surrounded by suspicious circumstances, gave weightage to the unregistered Will dated 10.01.1996 relied upon by the defendant side and giving priority and supremacy to the unregistered Will of 1996 over the registered Will of 1995 was not a correct and lawful approach of the trial court for the additional reason that only photostat copy of the said unregistered Will was produced which could not be treated as either primary or secondary evidence, nevertheless the Will of 1995 relied upon by the plaintiff being surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the view taken by the trial court to that extent appears to be strictly in consonance with law and the Will of 1995 was, hence, rightly discarded. Even if for the sake of accepting the Will of 1995 and reading it in favour of the plaintiff, it is quite necessary to explain the legal position as regards a Will and the rights bequeathed upon the beneficiary under it. 15. Even if for the sake of accepting the Will of 1995 and reading it in favour of the plaintiff, it is quite necessary to explain the legal position as regards a Will and the rights bequeathed upon the beneficiary under it. 15. A Will is not an instrument of transfer of property and that is why it does not find place in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 3 whereof defines an “instrument” as follows:- “Instrument” means a non-testamentary instrument. 16. ‘Transfer of Property’ has been defined under Section 5 as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself. The said provision reads as under:- “5. “Transfer of property” defined.— In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act................” 17. Admittedly, the property in dispute is an immovable property and its definition contained in Section 3 of the Act, 1882 only provides that “immovable property” does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. Clear definition of an “immovable property” is not found in the Transfer of Property Act, however, it has been defined under Section 4(23) of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904 in the following words:- “4(23) "immovable property" shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, but shall not include standing timber, growing crops or grass.” 18. The Will being a testamentary instrument excluded by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and which comes into effect after the death of the testator is certainly not an instrument of transfer of property by one living person to other as per Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Rather, as per Section 2 (h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the Will has been defined as under:- “2(h) “will” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.” 19. Rather, as per Section 2 (h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the Will has been defined as under:- “2(h) “will” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.” 19. In view of the above discussion, once it is admitted that ownership in the disputed immovable property never vested in SLM during his lifetime, mere execution of the Will mentioning that ownership would devolve upon the plaintiff after death of the testator would not make the plaintiff as owner of the disputed plot after death of SLM. Even if the rights conferred by SLM are treated to be lawfully bequeathed upon the plaintiff under the Will of 1995, the plaintiff would, at the most, succeed rights of SLM as an allottee and not more than that. Admittedly, NOIDA cancelled allotment of SLM on 14.03.2000 and there is sufficient documentary evidence on record that NOIDA issued notices, one after another, to SLM to take steps for getting the lease deed executed making it clear that in the event of non-compliance, the allotment would be cancelled but when no response was received, NOIDA cancelled the allotment by letter dated 14.03.2000. The said order having not been assailed in any independent proceedings or even in the suit in question, the necessary consequence would be that the allotment stood washed away for all theoretical and practical purposes. There being no fresh allotment in favour of the plaintiff even otherwise, no rights whatsoever stood devolved on him even if the Will of 1995 is treated to have been validly executed. There being no fresh allotment in favour of the plaintiff even otherwise, no rights whatsoever stood devolved on him even if the Will of 1995 is treated to have been validly executed. Going to the extreme extent that the order of cancellation of allotment was passed by NOIDA on 14.03.2000, i.e. after four years from the death of SLM and, hence, would be of no significance as far as rights alleged by plaintiff are concerned, the Court records that the subsequent lease deed was executed in favour of the defendant no.5 (appellant no.2 herein) on 28.05.2001, which act was fully supported by natural heirs of SLM in terms of letters submitted by SLM’s wife, namely, Vijay Mehra (defendant no.2), his mother Satyawati Mehra and son Vishal Mehra and also for grant/transfer/conferment of membership by the Paradise Cooperative Housing Building Society Ltd in favour of defendant no.5-Devendra Kumar vide MR No.7406 dated 10.05.2001 with a clear No Objection by the Society as regards transfer of allotment by NOIDA in favour of Devendra Kumar. The voluminous evidence on record infers only one thing that all the defendants including the non-party Cooperative Housing Society recognized the rights of membership acquired by appellant no.2 and transfer of allotment and execution of lease deed in his favour by NOIDA in the year 2001. By that time, the allotment made in favour of SLM was not in existence as the same had been cancelled on 14.03.2000 and even if rights of plaintiff at the strength of Will are stretched in his favour, he could only get issued a fresh allotment by NOIDA in his favour but no such fresh allotment letter was ever issued by NOIDA in his favour. The allotment made in favour of SLM would not automatically devolve upon the plaintiff without intervention by NOIDA and as far as execution of lease deed is concerned, the same could be done only in favour of a member of the Co-operative Housing Society. There is nothing on record that the plaintiff ever acquired membership in the society, as is apparent from the operative portion of the decree drawn by the lower appellate court declaring the plaintiff as member of the society with effect from 11.02.1996 on which date SLM had expired. 20. There is nothing on record that the plaintiff ever acquired membership in the society, as is apparent from the operative portion of the decree drawn by the lower appellate court declaring the plaintiff as member of the society with effect from 11.02.1996 on which date SLM had expired. 20. Now coming to that part of the decree whereby the plaintiff has been declared as a member of the Society in place of SLM with effect from 11.02.1996, it is to be noted that, admittedly, the Paradise Co-operative Housing Building Society Ltd was not a party to the proceedings nor was the issue of membership involved in the suit proceedings. Before arriving at a conclusion as regards membership, the lower appellate court should have considered that the cooperative society being a Housing Cooperative Society, the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 would come into application. Here, it would be necessary to deal with the said aspect as finds place in the Statute. 21. As per Section 2(n) of the Act, 1965, “member” means a person who joined in the application for registration of a society or person admitted to membership after such registration in accordance with the provisions of the Act, Rules and the Bye-laws. As to who can become a member of a Cooperative Society, Section 17 of the Act deals with the same. Section 18 defines classes of members. Section 25 contains a provision to the effect that liability of a past member or of the estate of a deceased member would continue. For a ready reference, Section 25(1) of the Act is reproduced as under:- “25(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) the liability of a past member or of the estate of a deceased member of a co-operative society for the debts of the society as they existed- (a) in the case of a past member, on the date on which he ceased to be a member ; and (b) in the case of a deceased member, on the date of his death shall continue for a period of two years from such date.” 22. Section 26 is a provision dealing with refusal to admit a person as a member. Section 26 is a provision dealing with refusal to admit a person as a member. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the said section read as under:- “26 (1) A person may be admitted as a member of cooperative society subject to the provisions of this Act, the rules and the bye-laws. (2) Where a person may be admitted as a member of cooperative society, the decision refusing admission shall be communicated by the society to that person within seven days of the date of the decision.” 23. Aforesaid provisions, when read with controversy involved in the present case, would make it clear that liability of estate of deceased member (SLM) would continue to exist for a period of two years from the date of his death. It, therefore, automatically ceased after 11.02.1998 when two years period from his death expired. During these two years period of time, no body came forward to assert rights, if any, left behind by SLM. Hence, any right held by SLM in terms of allotment made in his favour ceased to survive for all purposes. Once fresh membership came into existence in favour of defendant-appellant no.2 on 10.05.2001, as reflected from the letter of the office bearer of the Society addressed to AGM, NOIDA, the controversy ended then and there and, therefore, on the date of institution of suit in the year 2002, the plaintiff could not assert any right allegedly flowing from membership of SLM or even allotment made in his favour. The documents executed by SLM in favour of the plaintiff would also become of insignificant value in the facts of the case read with statutory provisions referred to hereinabove. 24. Another significant aspect would be applicability of barring provision of the Act of 1965, section 111 whereof specifically bars jurisdiction of a civil court. The said provision reads as under:- “111. Save as expressly provided in this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of :- (a) the registration of a co-operative society or its bye-laws or of an amendment of a bye-laws ; (b) the supersession or suspension of a committee of management ; (c) any dispute required under section 70 to be referred to the Registrar ; and (d) any other order or award made under this Act.” 25. Though in the present case, neither registration of the cooperative society nor its Bye-laws nor supersession or suspension of a Committee of Management nor any dispute required under Section 70 to be referred to the Registrar is involved, certainly there is an order of 10.05.2001 conferring membership in the society in favour of the defendant-appellant no.2-Devendra Kumar based upon which the lease deed was executed by NOIDA in his favour on 28.05.2001. The lower appellate court, while observing that since all the defendants had maliciously acted to the detriment of the interest of the plaintiff and the documents executed amongst themselves were invalid for such acts of them, has misdirected itself to comment upon the membership of the appellant no.2 in the co-operative society or act of its office bearers and also declaring the plaintiff as member without looking into the fact that the co-operative society was not a party to the proceedings nor was its order dated 10.05.2001 conferring membership upon the defendant-appellant no.2 under challenge. Surprisingly, the lower appellate court held the membership of the appellant No.2 as invalid by simply observing that the membership as well as registered lease deed was obtained on the basis of an invalid Will dated 10.01.1996. Even if the Court ignores the Will of 1996, as rightly observed by the lower appellate court, for the reason that its photostat copy was inadmissible in evidence and, even otherwise, its proof did not satisfy the statutory requirements needed for that, the same, in itself, could not be a circumstance to grant various decrees by the lower appellate court, including a decree against the co-operative society, non-party, and which relief appears to be clearly barred under Section 111 (d) of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. CONCLUSION 26. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that though the lower appellate court was right in holding that Will dated 10.01.1996 would not supersede the registered Will dated 24.11.1995, merely on that basis the suit could not be decreed as per the discussion made herein above. CONCLUSION 26. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that though the lower appellate court was right in holding that Will dated 10.01.1996 would not supersede the registered Will dated 24.11.1995, merely on that basis the suit could not be decreed as per the discussion made herein above. In this view of the matter, first three substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and against the defendant-appellants, however, the last question no.4, framed as regards transferable right created under the letter of allotment or a Will, is answered in favour of the defendant-appellants and against the plaintiff-respondent holding that mere allotment made by NOIDA in favour of SLM or execution of registered Will dated 24.11.1995 or agreement or power of attorney by him in favour of the plaintiff-respondent was not sufficient to grant the decree drawn by the lower appellate court. 27. In view of the above, the instant second appeal succeeds and is allowed. 28. The judgment and decree dated 17.01.2017 passed by learned Additional District Judge, First, Gautam Budh Nagar in Civil Appeal No.19 of 2013 is hereby set aside. Consequently, Original Suit No.482 of 2002 (Yashpal Khullar Vs. I.R. Constructions Pvt Ltd and others) stands dismissed for additional reasons given in this judgment. 29. Office is directed to remit the record of lower appellate court as well as trial court to the District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar forthwith so as to facilitate return of original documents to the concerned parties by the District Court office in accordance with the provisions of General Rules (Civil).