JUDGMENT : MAUNA M. BHATT, J. 1. Rule. Learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw and Mr. Y.S. Joshi waive service of Rule on behalf of the respective respondents. 2. Both these appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865, are directed against the CAV judgment dated 02.02.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 3723 of 2009, wherein the learned Single Judge while modifying the award of the Labour Court, Jamnagar dated 29.01.2009 in Reference (LCJ) No. 284 of 2000, has directed the appellant - District Rural Development Agency to pay a lumpsum compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- to the respondent-workman within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order. 3. Against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.02.2024, Letters Patent Appeal No. 670 of 2024 is preferred by the District Rural Development Agency (original petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3723 of 2009) seeking to quash and set aside the impugned CAV Judgment whereas, Letters Patent Appeal No. 1338 of 2024 is preferred by the workman (original respondent in Special Civil Application No. 3723 of 2009) for enhancement of the lumpsum compensation. Since, both these LPAs are filed challenging the order dated 02.02.2024, in SCA No. 3723 of 2009, with the consent of Learned Advocates for the respective parties, they are heard and decided by this common judgment. 4. Facts on record are not in dispute. The appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No. 670 of 2024 District Rural Development Agency is registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act and is entrusted from time to time, with various development Schemes by the Central Government as well as by the State Government. The funds for the entrusted Schemes are also provided by the respective Governments. The respondent-workman was appointed as daily wager on 17.02.1986 and he worked under different authorities at different places up to March, 1996. The respondent-workman was paid his wages out of contingency fund. It was the case of the appellant-District Rural Development Agency that the workman was appointed for development of certain Schemes and upon completion of the said Scheme on account of non-availability of work, he was discontinued from March, 1996 and therefore it was not a case of illegal termination. For his termination, the workman raised an industrial dispute being Reference (LCJ) No. 284 of 2000 before the Labour Court, Jamnagar. For his termination, the workman raised an industrial dispute being Reference (LCJ) No. 284 of 2000 before the Labour Court, Jamnagar. The Labour Court, Jamnagar upon adjudication, directed the appellant-District Rural Development Agency to reinstate the workman with 10% back wages. Aggrieved by which, captioned petition being Special Civil Application No. 3723 of 2009 was filed by the District Rural Development Agency, wherein Learned single judge modified the award by directing the District Rural Development Agency to pay compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- against which, the Letters Patent Appeal No. 670 of 2024 is filed by the District Rural Development Agency seeking to quash and set aside the CAV judgment. Whereas, Letters Patent Appeal No. 1338 of 2024 is filed by the workman seeking enhancement of the lumpsum compensation. 5. Heard learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for the appellant-District Rural Development Agency and learned advocate Mr. Yagneshkumar S. Joshi for the respondent-workman. 6. Learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for the appellant- District Rural Development Agency submitted that learned Single Judge has fell in error in not appreciating that the workman was appointed purely on temporary and on ad hoc basis as a daily wager. The employment was given to the respondent-workman till completion of the scheme. The scheme work was to be performed by the appellant- District Rural Development Agency since the work was entrusted to it by the State Government. Therefore, upon completion of the Scheme, the workman cannot be stated to be continued in service. Since, the respondent-workman was not appointed on regular basis, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act would be applicable and this aspect being not appropriately considered by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge, interference of this Court is necessary. He has further submitted that before the Labour Court in the written statements filed, it was contended that the workman was appointed only for specific period and thereafter, considering his family circumstances and with view to provide him employment, he was granted extension from time to time to work under different Gram Panchayats. Because there was no continuous employment of the workman by the District Rural Development Agency, the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable and thus, there is erroneous finding recorded by the Labour Court and upheld by the learned Single Judge. 7. Because there was no continuous employment of the workman by the District Rural Development Agency, the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable and thus, there is erroneous finding recorded by the Labour Court and upheld by the learned Single Judge. 7. Inviting attention to the order, learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for the appellant has submitted that the workman has failed in establishing his continuous employment with the District Rural Development Agency and therefore also, the impugned CAV judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside. Referring to the letter dated 29.03.1993 addressed by the workman to the Taluka Development Officer, he has submitted that from the letter, it is evident that he was aware about the completion of work on 31.03.1993 and thereafter, he had requested the appellant to provide him work and considering his necessity, he was appointed to work under different Gram Panchayats for which, the adverse interference is erroneously drawn by the Labour Court and confirmed by the learned Single Judge. He has submitted that employment of workman was not continuous and only for specific period, which is evident from his order of appointment dated 17.02.1986. In absence of breach of Section 25 F of the I.D. Act, the lumpsum compensation was erroneously granted. Hence, the judgment of the learned Single Judge may be quashed and set aside. 8. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.J oshi appearing for the respondent-workman has submitted that initial appointment of the workman was done under order dated 17.02.1986 for a period of 29 days and thereafter, his services were extended by passing separate orders. The workman had worked from 1989 to 1996, and he was given artificial break after his service for 29 days. Thus, the workman had continued to work till 1996 and he having completed 240 days in a year, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act would be applicable. Further, there being breach of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, the findings recorded by the Labour Court being appropriate, no interference is called for. 9. On the aspect of lumpsum compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge, learned advocate Mr. Joshi has submitted that the workman had worked from 1986 to 1996 as daily wager. The completion of 240 days in a year is evident from the pay-slip annexed at Annexure “B” Page-8. 9. On the aspect of lumpsum compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge, learned advocate Mr. Joshi has submitted that the workman had worked from 1986 to 1996 as daily wager. The completion of 240 days in a year is evident from the pay-slip annexed at Annexure “B” Page-8. Thus, since the workman had continuously worked for the aforesaid period, compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge deserves interference. He has submitted that for continuous work rendered by the workman, he deserves more compensation and therefore, he has requested to enhance the lumpsum compensation. 10. Considered the submissions and documents on record. From the facts, it is noticed that the workman was appointed as a daily wager by an order dated 23.01.1986 by the office of the Taluka Development Officer as Muster Clerk for a period of 29 days in the pay scale of 260-400. Thereafter, upon completion of period of 29 days, he was again continued in service vide order dated 25.03.1986 till completion of construction of community hall. On completion of work of that hall, he was discontinued and again employed to work by an order dated 30.06.1986 as Muster Clerk at Jodiya Kalavad, Lalpur and Jamnagar and he worked till 10.12.1996. Thus, from the pay-slip at Annexure -B page 8, produced by the Taluka Panchayat, it is evident that the workman had worked from 1986 and till 1996. There was break given in between to his service for a period of 2 to 3 days or at the most for few days, however his continuous employment by respondent may be at his request cannot be ignored. Every time, he has been permitted to work for 29 days and thereafter his services has been again continued/ extended by passing of separate order to again work for 29 days. Thus, that was artificial break given in between despite there having continuous work. Moreover, as contended by District Development Agency, no documents were placed on record having the workman appointed by different Gram Panchayat. Therefore, the Labour Court upon considering the evidence on record, has held that the workman had continuously worked from 1986 to 1996 and there is no adverse evidence to dislodge the same. Further, though directed to produce, the District Panchayat failed in providing the documents and therefore, in absence of any evidence, adverse interference was drawn, which in our opinion is appropriate. 11. Further, though directed to produce, the District Panchayat failed in providing the documents and therefore, in absence of any evidence, adverse interference was drawn, which in our opinion is appropriate. 11. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco Industries Limited, (2014) 11 SCC 85 ; wherein it is held as under: “27. Very interestingly, the periods of service extends to close to 6 years save the artificial breaks made by the respondent with an oblique motive so as to retain the appellant as a temporary worker and deprive the appellant of his statutory right of permanent worker status. The aforesaid conduct of the respondent perpetuates “unfair labour practice” as defined under Section 2(ra) of the I.D. Act, which is not permissible in view of Sections 25-T and 25-U of the I.D. Act read with entry at Serial No. 10 in the Vth Schedule to the I.D. Act regarding unfair labour practices. Section (ra) reads thus: “2(ra) ‘unfair labour practice’ means any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule. Entry 10 of Vth Schedule reads as under: “5. To discharge or dismiss workmen: ............. 10. To employ workmen as ‘badlis’ casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.” 28. The respondent, in order to mitigate its conduct towards the appellant has claimed that the appellant was appointed solely on contract basis, and his service has been terminated in the manner permissible under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act. However, we shall not accept this contention of the respondent for the following reasons: 28.1 Firstly, the respondent has not produced any material evidence on record before the Labour Court to prove that it meets all the required criteria under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, to be eligible to employ employees on contractual basis which includes license number etc. 28.2 Secondly, the respondent could not produce any material evidence on record before the Labour Court to show that the appellant was employed for any particular project(s) on the completion of which his service has been terminated through non-renewal of his contract of employment. 29. 28.2 Secondly, the respondent could not produce any material evidence on record before the Labour Court to show that the appellant was employed for any particular project(s) on the completion of which his service has been terminated through non-renewal of his contract of employment. 29. Therefore, we deem it fit to construe that the appellant has rendered continuous service for six continuous years (save the artificially imposed break) as provided under Section 25B of the I.D. Act and can therefore be subjected to retrenchment only through the procedure mentioned in the I.D. Act or the State Act in pari materia. 30. Therefore, we answer Point (ii) in favour of the appellant holding that the Labour Court was correct in holding that the action of the respondent/employer is a clear case of retrenchment of the appellant, which action requires to comply with the mandatory requirement of the provision of Section 6-N of the U.P. I.D. Act. Undisputedly, the same has not been complied with and therefore, the order of retrenchment has rendered void ab initio in law.” 12. Therefore, the findings of the Labour court that the workman was appointed continuously by giving various extension orders and by providing work at different places and therefore, provisions of section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act would not be applicable, in our opinion, is appropriate and the Labour Court has rightly held that there is a breach of the Section 25- F of the Act. 13. For the compensation modified by learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 02.02.2024, we have noticed that the learned Single Judge took into consideration the fact that the workman was orally terminated with effect from 1996 and thereafter the award of Labour Court directing reinstatement with continuity and 10% back wages was stayed by this Court by an order dated 20.04.2009. Thus, almost 11 years have been passed and the workman has not been reinstated on account of stay by this Court. Considering the number of years, which had undergone, the learned Single Judge has modified the award of the Labour Court directing lumpsum compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-. 14. Further, we have also noticed that pursuant to the order dated 20.04.2009 of this Court, granting stay against reinstatement, the workman was paid wages under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Considering the number of years, which had undergone, the learned Single Judge has modified the award of the Labour Court directing lumpsum compensation of Rs.3,00,000/-. 14. Further, we have also noticed that pursuant to the order dated 20.04.2009 of this Court, granting stay against reinstatement, the workman was paid wages under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, in our opinion, the lumpsum compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge of Rs.3,00,000/- being appropriate, no interference is called for and contention on behalf of the respondent-workman that he needs enhancement does not merit acceptance. Hence, both these appeals are dismissed. Rule is discharged.