ORDER : Vaibhavi D. Nanavati, J. 1. Heard Mr.Vijay Patel, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr.Lalit Patel, learned advocate appearing for the respondent. 2. By way of the present petition, the petitioner herein has prayed for direction to implement the order dated 30.03.2013 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad in Criminal Misc. Application No.197 of 2012 under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, the “Act”) whereby, the learned Magistrate was pleased to direct the respondent to take physical possession of the property in question. 3. Briefly stated, the respondent - bank sanctioned cash credit facility of Rs.3 lacs to one M/s.Norton Industries - the borrower in the year 1997 and to secure the said facility, M/s.Norton Industries executed security documents in favour of the respondent, creating security interest in favour of the respondent. 3.1. The borrower failed to make the payment of the loan amount and in view thereof, the account of the borrower was classified as Non-Performing Asset on 30.03.2003. The respondent – bank issued notice dated 20.11.2003 under Section 13(2) of the Act. The symbolic possession of the property in question was taken on 05.08.2010 under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002. 3.2. The borrower i.e. M/s.Norton Industries having not repaid the financial assistance availed, even after taking the symbolic possession of the property in question, the respondent – bank issued sale notice on 12.09.2011 and thereby, put the property for auction on 20.10.2011 and the petitioner participated in the auction proceedings and the bid for an amount to the tune of Rs.26,51,000/- was accepted by the respondent – bank as highest bid. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner herein has paid the aforesaid entire amount within the stipulated time. Not only that, the respondent – bank, as a part of the sale process also, executed the registered conveyance deed in favour of the petitioner on 25.01.2012. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad on 30.03.2013 passed the order under Section 14 of the Act for taking physical possession of the property. 3.3. Not only that, the respondent – bank, as a part of the sale process also, executed the registered conveyance deed in favour of the petitioner on 25.01.2012. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad on 30.03.2013 passed the order under Section 14 of the Act for taking physical possession of the property. 3.3. It is the case of the petitioner that the borrower i.e. M/s.Norton Industries, being aggrieved by the said order dated 30.03.2013, filed Securitisation Application No.39 of 2013 before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad under Section 17 of the Act without joining the petitioner as party respondent in the said proceedings. 3.4. The learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, upon hearing all the parties, dismissed the said Securitisation Application No.39 of 2013 by order dated 17.09.2013, duly produced at Annexure-C. 3.5. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 17.09.2013 passed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal in Securitisation Application No.39 of 2013, the borrower preferred appeal being Appeal No.264 of 2013 before the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai without joining the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an application for joining in the said appeal, which came to be allowed by order dated 07.10.2015. The learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, upon hearing the concerned parties, by order dated 16.01.2024, dismissed the appeal. Since the said appeal came to be dismissed, the petitioner approached the respondent – bank by letter dated 01.02.2024 with a request to handover the peaceful and vacant possession of the property in question. The said letter was duly received by the respondent – bank by hand delivery on 02.02.2024. 3.6. Though, upon lapse of 30 days, in absence of any reply given by the respondent – bank, the petitioner gave another letter for reminder on 04.03.2024. In absence of any reply nor any action taken by the respondent – bank, the petitioner has approached this Court, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to direct the Respondent Bank to execute the order dated 30.03.2013 passed by Ld. In absence of any reply nor any action taken by the respondent – bank, the petitioner has approached this Court, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has prayed for the following reliefs:- “(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to direct the Respondent Bank to execute the order dated 30.03.2013 passed by Ld. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad in CRMA No.197/2012 under section Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; (B) Your Lordship may be pleased to direct the Respondent Bank to take physical possession of the property being ALL THAT PIECE AND PARCEL OF THE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY BEING PLOT NO.146-B, ADMEASURING ABOUT 360 SQ.MTRS. GIDC, PHASE-II, VATVA, AHMEDABAD pursuant to the order dated 30.03.2013 passed under section 14 of the Act, 2002 and subsequently be pleased to direct the respondent bank to handover the same to the petitioner herein. (C) Any other relief, order or direction which Hon’ble Court may deem just, fit, proper and equitable in the facts of the case.” 4. Mr.Vijay Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner herein is the auction purchaser and registered conveyance deed is also entered into between the petitioner and the respondent – bank on 25.01.2012. It is submitted that in spite of the aforesaid, in view of the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, initiated by the borrower, being Securitisation Application No.39 of 2013 and Appeal No.264 of 2013, both the proceedings have attained finality whereby, borrower’s application has been dismissed concurrently. It is submitted that the aforesaid was also the subject matter of the petition filed before this Court being Special Civil Application No.7718 of 2024 and the same is also dismissed by this Court. 4.1. Placing reliance on the aforesaid, Mr.Vijay Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the prayers, as prayed for, in the present petition be allowed. 4.2. Reliance is also placed on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of CELIR LLP vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2024) 2 SCC 1 . 5. Placing reliance on the aforesaid, Mr.Vijay Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the prayers, as prayed for, in the present petition be allowed. 4.2. Reliance is also placed on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of CELIR LLP vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2024) 2 SCC 1 . 5. Mr.Lalit Patel, learned advocate for the respondent relied upon the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent – bank and submitted that in view of the proceedings, which were pending before the competent forums, the respondent – bank was not in a position to hand over the physical possession of the property in question to the petitioner herein. Mr.Lalit Patel, learned advocate has also supported the contentions of the petitioner herein. Placing reliance on paragraph 7 of the reply, it is submitted that the respondent herein would act in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Act to handover the physical possession of the property in question to the petitioner. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, it is not in dispute that the petitioner herein is an auction purchaser of the property in question. The conveyance deed is also executed on 25.01.2012. The borrower, being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order dated 30.03.2013 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad under Section 14 of the Act, approached the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad by filing Securitisation Application No.39 of 2013, which came to be dismissed by order dated 17.09.2013. The aforesaid order was the subject matter of appeal before the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai being Appeal No.264 of 2013, which also came to be dismissed by order dated 16.01.2024. The aforesaid orders were subject matter of challenge by filing Special Civil Application No.7718 of 2024, which also came to be dismissed. 7. In light of the aforesaid, it is apposite to refer to paragraph 7 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent – bank, which reads as under:- “7) It is therefore respectfully submitted that in the light of the foregoing facts and under the circumstances explained hereinabove, since order to maintain status quo passed by the Hon’ble DRAT, Mumbai was operating till 16.01.2024 the Respondent Bank was not in a position to and hence it could not handover possession of the property in question to the Petitioner. However, now since the Appeal filed by the borrower is dismissed and there is no_ order restraining the Respondent Bank to take possession in pursuance of the order dated 30.03.2013 passed by Hon'ble Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, Petitioner is entitled for possession of the property in question and it has made out a case warranting intervention by this Hon’ble Court and in view of the peculiar facts, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to exercise its inherent powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India directing the Hon’ble Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad to authorize any subordinate to him as a court commissioner to take possession and handover the property in question to the petitioner as per the provisions of Section 14(1A) of SARFAESI Act so as to enable it to further handover it to the Petitioner herein.” 8. It is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CELIR LLP vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2024) 2 SCC 1 . Paragraphs 88, 89, 91, 92, 96 and 105 thereof, read as under:- “88. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that as per the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, once the borrower fails to tender the entire amount of dues with all cost & charges to the secured creditor before the publication of auction notice, his right of redemption of mortgage shall stand extinguished / waived on the date of publication of the auction notice in the newspaper in accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of 2002. 89. We shall now consider whether in the factual score of the present matter, any interference was warranted by the High Court in exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 226. 91. The only justification for entertaining the Writ Petition is contained in paragraphs 11 and 14 respectively of the Impugned Judgment. 89. We shall now consider whether in the factual score of the present matter, any interference was warranted by the High Court in exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 226. 91. The only justification for entertaining the Writ Petition is contained in paragraphs 11 and 14 respectively of the Impugned Judgment. Whilst the High Court has accepted that normally, such a Writ Petition would not be maintainable, it proceeded to entertain the same because of the “peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case”, “it would be in the interest of all concerned if the consensus reached between the Respondent Bank and the Petitioners is taken cognizance of by us.” Thereafter, it went on to say that the “arrangement referred to above is in the interest of all, including the Auction Purchaser”. A perusal of paragraph 14 would indicate that since the outcome which the High Court considered to be ideal could be achieved, it did not hold the Writ Petition to be an abuse of process. 92. This Court has time and again, reminded the High Courts that they should not entertain petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. This Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra) made the following observations: “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. xxx xxx xxx 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 96. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra), it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act. 105. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra), it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act. 105. We summarise our final conclusion as under: (i) The High Court was not justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when the borrowers had already availed the alternative remedy available to them under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. (ii) The confirmation of sale by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 invests the successful auction purchaser with a vested right to obtain a certificate of sale of the immovable property in form given in appendix (V) to the Rules i.e., in accordance with Rule 9(6) of the SARFAESI. (iii) In accordance with the unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset was available till the sale or transfer of such secured asset. In other words, the borrower’s right of redemption did not stand terminated on the date of the auction sale of the secured asset itself and remained alive till the transfer was completed in favour of the auction purchaser, by registration of the sale certificate and delivery of possession of the secured asset. However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002. In effect, the right of redemption available to the borrower under the present statutory regime is drastically curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002 and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the secured asset in favour of the auction purchaser. (iv) The Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 could not have withhold the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002 and enter into a private arrangement with a borrower. (iv) The Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 could not have withhold the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002 and enter into a private arrangement with a borrower. (v) The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have applied equitable considerations to overreach the outcome contemplated by the statutory auction process prescribed under the SARFAESI Act. (vi) The two decisions of the Telangana High Court in the case of Concern Readymix (supra) and Amme Srisailam (supra) do not lay down the correct position of law. In the same way, the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pal Alloys (supra) also does not lay down the correction position of law (vii) The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Sai Annadhatha Polymers (supra) and the decision of the Telangana High Court in the case of K.V.V. Prasad Rao Gupta (supra) lay down the correct position of law while interpreting the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act.” 9. In view of the aforesaid position taken by the respondent – bank, as referred above, the borrower’s challenge to the order passed by the competent authority dated 30.03.2013 under Section 14 of the Act stands dismissed concurrently. Further, considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CELIR LLP vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2024) 2 SCC 1 , as referred above in paragraph 4.2, once the borrower fails to tender the entire amount of dues with all cost and charges to the secured creditor before the publication of auction notice, his right of redemption of mortgage stand extinguished / waived on the date of publication of the auction notice in the newspaper in accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of 2002. As there is no restrictive order against the respondent – bank to take possession, pursuant to the order dated 30.03.2013 passed by the competent Court, the respondent – bank is directed to do the needful in accordance with Section 14 of the Act. 10. The present petition is allowed accordingly.