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2024 DIGILAW 1789 (ALL)

Vinod Kumar Singh v. State of U. P.

2024-08-01

SIDDHARTHA VARMA

body2024
JUDGMENT : SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J. 1. The petitioner was appointed on the post of medical representative in the company known as M/s Tamilnadu Dada Pharmaceutical Limited. The service of the petitioner was confirmed on the post of Medical Representative on 28.10.1991 in the Agra region. 2. Thereafter, the company M/s Tamilnadu Dada Pharmaceutical Industries Limited was merged in the company known as M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited and the petitioner became an employee of the company into which the employer company had merged i.e. he became an employee of M/s Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited. 3. On 5.9.2002, the petitioner was transferred to Bedar (Karnataka). On 16.11.2002, as luck would have it, the respondent no. 3 the Employer Company, terminated the services of the petitioner. Aggrieved thereafter, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on 23.3.2006. The reference was to following effect: ^^D;k lsok;kstdksa }kjk Jh fouksn dqekj flag] esfMdy fjÁstsUVsfVo dh lsok;sa fnukad 16-11-2002 ls lekIr fd;k tkuk mfpr rFkk@vFkok oS/kkfud gS\ ;fn ugha] rks lacaf/kr Jfed D;k fgrykHk@mi'ke ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS ,oa vU; fdu fooj.kksa lfgrA** 4. The respondent no. 3 raised the question of jurisdiction with regard to the reference before the Tribunal at Uttar Pradesh and on 19.11.2012, the respondent no. 2 i.e. the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-IV, Agra, passed an order holding that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case as the termination had taken place in Bedar (Karnataka). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. Bushra Maryam has submitted that the respondent no. 2, the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal -IV, Agra, could not have gone behind the reference and for this purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner, has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1999 Law Suit (SC) 1310: National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan and others. This citation can also be found in 2000 (1) SCC 371 . In this judgment, she has specifically relied upon paragraphs no. 26 and 28 and, therefore they are being reproduced here as under: “26. There can be many splinter groups each forming a separate trade union. Under Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 any seven or more members of a trade union can get the trade union registered under that Act. 26 and 28 and, therefore they are being reproduced here as under: “26. There can be many splinter groups each forming a separate trade union. Under Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 any seven or more members of a trade union can get the trade union registered under that Act. If every trade union having few members is to go on raising a dispute and the State Government making reference again and again the very purpose of settlement is defeated. Once there is a representative union, which in the present case, is the Labour Union, it is difficult to see the role of the Workers' Union. If there are number of trade unions registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 not entitled to be registered as representative unions and they raise disputes, industrial peace would be a far cry. Under Section 2(0000)9 of the Rajasthan Act 'representative union' means a union for the time being registered as a representative union under the Rajasthan Act (Rajasthan Act XXXIV of 1950). Under Section 9-D1010 of the aforesaid Rajasthan Act any Union which has for the whole of the period of at least three months during the period of six months immediately preceding the calendar month in which it so applies under this section a membership of not less than fifteen per cent of the total number of workmen employed in unit of an industry may apply in the prescribed form to the Registrar for registration as a Representative Union. Then under Section 9-FI111 registration of a representative union can be cancelled on various grounds mentioned therein and one of such grounds is if, after holding such an inquiry, if any, as the Registrar deems fit he is satisfied that the registered union is being conducted not bona fide in the interest of the workmen but in the interest of the employers to the prejudice of the interest of the workmen. We have already quoted Section 9-E as to how a representative union is to be registered. Proviso to that Section makes it clear that if there are two or more unions fulfilling the criteria laid down in Section 9-D and apply for registration then the union having the largest membership of the employees has to be registered. We have already quoted Section 9-E as to how a representative union is to be registered. Proviso to that Section makes it clear that if there are two or more unions fulfilling the criteria laid down in Section 9-D and apply for registration then the union having the largest membership of the employees has to be registered. As to what is representative union is not defined in the Act but in common parlance it would mean that it represents all the workers. It is not the case of the Workers' Union that registration of the Labour Union is liable to be cancelled on any ground whatsoever. Notice given by Workers' Union under subsection (2) of Section 19 of the Act is obviously invalid as it did not represent majority of the persons bound by the settlement nor it is a representative union. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to consider what were the demands raised by the Workers' Union in its character which were not covered by the tripartite settlement. 9. 2(0000) 'Representative Union' means a Union for the time being registered as a representative Union under the Act. 10. 9-D. Application for registration-Any Union which has for the whole of the period of at least three months during the period of six months immediately preceding the calendar month in which it so applies under this section a membership of not less than fifteen per cent of the total number of workmen employed in unit of an industry may apply in the prescribed form to the Registrar of registration as Representative Union. 11. “9-F. Cancellation of registration-The Registrar shall cancel the registration of a Union: (a) if, after holding such an inquiry, if any, as he deems fit he is satisfied: (i).... (ii).... (iii) that the registered Union is being conducted not bona fide in the interests of the workmen but in the interest of employers to the prejudice of the interests of workmen; or (iv).... (b) If its registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (Central Act XVI of 1926) is cancelled. 28. Industrial Tribunal is the creation statute and it gets jurisdiction on the basis of reference. It cannot go into the question on validity of the reference. Question before the High Court was one of jurisdiction which it failed to consider. (b) If its registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (Central Act XVI of 1926) is cancelled. 28. Industrial Tribunal is the creation statute and it gets jurisdiction on the basis of reference. It cannot go into the question on validity of the reference. Question before the High Court was one of jurisdiction which it failed to consider. A tripartite settlement has been arrived at among the management, Labour Union and the Staff Union. When such a settlement is arrived at it is a package deal. In such a deal some demands may be left out. It is not that demands, which are left out, should be specifically mentioned in the settlement. It is not the contention of Workers' Union that tripartite settlement is in any way mala fide. lt has been contended by the Workers' Union that the settlement was not arrived at during the conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Act and as such not binding on the members of the Workers' Union. This contention is without any basis as the recitals to the tripartite settlement clearly show that the settlement was arrived at during the conciliation proceedings. 6. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1962 (4) FLR 444 which was a dispute between Indian Cable Co. Ltd and Its workmen. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon this judgment and submitted that a Court or Tribunal would have the jurisdiction if the parties resided within its jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the dispute substantially arose within its jurisdiction. 7. Still further, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment passed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. vs. Dhunubhai Motilal Vin and Ors. AIR 1955 Bom 463 and has specifically relied upon the judgment for the proposition as to what would be the jurisdiction of a Labour Court. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, in reply, has submitted that the jurisdiction of a Tribunal would lie at the place where the cause of action had arisen and if a particular workman had been transferred to a particular place then the jurisdiction would be at the transferred place. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment dated 5.8.2008 passed in Civil Misc. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment dated 5.8.2008 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7530 of 1996 (Ratnesh Mishra vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (I), Allahabad and others) and has submitted that the law was settled with regard to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that the jurisdiction would lie at the place where the cause of action had arisen i.e. the place where the person had been transferred and was working. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon a judgment of this High Court dated 5.2.1971 passed in Civil Misc. Writ No. 8341 of 1971 (General Manager, Northeastern Railway, Gorakhpur and others vs. Jamait Ram Khatnani and others) and has submitted that the jurisdiction would be in the Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the territorial area in which the workman was working. Similar is the law which has been laid down in a judgment of another learned Single Judge dated 3.9.2014 passed in Writ-C No. 453331 of 2008 (Salora International Ltd. vs. Prescribed Authority (Payment of Wages Act) and others. 10. Still further, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a judgment reported in Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat vs. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. And another, 1979 (3) SCC 792 and in this judgment, he relied upon specifically paragraphs no. 11 and 16 which are being reproduced here as under: “11. Having heard a closely thought out argument made by Mr Gupta on behalf of the appellant, we are of the opinion that the High Court is right in its view on the first question. The very terms of the references show that the point of dispute between the parties was not the fact of the closure of its business by the respondent but the propriety and justification of the respondent's decision to close down the business. That is why the references were expressed to say whether the proposed closure of the business was proper and justified. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. The references being limited to the narrow question as to whether the closure was proper and justified, the Tribunals by the very terms of the references, had no jurisdiction to go behind the fact of closure and inquire into the question whether the business was in fact closed down by the management. 16. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the two Tribunals had no jurisdiction to go behind the references and inquire into the question whether the closure of business, which was in fact effected, was decided upon for reasons which were proper and justifiable. The propriety of or justification for the closure of a business, in fact and truly effected, cannot raise an industrial dispute as contemplated by the State and Central Acts.” 11. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has relied upon 1962 FLR 444 : Indian Cable Co. Ltd vs. Its workmen, which has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and has submitted that a Court or Tribunal would have the jurisdiction if the parties reside within the jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the dispute substantially arose within its jurisdiction. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has also relied upon a judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Paritosh Kumar Pal v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1984 Lab. IC 1254 (FB) in which he specifically relied upon paragraphs no. 24, 25, 26 and 30 and has submitted that wherever the cause of action would arise the jurisdiction would lie. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 stated that if a Company had business all over the country then also the cause of action to a particular jurisdiction would arise only if the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction and the reference in a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could be made under Section 10(1)(d) read with 2(a) by the Government which was the proper Government under the statute. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has also submitted that no cause of action could arise to a person if the order by which he was aggrieved was served at the place where he was residing after termination of his services. For this purpose, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon 2005 (1) UPLBEC 118 : Ravindra Kumar vs. District Magistrate, Agra and others. 15. Having heard Ms. Bushra Maryam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri H.N. Singh, Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Seema Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, this Court is of the view that when the petitioner was transferred out from Agra to Bedar (Karnataka) on 5.9.2002 and when his services were terminated for his deeds at Bedar (Karnataka) then definitely, even if the termination order was served in Uttar Pradesh, no cause of action would arise in Uttar Pradesh. The territorial jurisdiction would lie with the Industrial Tribunal at Karnataka. In the instant case, the Court finds that the Tribunal had found that the termination had taken place in Karnataka and just because the order was served in Uttar Pradesh the jurisdiction would not lie with the Tribunal at Uttar Pradesh. So far as the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal could not go behind the reference is concerned, suffice it to say that definitely a Tribunal had no power/authority/jurisdiction to go behind the reference but when the matter went to the root of the case i.e. whether the reference itself was not made by the appropriate government then the Tribunal could have very well looked into the question of jurisdiction. 16. Under such circumstances, the writ petition being devoid of merit is being dismissed. No interference is warranted in the order dated 19.11.2012 passed by the respondent no. 2, the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-IV, Agra. 17. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.