ORDER : 1. The instant application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in preferring the connected appeal against the order dated 25.11.2020 passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge-III, Aizawl in Heirship Application No. 1135/2020. Though the delay was stated to be of 45 days, the same was found by the Office to be 520 days. Accordingly, an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the applicant attempting to explain the said delay. 2. I have heard Shri Lalfakwma, learned counsel for the applicant. I have also heard Shri J.H. Ramneihmawia, learned counsel for the contesting opposite party/respondent no. 1. 3. Shri Lalfakwma, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the subject matter of appeal is an order dated 25.11.2020 pertaining to allowing the Heirship Application of the opposite party no. 1. At the outset, he submits that though in an application for delay condonation, one is not normally required to traverse upon the merits of the matter, in the instant case, it may also have a bearing as according to the applicant, he is the only surviving son of the original owner. On the other hand, the opposite party no. 1 is the granddaughter and therefore, prima facie, such Heirship Certificate could not have been granted. It is also submitted that the Certificate was granted on the same day when it was applied for without even issuing notice. 4. It is submitted that the impugned order is of 25.11.2020, and the appeal was presented on 01.11.2023. In order to explain the delay, the learned counsel for the applicant has, at the outset referred to the case of In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, (2020) 9 SCC 468 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court had laid down that for the period from 15.03.2020 to 18.02.2022, limitation would not apply as it was the period of the pandemic. A further period of 90 (Ninety) days was included from 01.03.2022 to 29.05.2022. He accordingly submits that the delay is to be thereby counted from 30.05.2022. 5. He submits that initially, the applicant had approached the Lok Adalat for settlement of the matter which was subsequently realized to be without jurisdiction. Thereafter, the applicant had filed an application for issuance of Heirship Certificate which was allowed on the same date, i.e. 23.02.2021. He accordingly submits that the delay is to be thereby counted from 30.05.2022. 5. He submits that initially, the applicant had approached the Lok Adalat for settlement of the matter which was subsequently realized to be without jurisdiction. Thereafter, the applicant had filed an application for issuance of Heirship Certificate which was allowed on the same date, i.e. 23.02.2021. As the same was issued without notice, the opposite party no. 1 had filed a review petition which was accordingly allowed on 17.06.2022. Thereafter, the applicant had filed a Declaratory Suit on 01.08.2022 being Civil Suit No. 77/2022, which had continued for almost a year. Subsequently, on 07.09.2023, the said Civil Suit No. 77/2022 was withdrawn and certified copy of the impugned order dated 25.11.2020 was applied for on 18.10.2023. As there were certain Court holidays, the RFA could be presented only on 01.11.2023 and thereby, the delay had occurred. 6. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that there was no negligence or laches on his part and the delay had occasioned for reasons beyond his control. He submits that the suo moto proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court on account of the pandemic would come to his aid to explain the delay. He has also submitted that the applicant was in Defence Service and was posted elsewhere when the impugned order was passed on 25.11.2020 and he had retired from service thereafter on 30.11.2020. He has highlighted the aspect that the same was passed without issuing notice. 7. The learned counsel for the applicant has also drawn the attention of this Court to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and contented that he would also get the benefit of the said provision inasmuch as, he had approached the Lok Adalat and also the Civil Court for remedial measure which was on a bona fide belief and both the aforesaid fora did not have jurisdiction. 8. He has also contended that technicalities involved in a case should give way to substantial justice and in this regard, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 . In the said case it has been laid down as follows: “12. Lipok Ao and Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 . In the said case it has been laid down as follows: “12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, 1984 (4) SCC 66 , a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987 (2) SCC 107 , a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression “every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.” 9. Per Contra, Shri J.H. Ramneihmawia, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1, has strenuously opposed the application and has referred to the objection filed. He submits that the exercise of powers for condonation of delay is discretionary in nature, wherein the aspect of bona fide on the part of the party approaching the Court is of immense importance. It is submitted that in the instant case there is gross suppression of material facts which were within the knowledge of the applicant. 10. Elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 has drawn the attention of this Court to the averments made in paragraph 5 (iv) of the application wherein it has been stated that the knowledge about the impugned order dated 25.11.2020 was obtained on filing of the review application by the opposite party no. 1 against the order dated 23.02.2021. However, by referring to the written objection filed by him, more specifically, Annexure 1 thereof, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the proceeding before the Lok Adalat held on 12.02.2021 wherein both the parties were present which was on the same subject matter. The learned counsel for the opposite party has also highlighted that including the Lok Adalat proceeding, the applicant had participated in total number of 4 (four) proceedings which were all in the COVID-19 period. The same were (i) Lok Adalat, (ii) Women's Commission, (iii) WP (C)/113/2022 against the order of the Women's Commission and (iv) Civil Suit No. 77/2022 filed on 01.08.2022. The same were (i) Lok Adalat, (ii) Women's Commission, (iii) WP (C)/113/2022 against the order of the Women's Commission and (iv) Civil Suit No. 77/2022 filed on 01.08.2022. He submits that the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Suo Moto proceedings was only to facilitate a litigant to overcome the aspect of limitation if he was actually prevented or handicapped during the COVID-19 period, it is submitted that the applicant, in the instant case was actively pursuing his remedies in different fora and therefore he would not get the benefit of the said order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. As regards the submissions made on Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 has submitted that to apply the said provision, the approach has to be bona fide in a forum without jurisdiction. It is submitted that the Civil Suit which was instituted by the applicant was in a proper Court and the same cannot be said to have been filed in a Court without jurisdiction. It is submitted that a Declaration was sought with regard to the property in question and the Civil Court, as such was the proper Court where such a Suit could have been filed. He accordingly submits that the applicant would not get any benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 12. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 has relied upon the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 685 . In the said case, it was laid down that the exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act being discretionary in nature, the party approaching the Court has to come with clean hands. In the said case, the Supreme Court had also recorded the aspect that no correct facts were placed before the Court which is also the case in the present application. 13. He submits that the total delay is actually 1070 days as the applicant would not get the benefit of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Suo Moto proceedings which have been recorded above. In this regard, he had relied upon the case of Sagufa Ahmed and Ors. Vs. Upper Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Ors. 13. He submits that the total delay is actually 1070 days as the applicant would not get the benefit of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Suo Moto proceedings which have been recorded above. In this regard, he had relied upon the case of Sagufa Ahmed and Ors. Vs. Upper Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Ors. (2021) 2 SCC 317 wherein it has been laid down that the observation and directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Suo Moto proceedings was only to deal with the period of limitation in the COVID-19 period and to assist the persons who were actually affected. For ready reference, the relevant observations are extracted herein-below: “18. To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020. It reads as follows: ‘This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State). To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities. This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks.’ 19. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks.’ 19. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them.” 14. In the instance case, he submits that the applicant, instead of challenging the order dated 25.11.2020 in accordance with law was approaching various other fora. He has also relied upon the judgment of HT Media Limited and Anr. Vs. Brainlink International, Inc. and Anr. 2021 SCC Online Del 5398 wherein the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has laid down that Suo Moto case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not be applicable in all cases and only in those cases where COVID-19 had an impact, the same would be applicable. He submits that in the instance case, COVID-19 did not have any impact at all. 15. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 accordingly submits that the instant application is liable to be rejected. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286 wherein the principles have been laid down regarding consideration of an application for condonation of delay. “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself. “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself. (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time. (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally. (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act. (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence. (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal. (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay. (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 16. In his rejoinder, the learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the approach to the Lok Adalat was with a bona fide intention to have the matter settled which was not done. He has also tried to clarify that the earlier writ petition WP (C)/113/2022 had to be filed against the order of the Women's Commission passed on 18.07.2022 and the same has got nothing to do with the present challenge. He has also tried to clarify that the earlier writ petition WP (C)/113/2022 had to be filed against the order of the Women's Commission passed on 18.07.2022 and the same has got nothing to do with the present challenge. He has also clarified that though the Civil Suit was instituted on 18.07.2022, it was done on wrong advice and unless the impugned order dated 25.11.2020 is put to challenge, no effective relief can be granted to him. He has lastly submitted that if, in the event the appeal is allowed, no prejudice would be caused to the opposite party no. 1 as the matter has to be reconsidered after hearing the affected parties. 17. The rival contentions advanced by learned counsel for the parties have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court have been carefully perused. 18. It is a settled principle of law that while adjudicating an application, paying for condonation of delay, a pragmatic and justice oriented approach is required to be taken. However, at the same time, this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the Limitation Act provides a particular period of limitation after which a right vests on the opposite party and that right cannot be brushed aside in a casual manner. This Court has also taken into consideration the principles laid down in the recent case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra). Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, the rival contentions would be examined. 19. The impugned order was passed on 25.11.2020 and admittedly, the same was passed ex-parte and on the first day when the application for Heirship was filed. The applicant has tried to make out a case that apart from the aspect that no notice was issued to him, he was not even aware of the same till a long period of time as he was in Defence Service and before his retirement on 30.11.2020, the impugned order was passed. 20. This Court cannot accept the submission of the applicant that he was not aware of the impugned order as the proceedings before the Lok Adalat held on 12.02.2021 would clearly reflect that he was aware of the same. 20. This Court cannot accept the submission of the applicant that he was not aware of the impugned order as the proceedings before the Lok Adalat held on 12.02.2021 would clearly reflect that he was aware of the same. The Lok Adalat had passed an order that it did not have the jurisdiction, whereafter instead of challenging the impugned order, the applicant had filed an independent Heirship case which was also allowed on the same day i.e. 23.02.2021 without issuing of notice. The said had led to filing of a review by the opposite party no. 1 which was allowed more than a year thereafter on 17.06.2022. Even after that, the applicant did not choose to prefer the present appeal and on the other hand, on 01.08.2022 had filed a Civil Suit No. 77/2022. The same was also withdrawn more than a year thereafter on 07.09.2023, whereafter on 18.10.2023, the certified copy of the present impugned order was applied. The explanation which has been given for the delay does not appear to be wholly satisfactory or acceptable. 21. Having observed that, this Court cannot totally overlook the aspect of the challenge. The challenge is against an order dated 25.10.2020 passed in an Heirship case. Though in the adjudication process of an application for a condonation of delay, this Court may not be required to go into the merits of the case, in an appropriate case, the merits may have to be looked into. The impugned order has been passed on the very date of its institution without issuing notice, which would have adverse effect on the applicant. This Court is of the view that issuance of notice and an opportunity of hearing is a necessity for adjudication of such a Certificate. Having said that, this Court hastens to add that the aforesaid observation is only on the technicality of having the requirement of an effective hearing and not on the inter se merits of the rival parties. This Court has already held that the reasons sought to be prayed for explaining the delay is not wholly satisfactory and this Court also agrees with the proposition advanced on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that the order passed in the Suo Moto proceeding may not come to the aid of the applicant which has been explained by the subsequent decision of Sagufa Ahmed (supra). 22. 1 that the order passed in the Suo Moto proceeding may not come to the aid of the applicant which has been explained by the subsequent decision of Sagufa Ahmed (supra). 22. Be that as it may, taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, including the subject matter of dispute, this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served and the equities would be balanced if the delay is condoned. However, such condonation has to be on certain condition of imposition of cost. The delay in filing the appeal accordingly stands condoned subject to a cost of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) to be paid in favour of the Mizoram Bar Association. 23. The application stands disposed of. 24. The appeal may accordingly be listed for admission which however has to be done after the applicant furnishes proof of deposit of the cost, as directed above.