ORDER : 1. Heard learned senior counsel Mr. Mehul Shah assisted by learned advocate Mr. A.R. Kadri for the appellant-original defendant No. 2 and learned advocate Mr. Kishore Prajapati for respondent Nos. 1 and 2-original plaintiffs and learned advocate Mr. Pratik Jasani for respondent No. 3-original defendant No. 1. 2. By way of the present Appeal From Order, the appellant has challenged the order dated 13.10.2023 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No. 193 of 2021, whereby the learned Judge has allowed the Notice of Motion below Exhibit 32 filed by the plaintiffs and directed the defendants to maintain status-quo with regard to the title and possession of the suit property. 3. The brief facts leading to the present Appeal are as under: 3.1 The respondent Nos. 1 and 2-original plaintiffs filed a Civil Suit No. 193 of 2021 with regard to the suit property bearing Survey No. 620/1/1 admeasuring about 3339 meters situated at Naroda, Taluka Asarwa, District Ahmedabad. After implementation of Town Planning Scheme No. 121, the said land has been allotted as final plot No. 31/1 admeasuring 2003 meters. 3.2 The case of the plaintiffs-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are that the suit property is an ancestral property and they have right and share in the suit property. However, the defendant No. 1-respondent No. 3 sold the suit property to defendant No. 2 by executing a registered sale deed dated 10.11.2020. The prayers made in the plaint are basically for cancellation of sale deed and claiming share in the property and permanent injunction. 3.3 Exhibit-5 application came to be dismissed for default by the learned trial Court. Thereafter, fresh injunction application on permission of the learned trial Court came to be filed being Exhibits 31 & 32 and the same came to be allowed on 13.10.2023 by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No. 25, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, whereby defendant No. 2 was directed to maintain status quo, qua title and possession of the suit property till final disposal of the suit. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order impugned, the present appellant is before this Court. 4. Learned senior counsel Mr. Mehul Shah for the appellant has submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a suit for setting aside the sale deed dated 10.11.2020, share in the property and for relief of the permanent injunction. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order impugned, the present appellant is before this Court. 4. Learned senior counsel Mr. Mehul Shah for the appellant has submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a suit for setting aside the sale deed dated 10.11.2020, share in the property and for relief of the permanent injunction. It is submitted that there is no prayer for either partition or for possession of the property in question. 4.1 It is the submission of learned senior counsel that in the revenue record originally the properties stood in the name of Ramjibhai and Muljibhai . Upon partition amongst the brothers, the suit property came in the share of Ramjibhai and upon the death of Ramjibhai, the property was mutated in the names of son of Rajeshbhai and defendant No. 1, who is one of the son of Ramjibhai. Thereafter, there was a partition amongst the heirs of Ramjibhai and the suit property came in the share of Shankarlal Ramjibhai Dabhi and thereafter the suit land was sold to the present appellant by way of the registered sale deed dated 10.11.2020. The mutation entry of sale deed was challenged by the plaintiffs before the Mamlatdar, which was unsucessful. An appeal is pending against the order of Mamlatdar before the Deputy Collector. 4.2 It is submitted that since the suit land was purchased for development, thereafter the suit land was converted into non-agriculture land by the order of the competent authority on 10.08.2020 and the amount of the premium was also paid by the present appellant. Commencement certificate (Rja Chithi) was issued by the Ahmedabad Municipal Commissioner on 31.05.2021 and the RERA Authority has also issued Registration Certificate of the Project on 23.07.2021. The present suit was instituted on 06.02.2021. For a prolonged period of 2 years, the plaintiffs did not pursue injunction application, and resultantly, the same came to be dismissed for default. Thereafter, Exhibits 32/33 came to be filed. 4.3 Learned senior counsel Mr. Shah has submitted that the conduct of the plaintiffs reflects that they allowed the present appellant to continue with the construction activities and when the construction was almost completed, fresh injunction application came to be filed. Thereafter, Exhibits 32/33 came to be filed. 4.3 Learned senior counsel Mr. Shah has submitted that the conduct of the plaintiffs reflects that they allowed the present appellant to continue with the construction activities and when the construction was almost completed, fresh injunction application came to be filed. He has placed reliance upon photographs which are placed on record of this appeal, whereby it is submitted that the entire construction of the residential flats have been completed and out of the total residential flats, many of the residential flats have been allotted/sold/transferred in the name of third parties. 4.4 It is submitted that in absence of required consequential relief of partition, the suit is not maintainable and when the suit is not maintainable, there is no question of granting an equitable relief of injunction against the true owner. It is submitted that the appellant is bona-fide purchaser. It is also pointed out by the learned senior counsel from the plaint that one of the averments in plaintiff is that defendant No. 2 sold the suit land without sharing the amount of consideration and without any permission of the plaintiffs. Regarding such averments, the submission of learned senior counsel is that upon the partition of the suit property, which is reflected in the revenue record, the suit property assumes the character of self acquired property of the father and respondent No. 2 becomes the absolute owner of the property and has every right to transfer and sold the property and no permission of flats is required prior to sale. 4.5 Learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions in the case of: (i) Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koli Trust Virudhunagar vs. Chandran, 2017 (0) AIJEL-SC 59759 (ii) Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai vs. Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel, 2018 (0) AIJEL-HC 239467 (iii) Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, 1991 (0) AIJEL-SC 7212 (iv) Best Sellers Retail (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Aditya Birla Nuvo Limited, 2012 (0) AIJEL-SC 51203 (v) Ece Industries Limited vs. S.P. Real Estate Developers Private Limited, 2009 (0) AIJEL-SC 44328 5. Against this, learned advocate Mr. Prajapati for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has vehemently submitted that this Court may not interfere with the findings of fact and no interference is required as the learned trial Court has considered the prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. Against this, learned advocate Mr. Prajapati for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has vehemently submitted that this Court may not interfere with the findings of fact and no interference is required as the learned trial Court has considered the prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. It is also submitted that there is no delay on the part of plaintiffs in not pursuing the injunction application Ex.5 as the parties were relegated for Mediation. It is submitted that respondent No. 3 had full knowledge that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have raised their grievances by way of the public notice and replied to the public notice prior to sale. It is also submitted that the Mamlatdar did not allow the appeal of the plaintiffs while challenging the mutation entry of sale deed, the present plaintiffs filed suit for cancellation of sale deed together with the claim of the right in property. 5.1 It is also pointed out by the learned advocate for respondents that there is a clear admission in the Written Statement at Exh.15, more particularly, in Para 7 that defendant No. 1 had transferred the property by taking law in their hand. This admission has rightly been considered by the learned trial Court and upon such admission, the learned trial Court has granted injunction which is not required interference at this stage. 6. In rejoinder, learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that by no stretch of imagination, the averments made in Para 7 of the Written Statement be construed to be an admission because averments of Written Statement have to be considered as a whole. Even in the Written Statement, defendants have taken grievance regarding the rights of the plaintiffs in the suit property and have resisted the suit as well as injunction application on various aspects. 7. Considering the submissions and the order impugned while deciding the application for injunction three well known ingredients of the equitable reliefs are to be considered by the Court (i) prima-facie case (ii) balance of convenience (iii) irreparable loss. 8. 7. Considering the submissions and the order impugned while deciding the application for injunction three well known ingredients of the equitable reliefs are to be considered by the Court (i) prima-facie case (ii) balance of convenience (iii) irreparable loss. 8. In the present case, documents in support of the plaint uphold the facts that the suit land was originally owned by Ramjibhai and Maujibhai and upon partition between them, the suit land came in the share of Ramjibhai and upon the death of Ramjibhai, the suit property was mutated in the names of heirs of Ramjibhai and one of the heirs of Ramjibhai is present respondent No. 3. Thereafter, there was partition amongst the heirs of Ramjibhai and the suit property came in the share of Shankarlal Ramjibhai i.e. Respondent No. 3. After the partition deed, respondent No. 3 sold the suit land to the present appellant on 10.11.2020 and before the sale deed was executed, the suit land was converted into nonagricultural land by an order dated 10.08.2020. Upon getting the permission from the competent authority, construction activities were started over the suit land and when the injunction application was heard and decided almost the construction of flats is complete. The appellant must have expended crores of Rupees in developing the land. 9. The case of the original plaintiff in the plaint is that the suit property is an ancestral property and the partition has taken place amongst the brothers of the defendant No. 1. Mark 4/7, which is considered by the learned trial Court seems to be of a different land and does not pertain to the suit land. Even on perusal of the Written Statement, the defendants have raised question with regard to right of the plaintiffs in the suit land. It is pertinent to observe that out of total 7 children of Shankarbhai, only 2 daughters have challenged the sale deed. If at all, the plaintiffs had any share in the suit property, the plaintiffs could have brought the legal proceedings into motion much earlier. Though, the plaintiffs have admitted in the plaint that upon partition, the name of defendant No. 1 was mutated in the revenue record, there is no challenge to the such partition by the plaintiffs in the plaint. 10. Though, the plaintiffs have admitted in the plaint that upon partition, the name of defendant No. 1 was mutated in the revenue record, there is no challenge to the such partition by the plaintiffs in the plaint. 10. The learned trial Court has misread the Written Statement, more particularly Para 7 and has committed an error in considering an admission on the part of the defendants. There is no admission on the part of defendants that the plaintiffs have right or share in the suit property. Even on the issue of prima facie case, the plaintiffs have not been able to establish any case in their favour, the balance of convenience which is one of the important limb of granting or refusing interim relief, does not seem to be in favour of the plaintiffs. So far as the question of irreparable loss is concerned, the said limb tilts in favour of the present appellant as the entire project of construction is over and third party rights have been created. In view of the fact that the suit was filed in the year 2021 and the plaintiffs did not pursue the injunction application for one reason or the other and allowed the appellant to go on with construct activities and letting to develop the suit property. The learned trial Court has completely ignored these vital aspects and has completely given a go by in appreciating these facts. 11. In the case of Dalpat Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paras 4, 5 and 6 has observed hereunder: “4. Order 39, Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing... or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with effect from February 1, 1977. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with effect from February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. to grant ad interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. 6. Undoubtedly, in a suit seeking to set aside the decree, the subject-matter in the earlier suit, though became final, the Court would in an appropriate case grant ad interim injunction when the party seeks to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud pleaded in the suit or for want of jurisdiction in the Court which passed the decree. But the Court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused. But the Court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused. This case demonstrates (we are not expressing any opinion on the plea of fraud or their relative merits in the case or the validity of the decree impugned), suffice to state that the conduct of the respondent militates against the bona fides. At present there is a sale deed executed by the Court in favour of the first appellant. If ultimately the respondent succeeds at the trial. They can be adequately compensated by awarding damages for use and occupation from the date of dispossession till date of restitution. Repeatedly the Civil Court and the High Court refused injunction pending proceedings. For any acts of damage, if attempted to make, to the property, or done, appropriate direction could be taken in the suit. If any alienation is made it would be subject to doctrine of lis pendence under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The High Court without adverting to any of these material circumstances held that balance of convenience lies in favour of granting injunction with the following observations, “keeping in mind the history, various facts which have been brought to my notice, and looking to the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, I think it will be in the interest of justice to allow these appeals and grant temporary injunction that the appellants may not be dispossessed from the suit property.” The phrases “prima facie case” and “balance of convenience” and “irreparable loss” are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success.” 12. In the case of Best Sellers Retail (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the prima-facie case and irreparable loss has observed in Para 14 as under: “14. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success.” 12. In the case of Best Sellers Retail (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the prima-facie case and irreparable loss has observed in Para 14 as under: “14. Yet, the settled principle of law is that even where prima facie case is in favour of the plaintiff, the Court will refuse temporary injunction if the injury suffered by the plaintiff on account of refusal of temporary injunction was not irreparable. In Dalpat Kumar and Another vs. Prahlad Singh and Others, (1992) 1 SCC 719 this Court held: “Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages.” 13. Thus, even if there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff; however if the defendant suffers irreparable loss, no injunction can be granted in favour of the plaintiff. 14. In the present case, the grievance of the plaintiff which can be seen from the plaint that defendant No. 1 did not share the consideration with the plaintiff when the suit land was sold to defendant No. 2 on 10.11.2020. Thus, if at all the plaintiff succeeds, the plaintiff can avail the remedy claiming of share in the consideration. Thus, the grievance of the plaintiff is mainly against defendant No. 1 and for the internal disputes between the plaintiff and defendant No1, the entire project cannot be put to on hold by way of an injunction. 15. Thus, this Court is of the view that this Appeal From Order deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed. The order dated 13.10.2023 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No. 193 of 2021, is hereby quashed and set aside. 15. Thus, this Court is of the view that this Appeal From Order deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed. The order dated 13.10.2023 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No. 193 of 2021, is hereby quashed and set aside. ORDER IN CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2023 In view of the order passed in the main matter i.e. Appeal From Order No. 285 of 2023, the present Civil Application, does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.