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2024 DIGILAW 1821 (GUJ)

Chandubhai Govindbhai Patel v. Deputy Collector

2024-09-20

PRANAV TRIVEDI, SUNITA AGARWAL

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JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. 1. This civil reference has come up before this Bench on a reference made by the learned Single Judge as per the provisions of Rule 5(1) of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 (in short as 'the High Court Rules'), with the reasons in the referral order that an authoritative pronouncement to provide a guidance to the subordinate authorities as to what would be a reasonable time in a given case for exercise of suo motu power, is needed. 2. A perusal of the referral order indicates that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to note the facts culled out from the record and then noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suo motu power could not have been exercised after a period of 27 years from the date of the alleged dispossession of the tenant, i.e. father of the respondent no.3. It was also noted that there are judgements of the Apex Court wherein it has been observed that where no period of limitation is provided in exercising suo motu power, the authority would be obliged to exercise the power within a reasonable period. 3. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein was that if the delay of 27 years in exercise of suo motu power is not taken to be unreasonable time, somebody may come after 100 years and say that he be conferred rights under Section 32 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the possession be restored to him. In light of these arguments, it was opined by the learned Single Judge that the judgment of a Single bench of this Court in the matter of Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan vs. Ismai l Gafurbhai Vora [ 1989(1) GLR 392 ] deserves to be reconsidered in light of the decision of the Apex Court that the suo motu power of review or revision or reopening the proceedings should be exercised within a reasonable time. 4. Taking note of the above, we have gone through the record of the Writ petition and the judgment of this Court in Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra), which in the opinion of the learned Single Judge requires consideration. The learned Single Judge was facing a conflicting opinion which impelled him to make the reference. 5. 4. Taking note of the above, we have gone through the record of the Writ petition and the judgment of this Court in Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra), which in the opinion of the learned Single Judge requires consideration. The learned Single Judge was facing a conflicting opinion which impelled him to make the reference. 5. To understand the conflict, the facts as noted by the learned Single Judge and reflected from the record of the Writ petition are considered. The original petitioner before the learned Single Judge claims to be the purchaser of the land by registered sale deed executed in the year 1982 from the owner impleaded as respondent no.4 therein. The entry of the sale was mutated in the revenue record on 01.08.1982 and, thereafter, it was certified. It is stated that there was no tenant in the said land and the respondent no.4, viz. the owner sold his land without any tenancy right with the assurance to the petitioner that the land was never given to anyone for cultivation either by collecting any rent or any share. Since after sale, the petitioner is personally cultivating the land in question. The proceeding under Section 32(1)(b) vide Tenancy Case No. 32/(1)(b)/170 was initiated, but was dropped by order dated 17.09.1984 by holding that there was no tenant on the land and that the deceased Rama Deva had notbeen cultivating the said land as tenant, but he was cultivating for few years from 1952-1954 as a mortgagee. 6. It seems that in a suo motu revision, while exercising the power under Section 76, the Deputy Collector by the order dated 01.09.1986 remanded the matter back to the Mamlatdar & ALT with a direction to decide the same. Thereafter, the dispossession of the heirs of the deceased Rama Deva was recorded even from the deposition recorded earlier in the original proceeding under Section 32(1)(g). It was specifically shown from the revenue record that the name of deceased Rama Deva was recorded as tenant in the relevant column. It is the case of the petitioner that deceased Rama Deva was proved to be a legal tenant of the land and after his death, opposite party no.3, viz. heir of deceased Rama Deva was entitled to purchase the land under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. 7. It is the case of the petitioner that deceased Rama Deva was proved to be a legal tenant of the land and after his death, opposite party no.3, viz. heir of deceased Rama Deva was entitled to purchase the land under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. 7. Taking note of the aforesaid facts, the Mamlatdar & ALT has held that on the proof of the deceased Rama Deva being the tenant of the land in question, his heirs, viz.the opposite party no.3 were entitled to purchase and in case the purchase was not effected, the land will be vested with the State Government and it will be disposed of as per the provisions of Section 32P(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ( Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ). 8. It was, thus, held that the original owner of the land in question sold the land to the original petitioner in contravention of the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the sale is illegal. It was further ordered to hold a separate proceeding under Section 84-C of the Act. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector, which was dismissed vide order dated 28.09.1987 in Tenancy Appeal No. 21/86. The revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act' 1948 was also dismissed vide order dated 24.07.1992. 9. The main arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Mamlatdar & ALT was not competent to exercise suo motu powers after a period of 37 years by invoking the provisions of Section 32(1B). It was the case of the petitioner that the name of the father of the opposite party no.3 was recorded in the revenue record of 1951-52 to 1955-56, but subsequently by Entry no. 36 his name was cancelled from the column of the tenant. The land in question has not been in the possession of the tenant and from the year 1982 soon after purchase the petitioner is cultivating the said land as owner and is in possession thereof. 10. 36 his name was cancelled from the column of the tenant. The land in question has not been in the possession of the tenant and from the year 1982 soon after purchase the petitioner is cultivating the said land as owner and is in possession thereof. 10. Taking note of the above, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra) , wherein the Writ petition was filed by a person claiming to be in possession of the land in question as a tenant on 15.06.1955 further application was filed on 15.07.1976 under Section 70(b) read with Section 32(1B) of the Act for restoration of possession of the land. It was the case of the petitioner therein that he was tenant of the land in question and had submitted an application on 05.05.1973 to the Mamlatdar and, thereafter, a fresh application was submitted on 24.09.1974 for restoration of possession. When no reply was received from the Mamlatdar, the petitioner therein again submitted a fresh application on 15.07.1976, which was rejected on the ground that since the possession was not with the landlord, the application of the petitioner could not be allowed. The Deputy Collector, in appeal, had reached at the conclusion that the application of the petitioner was barred by time and same view was taken by the Tribunal, though on merits the Tribunal reached at a different conclusion in favour of the petitioner. 11. On the aspect of limitation under Section 32(1B), the question was as to whether the Mamlatdar could invoke his jurisdiction and start a suo motu inquiry though the application filed by the petitioner tenant was beyond time. The decision of this Court Rasulmiy a Rehmanmiya vs. Patel Lalbhai Shankerbhai [198 3 XXIV (1) GLR 714] was considered to note that the limitation aspect of the matter is no long res integra. 12. Coming to the case of Rasulmiya Rehmanmiy a (supra) on the issue as to what would be the reasonable time for exercise of suo motu power of revision, the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent therein was that if the Mamlatdar is held entitled to exercise suo motu power at any distant time in future, there would be no upper limit to the invocation of such powers and even after 10, 20, or 30 years such powers might be exercised. It was held by this Court that the apprehension voiced by the learned advocate is more imaginary than real. Section 32(1B) itself provides an inherent safeguard against such contingencies. Powers under Section 32(1B) can be exercised against landlords or their successors in interest who as mentioned in the Explanation would mean landlords' heirs, testamentary or intestate. If the land in question is bona fide and genuinely sold or otherwise transferred to third parties and is not available for being restored back to the tenant under Section 32(1B) by the time the Mamlatdar is informed of the grievances of the concerned tenant, the Mamlatdar would justifiably refuse to invoke his suo motu powers in such cases as the very exercise would be a futile one. If, however, such land has remained as part and parcel of the estate of the original wrong-doer, i.e. the landlord who deprived the tenant of his possession illegally during the period contemplated by Section 32(1B) and is traceable in the hands of the land-lord or his heirs and is available for restoration to the victim tenant by getting it back from the hands of the landlord or his heirs, who also must remain answerable for the wrong committed by their predecessor in title from whom they have inherited such land, then in effect and in law there is nothing wrong in the invocation of the suo motu powers of the Mamlatdar even after any number of years. 13. It was, thus, held that the legislature in its wisdom has not put any time limit for the exercise of suo motu powers by the Mamlatdar under Section 32(1B). By no process of judicial interpretation such a time limit can be engrafted in the section. Only safety valve can be that such powers should be exercised within reasonable time. It was further held that whether exercise of suo motu powers of the Mamlatdar is within reasonable time or not will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The section itself demonstrates as to how by change of circumstances with the passage of time, the said exercise would become unreasonable and or futile. Having said so, the Court in Rasulmiya Rehmanmiy a (supra) had proceeded to reject the contentions on the limitation and examined the case on merits. 14. The section itself demonstrates as to how by change of circumstances with the passage of time, the said exercise would become unreasonable and or futile. Having said so, the Court in Rasulmiya Rehmanmiy a (supra) had proceeded to reject the contentions on the limitation and examined the case on merits. 14. In Rasulmiya Rehmanmiya (supra), it was further noted by the learned Single Judge that Section 32(1B) is a beneficial provision enacted with a view to protect the rights of illiterate and ignorant tenants who might have been duped by their crafty landlords into giving up possession of their lands contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Such tenants might skip the period of one year's limitation as provided by the statutory rules. However, they are given a locus paenitentiae in the form of invocation of suo motu powers of Mamlatdar for getting justice. Their time barred applications seek to do nothing else but to inform the Mamlatdar about the injustice done to them. Once convinced of the justness of the grievance put forward by such a tenant, if the Mamlatdar proceeds to deal with the case under Section 32(1B) on merits, only inference that can follow from such a course adopted by the Mamlatdar is that he has thought it fit to invoke his suo motu powers which are not subject to any period of limitation. 15. Having conjointly read the decisions of this Court in Rasulmiya Rehmanmiya (supra) and Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra), the ratio of two decisions is that there is no embargo on the suo motu powers of the Mamlatdar in view of the nature of the provisions contained in Section 32(1B), which is a beneficial provision enacted with a view to protect the rights of the illiterate and ignorant tenants who might have been duped by their landlords into giving possession of their lands contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act. No time limit can be engrafted in the section by any process of judicial interpretation. However, such a power shall be exercised within a reasonable time and what would be the reasonable time to exercise suo motu powers will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 16. No time limit can be engrafted in the section by any process of judicial interpretation. However, such a power shall be exercised within a reasonable time and what would be the reasonable time to exercise suo motu powers will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 16. Taking note of the above, we may go through the provision itself, which reads as under :- "32.(1) x x x x x (1A) x x x x x (1B) Where a tenant who was in possession of land on the appointed day and who, on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part there of by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in section 29 or any other provision of this Act is not in possession of such land or any part there of and such land or part thereof is in the possession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the said date and such land or part there of is not put to non-agricultural use on or before the said date, then the Mamlatdar shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said section 29 or any other provision of this Act either suo motu or on an application of the tenant made within the prescribed period hold an inquiry and direct that such land or as the case may be, part thereof shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor in interest, and shall be restored, to as the tenant; and thereafter, the provisions of this section and sections 32A to 32R (both inclusive) shall, so far as they may be applicable, apply there to, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased such land or part there of on the date on which such land or, as the case may be, part there of is restored to him: Provided that the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of land or part there of, as the case may be, under this sub-section only if he gives an undertaking in writing within such period as may be prescribed to cultivate it personally and of so much there of as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceiling area: Provided further that- (i) if the tenant fails to give such undertaking within such prescribed period, or if the tenant, after giving such undertaking refuses to accept the tenancy or possession of the lands, the land the possession of which the land-lord or, as the case may be, his successor-in-interests is not entitled to retain under this sub-section; or (ii) if the tenant gives such undertaking and accepts such tenancy or possession of the land, such portion of the land referred to in clause (i) to the restoration of which the tenant would not be entitled under the first proviso, shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances, and shall be disposed of in the manner provided in sub- section (2) of section 32P Explanation.- In this sub-section "successor in interest" means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death." 17. A careful reading of the provision indicates that the time limit prescribed for the application of the tenant cannot be imported for exercise of suo motu power of the Mamlatdar, who has been assigned jurisdiction in the nature of suo motu power to set right the wrong done, which is necessarily to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 18. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge while making reference did not proceed to examine the facts and circumstances of the case before him and simply taking note of the judgement of this Court in Bhaikh a Umravkha Pathan (supra) has proceeded to record that the said decision deserves to be reconsidered by the Division Bench in view of the statement of law by the Apex Court with respect to a suo motu power of review or revision or reopening the proceedings within a reasonable time. No opinion has been formed by the learned Single Judge that he was facing any conflict in taking a decision on the facts of the case in view of the law stated in Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra). In Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra), there is no statement of law and the said case has proceeded on its own merits after taking note of the statement of law (ratio) in the case of Rasulmiya Rehmanmiya (supra) , holding that the decision of the tribunal on the aspect of limitation therein cannot be sustained. 19. As noted above, in Rasulmiya Rehmanmiya (supra), it is categorically stated that no fix time period can be provided by the process of judicial intervention in view of the specific nature of the provision contained in Section 32(1B), which is peculiar in nature. However, checks and balances have already been provided under the provision and in view of the inherent safeguard against any such contingency where the suo motu power is exercised in an unreasonable manner, whether exercise of suo motu power of Mamlatdar was within reasonable time or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 20. Insofar as the decision of the Apex Court in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil vs. Babasahe b Tukaram Shevale [ (2009) 9 SCC 352 ] , there is a general statement about the exercise of power of revision where the statute does not provide the time limit for exercising revisional power. 20. Insofar as the decision of the Apex Court in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil vs. Babasahe b Tukaram Shevale [ (2009) 9 SCC 352 ] , there is a general statement about the exercise of power of revision where the statute does not provide the time limit for exercising revisional power. It was observed therein that where the legislature does not provide any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 21. Even in the State Of Punjab & Ors vs Bhatind a District Coop. Milk P. Union Ltd. [(2007 (11) SC C 363] , wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. It was observed by the Apex Court that :- "18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years." 22. A careful reading of both the above extracted paragraphs indicates that if no time period has been prescribed, the statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period, and what shall be the reasonable period, however, would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 23. From the above discussion, it is clear that there cannot be any straitjacket formula for stating the fixed period which can be said to be reasonable period, applicable to all variety of cases in exercise of suo motu power of revision by the statutory authority exercising power in different statutory jurisdictions. 23. From the above discussion, it is clear that there cannot be any straitjacket formula for stating the fixed period which can be said to be reasonable period, applicable to all variety of cases in exercise of suo motu power of revision by the statutory authority exercising power in different statutory jurisdictions. The court in each case has to examine as to whether the power has been exercised within a reasonable period, in a reasonable manner, taking note of the statutory rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors of the particular case. 24. In view of the above, we reach at a irresistible conclusion that there cannot be an authoritative pronouncement by the Division Bench as to what would be the reasonable time in a given case for exercising suo motu powers or fix any time period as a reasonable period, as even in view of the judgment of the Apex Court what would be the reasonable period of time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 25. There is another aspect of the matter. The question is whether the learned Single Judge was right in making the reference by invoking the power under Rule 5(1) of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 for the mere necessity of creating a precedent when he was not facing any conflict that too casting aspersions on another decision wherein earlier law stated had been followed. In other words, the question is whether the reference made by the learned Single Judge was proper or not and whether the academic issues on the question of law has to be answered by the Larger Bench when there is no conflict or controversy. 26. There cannot be two opinion that if a question of law of whatever importance arises before the Bench having jurisdiction, ordinarily, that Bench (whether Single or Division) shall decide it itself and not refer it to a Larger Bench, unless there is a conflict of precedent, which makes it impossible for the Bench to decide this way or other. [Ref. Suo Motu Action Taken by the Court vs . ICICI Bank Ltd., Allahabad ( 2006(4) ADJ 106 )] . 27. [Ref. Suo Motu Action Taken by the Court vs . ICICI Bank Ltd., Allahabad ( 2006(4) ADJ 106 )] . 27. The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Bab u Premarajan vs. Supreintendent of Police , Kasaragode [AIR 2000(2) 417] had also considered the similar issue taking note of the Rule 4 of the High Court Rules therein, which reads as under :- "4. ...Powers of a Bench of two Judges :- The Powers of the High Court in relation to the following matters may be exercised by a Bench of two Judges, provided that if both Judges agree that the decision involves a question of law they may order that the matter or question of law be referred to a Full Bench" 28. It has been noted therein with the meaning of the word "reference" in Shroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (4th edition, Vol. I, Page 65), to observe in paragraph 49' of the report as under :- "Meaning of Reference :- Reference has been stated to mean the sending of pending case, for some question therein, by the Court in which it is pending to a private person or some other tribunal to hear and determine the cause of the question "Para'49 of the report:- 49. The last question referred for our decision is viz. whether a reference by a Division Bench to a Full Bench is permissible merely because both Judges in a Division Bench so agree that the decision involves a question of law. Section 4 has been reproduced in para 6 above. It deals with the powers of a Bench of two Judges, Indeed powers of the High Court. The proviso says that when both Judges agree that the decision involves a question of law, the may order that the matter or question of law be referred to a Full Bench. Whereas in Section 3, a single Judge is required to refer the entire case for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Julges, Under Section 4, a Division Bench may refer the entire case or question of law to a Full Bench Assuming that to be so, it is difficult to appreciate why a Division Bench should not decide the question of law and merely because both the Judges agree that the decision involves a question of law. It should be referred to a Full Bench or the entire matter be referred to a Full Bench. If a question of law arises before a Division Bench, which situation is not uncommon, is it open to a Division Bench not to decide it and refer it to a Full Bench. One can understand when there is a conflict of Division Bench decisions on a question of law and there is no subsequent decision of the Apex Court on the point; in such a situation a reference to Full Bench would undoubtedly be justified. In the light of the cases we have discussed above there is no doubt that the power of two Judges in a Division Bench to refer a question of law to a Full Bench must be exercised sparingly and only in cases where there is a conflict of opinion of Division Benches of this Court and there is no latter decision of the Apex Court on that point Obviously, if there is a subsequent decision of the Apex Court which resolves the conflict or, in the light of which, one of the Division Bench decisions must be taken to be impliedly overruled and the other Impliedly upheld, the Division Bench is obliged to follow the view which has been impliedly upheld by the subsequent decision of the Apex Court. Our answer to the third question would, therefore, be that, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act contemplate a reference by a Division Bench, not merely because both the Judges of the Division Bench agree that the decision involves a question of law. Such a reference by a Division Bench to a Full Bench is permissible only if there is a conflict of Division Bench decisions of this Court and there is no latter decision of the Apex Court resolving the said conflict directly or impliedly. 29.It was, thus, observed therein that when there is a conflict of Division bench decisions on the question of law and if there is no subsequent decision of the Apex Court on the point, in such a situation, reference to the Full Bench would undoubtedly be justified. 29.It was, thus, observed therein that when there is a conflict of Division bench decisions on the question of law and if there is no subsequent decision of the Apex Court on the point, in such a situation, reference to the Full Bench would undoubtedly be justified. Further, the power of two judges in a Division Bench to refer a question of law to a Full Bench must be exercised sparingly and only in cases where there is conflict of opinion of the Division Bench of that Court and there is no latter decision of the Apex Court on the point. If there is a subsequent decision of the Apex Court, which resolves the conflict or in light of which, one of the Division Bench decision would be taken to be impliedly overruled and the other impliedly upheld, the Division Bench is obliged to follow the view which has been impliedly upheld by the subsequent decision of the Apex Court. It was held that the rules do not contemplate a reference by a Division Bench merely because both the judges agree that the decision involves a question of law. Such a reference is permissible by a Division Bench to a Full Bench only if there is a conflict of Division Bench decision of that Court and there is no latter decision of the Apex Court resolving the conflict directly or impliedly. 30. In view of the above discussion, from a reading of Rule 5(1), Rule 5(2) and Rule 6 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, it is found that when it appears to a Single Bench or a Division Bench that there are conflicting decisions of the co-ordinate strength of the same Court or that a question of law of importance having conflicting views arises in the trial of a case, the Judge or the Bench passes an order that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court with the request to form the Special or Full Bench to hear and decide the case on the questions that arise in the matter. Though the judge concerned should make a reference briefly indicating reasons for his views which necessitated to refer the matter to a Larger Bench, but the same is not indispensable. The Full Bench cannot decline to answer the question referred to it in respect of the order of reference. Though the judge concerned should make a reference briefly indicating reasons for his views which necessitated to refer the matter to a Larger Bench, but the same is not indispensable. The Full Bench cannot decline to answer the question referred to it in respect of the order of reference. It is a matter of judicial propriety that brief reasons for making a reference are to be indicated so as to enable the Larger Bench to know the minds of Hon'ble Judge(s) making the reference. This view has been stated by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Suresh Jaishwal Vs. State o f U.P [(2021) 147 ALR 19] . 31. Similar view has been expressed by the Full Bench of this Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs . Union of India [2015 (2) GLR 1359] wherein it was observed that though in the referred order no specific reasons are recorded by the Division Bench for disagreement with the view taken by the another Division Bench of this Court, but the questions which have been referred, though not directly, but indirectly are of general importance and, therefore, the Full Bench found it appropriate to answer the questions was to be given by the Full Bench instead observing the reference as incompetent. 32. In Rama Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujara t [ 2001 (3) GLR 2261 ] , it was held by this Court that :- "4.1 It will be seen from the provisions of Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 that a Single Judge may refer any matter before him or question arising in such matter to a Division Bench of two Judges or a larger Bench. The rule does not require any reasons being recorded for the purpose and it is sufficient if in the opinion of the learned Single Judge the matter requires to be considered by a Division Bench of two Judges or a larger Bench. Therefore, even if no reason is recorded for referring the matter, there can arise no question of a larger Bench not being able to consider the matter, because, the process of assignment of work to Benches is purely an internal matter of the High Court governed by these Rules and a matter which could have been considered by a learned Single Judge can always be referred for a decision to a larger Bench. A bare look at the order referring the matter to a larger Bench would, however, show that very cogent reasons are recorded by the learned Single Judge for referring the matter for a decision by a larger Bench. We therefore do not find any substance in the preliminary objection which was raised against the Full Bench hearing the matter, on the ground that the reference was not validly made." 33. In Gujarat Forest Producers, Gatherers & Fores t Workers Union vs. State of Gujarat [2004(2) GL R 1488] , it was observed by the Full Bench that :- "26.3........Even if it may have appeared to the learned Single Judge that there was a conflict between the two judgements of the Supreme Court, the question for the High Court to consider is not which decision lays down the correct law, as has been framed in the reference but the real question would be, which of the two decisions should be treated as binding on the basis of the well known principles of law governing precedents. When, however, the Supreme Court has itself considered its earlier judgement in Jaggannath case (supra) and distinguished it in Prathamsinh Parmar case (supra), then there can arise no question of conflict between the two and the earlier judgement has to be read in the manner found distinguishable by the Supreme Court in the later judgement which has considered it." 34. In Principal, Shri Jivkor Vanita Vishram vs. Savit a Saymon Parmar [ 2004(2) GLR 1488 ] , it was noted by the Full Bench that in the reference made by the learned Single Judge to the decision of the Apex Court in Jyotindranath's case and the Full Bench judgment in Shantiben of this Court rendered on the same issue has been referred by the learned Single Judge noticing that the Apex Court decision in Jyotindranath Roy was not brought to the notice of the Full Bench in Shantiben. Taking note of the questions referred and the decision of the Full Bench in Shantiben and the judgment of the Apex Court in Jyotindranath Roy, though the Full Bench in the said case was of the view that the Apex Court decision in Jyotindranath Roy was with respect to a different class of employees and the Full Bench in Shantiben was pertaining to teaching staff, but it has refused to go into the propriety and legality of the reference by the learned Judge. The question of law was restated referring to the decision of the Full Bench in Shantiben and judgment of the Apex Court in Jyotindranath Roy, has referred to the Full Bench in Principal, Shri Jivkor Vanita Vishram (supra) . 35. In a recent decision of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Manish Kumar Mishra vs. Union of Indi a [ AIR 2020 All 97 : AIROnline 2020 All 813] , it was noted that the reference to a Larger Bench ordinarily, can only be made when there are conflicting views of the coordinate bench or the larger bench, facing the learned Judge on a subject/controversy before him making it difficult for him to take one or other view. Reference cannot be made merely to create a precedent or to get an authoritative pronouncement by the Larger Bench on any "assumed conflict". Whenever a matter is placed before the Court (whether Single or Division Bench) for adjudication, if a question of law of whatever importance arises before that Bench, ordinarily the Court should decide it itself by applying legal principles and judicial pronouncements on the subject. Only if the learned Judge reaches at a conclusion that there is a conflict of precedent, i.e. conflicting views of the coordinate bench or the larger bench on the subject making it impossible for the Court to decide this way or other, reference can be made. 36. Only if the learned Judge reaches at a conclusion that there is a conflict of precedent, i.e. conflicting views of the coordinate bench or the larger bench on the subject making it impossible for the Court to decide this way or other, reference can be made. 36. Taking note of the above decisions on the aspect of propriety of the reference to be made by the learned Judge to a Larger Bench, considering the language employed in Rule 5(1) and (2) of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, specifically the decisions of this Court noted hereinabove, we answer the second question posed by us that the provisions of Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 contemplate a reference by a Single Judge or a Division Bench, not merely because the learned Single Judge or both the Judges of the Division Bench are of the view that the decision involves a question of law and an authoritative pronouncement of law by a Larger Bench is needed so as to create a precedent. A reference by the Court (whether Single or Division Bench) is to be made only if there is a conflict of decision of the coordinate bench of the same Court and there is no latter decision of the Apex Court resolving the conflict directly or impliedly. Ordinarily, the Court (whether Single or Division Bench) having jurisdiction should decide the question of law raised before it and merely because the learned Judge(s) is/are of the opinion that the decision involves a question of law the matter should not be referred to a Full Bench, to decide either on a question of law or the entire matter itself. Reference to a Larger Bench under Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 can be made to resolve a conflict faced by the Court in arriving at its own decision on a question of law and not on the 'assumed conflict'. 37. With the above, we answer the reference in the following manner :- i. In view of the law stated by the Apex Court in Stat e of Punjab (supra) and Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil (supra), where the statute does not provide a time limit for exercising revisional power by the statutory authority suo motu, the exercise of such power within a reasonable time is inherent in the Statute itself. However, what shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors of the case. It is not possible for this Court to fix any time period for general guidance of the statutory authorities exercising powers in different statutory jurisdictions. Whenever a question arises before any Court as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the statutory authority is within a reasonable period, the said Court has to decide the matter in the facts and circumstances of the particular case taking note of the statutory rights and liabilities under the relevant statutes and other relevant factors of the case. ii. The decision of this Court in Rasulmiy a Rehmanmiya (supra), wherein the question of limitation in exercise of suo motu power has been raised, with reference to the provisions contained in Section 32(1B) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 has been rendered taking note of the statutory rights and liabilities conferred under Section 32(1B) and it was, thus, relied upon in Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra ) in the facts and circumstances of the said case. The ratio of the said decisions is in line of the decision of the Apex Court in the State of Punjab (supra) and, therefore, the decision in Bhaikha Umravkh a Pathan (supra) requires no reconsideration, that too in wake of the statement of law made hereinabove about fixing a reasonable time period for exercise of suo motu power by a statutory authority under a Statute. 38. The reference made to this Court is answered, accordingly. The case file of the matter be placed before the learned Single Judge for decision on the merits. The order and the observations made hereinabove are without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties before the Writ Court. 39. The reference stands disposed of, accordingly.