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2024 DIGILAW 179 (PNJ)

Aditya Beri v. State of Haryana

2024-01-16

PANKAJ JAIN

body2024
JUDGMENT Mr. Pankaj Jain, J. By way of instant order I intend to dispose off the aforesaid two petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. However, for the sake of convenience the facts are being culled out from a petition bearing CRM-M No.56496-2023. 2. Present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against complaint dated 17.12.2020 (Annexure P-20), Orders dated 26.10.2023 (Annexures P-36 & P-37) and FIR No. 11 dated 14.01.2021 (Annexure P-24) registered under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC at Police Station Sushant Lok, Gurugram along with all subsequent proceedings arising thereto. 3. The facts leading to the present case narrate a long tale. The complaint was preferred by respondent No.2 before the Commissioner of Police, Gurugram, Haryana against nine accused. Accused No. 1 is a company and accused Nos.2 to 9 were stated to be the directors of the said company. The complainant alleged that he met accused No.2 -Sikandar Singh and his family in the year 2015. He was induced by accused No.2- Sikandar Singh to start a 'Affordable Housing Project' in Gurugram to reap profits. Believing the advice the complainant formed a company along with Sikandar Singh under the name and style of M/s D.S. Estates and Construction Private Limited registered with Registrar of Companies (ROC). The complainant alleged that accused No.2-Sikandar Singh turned dishonest and instead of applying for license in the name of the company-M/s D.S. Estates and Construction Private Limited wherein both the complainant and Sikandar Singh were the Directors, license was applied in the name of accused No.1-company. 3.1. License was granted on 22.12.2017. The complainant claims that for obtaining the said license, funds infused by him were misused as he was ignored and not treated as one of the licensees. It was further alleged that licensee was required to furnish bank guarantees to the tune of Rs.2,63,23,892/- (Rupees Two Crore Sixty Three Lakh Twenty Three Thousand Eight Hundred & Ninety Two Only) and Rs. 1,24,61,000/-(Rupees One Crore Twenty Four Lakh Sixty One Thousand Only) but accused No. 1 played fraud with the Government department by submitting forged bank guarantees. The complainant thus claimed that the accused have played fraud upon the Government of Haryana and strict action needs to be initiated against them. 3.2. The aforesaid complaint carries Diary No.3247/07th January, 2020. 1,24,61,000/-(Rupees One Crore Twenty Four Lakh Sixty One Thousand Only) but accused No. 1 played fraud with the Government department by submitting forged bank guarantees. The complainant thus claimed that the accused have played fraud upon the Government of Haryana and strict action needs to be initiated against them. 3.2. The aforesaid complaint carries Diary No.3247/07th January, 2020. Further from the document (Annexure P-19) placed on record by the petitioners it seems that there is another complaint dated 20.08.2020 which was inquired by Economic Crime Branch and the investigation was concluded by concerned Assistant Sub Inspector, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram observing as under:- "Investigation - The investigation of the complaint has been done by the undersigned. During investigation, after involving both parties and enquiry, written replies have been taken. The same are enclosed for perusal. After examining the replies of both the sides, it has been found that on obtaining License No. 106/2017 by respondent firm M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt Ltd from DGTCP Office, Haryana, Chandigarh, Neeraj Chaudhry has leveled the allegations that for obtaining the said license, M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt Ltd has used fake documents. Regarding the same, the Complainant filed CWP No.13933/2018 before the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court. In CWP No. 13933/2018, on 29.05.2018, DGTCP, Haryana, Chandigarh was directed for looking into the matter. On 29.06.2018, the complainant gave written complaint to the DGTCP, Haryana Chandigarh for cancellation of License No. 106/2017. Regarding the same, the DGTCP, Haryana Chandigarh vide order dated 13.05.2020 restrained the execution of sale deeds and carving of plots in the said project. The enquiry of the complaint of complainant Neeraj Chaudhry is already being done by the DGTCP Haryana, Chandigarh as per the directions of the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court. Hence, orders be kindly passed for forwarding the said complaint of complainant, Neeraj Chaudhry also to the DGTCP, Haryana, Chandigarh. The report is submitted. Babloo Singh, A.S.I Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram, Dated:07.10.2020" 3.3. The In charge, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram further reported as under:- "Sir, The investigation of the complaint has been done by A. S.I. Babloo Singh, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram. During investigation, after including both the sides during investigation, written replies have been taken, which are enclosed for perusal. Babloo Singh, A.S.I Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram, Dated:07.10.2020" 3.3. The In charge, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram further reported as under:- "Sir, The investigation of the complaint has been done by A. S.I. Babloo Singh, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram. During investigation, after including both the sides during investigation, written replies have been taken, which are enclosed for perusal. After examining the replies of both the sides, it has been found that on obtaining License No. 106/2017 by respondent firm M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt Ltd from DGTCP Office, Haryana, Chandigarh, Neeraj Chaudhry has leveled the allegations that for obtaining the said license. M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt Ltd has used fake documents. Regarding the same, the Complainant filed CWP No. 13933/2018 before the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court. In CWP No. 13933/2018, on 29.05.2018, DGTCP, Haryana, Chandigarh was directed for looking into the matter. Copy of order is enclosed. Upon which, the complainant gave written complaint to the DGTCP Haryana Chandigarh on 29.06.2018for cancellation of license no. 106/2017 Regarding the same, the DGTCP, Haryana Chandigarh vide order dated 13.05.2020 restrained the execution of sale deeds and carving of plots in the said project. The enquiry of the complaint of complainant Neeraj Chaudhry is already being done by the DGTCP Haryana, Chandigarh as per the directions of the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court. Hence, orders be kindly passed for forwarding the said complaints of complainant, Neeraj Chaudhry also to the DGTCP, Haryana, Chandigarh. The report is submitted. Madan Singh, Director Incharge, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram Dated 07.10.2020" 3.4. The complainant/respondent No.2 preferred criminal complaint dated 17.12.2020 under Section 200 Cr.P.C. with further prayer for issuance of directions to police under Section 156(3) of the Code to investigate. The complainant made the following prayer:- "It is, therefore, prayed that in view of the above submissions and circumstances, since the accused no. 1 to 12, in conspiracy with accused no. The complainant/respondent No.2 preferred criminal complaint dated 17.12.2020 under Section 200 Cr.P.C. with further prayer for issuance of directions to police under Section 156(3) of the Code to investigate. The complainant made the following prayer:- "It is, therefore, prayed that in view of the above submissions and circumstances, since the accused no. 1 to 12, in conspiracy with accused no. 13 to 15, who are Government officials and have misused their position as such, have committed the offences mentioned above, this complaint may very kindly be ordered to be sent to police P. S. Sushant Lok, Gurugram, under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for registration of a case and investigations by the police under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code according to Law, since several facts are to be probed into and documents to be recovered from different places/offices, which cannot be done without the intervention or the investigations carried out by the police. " It is this complaint which is subject matter of present petition. 3.5. There is one pertinent difference between the complaint preferred before police and the one filed before the magistrate. The complaint preferred before the magistrate is against 16 accused whereas in the complaint filed before economic offence wing only 9 persons were named as accused. 6 more have been arraigned as accused by name which includes the present two petitioners. The 16th accused was mentioned as under:- "16. Any other accused (subject to investigation). " 3.6. Acting upon the complaint made by the complainant/respondent No.2 the Trial Court on 17.12.2020 passed the following order:- "Neeraj Chaudhary v. M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Present: Complainant in person with Sh. N.K. Jain, Advocate Complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read with Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking directions to the SHO, P.S. Sushant Lok, Gurugram, to register and investigate the present complaint against the accused for committing the offences punishable under Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC presented before me being Chief Judicial Magistrate. Let, Action Taken Report be called for 23.12.2020. " 3.7. Action Taken Report was filed by the concerned official. On 07.01.2021, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram passed the following order:- "Neeraj Chaudhary v. M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Present: Complainant in person being represented by Sh. N.K. Jain, and Ms. Jyotsna Bhuchar, Advocate. ASI Bablu Singh, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram in person. " 3.7. Action Taken Report was filed by the concerned official. On 07.01.2021, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram passed the following order:- "Neeraj Chaudhary v. M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Present: Complainant in person being represented by Sh. N.K. Jain, and Ms. Jyotsna Bhuchar, Advocate. ASI Bablu Singh, Economic Crime Branch, Gurugram in person. Action taken report has been filed by the police. The same is not found conclusive on any count. However, on bare perusal of the complaint and the documents annexed with it, this Court is of the considered view that there are serious allegations of forgery, which otherwise also appears to be made out Hence, the matter requires investigation by a professional agency. The complainant would not be in a capacity to collect evidence or to investigate the matter on its own. Hence, specialist agency i.e. Police would be in a position to investigate the matter. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that it is a fit case for registration of FIR in compliance of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C under relevant Sections of Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the accused persons. However, simply because certain persons has been arrayed by the complainant in the present complaint as accused shall not disentitled the police to add more accused or delete some accused from the list of accused persons. SHO, P.S. Sushant Lok, Gurugram is directed to register the FIR in the present complaint and submit his compliance report in this Court on 15.01.2021. File complete in all respect be sent to the concerned Police station. Photocopy of the same be retained on record. Ahlmad is directed to put up photocopy of the file on the date fixed. Announced in Open Court: (Anil Kaushik) Date of Order: 07.01.2021 Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram" 3.8. The aforesaid order led to registration of FIR No.0011 dated 14.01.2021 against all the accused under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 467, 468 & 471 IPC. 3.9. The complaint dated 17.12.2020 and order dated 07.01.2021 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram were challenged by the accused by way of petition bearing CRM-M No.3823 of 2021. This Court vide detailed interim order dated 27.01.2021 stayed the operation of impugned orders and further proceedings in the consequential FIR. The issue was finally decided vide judgment dated 05.07.2023. The matter was remanded back to the magistrate directing as under:- "XXXX XXXX XXXX [30]. This Court vide detailed interim order dated 27.01.2021 stayed the operation of impugned orders and further proceedings in the consequential FIR. The issue was finally decided vide judgment dated 05.07.2023. The matter was remanded back to the magistrate directing as under:- "XXXX XXXX XXXX [30]. At this stage, this Court does not wish to opine anything on merits of the case, lest it may prejudice the case of the parties. The impugned order dated 07.01.2021 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram appears to be nonspeaking in the light of legal requirement for that the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall be under legal obligation to reconsider the issue afresh strictly in accordance with law and thereafter pass speaking order exhibiting due application of mind after grasping the facts of the case and law on the subject with reasoned order. All other grounds are still left open. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx" 3.10. The Trial Court vide impugned orders dated 26.10.2023 (Annexures P-36 & P-37) has again allowed the application filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 under Section 156(3) of the Code directing the police to investigate the offence. 4. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners has assailed the complaint as well as the impugned orders passed by the Trial Court. It has been submitted that as per Chapter XII of the Code before resorting to remedy under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the complainant was required to approach the officer in charge of the concerned police station as contemplated under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. and further to the concerned Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. Reliance is being placed on the observations made by Apex Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 . It is being contended that the aforesaid requirements are prerequisites to maintain application under Section 156(3) of the Code. The absence of invocation of aforesaid provisions is an incurable defect. Once the Magistrate in the impugned order himself records that, admittedly the complainant has not filed any application before the officer in charge of the police station as contemplated under Section 154(1) of the Code, the only option left before him was to dismiss the application under Section 156(3) of the Code as not maintainable. 4.1. Once the Magistrate in the impugned order himself records that, admittedly the complainant has not filed any application before the officer in charge of the police station as contemplated under Section 154(1) of the Code, the only option left before him was to dismiss the application under Section 156(3) of the Code as not maintainable. 4.1. It has been further contended that in the judgment rendered in the case of Priyanka Srivastava's case ibid the Apex Court after recording anguish issued a mandate that detailed affidavit spelling out clear role of each and every accused needs to be filed by the complainant in support of application filed under Section 156(3) of the Code holding that time has come that the Courts should not entertain any request under Section 156(3) of the Code in the absence of such detailed affidavit and the same has been reiterated in Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 6 SCC 639. Learned senior counsel for petitioners has drawn attention of this Court to the findings recorded by Trial Court and the affidavit filed before the Magistrate in support of application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to contend that statement made by the complainant in the short affidavit to the effect that the complaint has been drafted on his instructions and the contents of the complaint are true, the same would not answer the requirement of law as laid down in Priyanka Srivastava's case ibid. 4.2. Learned senior counsel contends that order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate is a serious order and it has been repeatedly held by Courts that before passing order under Section 156(3) of the Code, the Court has to record satisfaction that the complaint does disclose the cognizable offence qua each accused. He eloquently emphasizes on the word "satisfaction" which in his submission is much more serious to mere 'forming opinion' on information. He thus submits that once the law requires the Magistrate to record satisfaction, the same has to be not only recorded in writing but has to be supported by reasons which must reflect due application of mind as registration of Fir against a person involves serious stigma. 4.3. He thus submits that once the law requires the Magistrate to record satisfaction, the same has to be not only recorded in writing but has to be supported by reasons which must reflect due application of mind as registration of Fir against a person involves serious stigma. 4.3. Reliance has been placed upon the order passed by this Court in the earlier round remanding the matter back to contend that there were directions issued to the Magistrate to consider the submissions of petitioners recorded in the order itself as all issues were left open. It has been further contended that there were specific directions by this Court that the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate must exhibit the application of mind as required under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the light of judgments discussed in the preceding part of the order. However, the Magistrate again passed a nonspeaking order so much so he failed to consider that in the initial complaint none of the petitioners were arrayed as an accused and even if the allegations as levelled in the complaint are taken on its face value the same would not constitute a cognizable offence against petitioners as none of them were directors in the accused company at the relevant point of time and from the allegations levelled in the complaint, it is clear that the complainant has alleged forgery of bank guarantees against the then authorized signatories of accused No. 1-company. It is thus contended that the impugned order deserves to be set aside on this sole ground that the same is not in compliance with the remand order. 4.4. In order to hammer-forth his contentions, learned senior counsel has relied upon following judgments :- i. Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 ii. Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 6 SCC 639 iii. Harry Inder Dhaul v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC Online Bom 200 (DB) iv. Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022 SCC Online P&H 1480 v. Ashok v. State, 2023 SCC Online Karnataka 70 vi. Alok Kumar v. Harsh Mander, 2023 SCC Online Del 4213 vii. Shri Subhkaran Luharuka v. State of Delhi, 2010 (7) R.Cr.R 595 (Delhi) SB viii. Anil Kumar v. N.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705 ix. Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022 SCC Online P&H 1480 v. Ashok v. State, 2023 SCC Online Karnataka 70 vi. Alok Kumar v. Harsh Mander, 2023 SCC Online Del 4213 vii. Shri Subhkaran Luharuka v. State of Delhi, 2010 (7) R.Cr.R 595 (Delhi) SB viii. Anil Kumar v. N.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705 ix. Ram Dev Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439 x. Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 xi. Usha Chatraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 90 xii. Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 xiii. Ravinadranatha Bajpe v. Manglore Special Economic Zone Ltd., 2021 SCC Online SC 806 xiv. Sushil Sethi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 240 xv. Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State of NCT, (2019) 17 SCC 193 xvi. S.K. Alagh v. State of U.P., (2008) 5 SCC 662 xvii. Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 xviii. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 479 xix. Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P., 2003 (3) SCC 11 xx. Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739 xxi. Archana Rana v. State of U.P., (2021) 3 SCC 751 xxii. Rajendra Singh Tomar v. State of Uttrakhand, passed in Crl. Appeal No. 1822 of 2019, arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.4440/2018, decided on 03.12.2019 xxiii. Shilpa Aiwani v. UT Chandigarh, 2020 (1) RCR 934 xxiv. Raiib Ranian v. R. Viiavkumar, (2015) 1 SCC 513 xxv. G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 xxvi. GHCL Employees Stock Option v. India Infoline Ltd., (2013) 4 SCC 505 xxvii. Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 xxviii. MCD v. State of Delhi, (2005) 4 SCC 605 xxix. Rishpal Singh v. State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 215 xxx. Lalita Kumari v. Govt, of U.P, (2014) 2 SCC 1 5. Counsel for respondent No.2/complainant while controverting the submissions made by learned Senior counsel submits that the remand order dated 05.07.2023 is without recording any finding. Neither the Fir nor order dated 07.01.2021 was quashed. Rishpal Singh v. State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 215 xxx. Lalita Kumari v. Govt, of U.P, (2014) 2 SCC 1 5. Counsel for respondent No.2/complainant while controverting the submissions made by learned Senior counsel submits that the remand order dated 05.07.2023 is without recording any finding. Neither the Fir nor order dated 07.01.2021 was quashed. The Magistrate was only required to revisit the order in the light of contentions of the parties and law dealing with Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It has been contended that once the Fir has been registered, the limited scope before this Court is to consider the Fir on merits. It has been further contended that at this nascent stage when the investigation is at threshold the petitioner seeking quashing of Fir itself would not be maintainable. 5.1. Counsel for respondent No.2/complainant further submits that in view of the provisions contained under the Haryana Police Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as 2007 Act) and the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as 1934 Rules) the complaint was addressed to the Commissioner of Police with specific endorsement for Economic Offences Wing (EOW). Complaint was further marked to the officer in charge of EOW. The requirement as contained under Section 154 Cr.P.C. stood validly complied with. Reliance has been placed upon conjoint reading of Section 95, Sections 8 & 9 of 2007 Act. 5.2. Counsel for respondent No.2/complainant further submits that the complaint filed before the concerned Magistrate was duly accompanied by affidavit and the same is evident from the index of the initial complaint. He further submits that after remand also the complainant filed a detailed affidavit and the magistrate has rightly held it to be a valid compliance. 5.3. Counsel for respondent No.2/complainant has further relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Srimvas Gundluri v. M/s Speco Electric Power Construction Corporation and others, (2010) 8 SCC 206 to submit that once the complaint comes before the Magistrate, it is not necessary to proceed under Chapter XV. The Magistrate has a discretion vested in him to order investigation by police. The Magistrate thus having validly exercised its discretion, no fault can be found with the impugned order. 5.4. On the facts, the counsel for respondent No.2/complainant has referred to order passed by Director General, Town & Country Planning, Haryana who recommended registration of Fir on the representation made by the complainant. The Magistrate thus having validly exercised its discretion, no fault can be found with the impugned order. 5.4. On the facts, the counsel for respondent No.2/complainant has referred to order passed by Director General, Town & Country Planning, Haryana who recommended registration of Fir on the representation made by the complainant. He further submits that from the Action Taken Report placed on record as Annexures R-2/8 & R-2/9 the fraud as spelled out in the complaint stood established yet the police remained inert and thus, the Magistrate having found that there was cognizable offence made out from reading of the complaint rightly ordered the police to investigate the complaint. Further reliance is being placed upon Apex Court judgment in Lalita Kumari v. Govt Of U.P. and others, (2014) 2 SCC 1 to submit, the Constitution bench held that where the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code. At this stage the only consideration required by the Magistrate was whether the information discloses cognizable offence or not. It has been contended that there are specific allegations against both the petitioners who in their position as Directors in the sister group companies were aware of the major fraudulent transactions using various bank accounts and thus participated actively in connivance with accused No.1. 5.5. He also relies upon the Apex Court judgment in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Hari Singh Ranka, (2019) 6 SCC 687 to submit that economic offences need to be dealt seriously as the same involve social wrong and have immense societal impact. 5.6. Apart from aforesaid judgments, the counsel for respondent No.2/complainant has relied upon following judgments:- i. M/s Sujan Multiports Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others, (2019) High Court of Punjab and Haryana ii. M/s Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 iii. K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, (2008) 12 SCC 481 iv. State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, (1992) CriLJ 527 v. Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 574 vi. Sushil Suri v. C.B.I. and another, (2011) 5 SCC 708 vii. Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 439 viii. Lee Kun Hee & others v. State of U.R and others, (2012) 3 SCC 132 ix. Sushil Suri v. C.B.I. and another, (2011) 5 SCC 708 vii. Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 439 viii. Lee Kun Hee & others v. State of U.R and others, (2012) 3 SCC 132 ix. Vijayander Kumar and others v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2014) 3 SCC 389 x. State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri, (1996) CriLJ 1127 xi. M/s Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. v. Md. Sharaful Haque, (2005) CriLJ 92 xii. State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540 xiii. State of Gujarat v. Anirudh Singh, (1997) 6 SCC 514 6. Learned Deputy Solicitor General of India Mr. Lalli submits that the remand order in the present case cannot be read in the manner as suggested. It has been contended by him that while remanding the matter back to the Magistrate the Court was conscious of the fact that the FIR already stood registered and it was only few of the accused who approached this Court impugning the order passed under Section 156(3) of the Code and the consequential FIR. It was in these circumstances that the Court rightly remanded the matter back to the Magistrate without quashing the FIR or the order. He thus submits that argument raised by learned Senior counsel for petitioners that the earlier order whereby the Magistrate invoked Section 156(3) of the Code on the complaint made by the complainant and the consequential FIR are deemed to have been set aside by the order or remand is against the record. 7. He has further supported the arguments raised by counsel for respondent No.2/complainant. He refers to the finding recorded by the Enforcement Director to submit that cognizable offence against the petitioner is fully established. 8. I have heard counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through records of the case. 9. Before adverting to the aforesaid legal propositions canvassed it will be apt to peruse provisions of the Code relevant to address the issue. 10. Sections 154 to 157 contained in Chapter XII of the Code read as under: Chapter XII Information To The Police And Their Powers To Investigate 154. 9. Before adverting to the aforesaid legal propositions canvassed it will be apt to peruse provisions of the Code relevant to address the issue. 10. Sections 154 to 157 contained in Chapter XII of the Code read as under: Chapter XII Information To The Police And Their Powers To Investigate 154. Information in cognizable cases : (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf: Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under Section 326A, Section 326B, Section 354, Section 354A, Section 354B, Section 354C, Section 354D, Section 376, Section 376A, Section 376AB, Section 376B, Section 376C, Section 376D, Section 376DA, Section 376DB, Section 376E or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer: Provided further that- (a) in the event that the person against whom an offence under Section 354, Section 354A, Section 354B, Section 354C, Section 354D, Section 376, Section 376A, Section 376AB, Section 376B, Section 376C, Section 376D, Section 376DA, Section 376DB, Section 376E or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of such person's choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be; (b) the recording of such information shall be video graphed; (c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section (5-A) of Section 164 as soon as possible.] (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence. 155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases: (1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate. (2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. (3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case. (4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable. 156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case: (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned. 157. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned. 157. Procedure for investigation : (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender: Provided that- (a) when information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot, (b) if it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case: Provided further that in relation to an offence of rape, the recording of statement of the victim shall be conducted at the residence of the victim or in the place of her choice and as far as practicable by a woman police officer in the presence of her parents or guardian or near relatives or social worker of the locality. (2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the officer-in-charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that subsection, and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated. 11. Section 2(d) of the Code defines complaint, which reads as under:- 2. Definitions.-In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,- xxxx xxxx xxxx (d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation.-A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant; 12. Section 2(c) of the Code defines the term cognizable offences and Section 2(1) of the Code defines the term non-cognizable offences, which read as under:- 2 (c) "cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and "cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant; 2(1) "non-cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and "non-cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant; 13. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners has relied upon plethora of judgments. However, the main thrust of his argument is dictum of law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava's case (supra) wherein it was held as under:- "xxxx xxxx xxxx 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [ (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the Fir. xxxx xxxx xxxx" 14. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the Fir. xxxx xxxx xxxx" 14. The aforesaid ratio of law was reiterated in Babu Venkatesh's case (supra) as under:- "xxxx xxxx xxxx 27. In the present case, we find that the learned Magistrate while passing the order under Section 156(3)CrPC, has totally failed to consider the law laid down by this Court. 28. From the perusal of the complaint it can be seen that, the complainant Respondent 2 himself has made averments with regard to the filing of the original suit. In any case, when the complaint was not supported by an affidavit, the Magistrate ought not to have entertained the application under Section 156(3)CrPC. The High Court has also failed to take into consideration the legal position as has been enunciated by this Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., and has dismissed the petitions by merely observing that serious allegations are made in the complaint. 29. We are, therefore, of the considered view that, continuation of the present proceedings would amount to nothing but an abuse of process of law. xxxx xxxx xxxx" 15. Apart therefrom, he has heavily relied upon para 52 of the judgment passed by Delhi High Court in Shri Subhkaran Luharuka's case (supra) which read as under:- "52. The facts as they are before me goes to show that on the same day when Utility claims to have lodged a report with the police, they also prepared a complaint under Section 200 of the Code along with the application under Section 156(3) of the Code, which is dated 27.5.2005. This shows that the modus operandi of the complainant was to approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code immediately without waiting for police investigation and without approaching higher authorities even if the SHO refused to register an FIR. This also casts aspersions as to whether such a complaint was filed with the Police at all. The Govt, of NCT of Delhi has taken a stand that such a complaint was received in the concerned Police Station, but with a rider that records are not available which makes it impossible for the court to verity the facts as they are. This concludes the discussion on the first question 52A. The Govt, of NCT of Delhi has taken a stand that such a complaint was received in the concerned Police Station, but with a rider that records are not available which makes it impossible for the court to verity the facts as they are. This concludes the discussion on the first question 52A. For the guidance of subordinate courts, the procedure to be followed while dealing with an application under Section 156(3) of the Code is summarized as under:- (i) Whenever a Magistrate is called upon to pass orders under Section 156(3) of the Code, at the outset, the Magistrate should ensure that before coming to the Court, the Complainant did approach the police officer in charge of the Police Station having jurisdiction over the area for recording the information available with him disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence by the person/persons arrayed as an accused in the Complainant. It should also be examined what action was taken by the SHO, or even by the senior officer of the Police, when approached by the Complainant under Section 154(3) of the Code. (ii) The Magistrate should then form his own opinion whether the facts mentioned in the complaint disclose commission of cognizable offences by the accused persons arrayed in the Complaint which can be tried in his jurisdiction. He should also satisfy himself about the need for investigation by the Police in the matter. A preliminary enquiry as this is permissible even by an SHO and if no such enquiry has been done by the SHO, then it is all the more necessary for the Magistrate to consider all these factors. For that purpose, the Magistrate must apply his mind and such application of mind should be reflected in the Order passed by him. Upon a preliminary satisfaction, unless there are exceptional circumstances to be recorded in writing, a status report by the police is to be called for before passing final orders. (iii) The Magistrate, when approached with a Complaint under Section 200 of the Code, should invariably proceed under Chapter XV by taking cognizance of the Complaint, recording evidence and then deciding the question of issuance of process to the accused. In that case also, the Magistrate is fully entitled to postpone the process if it is felt that there is a necessity to call for a police report under Section 202 of the Code. In that case also, the Magistrate is fully entitled to postpone the process if it is felt that there is a necessity to call for a police report under Section 202 of the Code. (iv) Of course, it is open to the Magistrate to proceed under Chapter XII of the Code when an application under Section 156(3) of the Code is also filed along with a Complaint under Section 200 of the Code if the Magistrate decides not to take cognizance of the Complaint. However, in that case, the Magistrate, before passing any order to proceed under Chapter XII, should not only satisfy himself about the prerequisites as aforesaid, but additionally, he should also be satisfied that it is necessary to direct Police investigation in the matter for collection of evidence which is neither in the possession of the complainant nor can be produced by the witnesses on being summoned by the Court at the instance of complainant, and the matter is such which calls for investigation by a State agency. The Magistrate must pass an order giving cogent reasons as to why he intends to proceed under Chapter XII instead of Chapter XV of the Code. 16. The Magistrate must pass an order giving cogent reasons as to why he intends to proceed under Chapter XII instead of Chapter XV of the Code. 16. After going through various precedents as relied by both the parties, the settled proposition of law that emerges with respect to Chapter XII is as under:- i) The Chapter deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate; ii) Section 154(1) is mandatory that means wherever the information received by the police relates to commission of cognizable offence mandate of the statute is to record the same in the prescribed format; iii) Where the informant is aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information of cognizable offence he can approach the Superintendent of Police, who on being satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence is required to either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence; iv) Officer in charge of a police station may without the order of Magistrate investigate any cognizable offence; v) Though the power to investigate cognizable offence vests exclusively with the police authorities, however, the same is not dependent on their whims and wishes. Legislature has clothed the Magistrate having powers under Section 190 of the Code with power to order investigation of cognizable offence; vi) the power vested in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code is discretionary in nature as the provision uses the word 'may'; vi) Under Section 157(1) of the Code, the police officer in charge is required to send a report to the Magistrate where he suspects commission of cognizable offence. However, when information as to the commission of any such offence is given and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot. Where it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. Where it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. But the officer in charge shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements and shall also forthwith notify to the informant; 17. Once the Magistrate is satisfied that the complaint discloses cognizable offence he has discretion to direct investigation. In order to exercise the same, the next consideration for the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code is to see whether the allegations are so serious that there is no time to hold inquiry and/or evidence is beyond the reach of the complainant and/or custodial interrogation of the accused(s) appears to be necessary for recovery of articles or discovery of facts. 18. Once the said twin conditions are satisfied the Trial Court is required to find as to whether the complainant has earlier approached the police authorities which the complainant is bound to disclose in his application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In case the complainant has earlier approached the police authorities, the Magistrate is required to call for the Action Taken Report and to see as to whether it is the simple denial for registration of case by the police authority or it is a case wherein the police conducted preliminary inquiry and thereafter concluded that the allegations were not worth investigation. Where there is a case of mere denial at the hands of the police authorities the Magistrate is required to apply its mind to the allegations leveled in the complaint and in case the police authorities after conducting preliminary inquiry have come to the conclusion that the allegations leveled do not call for investigation the Magistrate though not bound by such conclusions is required to pass a reasoned order showing application of mind as to why he finds it necessary to order investigation by police. It needs to be reiterated that where disclosure of a cognizable offence in the complaint is sine qua non for exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code, the application of mind by the Magistrate serves as lifeblood. There is another aspect that the Trial Court must address. If the complainant has earlier approached the police authorities the initial version should also be considered. There is another aspect that the Trial Court must address. If the complainant has earlier approached the police authorities the initial version should also be considered. The Courts need to be conscious of the fact that in majority of cases the applications filed before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code are drafted by the professionals. Even if there is no concoction the version is bound to lose its ingenuity. The improvement of version and the twist given by the professional needs to be seen with caution. 19. The Magistrate has to look into the allegations and not to test the veracity thereof. It is settled proposition that the Magistrate at the stage of passing of order under Section 156(3) of the Code is not required to look into the veracity or truthfulness of the complaint nor is required to look into the defense of the accused. 20. Coming to the present case, Mr. Aggarwal has tried to impress upon by reading observations made in Priyanka Srivastava's case (supra) by the Apex Court and in Shri Shubhkaran Luharuka's case (supra) by the Delhi High Court that in the absence of there being any complaint to the Officer in charge of the Police Station under Section 154(1) of the Code and further absence of any effort by the concerned informant to approach the higher authorities under Section 154(3) of the Code, the powers of Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the code is ousted. 21. Though it does appear to logic that where a person approaches Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code seeking a direction to the police authorities to investigate he normally should first approach the police authorities. But Chapter XII does not prescribe hierarchal structure to suggest that power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code is dependent upon the effort by the complainant to approach police authorities. Also there is no such gap for the Court to supply casus omissus. Apart from that precedents, the Supreme Court suggests that Section 156(3) of the Code is an alternate mode. Reference can be made to State of Gujarat v. Girish Radhakrishnan Varde (SC) (2014) 3 SCC 659 wherein it was held as under:- "xxxx xxxx xxxx 11. Also there is no such gap for the Court to supply casus omissus. Apart from that precedents, the Supreme Court suggests that Section 156(3) of the Code is an alternate mode. Reference can be made to State of Gujarat v. Girish Radhakrishnan Varde (SC) (2014) 3 SCC 659 wherein it was held as under:- "xxxx xxxx xxxx 11. While analysing the controversy raised in this appeal, it is clearly obvious that the entire dispute revolves around the procedural wrangle and the correct course to be adopted by the trial court while taking cognizance but in the entire process it appears that the distinction between a case lodged by way of a complaint before the magistrate commonly referred to as complaint case under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. and a case registered on the basis of a first information report under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. before the police, seems to have been missed out, meaning thereby that the distinction between the procedure prescribed under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. to be adopted in a case based on police report and the procedure prescribed under Chapter XTV and Chapter XV for cases based on a complaint case lodged before the magistrate has clearly been overlooked or lost sight of. It may be relevant to record at this stage that the term 'complaint' has been defined in the Cr.P.C. and it means the allegations made orally or in writing to a magistrate, with a view to taking action under the Code due to the fact that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence but does not include a police report lodged under Section 154 Cr.P.C. Section 190 (1) of the Cr.P.C. contains the provision for cognizance of offences by the Magistrates and it provides three ways by which such cognizance can be taken which are reproduced hereunder:- (a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report in writing of such facts-that is, facts constituting the offence-made by any police officer; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate's own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. An examination of these provisions makes it clear that when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, a case is instituted in the Magistrate's Court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such, facts made by any police officer it is a case instituted in the Magistrate's court on a police report. The scheme underlying Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information of an offence may either approach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a Police Station. If the offence complained of is a non-cognizable one, the Police Officer can either direct the complainant to approach the Magistrate or he may obtain permission of the Magistrate and investigate the offence. Similarly anyone can approach the Magistrate with a complaint and even if the offence disclosed is a serious one, the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offence and initiate proceedings. It is open to the Magistrate but not obligatory upon him to direct investigation by police. Thus two agencies have been set up for taking offences to the court, xxx xxxx" 22. The sine qua non to invoke power under Section 156(3) of the Code at the hands of Magistrate is that the complaint must disclose commission of cognizable offence. Once the Magistrate is called upon to exercise jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code the primary consideration is his satisfaction that the complaint discloses cognizable offence. Apart from that in the present case it has come on record that in Gurugram under the Standing Orders issued by authority under statute, economic offence wing has been constituted and the same was approached by the complainant. Thus Magistrate rightly held that the complainant cannot be faulted with non compliance of section 154 of the Code. 23. Coming to the second submission being raised by Mr. Aggarwal regarding absence of detailed affidavit of the complainant when he approached the Magistrate at the first instance, the objective for insisting upon detailed affidavit is evident from the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava's case. 23. Coming to the second submission being raised by Mr. Aggarwal regarding absence of detailed affidavit of the complainant when he approached the Magistrate at the first instance, the objective for insisting upon detailed affidavit is evident from the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava's case. The peculiar facts of Priyanka Srivastava's case (supra) were noticed as under by the apex court in the opening paras of the judgment:- "The present appeal projects and frescoes a scenario which is not only disturbing but also has the potentiality to create a stir compelling one to ponder in a perturbed state how some unscrupulous, unprincipled and deviant litigants can ingeniously and innovatively design in a nonchalant manner to knock at the doors of the court, as if, it is a laboratory where multifarious experiments can take place and such skilful persons can adroitly abuse the process of the court at their own will and desire by painting a canvas of agony by assiduous assertions made in the application though the real intention is to harass the statutory authorities, without any remote remorse, with the inventive design primarily to create a mental pressure on the said officials as individuals, for they would not like to be dragged to a court of law to face in criminal cases, and further pressurise in such a fashion so that financial institution which they represent would ultimately be constrained to accept the request for "one-time settlement" with the fond hope that the obstinate defaulters who had borrowed money from it would withdraw the cases instituted against them. The facts, as we proceed to adumbrate, would graphically reveal how such persons, pretentiously aggrieved but potentially dangerous, adopt the self-convincing mastery methods to achieve so. That is the sad and unfortunate factual score forming the fulcrum of the case at hand, and, we painfully recount. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx" 24. It was in these circumstances that the Apex Court observed as above in para Nos.30 & 31 of the judgment passed in Priyanka Srivastava's case (supra). 25. Thus, the requirement of detailed affidavit is to make complainant more responsible and to make him conscious of the allegations being levelled by him so that he is aware that in case the affidavit is found to be false he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. 25. Thus, the requirement of detailed affidavit is to make complainant more responsible and to make him conscious of the allegations being levelled by him so that he is aware that in case the affidavit is found to be false he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. Requirement of the said detailed affidavit as prescribed by Apex Court cannot be said to be defect of incurable nature. Wherever the Magistrate finds that application under Section 156(3) of the Code is not supported by affidavit, he is well within its power to call upon the complainant to file detailed affidavit thereof and also put him to terms that in case the allegations made by him are not found to be true, the same shall invite prosecution. In the present case defect now stands cured. 26. The last contention raised by Mr. Aggarwal is based upon the effect of remand order. He assails the impugned orders dated 26.10.2023 claiming that the Magistrate erred in directing that the order be made part of the FIRs as if the FIRs are still in existence. On passing of initial order dated 07.01.2021 the impugned FIRs came into being. This Court in initial round opined that order dated 07.01.2021 was a non-speaking order and remanded the matter back to the Magistrate to revisit the same. Now fresh orders dated 26.10.2023 have been passed. The question thus is whether after order dated 07.01.2021 was found to be bad for non-application of mind, can it be said that consequential FIRs still exist. 27. Counsel for the respondent(s) submit that remand order was clear and unambiguous. Neither order dated 07.01.2021 nor FIRs were quashed. 27.1. If the aforesaid plea is accepted, it will lead to anomalous situation wherein the High Court has opined that order dated 07.01.2021 is bad for non-application of mind yet not only the said order exists but is also bearing fruits in form of the impugned FIRs. While canvassing somewhat similar situation in the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others, (2011) 14 SCC 770 the Apex Court held as under:- " xxxx xxxx xxxx 107. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim "sublato fundamento cadit opus " meaning thereby that foundation being removed, structure/work falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the present case. 108. In Badrinath v. Govt, of T.N., AIR 2000 SC 3243 and State of Kerala v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam, (2001) 10 SCC 191 this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle is applicable to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings equally. 109. Similarly in Mangal Prasad Tamoli v. Narvadeshwar Mishra, (2005) 3 SCC 422 this Court held that if an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings, consequent thereto, will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. 110. In C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran, (2006) 1 SCC 228 , this Court held that a right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. 111. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the orders impugned being a nullity, cannot be sustained. As a consequence, subsequent proceedings/orders/FIR/investigation stand automatically vitiated and are liable to be declared non est. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx" 28. It is matter of record that the order dated 07.01.2021 was found to be bad by the Court, the natural corollary of the remand order passed by this Court is that order dated 07.01.2021 and consequential FIRs cannot be said to be in existence and are held to be in nullity. As a consequence thereof, the impugned orders dated 26.10.2023 are also held to be bad as directions have been issued to make order as part of FIRs which is no more in existence. 29. As a consequence thereof, the impugned orders dated 26.10.2023 are also held to be bad as directions have been issued to make order as part of FIRs which is no more in existence. 29. In the light of above, the present petitions are allowed and as a sequel of aforesaid discussions the following directions are issued:- I) In view of remand order passed by this Court, the order dated 07.01.2021 and the consequential FIRs are held to be nullity; II) Impugned orders dated 26.10.2023 are hereby set aside; III) Directions are issued to the Magistrate to decide applications made by the complainant under Section 156(3) of the Code afresh especially in the light of observations made in para Nos.16, 17, 18, 19 ibid. The complainant shall appear before the Magistrate on 30.01.2024 and the Magistrate shall pass a fresh order within a period of 4 weeks thereafter. However, the petitioners have no right to be heard nor their defense can be looked into at this stage; IV) So far as the objections raised by the petitioners with respect to non-compliance of Section 154 of the Code and detailed affidavits are concerned, the same shall abide by this order. 30. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off. 31. Photocopy of this order be placed on a connected file.