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2024 DIGILAW 179 (KER)

Sunil C v. Selsa S

2024-02-13

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, G.GIRISH

body2024
JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. The appellant is the 2nd respondent in Contempt Case (C)No.2610 of 2022, which is one filed by the respondents herein, who were the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, alleging that the respondent therein, the then Deputy director of Collegiate Education, Kollam has willfully and deliberately disobeyed the direction contained in Annexure A1 judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 02.08.2022 in that writ petition, whereby that writ petition was allowed directing the said respondent to take up Exts.P4 to P7 proposals and issue appropriate orders thereon, after hearing the petitioners and adverting to Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order dated 29.06.2019, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of that judgment. 2. In Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022, Dr. Suvarnakumar, the then Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam, was arrayed as the respondent. During the pendency of the Contempt Case, he was transferred. On behalf of the respondent, an affidavit dated 28.10.2023 was placed on record, producing therewith Annexures R1(a) to R1(d) orders. The document marked as Annexure R1(d) is a copy of the order dated 04.07.2023 of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam, whereby a decision has been taken on Exts.P4 to P7 proposals, based on Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023. In the affidavit, it is stated that since the respondent has passed an order as directed in Annexure A1 judgment in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, the Contempt Case may be closed. 3. On 30.10.2023, when Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge passed the following order; “The respondent is directed to appear before this Court to read out charges.” 4. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 30.10.2023 of the learned Single Judge, the appellant is before this Court in this Contempt Appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 5. On 10.11.2023, when this appeal came up for consideration as unnumbered, Registry was directed to number the appeal in case the defects noted are cured and list before the Bench. In that order, it was made clear that, the question of maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act will be decided on the judicial side. 6. 5. On 10.11.2023, when this appeal came up for consideration as unnumbered, Registry was directed to number the appeal in case the defects noted are cured and list before the Bench. In that order, it was made clear that, the question of maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act will be decided on the judicial side. 6. On 22.11.2023, after hearing arguments of the learned Special Government Pleader for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents at length, including the question of maintainability, this Court granted an interim stay of further proceedings in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 pending before the learned Single Judge, for a period of three weeks. 7. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The issue that requires consideration in this appeal is as to whether an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable against the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case (C)No.2610 of 2022 directing the respondent therein to appear before the Court to read out the charges. If such an appeal is maintainable, the further question that requires consideration is as to whether any interference is warranted on the impugned order dated 30.10.2023. 9. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the respondents addressed arguments on the legality of Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023 of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam and also Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023 on bunching of increment. We do not propose to consider those issues in this contempt appeal, since it is beyond the scope of this appeal. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and that raised by the learned Special Government Pleader on those issues are left open to be raised before the appropriate forum at appropriate stage. 10. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents is that, in view of the specific direction contained in Annexure A1 judgment dated 02.08.2022 in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, which is one rendered after considering the entitlement of the petitioners with reference to Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order dated 29.06.2019, the decision taken by the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam, vide Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023, on Exts.P4 to P7 proposals, is not in tune with the directions contained in that judgment. The learned Special Government Pleader would point out the submissions made by the learned Government Pleader before the learned Single Judge, which is reflected in paragraph 3 of Annexure A1 judgment in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022. 11. On the aforesaid submission made by the learned Special Government Pleader, we notice that in paragraph 3 of Annexure A1 judgment, the learned Single Judge noticed the submission of the learned Government Pleader that certain clarifications have been sought by the 3rd respondent-Deputy Director of Collegiate Education from the Director of Collegiate Education and the 3rd respondent will issue appropriate orders on Exts.P4 to P7, immediately thereafter. A reading of paragraph 5 of Annexure A1 judgment would make it explicitly clear that while directing the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam to issue appropriate orders on Exts.P4 to P7 proposals, after obtaining any clarifications from any authority, the learned Single Judge has not rendered any specific finding on the entitlement of the petitioners for bunching of increment. Paragraphs 3 to 6 and also the last paragraph of Annexure A1 judgment read thus; “3. In response to the afore submissions of petitioners, as made by their learned counsel Sri.M.S.Radhakrishnan Nair, the learned Government Pleader - Smt.Resmi Thomas, submitted that certain clarifications have been sought by the third respondent from the Director of Collegiate Education and that he will issue appropriate orders on Exts.P4 to P7 immediately thereafter. 4. Even when I hear the learned Government Pleader on the afore lines, the fact remains that the petitioners' claims cannot be allowed to be left unresolved ad infinitum, merely because the third respondent has sought clarifications from the Directorate of Collegiate Education. 5. This is more so because, prima facie, the petitioners appear to be eligible to stake a claim as afore based on clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order. Of course, this does not mean that this Court has affirmatively found so, but certainly, this is an issue that will have to be decided by the third respondent without any further delay. 6. Resultantly, I allow this writ petition and direct the third respondent to take up Exts.P4 to P7 proposals and issue appropriate orders thereon, after hearing the petitioners and adverting to clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order; thus culminating in an appropriate order thereon within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 6. Resultantly, I allow this writ petition and direct the third respondent to take up Exts.P4 to P7 proposals and issue appropriate orders thereon, after hearing the petitioners and adverting to clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order; thus culminating in an appropriate order thereon within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. In order to pave way for the expeditious compliance of the afore directions, I set aside Ext.P8; however, leaving liberty to the third respondent to obtain any clarification that he may choose from any Authority within the afore period, but that he will issue the resultant order within the time frame fixed.” (underline supplied) 12. In the above circumstances, we find absolutely no merits in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that Annexure A1 judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 02.08.2022 in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, is one rendered after considering the entitlement of the petitioners for bunching of increment, with reference to Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order dated 29.06.2019. 13. On the question of maintainability of an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022, we notice that the said order of the learned Single Judge whereby the respondent therein was directed to appear before the Court to read out charges is one passed after the filing of an affidavit dated 28.10.2023 on behalf of the respondent therein, producing therewith Annexures R1(a) to R1(d) documents. Paragraphs 2 to 7 of that affidavit read thus; ‘2. The above Contempt Petition is filed alleging non compliance of the directions in the judgment dated 02.08.2022 in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022 by which this Hon’ble Court directed this respondent to take up Exts.P4 to P7 proposals and issue appropriate orders there on, after hearing the petitioners and adverting to Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order. The contention raised by the petitioners was relating to granting of bunching benefit to them. Bunching benefit as per Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 read as "If a situation arises whenever more than two stages are bunched together, one additional increment equal to three percent may be given for every two stages bunched and pay fixed in the subsequent cell in the pay matrix". 3. Bunching benefit as per Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 read as "If a situation arises whenever more than two stages are bunched together, one additional increment equal to three percent may be given for every two stages bunched and pay fixed in the subsequent cell in the pay matrix". 3. It is submitted that, after receiving the judgment, this respondent referred the matter to the Director of Collegiate Education to get a clarification on the subject. As per the direction of this Hon'ble Court, a hearing was conducted on 21.10.2022. All the petitioners were present on the hearing. Details regarding the contentions were discussed with the petitioners and they were informed clearly that the respondent can take decision, only after getting the clarification from the Director of Collegiate Education in this regard. 4. The Director of Collegiate Education directed this respondent to take further action in accordance with the Government Order G.O.(P)No.37/2023/Fin dated 04.04.2023. A true copy of the letter No.UGC CELL3/20838/2022/DCE by the Director of Collegiate Education is produced herewith and marked as Annexure R1(a). As per Government Order G.O.(P)No.37/2023/Fin dated 04.04.2023, it is clarified that the grant of bunching benefit may lead to further complications, anomalies, and unnecessary litigation, which in turn will result in additional financial commitment to the State Exchequer. The Government, after having examined the issues in detail, ordered that the bunching benefit stands deleted with effect from the date of effect of the respective Government orders. A true copy of the Government Order G.O.(P)No. 37/2023/Fin dated 04.04.2023 is produced herewith and marked as Annexure R1(b). 5. It is humbly submitted that after coming into force of Annexure R1(b) Government Order, this respondent could not allow the petitioners' application. Hence, this respondent informed that this respondent cannot consider their application vide letter dated 22.06.2023. A copy of the letter dated 22.06.2023 is produced herewith and marked as Annexure R1(c). The Government have issued Annexure R1(b) exempting the provisions regarding bunching benefit from the pay revision orders issued for the implementation of the 7th UGC/AICTE Schemes. It is specifically provided in Rule 10(i) of the Rules of Business of Kerala that, no department shall, without previous consultation with Finance Department, authorize any orders (other than the orders pursuant to any other general delegations made by the Finance Department), which either immediately or by their repercussions will affect the Finance of the State. It is specifically provided in Rule 10(i) of the Rules of Business of Kerala that, no department shall, without previous consultation with Finance Department, authorize any orders (other than the orders pursuant to any other general delegations made by the Finance Department), which either immediately or by their repercussions will affect the Finance of the State. The Finance Department objected the grant of this benefit to the petitioners. It is also noted that Annexure R1(b) order is unchallenged till this date. 6. It is submitted that in compliance with the directions in the judgment dated 02.08.2022, this respondent issued Order No.D3/6690/2022/DCEDDKLM Kollam dated 04.07.2023. A true copy of the order No.D3/6690/2022/DCEDDKLM Kollam dated 04.07.2023 is produced herewith and marked as Annexure R1(d). 7. This respondent passed an order as directed by this Hon’ble Court passed on Annexure R1(b) Government Order. Under these circumstances, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to accept this affidavit and close this contempt case against this respondent.’ 14. As stated in the affidavit dated 28.10.2023, by Annexure R1(a) letter dated 17.05.2023 of the Director of Collegiate Education, the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam was directed to take further action on the request made by the respondents for the grant of bunching benefit, in accordance with Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023, whereby that benefit in terms of Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order dated 29.06.2019 or in terms of any other Government orders stands deleted, with effect from the date of the respective Government orders. Annexure R1(c) is the letter dated 22.06.2023 of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam, addressed to the Drawing and Disbursing Officer, SN College, Chembazhanthi, whereby it was informed that bunching benefit stands deleted as per Annexure R1(b) Government order. By Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023 of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam, the proposals in Exts.P4 to P7 stand rejected, based on Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023. The said affidavit on behalf of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam was filed on 30.10.2023, wherein it is stated that since the respondent has passed an order as directed in Annexure A1 judgment in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, the Contempt Case may be closed. However, by the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 the learned Single Judge directed the respondent therein to appear before the Court to read out charges. 15. However, by the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 the learned Single Judge directed the respondent therein to appear before the Court to read out charges. 15. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act deals with appeal. As per sub-section (1) of Section 19, an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt (a) where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court. As per the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 19, where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. As per sub-section (2) of Section 19, pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. As per subsection (3) of Section 19, where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). As per sub-section (4) of Section 19, an appeal under subsection (1) shall be filed (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against. 16. In Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Misra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court noticed that under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no appeal shall lie at the instance of a party moving the High Court for taking action for contempt, if the High Court in the exercise of its discretion refused to take action on the motion of such party. Even if the High Court took action and initiated a proceeding for contempt and in such proceeding, the alleged contemnor, being found guilty, was punished for contempt, the order being one made by the High Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, was not appealable under Clause 15 of the letters patent, and therefore, no appeal shall lie against it from a Single Judge to a Division Bench and equally, there was no appeal as of right from a Division Bench to the Apex Court. The result was that in cases of criminal contempt, even a person punished for contempt had no right of appeal and he could impugn the order committing him for contempt only if the High Court granted the appropriate certificate under Article 134 of the Constitution of India in fit cases or on the refusal of the High Court to do so, the Apex Court intervened by granting special leave under Article 136. This was a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and it was largely responsible for the criticism against the large powers of the Court to punish for contempt. This unsatisfactory feature of the law of contempt was adversely commented upon by Sanyal Committee in its report dated February 28, 1963 submitted to the Government of India. In para 3.1 in Chapter XI of the Report, the Sanyal Committee recommended that against an order of a Single Judge, punishing for contempt, the appeal should lie, in the High Court, to a Bench of Judges and against a similar order of a Bench of Judges of a High Court, the appeal should lie as of right to the Apex Court. Chapter XII of the Report contained the recommendations of the Sanyal Committee and Clause 25 of the recommendations was in the following terms: “Provision may be made for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The appeal should lie to a Bench of Judges of the High Court where the order or decision is of a Single Judge. The appeal should lie to a Bench of Judges of the High Court where the order or decision is of a Single Judge. Where the order or decision is of a Bench the appeal should lie to the Supreme Court.” The Apex Court noticed that it was in pursuance of the above recommendation made by the Sanyal Committee that the Parliament, while enacting the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, introduced Section 19, sub-section (1) in that Act conferring an appeal as of right “from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt”. The Apex Court noticed further that where the court rejects a motion of a reference and declines to initiate the proceedings for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of Section 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. This of course does not mean that there is no remedy available where the High Court on an erroneous view of the law or unreasonably and perversely refuses to take action for contempt on a motion or a reference. Though no appeal lies under Section 19, sub-section (1) as of right against such an order or decision of the High Court, the Advocate General or any other person who has with the consent in writing of the Advocate General moved the High Court can always approach the Apex Court by a petition for special leave to appeal and the power of the Apex Court to interfere with such order or decision in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is unfettered. The Apex Court can always in suitable cases set right any order or decision of the High Court refusing to take action for contempt against the alleged contemnor, if the larger interest of administration of justice so requires. 17. The Apex Court can always in suitable cases set right any order or decision of the High Court refusing to take action for contempt against the alleged contemnor, if the larger interest of administration of justice so requires. 17. In Purshotam Das Goel v. Justice B.S.Dhillon [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ] the challenge before a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in an appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, was against an order dated 02.04.1975 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana issuing notice to the appellant to show cause, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 17 of the Act, why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of the High Court punishable under Section 15 of the Act. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Solicitor General of India, on behalf of the respondents, that no appeal lies to the Apex Court under Section 19 of the Act from an order issuing notice, as nothing yet has been decided by the High Court. Upholding the preliminary objection, the Apex Court noticed that, as would appear from a plain reading of Section 19 of the Act, an appeal shall lie to the Apex Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a Bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. No appeal can lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceedings for contempt. The proceedings is initiated under Section 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to the Apex Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceedings, does not decide any question. Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceedings, does not decide any question. The Apex Court, for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High Court or not. The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be, even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemnor asking the High Court to drop the proceedings. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to the Apex Court under Section 19 of the Act. A final order, surely, will be appealable. If the alleged contemnor, in response to the notice, appears before the High Court and asks to drop the proceedings on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to the Apex Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceedings has remained pending in the High Court. In the said decision, the Apex Court made it clear that, it was not called upon to express its final opinion in regard to such an order, but it merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceedings may be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court held that, an order merely initiating the proceedings without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemnor and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19 of the Act. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India from an order initiating the proceedings. But that is entirely a different matter. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India from an order initiating the proceedings. But that is entirely a different matter. The Apex Court noticed that in the decision of the Three-Judge Bench in Baradakanta Mishra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ] there are no observations by the Court, nor on the facts of that case there can be any, to show that an appeal would lie to the Apex Court from an order of the High Court merely initiating the proceedings by issuance of a notice. It may be a different matter if the order does decide some dispute raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. But unless and until there is some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it by the parties, affecting their right, the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable. 18. In R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ] a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with appeals filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta, whereby the Court accepted unqualified apology tendered by the appellants in compliance with the orders of the Court for not paying the balance award money due to the respondents. The Court further directed the appellants to deposit with the Registrar (Appellate Side) the compensation money determined in terms of the order of the Land Acquisition Judge in respect of the lands acquired by the State as mentioned in the order and decree within two weeks from the date of the order without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in such proceedings. Further, the Court did not pass any orders on the application filed by the Collector for vacating the rule issued in the contempt proceeding holding that the Collector cannot go behind the award passed by him as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Before the Apex Court, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after issuance of notice for contempt proceedings initiated by the respondents, the Court has only issued rule and the matter is not finally decided, therefore, the appeal against such order is not maintainable. Before the Apex Court, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after issuance of notice for contempt proceedings initiated by the respondents, the Court has only issued rule and the matter is not finally decided, therefore, the appeal against such order is not maintainable. It was submitted that the respondents want to take undue advantage of the pending contempt proceedings and coerce the officers of the State in making payment on the basis of the award even though they are not entitled to recover the same as the property had already vested in the State and that the appellants were required to pay in all approximately Rs.50 lakhs to the claimants. The Apex Court found that the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the notice, officers concerned tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the rule issued for contempt action. When the court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable. 19. In R.N. Dey [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ] the Apex Court noticed that in Purshotam Dass Goel [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ] it was observed that if the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceedings on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to the Apex Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. The Court further observed that if the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. The Court further observed that if the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court noticed that, in the present proceedings the question whether appeal under Section 19 of the Act is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as the facts of the case are grossly inadequate and the contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and the rule ought to have been discharged. 20. In Pallav Sheth v. Custodian [ (2001) 7 SCC 549 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by court. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as ‘admit’, ‘rule’, ‘issue notice’ or ‘issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated’. In all such cases, the notice is issued either in routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the materials placed before it, the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the materials placed before it, the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and the materials before it. In the said decision the Apex Court noticed that Section 19 of the Act gives the right of appeal from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Baradakanta Mishra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ] was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the Act, namely, there was no right of appeal if the court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings. 21. In Midnapore Peoples’ Co.op.Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda [ (2006) 5 SCC 399 ], after referring to the law laid down in Baradakanta Mishra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ], Purshotam Dass Goel [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ], State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy [ (1996) 4 SCC 411 ] and J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar [ (1996) 6 SCC 291 ] the Apex Court summarised the legal position emerging from those decisions in regard to appeals filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against orders in contempt proceedings. Paragraph 11 of that decision reads thus; “11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).” (underline supplied) 22. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).” (underline supplied) 22. In Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar [ (2009) 2 SCC 784 ], after referring to the decision in Purshotam Dass Goel [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ], the Apex Court reiterated that it may be a different matter if the court while passing an order decided some disputes raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show cause. On the facts of the case on hand the Apex Court noticed that even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the court by showing cause that the respondent contemnors had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. The contempt proceedings had been initiated only against the Managing Director of the Bank. Though the Apex Court found that it need not go into the larger question of maintainability of the appeal, in view of the fact that the matter had been referred to a Three-Judge Bench in Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal - SLP(Civil) No.18852 of 2005 decided on 19.09.2005 - but prima facie, in view of the decision in Purshotam Dass [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ] there cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a court which is beyond its jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in R.N. Dey [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ]. In the said decision, the Apex Court has also referred to the law laid down by the Two-Judge Bench in Midnapore Peoples’ Co.op.Bank Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 399 ]. 23. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in R.N. Dey [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ]. In the said decision, the Apex Court has also referred to the law laid down by the Two-Judge Bench in Midnapore Peoples’ Co.op.Bank Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 399 ]. 23. In the instant case, as already noticed hereinbefore, Annexure A1 judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 02.08.2022 in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022 is not one rendered after considering on merits the entitlement of the petitioners with reference to Clause 6.1.1.(g) of Ext.P2 order dated 29.06.2019. In paragraph 3 of Annexure A1 judgment, the learned Single Judge noticed the submission of the learned Government Pleader that certain clarifications have been sought by the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam from the Director of Collegiate Education and thereafter the Deputy Director will issue appropriate orders on Exts.P4 to P7 proposals. In Annexure A1 judgment, the learned Single Judge directed the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam to issue appropriate orders on Exts.P4 to P7 proposals, after obtaining any clarifications from any authority. Annexure A1 judgment of the learned Single Judge is not a one rendered with any specific finding on the entitlement of the petitioners for bunching of increment in terms of Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order. 24. The specific stand taken in the affidavit dated 28.10.2023 filed on behalf of the respondent in Contempt Case (C)No.2610 of 2022 is that by Annexure R1(a) letter dated 17.05.2023 of the Director of Collegiate Education, the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam was directed to take further action on the request made by the respondents for the grant of bunching benefit, in accordance with Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023, whereby that benefit in terms of Clause 6.1.1(g) of Ext.P2 order dated 29.06.2019 or in terms of any other Government orders stands deleted, with effect from the date of the respective Government orders. Based on the directions contained in Annexure R1(a) letter dated 17.05.2023 of the Director of Collegiate Education, which is one issued in view of Annexure R1(b) Government Order dated 04.04.2023, the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam issued Annexure R1(c) letter dated 22.06.2023 to the Drawing and Disbursing Officer, SN College, Chembazhanthi, whereby it was informed that bunching benefit stands deleted as per Annexure R1(b) Government order. Thereafter, by Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023 of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam, the proposals in Exts.P4 to P7 stand rejected, based on Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023. 25. After complying with the directions contained in Annexure A1 judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 02.08.2022 in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, an affidavit dated 28.10.2023 was placed on record in Contempt Case(C) No.2610 of 2022, producing therewith Annexures R1(a) to R1(d) documents. In that affidavit, it is stated that since the respondent has passed an order as directed in Annexure A1 judgment in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022, the Contempt Case may be closed. Instead of closing the Contempt Case, without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to challenge Annexure R1(b) Government Order dated 04.04.2023 and Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023 in appropriate proceedings, the learned Single Judge, by the impugned order dated 30.10.2023, directed the respondent in Contempt Case(C) No.2610 of 2022 to appear before the Court to read out charges. 26. The impugned order dated 30.10.2023 in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022, whereby the alleged contemnor is directed to appear before the Court to read out charges, is one passed by the learned Single Judge after the filing of an affidavit dated 28.10.2023 on behalf of the respondent therein, with a request to close the Contempt Case, since the direction contained in Annexure A1 judgment in W.P.(C)No.14653 of 2022 has already been complied with by passing Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge negatived the contention raised by the alleged contemnor that the proceedings in that Contempt Case are liable to be dropped since the direction contained in the judgment has already been complied with. Such an order, which decides the contention raised by the alleged contemnor for dropping the proceedings in the Contempt Case, with a direction incidental to or intrinsically connected with the order punishing for contempt, is appealable under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, we hold that the present appeal filed by the appellant against the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 is maintainable under Section 19(1) of the Act. 27. Therefore, we hold that the present appeal filed by the appellant against the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 is maintainable under Section 19(1) of the Act. 27. Since the Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam has already passed Annexure R1(d) order dated 04.07.2023, based on Annexure R1(b) Government order dated 04.04.2023, it is for the respondents in this appeal to challenge those orders before the appropriate forum. Without prejudice to the aforesaid right of the said respondents, Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 is liable to be closed. In the result, this Contempt Appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 30.10.2023 of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Case(C)No.2610 of 2022 and that Contempt Case pending before the learned Single Judge is closed; however, without prejudice to the aforesaid right of the respondents herein.