JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. Rule. Learned advocate Manan Bhatt waives service of rule on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned advocate Mr. Amit K. Dave, waives service of rule on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4. All these Misc. Civil Applications are arising out of the same cause of action and hence, with the consent of learned advocates for the parties, all the applications are taken up for joint hearing. The facts are extracted from the lead matter i.e. Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023. 2. This petition is filed alleging contempt of the Court as allegedly the respondents have disobeyed the order dated 05.05.2023 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal” for short) in Appeal No. 23 of 2022. The applicants also pray for purging of the contempt by cancelling a lease deed No. 6447 of 2023 dated 09.05.2023 registered with Office of the Sub-Registrar, Surat-5. This lease deed pertains to property in question bearing survey No. 67 of Town Planning Scheme No. 8, Umarvada with final plot No. 50. 3. The aforesaid property is in the name of Surat Parsi Panchayat Funds and Properties Trust (hereinafter referred to as “Trust” for short) of which the respondents Nos.1 and 2 are the trustees and respondent Nos.3 and 4 are the tenants of the trust properties. The trust had filed an application seeking permission under Section 36 of the Gujarat Public Trust Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for short) for executing a fresh lease deed in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4, which came to be granted. 4. The applicants herein belonging to the Parsi Community claim to be beneficiaries of the trust and in that capacity claim to be interested in protecting interest of the trust. They are also the objectors in the application under Section 36 of the Act which came to be ultimately allowed by the Charity Commissioner. 5. The applicants did challenge the order of the Charity Commissioner by filing a Special Civil Application before this Court, however, this Court passed an order relegating the applicants to the remedy available in the form of an appeal before the Tribunal. 6. 5. The applicants did challenge the order of the Charity Commissioner by filing a Special Civil Application before this Court, however, this Court passed an order relegating the applicants to the remedy available in the form of an appeal before the Tribunal. 6. It appears that all these people who had objected to the application under Section 36 of the Act, 13 of them preferred appeals before the Tribunal, where the Tribunal ultimately passed an order dated 05.05.2023, staying the permission granted by the Joint Charity Commissioner by his order dated 08.03.2022. 7. It is the case of the applicants that immediately thereafter i.e. on 09.05.2023, lease deed came to be executed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4 and this was a willful disobedience of the order dated 05.05.2023. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah appearing for the applicants have argued that the Charity Commissioner by passing an order dated 08.03.2022 had granted permission required under Section 36 of the Act for dealing with the trust property in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4, but when by an order dated 05.05.2023 the permission thus granted under Section 36 of the Act was stayed by the Tribunal, and therefore, it was not open for respondent Nos.1 and 2 to act contrary to the stay granted by the Tribunal. 8.1 It is submitted that though the respondents were aware of the order passed by the Tribunal and that there was no sanction/permission in existence to deal with the trust property, in a great hurry and immediately after the order of stay granted, on 09.05.2023 the lease deed was executed and thus it was directly against the order of the Tribunal amounting to contempt of the order of the Tribunal. 8.2 Learned advocate has argued that the fact that the respondents were aware of these proceedings, is evident from the fact that after the Tribunal issued the notice, the respondents had appeared through their advocates and the advocate had given a solemn assurance to the Tribunal in not to deal with the property pending the proceedings before the Tribunal. 8.2 Learned advocate has argued that the fact that the respondents were aware of these proceedings, is evident from the fact that after the Tribunal issued the notice, the respondents had appeared through their advocates and the advocate had given a solemn assurance to the Tribunal in not to deal with the property pending the proceedings before the Tribunal. Attention is drawn to document annexed at Annexure-G which is an application for interim injunction, wherein a reference is made that during the course of an application for stay, the hearing on the part of the respondents was pending, and at that time, learned advocate for the respondents had given solemn assurance not to carry out any activity, despite such assurance given in the capacity as a Court officer, some activity suggesting construction on the site is taking place and hence, such application was filed on 10.04.2023. 8.3 It is therefore, submitted that even when the application for stay was pending for hearing, an assurance was given by the learned advocate which was also breached and thereafter, when the order was passed by the Tribunal on an interim application for stay, the respondents have entered into registered lease deed. 8.4 Learned advocate has taken this Court to the operative part of the order dated 05.05.2023 and then to the registered lease deed, which was executed on 09.05.2023 between the representatives of the trust and the respondent Nos.3 and 4. It is submitted that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 were also parties before the Tribunal and therefore, the interim order was binding upon them and they should not have been entered into such lease deed. 8.5 Learned advocate has thereafter, drawn attention of this Court to the lease deed specifically to the part of the lease deed, where photographs of the properties were shown and thereafter, to page No. 317 which, according to the applicants, is the present situation where the photographs reflect civil construction of a gate like structure. Learned advocate has therefore, submitted that the respondents have conducted themselves in a manner in complete defiance of the order. 8.6 It is submitted that the respondents are also facing other proceedings under the revenue law, ULC proceedings, but are not really concerned about any such proceedings and are simply proceeding ahead to frustrate the provisions of law. Learned advocate has therefore, submitted that the respondents have conducted themselves in a manner in complete defiance of the order. 8.6 It is submitted that the respondents are also facing other proceedings under the revenue law, ULC proceedings, but are not really concerned about any such proceedings and are simply proceeding ahead to frustrate the provisions of law. It is submitted that the respondents by their conduct have shown no remorse or a apologetic behavior and in fact have shown scant regard for the rule of law and have come up before this Court contending that the appeal itself before the Tribunal is still pending and that may be finally decided. This shows that the respondents, on one hand are committing breach of the Tribunal and without any corrective measure, on the other hand claimed to finally deciding the appeal and in the meantime, the action of entering into lease deed may continue as it is and undisturbed but if such contention is accepted then, it will amount to give premium to the wrong committed by the respondents. 8.7 Learned advocate for the applicants submitted that it is a matter of protecting the dignity and authority of the Court for which contempt proceedings are required to be initiated and the facts of the present case would clearly indicate that the dignity of the Court has been damaged by the respondents by their conduct in defiance with the order of the Tribunal. 8.8 Learned advocate has submitted that the respondents insist on final decision on the appeal before the Tribunal itself however, it may not be open for the Tribunal to proceed ahead with the final hearing of the appeal itself when the respondents have not purged the contempt. It is submitted that this Court ought to take a serious note of this fact and order cancellation of the lease deed executed after the stay granted by the Tribunal. 8.9 Learned advocate has therefore, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Balvantbhai Somabhai Bhandari vs. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor (Deceased), 2023 (3) GLH 687 and submitted that the conduct demonstrated by the respondents herein has been deprecated by the Apex Court and the apology may not be accepted when it appears that the apology is a trick to wriggle out of the responsibility to comply with the directions of the Court. 8.10 Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in case of Jaisinh Jodhabhai Vaisya vs. Grofed Employees Union, 2001 (2) GLH 68 in support of his argument that this Court can initiate contempt proceedings by invoking Article 215 of the Constitution of India even if the contempt is for the Courts and Tribunal subordinate to the High Court. 8.11 Learned advocate has also relied upon the decision in case of Nareshbhai Hathising Shah vs. Dinaben Jitendrabhai Thakkar, 2014 (0) AIJEL HC 231112 referring to para-18 of the judgment, where the Court had proceeded to hold the opponent guilty of contempt of Courts Act for deliberate and willful disobedience of an interim order of the High Court under Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance is also placed upon the decision in case of Satyabrata Biswas vs. Kalyankumar Kisku, 1994 (2) SCC 266 , wherein in the suit of declaration of title, an order of maintaining the status- quo was granted and yet the sub lease was created which was held to be illegal and violative of status-quo order. 9. As against this, learned senior advocates Mr.Dhaval Dave with learned advocate Mr. Manan Bhatt appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned senior advocate Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala with learned advocate Mr.Amit K. Dave, appearing for respondent Nos.3 and 4, have submitted that the allegation of the applicants for contempt is on two basis. Firstly, about the breach of a solemn assurance given by the counsel of the respondents before the Tribunal and the second being entering into a lease deed on 09.05.2023 despite the stay granted by the Tribunal. 9.1. At the outset, it is submitted that the respondents have tendered unconditional apology and the lease agreement was entered into as they did not have the knowledge of order being passed staying the permission under Section 36 of the Act. It is submitted that immediately upon the knowledge of the order being passed, the trust has resolved to execute a addendum to the lease deed, wherein all the parties to the lease deed have to undertake to cancel the lease deed in the eventuality of the order of the Tribunal of quashing and setting aside the order of the Charity Commissioner. It is submitted that before this Court also, an undertakings have been given by respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively that there would not be any construction on the subject land pending the appeal before the Tribunal. 9.2 Learned senior advocates have submitted that the applicants are trying to mislead the Court by making submission that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have entered into a lease deed with the third party being respondent Nos.3 and 4, but as a matter of fact respondent Nos.3 and 4 are sitting tenants in the trust property since last 16 years and the lease deed is only helping the trust to create more income for the benefit of the trust from the very same tenants. It is submitted that respondent No. 1 is deliberately made a party herein despite the knowledge of the applicants that the respondent No. 1 has long back resigned and is not in the day to day functioning of the trust. He is also not a signatory to the lease deed. 9.3 It is submitted that the act on the part of the respondents cannot be termed to be willful and deliberate breach of the order as the respondents were not aware of the order and they could gather the passing of the order only on the basis of caveat filed by the applicants which was served upon the respondents when they came to know about the passing of the order. 9.4 Learned senior advocates submitted that the applicants have not placed anything on record to substantiate that the act on the part of the respondents was willful and deliberate, more particularly, in absence of the knowledge of the order. It is submitted that the applicants have not placed anything on record to indicate that the respondents were made aware subsequently about the passing of the order and has drawn attention of this Court to the record of the Tribunal and submitted that even till date, the copy of the order though dispatched from the Registry of the Tribunal has never been served. It is submitted that the applicants themselves are having dubious interest in the lands of the trust and in fact they have as got chunk of spacious trust lands and therefore, for their selfish motive they are acting against the interest of the trust by raising objections without there being any legitimate ground. 9.5 Learned senior advocate Mr. It is submitted that the applicants themselves are having dubious interest in the lands of the trust and in fact they have as got chunk of spacious trust lands and therefore, for their selfish motive they are acting against the interest of the trust by raising objections without there being any legitimate ground. 9.5 Learned senior advocate Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala appearing for respondent Nos.3 and 4 submitted that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 were already in possession of the property belonging to the trust as tenants. It is submitted that the applicants are using the contempt proceedings as arm-twisting method and has referred an affidavit of the lawyer, which would indicate that the applicants had demanded money for settling the matter. It is submitted that at one stage, the applicants have even approached the Tribunal to withdraw the appeal itself and prepared an affidavit in this regard. 9.6 Learned senior advocate submitted that much reliance is placed upon the statement of the advocate on behalf of the respondents, but no such statement is on record, except for an application filed by the applicants themselves before the Tribunal saying that the advocate has given solemn assurance. There is no mention of any detail of which advocate and for which party such an assurance has been given. It is submitted that the communication of learned advocate is also on the record, wherein he has categorically stated that no statement or assurance was given to the Tribunal recording maintaining of status-quo. 9.7 It is lastly submitted that the proceedings are still at large before the Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal is under the direction to conclude the hearing within stipulated time, and the next date of hearing was also fixed on 21.08.2024. 9.8 Learned senior advocates for the respondents have relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Niaz Mohammad and others vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1995 SC 308 to contend that to hold an individual as contempnor, the Court has to record finding that the disobedience was willful and intentional and where it is brought to the notice of the Court that the disobedience is a result of compelling circumstances, the Court may not proceed to punish the contempnor. 9.9 Learned senior advocates have then relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of B.K. Kar vs. The Chief Justice and his Companion Judges of the High Court of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 1367 to submit that the knowledge of the order cannot be inferred to lead to intention for disobey the order. It has to be specifically established that there was conscious knowledge of the order of which breach is alleged. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Anil Panjwani Suo Motu Contempt Petition, (2003) 7 SCC 375 to submit that there is no rigid rule of law or practice that the contempnor cannot be heard unless the contempt is purged. On the same line, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 . 10. Heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. The applicants are the objectors to the proceedings initiated by the respondent-trust under Section 36 of the Act seeking permission of the Charity Commissioner to deal with the trust property in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 are the tenants in the property of the trust since many years. Though the dispute is also sought to be created by the applicants that originally the tenant was an individual way back in the year 1968, thereafter, the partnership firm had stepped into in place of the original tenant. The partnership firm also is of the heirs of the original tenant. However, such contention is not relevant for the purpose of these proceedings. 11. The Charity Commissioner passed order dated 08.3.2022 granting permission under Section 36 of the Act. Initially the decision of the Charity Commissioner was challenged in group of petitions being Special Civil Application Nos.6782 of 2022 and 6789 of 2022 before this Court and by an oral order dated 13.04.2022, this Court permitted withdrawal of the writ petitions with a view to approach the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal to file a separate appeal. The directions were also given that alongwith the appeal, an application for stay may be expeditiously dealt with preferably within a period of two weeks. 12. The directions were also given that alongwith the appeal, an application for stay may be expeditiously dealt with preferably within a period of two weeks. 12. After the order passed by this Court, the applicants preferred various appeals, one of them being Appeal No. 23 of 2022 and alongwith this appeal, an application for stay was also filed on the same day i.e. on 14.04.2022. 13. It appears that the notice was issued in such appeals preferred by various appellants including the present applicants and ultimately an order was passed on the interim application on 05.05.2023 by which the order passed below an application for permission under Section 36 of the Act dated 08.03.2022 in application No. 36/04/2019 and 36/25/2019 were ordered to be stayed. The order also recorded that this order be brought to the notice of the authorities immediately. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the proceedings before the Tribunal, particularly, the Rojkam which is placed at page-189, wherein it is recorded that on 25.04.2023 the matter was taken up on board for hearing of the application for stay. Thereafter, there was no specific date mentioned as a next date of hearing and thereafter, the Rojkam records the date of 05.05.2023 on which the stay applications of the applicants were allowed. The proceedings recorded of all previous dates. The proceedings mentioned the next date of hearing except for the proceedings recorded on 25.04.2023. 13.1 Meaning thereby, the date on which the order was declared below the stay application was not specifically brought to the notice of the parties, especially the respondents. Another documents which is brought to the notice of this Court is the Register maintained by the Tribunal for effecting the services of the process, wherein in the register dated 07.06.2023, it is recorded that at item No. 2874, process of the order below the aforesaid appeals of the applicants was noted for outward. This was in the date of 07.06.2023 which is much later than the lease deed executed by the respondents. 14. It is true that when the parties were represented by the respective advocates, the parties would obviously be in the know of the proceedings. This was in the date of 07.06.2023 which is much later than the lease deed executed by the respondents. 14. It is true that when the parties were represented by the respective advocates, the parties would obviously be in the know of the proceedings. However, when it is coming on record that the next date of adjournment after concluding the hearing of stay application was not specified in the Rojkam itself, the presumption of knowledge of the order even by the advocate cannot be presumed much less established. In this connection as well as in connection with the contention of the applicants regarding solemn assurance given on behalf of the advocate of the respondents not to deal with the trust properties pending application, it would be appropriate to refer to page-165 which is the specific denial by respondent Nos.3 and 4 of any undertaking being given by their advocate for maintaining status-quo as also the communication of advocate Mr. H.S. Pandya dated 22.03.2024, responding to the communication of the trust to the specific query of statement made before the Tribunal and the advocate has clearly denied that no such solemn assurance was given for maintaining status-quo and even in the Rojkam, he has not made any endorsement regarding the stay. He has also clarified that he has not made any statement regarding not to enter into any lease deed with any of the tenants. 15. In this regard, it would also be pertinent to observe that the applicants for the purpose of solemn assurance of the advocate has relied upon Annexure-G, which is application for interim injunction dated 10.04.2023, wherein reference is made only to an advocate for the other side, who has given oral assurance to the Tribunal to maintain status-quo however, no specific name has been given as to which advocate out of all the respondents have given such statement. Later on, in the affidavit-in-rejoinder of the applicant of Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023, for the first time, the name of the advocate representing the respondents Mr. Later on, in the affidavit-in-rejoinder of the applicant of Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023, for the first time, the name of the advocate representing the respondents Mr. Pandya has surfaced by stating that while asking for adjournment, he has undertaken on behalf of the trust “not to execute any lease deed and change the nature of the land and maintain status-quo.” As is seen in the preceding paras, the stand of the learned advocate representing the trust and in the opinion of the Court, the stand of the applicants regarding solemn assurance by the advocate, cannot be accepted. 15.1 With regard to the knowledge of the order passed by the Tribunal on 05.05.2023 after the hearing which took place on 25.04.2023, he has communicated to the trust that on 25.04.2023 final hearing of the stay application was conducted before the Tribunal and thereafter, on 03.05.2023 for a period of two months, he had gone to Canada to visit his family and the order dated 05.05.2023 came to his knowledge through his client on the basis of the Caveat filed before the High Court on 30.05.2023. This being a stand which is clarified by the advocate himself and the same being no controverted, the Court will have to presume that the respondents did have any knowledge of the order dated 05.05.2023 when they executed a lease deed on 09.05.2023. The Court may observe further that respondent Nos.3 and 4 were not third parties, who were as if indicated newly into the properties by the lease deed, but they were tenants of the trust property since many years. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 in their affidavit dated 27.03.2024, have stated as under: “7. I state and submit that even at cost of repetition that no construction activity is going on as alleged by the applicant and the subject matter land is open land. Further state and submit that demolition of old construction was carried out after the order under section 36 was passed on 8/3/2022, since the Surat Municipal Corporation Officials had during survey identified the y construction as dilapidated and dangerous for human life. I further state and submit that at present subject matter land is open land and the respondent no. 3 and 4 begs to rely on photographs of the land in question at the time of hearing of this application.” 16. I further state and submit that at present subject matter land is open land and the respondent no. 3 and 4 begs to rely on photographs of the land in question at the time of hearing of this application.” 16. The Court may therefore, consider the conduct of the respondents who have taken a stand that they came to know about the order upon the Caveat being filed by the applicants. The stand taken by the trust which is evident from their pleadings in Para-3 of the affidavit-in-reply of respondent No. 1 as under: “...The Board of trustees the Trust after receiving the notice of the captioned application, has resolved to execute an addendum to the Lease Deed dated 09/05/2023, which will ensure the equities of all the parties. The proposed clause would read as under: “Both the parties to this Lease Deed acknowledge the order dated 5/5/2023 passed by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No. 23 of 2022 and allied appeals. The Parties further acknowledge and agree that the present Lease Deed shall be subject to the final outcome of the Appeal No. 23 of 2022 and allied appeals pending before the Ld. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Parties undertake to cancel the Lease Deed in the eventuality of any order passed by the Ld. GRT quashing and setting aside the order dated 08/03/2022 passed in Permission Application No. 36/04/2019 and allied matters by the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat subject to the rights and remedies available to the parties to question the legality and validity of such an order of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal before appropriate legal forum.” The said clause will be added to the Lease Deed dated 09/05/2023 as an addendum and the same shall be treated as integral art and parcel of the Lease Deed dated 09.05 2023.” 17. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 have individually filed an undertaking before this Court, which would read as under: “Misc. Civil Application (For Contempt) No. 2219 of 2023 Undertaking on behalf of the Respondent No. 3 and 4 1. We, Suman Natwar Malpani and Jay Arunkumar Naik, Respondent no. 3 and 4, in Misc. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 have individually filed an undertaking before this Court, which would read as under: “Misc. Civil Application (For Contempt) No. 2219 of 2023 Undertaking on behalf of the Respondent No. 3 and 4 1. We, Suman Natwar Malpani and Jay Arunkumar Naik, Respondent no. 3 and 4, in Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023, do hereby undertake before this Hon’ble Court as under: “That we will not be making construction on the subject matter land which is in our possession during the pendency of the captioned petition and during the pendency of Appeal No. 23 of 2022 and allied matters before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.” Date: 03.05.2024 For Vasant Engineering Works “Misc. Civil Application (For Contempt) No. 2220 of 2023 Undertaking on behalf of the Respondent No. 3 1. I, Mahernosh Burjoji Ghadiali, Respondent no. 3, in Misc. Civil Application No. 2220 of 2023, do hereby undertake before this Hon’ble Court as under: “That we will not be making construction on the subject matter land which is in our possession during the pendency of the captioned petition and during the pendency of Appeal No. 23 of 2022 and allied matters before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.” Date: 03.05.2024 For Mazda Developers” 18. The aforesaid aspect if is viewed with the fact that the appeal is on the verge of final hearing before the Tribunal and the next date of listing being fixed on 21.08.2024, the Court does not deem it to be a fit case for initiating contempt proceedings. 19. The Court may thereafter, briefly refer to the several off shoots out of this dispute of the trust of the land with many people interested in stacking their respective claims. Apart from the proceedings arising out of the Trust Act, there are criminal complaints filed, where the applicant of Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023 has been charge-sheeted for an offense being C.R. No. I-29 of 2011 registered with DCB Police Station, Surat for offenses punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471, 201 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. A criminal complaint being No. 146 of 2022 filed by the trust against six individuals, who are also the objectors to the proceedings under Section 36 of the Act. 20. The affidavit of the applicant of Misc. A criminal complaint being No. 146 of 2022 filed by the trust against six individuals, who are also the objectors to the proceedings under Section 36 of the Act. 20. The affidavit of the applicant of Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023 to the extent that challenge before the Tribunal was out of some misunderstanding and after clearing of such misunderstanding, he would like to withdraw two appeals filed by him being No. 23 of 2022 and 24 of 2022 unconditionally. Based on such affidavit, pursis was filed on 23.04.2022 before the Tribunal for the very parties. Of course, the learned advocate for the applicant Mr. Mehul Shah has strongly refuted and has submitted that under great duress, such an undertaking and pursis were filed on behalf of the applicants and he clearly disowned it and has taken corrective measures immediately by appearing before the Tribunal and not ratifying to such undertaking. 21. The Court may also refer to an affidavit at Page-199 of an advocate, who had appeared before the Charity Commissioner for the tenants and on affidavit this advocate has stated as under: “.......In both the said Permission Applications, before renewing the lease, the Joint Charity Commissioner had given an advertisement in the newspapers seeking objections. Therefore, objections were raised in both these Permission Applications by more than 15 professional objectors. As part of the same, an objector named Dinsha Ghadiyali contacted us first through his advocate Mr. Chintan Devmurari at the outside of Joint Charity Commissioner’s Court and demanded 50 lakh rupees from us to withdraw both the said objection applications. During this conversation, Mr. Harshad Pandya, Advocate for the Trust was also present over there and in his presence itself, Advocate Mr. Chintan Devmurari demanded money from me to withdraw both the objection applications. But as I and my client are law abiding citizens, we denied to give money to the advocate of Dinsha Ghadiyali. Therefore, he got angry with me and told me that he would harass me till the proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court...” 22. In the decision of the Apex Court in case of Balvantbhai Somabhai Bhandari (supra), the Court has undoubtedly held that the assurance in the form of an undertaking given by the counsel/advocate on behalf of his client to the Court and the willful disobedience of the same would amount to civil contempt. In the decision of the Apex Court in case of Balvantbhai Somabhai Bhandari (supra), the Court has undoubtedly held that the assurance in the form of an undertaking given by the counsel/advocate on behalf of his client to the Court and the willful disobedience of the same would amount to civil contempt. However, in the facts of the case as is observed in the preceding paras, there is nothing on record that such undertaking/assurance given by the advocate, but in a specific communication addressed by the advocate himself, he has denied having given any such undertaking or solemn assurance. It would be pertinent to observe that in Para-42, while analyzing principle governing the exercise of contempt jurisdiction, the Court has held as under: “42. If a party, who is fully in the know of the judgment/order of the Court, is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the order of the Court, acts in violation thereof, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. To establish contempt of court, it is sufiicient to prove that the conduct was wilful, and that the contemnor knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the undertaking.” 23. As is discussed in the preceding paras, in the facts of the case, the date on which the order was pronounced by the Tribunal on the stay application, was not specified in the Rojkam itself and straightway on 05.05.2023, as is recorded in the Rojkam, the order in the stay application was pronounced. The service of order which was required to be made to the parties as per the observance made in the order itself, the record of the Register of Tribunal indicates that the outward of the order was recorded in the register dated 07.06.2023 and therefore the Court, cannot presume knowledge of the order of the respondents at the time when the lease deed was executed in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4. 24. The Apex Court in case of B.K. Kar (supra), in Para-8 has held that there is no room for inferring an intention to disobey an order unless the person charged had knowledge of the order. There may be cases of disobedience possibly by accident and in such cases, there would not be any contempt. Such knowledge must be obtained from a source which is authorized or authentic. 25. There may be cases of disobedience possibly by accident and in such cases, there would not be any contempt. Such knowledge must be obtained from a source which is authorized or authentic. 25. The Apex Court in case of Niaz Mohammad (supra) in Para-9 has held as under: “9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defines “Civil Contempt” to mean “willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court....” Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of the court made in favour of the party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under CPC. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non compliance of the direction of a court the Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was willful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing a decree against the judgment debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was willful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequences thereof. But wile examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was willful and intentional. But wile examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was willful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish the alleged contemner.” 26. As discussed above, in the facts of the present case, respondent Nos.3 and 4 were only sitting tenants in the property of the trust and there were also several litigations going on with regard to the property in which respondent Nos.3 and 4 are the tenants. 26.1 Considering the subject matter for consideration, before the Tribunal which being the permission granted by the Charity Commissioner under Section 36 of the Act which was ordered to be stayed by order dated 05.05.2023, the Court cannot presume that such an order has to be construed as an order of status-quo with regard to the subject land and/or status-quo with regard to the relation between the trust as a landlord and respondent Nos.3 and 4 as tenants. Their relations inter-se continued to exist and in the opinion of the Court, the stay on the permission under Section 36 of the Act will not change relation of tenant and landlord between respondent Nos.1 and 2 and respondent Nos.3 and 4. 27. The applicants before the Court are the objectors to the permission granted under Section 36 of the Act and in their capacity such objectors have preferred appeals before the Tribunal alongwith their respective applications for stay and such stay is prayed for only on the permission granted under Section 36 of the Act. Thereafter, the proceedings are still pending before the Tribunal which will go on to decide whether the permission granted by the Charity Commissioner was an appropriate legal permission or not. Thereafter, the proceedings are still pending before the Tribunal which will go on to decide whether the permission granted by the Charity Commissioner was an appropriate legal permission or not. On the other hand, lease deed which was executed by the trust in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4 was in favour of the sitting tenants and only with a view to earn more income for the trust even while the respondent Nos.3 and 4 continued to be tenants in occupation. Such an act therefore, cannot be termed to be willful disobedience. 27.1 While the conduct of the objectors as is discussed in the preceding paras is for serving their self interest and have axe to grind as the applicants have some interest in the trust property for which on and off they are litigating with the trust, particularaly applicant of Misc. Civil Application No. 2219 of 2023 as is alleged is in occupation of large chunk of trust property and therefore, will obviously have an axe to grind against the trust. Therefore, the Court is not willing to accept the contention of the applicants that it is for the protection of the dignity of the Court that the present applications are filed, but rather for the selfish motive to keep the members of the trust and the tenants under the pressure of contempt, these applications have been filed. 28. The Apex Court in case of Anil Panjwani (supra), in Para-9 has held as under: “9. To our mind, the rule as to denying hearing or withholding right of participation in the proceedings to the contemnor may briefly be summed up and so stated. It lies within the discretion of the Court to tell the contemnor charged with having committed contempt of Court that he will not be heard and would not be allowed participation in the Court proceedings unless the contempt is purged. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of law. The discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and circumstances of a given case. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of law. The discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where the Court may form an opinion that the contemnor is persisting in his behaviour and initiation of proceedings in contempt has had no deterrent or reformatory effect on him and/or if the disobedience by the contemnor is such that so long as it continues it impedes the course of justice and/or renders it impossible for the Court to enforce its orders in respect of him, the Court would be justified in withholding access to Court or participation in the proceedings from the contemnor. On the other hand, the Court may form an opinion that the contempt is not so gross as to invite an extreme step as above, or where the interests of justice would be better served by concluding the main proceedings instead of diverting to and giving priority to hearing in contempt proceeding the Court may proceed to hear both the matters simultaneously or independently of each other or in such order as it may deem proper.” 29. Similarly, in case of Prestige Lights Ltd. (supra), in Para-25, it is held as under: “25. That, however, does not mean that in each and every case in which a party has violated an interim order has no right to be heard at all. Nor the court will refuse to hear him in all circumstances. The normal rule is that an application by a party will not be entertained until he has purged himself of the contempt. There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule. One of such exceptions is that the party may appeal with a view to setting aside the order on which his alleged contempt is founded. A person against whom contempt is alleged must be heard in support of the submission that having regard to the meaning and intendment of the order which he is said to have disobeyed, his actions did not constitute a breach of it.” 30. A person against whom contempt is alleged must be heard in support of the submission that having regard to the meaning and intendment of the order which he is said to have disobeyed, his actions did not constitute a breach of it.” 30. This Court may refer to the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2015 SC 3699 in case of Quantum Securities Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. New Delhi Television Ltd. wherein the Apex Court has indicated that where the issue on merit is seized of by the Original Court in the pending proceedings and the rights of the parties are still not decided on merits, then it may not be proper for the Court to probe into the facts and record any finding on any of the issue arising of collateral proceedings. This observation was made by the Apex Court on the issue of Contempt on account of the non-compliance of the order passed below notice of motion. In Para-21 to 24, the Court has held as under: “21. In our considered opinion, It is always in the larger interest of the parties to the Lis to get the main case (Lis) decided first on its merits as far as possible rather than to pursue their off-shoot proceedings on merits by keeping the main case undecided. It is more so when any decision rendered in the main case has a bearing over the pending off-shoot proceedings. 22. In our view, the defendant in such case has a right to point out in the Notice of Motion, that the plaintiff has neither any prima facie case in their favour nor there is any likelihood of plaintiff to suffer any irreparable loss/injury in relation to subject matter of the suit, if injunction is declined to the plaintiff and that no balance of convenience lies in the plaintiff’s favour and, therefore, the Court should not have granted ex parte injunction to the plaintiff and even if it has granted then it should now be either recalled or modified, as the case may be. It is then for the Court to decide as to whether ex parte injunction granted to the plaintiff should be confirmed or recalled or varied etc. and if so on what grounds. 23. It is then for the Court to decide as to whether ex parte injunction granted to the plaintiff should be confirmed or recalled or varied etc. and if so on what grounds. 23. We are also of the considered view that when the issue on merits is seized of by the original court in civil suit/proceedings and rights of the parties are still not decided on merits then it is not proper for this Court to probe into the facts and record any finding on any of the issues arising out of collateral proceedings such as the one here else our observation may cause prejudice to the parties while prosecuting their case before the original court on merits. 24. It is for these reasons we are of the considered opinion that it would be apposite to request the learned Single Judge to decide Notice of Motion No. 1553/2013 renumbered as 488/2014 arising out of Civil Suit No. 677/2013 renumbered as 284/2014 on merits in accordance with law preferably within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. Till it is decided, we are inclined to stay the contempt proceedings out of which these appeals arise. After the disposal of the Notice of Motion, the contempt proceedings may be decided in accordance with law including its maintainability etc.” This Court therefore, deems it appropriate to adopt the same methodology as by the Apex Court. 31. In view of the aforesaid discussions, order being on an interim application for stay and particularly, when the proceedings are still pending at large and on the verge of completion, the Court is not inclined to initiate contempt proceedings. The present applications therefore, are hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.