ORDER : NIRAL R. MEHTA, J. 1. The petitions involve similar facts and identical issues, therefore, they were heard together to be treated for disposal by this common judgment and order. 2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, having regard to the issues involved and with consent and request of learned advocates for the parties, both these Special Civil Applications were taken up for final consideration today, by treating Special Civil Application No.14025 of 2020 as lead matter. 3. Rule returnable in both the Special Civil Applications forthwith. Learned advocate Ms.Maithili Mehta waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the Revenue. 4. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 4.3.2020 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Ahmedabad under Section 260 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’), by which the application filed by the petitioner under Section 264 of the Act came to be rejected, holding it as not maintainable. 5. Brief facts of the case are as under : 5.1 The Petitioner filed its return of income for AY 2007-08 on 30.10.2007, declaring total income at Nil pursuant to the scheme of demerger which was approved by this Court, a business unit of Adani Energy Limited was demerged and vested into the petitioner company. In terms of the order dated 9th December, 2009 passed by this Court under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956, the appointed date of this order was directed to be 1st January, 2007. As a result of the aforesaid demerger, the Applicant - assessee had paid a consideration of Rs.33,98,90,680/- over and above the net assets of the company which was towards goodwill. Goodwill being an intangible asset, the petitioner company was entitled to depreciation under Section 32 of the Act on the amount of Rs.33,98,90,680/-. In view of the fact that the order was passed on 9th December, 2009, the petitioner made claim for deduction of depreciation allowance for the A.Y. 2010-11 and all subsequent assessment years on the aforesaid value of the goodwill. This claim was accepted by the then Assessing Officer for A.Y. 2011-12 but was disturbed by then Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263 considering AY 2007-08 as the first year for claim of depreciation. This order of CIT was challenged by the petitioner and ITAT quashed the same. This claim was accepted by the then Assessing Officer for A.Y. 2011-12 but was disturbed by then Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263 considering AY 2007-08 as the first year for claim of depreciation. This order of CIT was challenged by the petitioner and ITAT quashed the same. In later years, the Assessing Officer itself computed the claim of depreciation considering AY 2007-08 as the first year although the petitioner had not claimed any depreciation in AY 2007-08 to AY 2009-10. The ITAT vide order dated 17th October, 2018 (for AY 2009-10) finally concluded this controversy and the petitioner - company's claim was accepted by the ITAT for even AY 2009-10. In this regards, comparative working of depreciation on goodwill, as computed by respondent and Assessing Officer is provided as under: Assessment Year Depreciation claimed by petitioner Depreciation computed by AO 2007-08 - 4,24,86,335/ (Being 12.5% of value of goodwill on demerger i.e. Rs.33,98,90,680/-) (Notional computation, actual depreciation is not granted) 2008-09 - 7,43,51,086/ (Notional computation, actual depreciation is not granted) 2009-10 - 5,57,63,315/ (Notional computation, actual depreciation is not granted) 2010-11 4,24,86,335/ 4,18,22,486/ (Being 12.5% of value of goodwill on demerger i.e. Rs.33,98,90,68 0/-) 2011-12 7,43,51,086/ 3,13,66,865/ 2012-13 5,57,63,315/ 2,35,25,148/ 2013-14 4,18,22,486/ 1,76,43,861/ 5.2 The petitioner, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, filed application under Section 264 of the Act. However, the respondent, vide order dated 4.3.2020, rejected the petitioner’s revision application on the ground of being not maintainable. Hence, the present petition is filed seeking appropriate reliefs. 6. Heard learned advocate Mr.B.S. Soparkar for the petitioner and learned advocate Ms.Maithili Mehta for the respondent. 7. Having considered the submissions canvassed by learned advocate for the respective parties, a short question that falls for consideration of this Court is whether the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act would fall within the ambit of expression ‘any orders’ as envisaged under Section 264 of the Act? 8. The aforesaid question is no more res-integra. This Court, in a decision rendered in Special Civil Application 14230 of 2020, dated 29.4.2024, after having considered catena of decisions, held that the powers conferred under section 264 of the Act are very wide. That the powers conferred under Section 264 of the Act would imply that section does not limit the power to correct errors committed by the subordinate authorities but could even be exercised where errors are committed by assessee. That the powers conferred under Section 264 of the Act would imply that section does not limit the power to correct errors committed by the subordinate authorities but could even be exercised where errors are committed by assessee. It would even cover situations where the assessee because of an error has not put forth a legitimate claim at the time of filing the return and the error is subsequently discovered and is raised for the first time in an application under section 264 of the Act. For the sake of brevity, the relevant observations of the decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application 14230 of 2020 are quoted, thus; “8. It will be also useful to reproduce paragraphs 11 and 12 of EBR Enterprises v. Union of India [2018] 89 taxmann.com 194/2017(12) TMI 425, which read as under: "11. Coming back to the impugned Order, the Commissioner has observed there are binding decisions which require each and every day's delay to be explained. The Commissioner has made a reference to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Others. However, the Commissioner has ignored the ratio of the said decision. In paragraph 4 of the said decision, the Apex Court has held thus : "4. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk." 12. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it was not necessary for the petitioner to have explained each and every day's delay. On the contrary, the Apex Court held that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice is to be preferred. The Apex Court also held there is no presumption that delay is intentional and deliberate, as normally a litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. As stated earlier, in the application dated 20th March, 2014 seeking invocation of the power under section 264, the delay has been adequately explained." 9. Therefore, the commissioner having been conferred the power to condone the delay to do substantial justice to parties by disposing the matter on merits should have, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in particular that it took a long time for the CIT(A) to dispose petitioner's appeal, ought to have condoned the delay. 10. On the second part of the impugned order that intimation under section 143(1) of the Act is not an assessment order, this court in Smita Rohit Gupta v. Pr. CIT [2024] 158 taxmann.com 157/| 2023] 459 ITR 369/2023 SCC online Bom 1861 held in paragraphs 6 to 10 as under: "6. Mr. Manwani relying upon judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ACIT v Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. (161 taxmann 316 (SC) submitted that since Petitioner had filed returns under section 139 and that was processed under section 143(1) of the Act, that processing order will not be an order and, therefore, Respondent No. 1 was justified in not entertaining application under section 264 of the Act. 7. In our view, judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh Jhaveri (supra) will not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case because that was a case where the Court was considering the provisions of Section 147 for reopening the assessment. The Court was considering whether the question of change of opinion would arise when an order under section 143(1) (a) of the Act had been passed. 8. The Court was considering whether the question of change of opinion would arise when an order under section 143(1) (a) of the Act had been passed. 8. The provisions of Section 264 and the power available to the Commissioner to exercise under section 264 of the Act came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan Diamond Company Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [(2003) 175 Taxation 91 (Bom)]. The Division Bench was pleased to observe that exercise of power under section 264 was not subject to the power of the Assessing Officer to make adjustment under section 143(1) of the Act. The Court held that power of the Commissioner under section 264 is rather wide and even the errors committed could be rectified. Paragraph 6 of the Hindustan Diamond Company Pvt. Ltd. (supra) reads as under: "6. Having heard the Counsel on both sides, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the revision application of the assessee. As rightly contended by Mr.Inamdar, Section 264 confers wide jurisdiction on the Commissioner. Proceedings under section 264 are intended to meet the situation faced by an aggrieved assessee who is unable to approach the appellate authority for relief and has no other alternate remedy available under the Act. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers (supra), the provision for Leave Encashment being a current liability the assessee is entitled for deduction of that amount. The Assessing Officer had accepted the return, ignoring the request of the assessee for deduction of the above amount. Therefore, the relief which was not granted by the Assessing Officer could be granted by the Commissioner under section 264. Before allowing such deduction if any further enquiry was required to be done, the Commissioner could have either himself enquired or directed the Assessing Officer to do the needful. However, the Commissioner has declined to exercise power under section 264 besasse of amendment to section 143(1) by Finance Act, 1999. Before allowing such deduction if any further enquiry was required to be done, the Commissioner could have either himself enquired or directed the Assessing Officer to do the needful. However, the Commissioner has declined to exercise power under section 264 besasse of amendment to section 143(1) by Finance Act, 1999. Powers of the Assessing Officer to make prima facie adjustments under section 143(1), done away with by Finance Act, 1999 (with effect from 1st June, 1999) does not in any way effect the right of the Commissioner under section 265 of the Act to grant relief to the assessee if available to the assessee as per the decision of the Apex Court. Exercise of powers under section 264 is not subject to the power of the Assessing Officer to make adjustments under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, relief can be granted to the assessee under section 264 even if the power of adjustment under section 143(1) is taken away from the Assessing Officer." (emphasis supplied) 9. Section 264 of the Act also came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Vijay Gupta v CIT Delhi-III [2016] 68 taxmann.com 131 (Delhi) where paragraph 35 reads as under: "35. From the various judicial pronouncements, it is settled that the powers conferred under section 264 of the Act are very wide. The Commissioner is bound to apply his mind to the question whether the petitioner was taxable on that income. Since section 264 uses the expression "any order", it would imply that the section does not limit the power to correct errors committed by the subordinate authorities but could even be exercised where errors are committed by assessees. It would even cover situations where the assessee because of an error has not put forth a legitimate claim at the time of filing the return and the error is subsequently discovered and is raised for the first time in an application under section 264." (emphasis supplied) 9. Adopting the above reasoning and considering the facts of the case, the impugned order passed by dated 20th March, 2020 passed by the respondent under Section 264 of the Act is hereby quashed and set aside and the delay in preferring the revision application is ordered to be condoned and the matter is remanded back to the respondent to decide the same on merits after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No orders as to cost.” 9. Keeping in mind the ratio laid down by this Court considering series of decisions, in our considered opinion, the Revision under Section 264 of the Act is maintainable against the intimation send under Section 143(1) of the Act. We answer the question accordingly. 10. Resultantly, the present petitions are allowed, by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 4.3.2020 passed by the respondent under Section 264 of the Act is hereby quashed and set aside and the delay in preferring the revision application is ordered to be condoned and the matter is remanded back to the respondent to decide the same on merits after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent in both the matters. No orders as to cost.