ORDER : 1. These applications are filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’ for short) for quashing and setting aside the complaints being Criminal Case Nos.37079 of 2016, 37076 of 2016, 37081 of 2016, 37072 of 2016, 37077 of 2016, 28893 of 2016 and 37075 of 2016 pending in the Court of learned 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat qua the applicant filed under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (‘NI Act’ for short). 2. The facts leading to filing of these applications, as stated in the applications are such that the impugned complaints came to be filed by the respondent no.2- complainant alleging that the complainant is a private limited company; that the complainant has filed the impugned complaints in his capacity as a Director of the said company; that the complainant company is indulged in the business of imported industrial call trading; that the company has various branches, out of which one is situated at Thane, Maharashtra; that the accused visited the Thane office of the complainant company and purchased goods for which the complainant company had raised certain bills; that for the said outstanding payment of goods from Marriott Cotsyn Industries Limited, the accused had given the cheques in his capacity as an authorized signatory, which were deposited by the complainant. However, the said cheques returned with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’; that the statutory notice was issued to the applicant, which was not replied and the amount was not paid. Therefore, the impugned complaints are filed, which are prayed to be quashed by way of these applications. 3. Heard learned advocate for the parties. 3.1. However, the said cheques returned with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’; that the statutory notice was issued to the applicant, which was not replied and the amount was not paid. Therefore, the impugned complaints are filed, which are prayed to be quashed by way of these applications. 3. Heard learned advocate for the parties. 3.1. Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that the goods were purchased by the partnership firm M/s Marriott Cotsyn Industries of which the accused is a partner, the cheques in question were issued by the said firm; however, the said firm is not joined as an accused; that in absence of joining the partnership firm, the partners cannot be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act; that none of the other partners have been prosecuted as well; that therefore the proceedings against the partner solely are not maintainable; that the argument of the complainant that it is a disputed question of fact is not tenable as the complaint orally disputes the document of partnership firm but no reply has been filed till date taking the said contention; that even though the contention of the complainant that no reply to the notice has been given is admitted, it would not render the prosecution maintainable when the partnership firm is not joined as an accused. He, therefore, submitted that the complaints against the applicant are not tenable and liable to dismissed by allowing these applications, considering the various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court. 4. He, therefore, submitted that the complaints against the applicant are not tenable and liable to dismissed by allowing these applications, considering the various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court. 4. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Dave for the respondent no.2 has submitted that despite there being a settled law that the partners cannot be prosecuted unless partnership firm is joined as an accused, the issuance of cheques from the account maintained by the partnership firm itself is in dispute and therefore the said point is required to be proved by leading evidence; that the signatures on the cheques are done as authorized signatory for Marriott Cotsyn Industries and not as a partner and therefore the complainant would not be aware of the status of the accused-firm; if on the cheques, partner would have been mentioned, there would have been no dispute and therefore, in absence of the same, it is a disputed question of fact which is required to be adjudicated at trial; that in the statutory notice as well as in the complaint, by accepting liability of M/s Marriott Cotsyn Industries, the cheques were given from M/s Marriott Cotsyn Industries, that despite specific case raised in the statutory notice and even though service of statutory notice is affected, no dispute was raised at that point of time and no reply was given to the said statutory notice; that the certificate of bank and partnership deed are documents which cannot be read into evidence without proper proof and therefore said documents are required to be proved during trial in defence; he, therefore, submitted that there are several disputed questions of facts involved in the present applications and therefore, these applications may not be entertained at this stage and be dismissed. 5. Learned APP for respondent no.2-state has objected these applications and submitted that this Court should not exercise its powers by interfering with the proceedings of recovery of amount and the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act are perfectly justified. 6. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7. Section 138 of the NI Act is required to be seen, which reads as under : “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. 6. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7. Section 138 of the NI Act is required to be seen, which reads as under : “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for "a term which may extend to two year", or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless (a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) The payee or the holder induce course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer, of the cheque, "within thirty days" of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheques as unpaid, and (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 8. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 8. It transpires from the facts of the present case that there a dispute as to whether Marriott Cotsyn Industries, on whose behalf the applicant has signed the cheques as authorized signatory, is a firm or a company?; the documents which are produced on the record are not admitted by the complainant and they are also being disputed; the applicant has, admittedly, not replied to the statutory notice issued by the complainant before filing the impugned complaints and raising all the contentions in this application which are in the form of defence and need to be proved by leading evidence in a full-fledged trial; these are disputed questions of facts and in absence of any uncontrovertible material produced in these applications for the same, it needs a full-fledged trial and cannot be decided at this stage of quashing of applications. 9. It is also fruitful to reproduce paragraph 30 of the judgment in the case of Gunmala Sales Privated Limited V/s Anu Mehta and Others reported in (2015)1 SCC 103 , which reads as under: “[30] When in view of the basic averment process is issued the complaint must proceed against the Directors. But, if any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling uncontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his contention. He must make out a case that making him stand the trial would be abuse of the process of court. He cannot get the complaint quashed merely on the ground that apart from the basic averment no particulars are given in the complaint about his role, because ordinarily the basic averment would be sufficient to send him to trial and it could be argued that his further role could be brought out in the trial. Quashing of a complaint is a serious matter. Complaint cannot be quashed for the asking. For quashing of a complaint it must be shown that no offence is made out at all against the Director.” 10. Quashing of a complaint is a serious matter. Complaint cannot be quashed for the asking. For quashing of a complaint it must be shown that no offence is made out at all against the Director.” 10. It is also fruitful to reproduce paragraph 30 of the judgment in the case of S.P.Mani and Mohan Dairy V/s Dr.Snehalatha Elangovan reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1238, which reads as under: Specific Averments in the complaint: 41. In Gunmala Sales Private Limited (supra), this Court after an exhaustive review of its earlier decisions on Section 141 of the NI Act, summarized its conclusion as under: "a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director; b) If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director; c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of the process of the court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an armtwisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an armtwisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed; d) No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director. 42. The principles of law and the dictum as laid in Gunmala Sales Private Limited (supra), in our opinion, still holds the field and reflects the correct position of law.” 11. Further, when, there is no reply to the demand notice by the applicant, such contentions cannot be taken into consideration while deciding the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, unless there is some uncontrovertible documents produced on record. In the present case, this Court has found none of such documents are produced along with the present applications. Therefore, in my opinion, this Court should not exercise discretion in favour of the present applicant. In the present case, this Court has found none of such documents are produced along with the present applications. Therefore, in my opinion, this Court should not exercise discretion in favour of the present applicant. Let the applicant face trial by contending all the defences raised in the present applications and the trial Court shall decide the same in accordance with law considering the record available, in view of the judgment in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd. V/s State of Maharashtra reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315, wherein, it is held in paragraph 80 as under: “80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 12. In view of the above discussion, this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. Let the petitioner as well as complainant lead proper evidence in the trial Court to establish their respective case on merits. Accordingly all these applications are dismissed. Notice/Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. The learned 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat is directed to conclude the proceedings of Criminal Case Nos.37079 of 2016, 37076 of 2016, 37081 of 2016, 37072 of 2016, 37077 of 2016, 28893 of 2016 and 37075 of 2016, on or before 30.9.2024.