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2024 DIGILAW 1828 (GUJ)

STATE OF GUJARAT v. GIRVATBHAI LAXMANBHAI BARIA

2024-10-01

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK

body2024
JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. The appellant-State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 01.10.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Dahod (hereinafter be referred to as “the trial Court”) in Sessions Case No. 163 of 2008, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the accused from the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as “the IPC”). 2. Brief facts of the present case are as under: 2.1 It is the case of the complainant that on 29.03.2008, the complainant Nanabhai Shanabhai Pagi, resident of Pipero, Taluka: Janvad, Santarampur lodged the complaint at Limkheda Police Station to the effect that his daughter Sangeeta married with Girvatbhai son of Laxmanbhai Mumabhai Bariya at Village: Pisoi, as per their rituals. It is alleged that after the marriage, his daughter Sangeeta was residing with her in-laws with her husband, mother-in-law Bhaliben and father-in-law Laxmanbhai and brother-in-law Pakabhai. After marriage, her daughter-in-law used to come as a guest at their house during the festival at that time she has not made any complaint with regard to any harassment and cruelty. That on 23.03.2008, when his daughter and son-in-law Girwatbhai Janwad came at his house, his daughter seemed upset, so he and his wife asked Sangeeta why she was upset, at that time Sangeeta told that her ornaments were pledged by her mother-in-law, father-in-law and husband and they did not give back and when she asked them to give it back, they they fought with her. Then his daughter and son-in-law stayed there for four days and dated and left for Village Pisai on 27.03.2008 at three o'clock in the afternoon. It is alleged that at seven o'clock in the evening, Sangeeta got a call from Pisai Village and she told his wife Gajraben on the phone that they came there and picked up her and she also told that her husband got up to beat her when she asked him to release her ornaments as a pledge and her mother-in-law and father-in-law told her that she would bring money from her father and release the ornaments. It is alleged that on 28.03.2008 at nine o'clock, in the morning, Police Constable of Randhikpur Police Station received a call that his (complainant) daughter Sangeeta has fallen into the well and died, so they needed immediate help. Thereafter, the dead-body was brought out from the well in presence of the complainant, the panchnama was carried out. The incident had occurred on 27.03.2008 between ten to twelve o'clock. After marriage of the deceased, her mother-in-law stayed at Village: Pisoi, and husband of the deceased and mother-in-law had mortgaged her ornaments, which her motherin- law, father-in-law, brother-in-law and husband had quarreled with the deceased about the redemption and they were harassing and torture her and therefore the deceased committed suicide. The FIR being C.R. No. 61/2008 was registered before the Limkheda Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the IPC. 2.2 Pursuant to the aforesaid FIR, the police started investigation and prepared panchnama of the scene of offence as well as prepared inquest panchnama and recorded the statements of various witnesses and arrested the accused and after completion of investigation, as the sufficient evidence was found, the police has filed the charge-sheet against the accused before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. As the offence was triable by the Court of Sessions, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class has committed the case under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Sessions at Surendranagar wherein it has been registered as Sessions Case No. 520 of 2008. 3. The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial Court on 09.07.2009 vide Exhibit 2 for the aforesaid offences against the accused. On being explained it to them, the accused have denied having committed any offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for trial and hence, the case was tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Dahod. 4. After completion of the trial and having heard both the sides, the trial Court has acquitted the accused from the charges levelled against them. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 6. Heard Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State of Gujarat at length. Though served, nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, in absence of the accused, the Court has proceeded the matter. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 6. Heard Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State of Gujarat at length. Though served, nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, in absence of the accused, the Court has proceeded the matter. Perused the evidence on record as well as impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court. 7. Ms. Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant has vehemently submitted the same facts which are narrated in the appeal memo and has also submitted that there is ample evidence on record in connecting the accused with the alleged crime. She has submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error of facts and law in acquitting the accused. She has submitted that the deceased committed suicide on account of mental and physical torture given by accused on account of the ornaments of the deceased which were pledged by the husband and his family members for which they were not taking steps to relieve the same and deceased having marriage span of ten to eleven months who committed suicide by jumping into the well. She has submitted that though the said fact was proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and reliable evidence in the nature of oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial Court has failed to consider such facts in its true and proper spirit. She has submitted that on 23.03.2008, deceased along with her husband visited the parental house and stayed for about four days and on returning on 27.03.2008, deceased has informed her mother and family members with regard to the mental torture and cruelty on account of pledging of the ornaments. She has submitted that on 27.03.2008, the deceased along with her husband returned at matrimonial home and in night hours of the same day, she committed suicide by jumping into the well, so there is proximate reason and this led to instigation to the deceased for committing suicide and, therefore, all the accused are liable to be convicted for the offences punishable under Section 498A, 306 and 114 of the IPC. She has submitted that though the statements / evidence of the witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer, who are the family members of the deceased and they have supported the case of the prosecution and supported the fact that there was quarrel between the husband and wife with regard to pledging of the ornaments, the trial Court has not believed this aspect and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has submitted that the trial Court ought to have drawn inference under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act since the deceased has committed suicide within a span of ten months only, however, the trial Court has not brushed aside the aspect while evaluating the evidence of the witnesses. According to Ms. Bhatt, the FIR came to be lodged by the father on the very next day of the incident and there is no delay in filing the complaint. She has prayed to allow the present appeal and convict and punish the accused for the above charges. In support of her submissions, Ms. Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gumansinh alias Lalo alias Raju Bhikhabhai Chauhan and another Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2021 SC 4174 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-20, 21 and 22 as under: “20. It was next submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that all the witnesses are relative and interested witnesses and no independent witness was examined by the prosecution to prove the case, thus, the prosecution case becomes doubtful. 21. Most often the offence of subjecting the married woman to cruelty is committed within the boundaries of the house which in itself diminishes the chances of availability of any independent witness and even if an independent witness is available whether he or she would be willing to be a witness in the case is also a big question because normally no independent or unconnected person would prefer to become a witness for a number of reasons. There is nothing unnatural for a victim of domestic cruelty to share her trauma with her parents, brothers and sisters and other such close relatives. The evidentiary value of the close relatives/interested witness is not liable to be rejected on the ground of being a relative of the deceased. There is nothing unnatural for a victim of domestic cruelty to share her trauma with her parents, brothers and sisters and other such close relatives. The evidentiary value of the close relatives/interested witness is not liable to be rejected on the ground of being a relative of the deceased. Law does not disqualify the relatives to be produced as a witness though they may be interested witness. 22. However, when the Court has to appreciate the evidence of any interested witness it has to be very cautious in weighing their evidence or in other words, the evidence of an interested witness requires a scrutiny with utmost care and caution. The Court is required to address itself whether there are any infirmities in the evidence of such a witness; whether the evidence is reliable, trustworthy and inspires the confidence of the Court. Another important aspect to be considered while analyzing the evidence of interested witness is whether the genesis of the crime unfolded by such evidence is probable or not. If the evidence of any interested witness/relative on a careful scrutiny by the Court is found to be consistent and trustworthy, free from infirmities or any embellishment that inspires the confidence of the Court, there is no reason not to place reliance on the same.” 7.1 Ms. Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the accused deserves to be convicted and punished for the alleged offence and the impugned judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 9. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 9. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 10. This court has considered the submissions canvassed by learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State of Gujarat and gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution before the trial Court and also gone through the record and proceedings of the case. Now, the issues that (i) whether the reasons stated for commission of the crime in question is fallen under the provisions of Section 306 of the IPC and whether it can be said that the case is for instigation and for which all the accused are abetting in the crime in question; (ii) whether it can be said that it is a case of abetment in question. It is is required to be considered that whether in the facts of the case the presumption is drawn under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act; whether the prosecution proves the fact beyond reasonable doubt for the above stated reasons. 11. It is is required to be considered that whether in the facts of the case the presumption is drawn under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act; whether the prosecution proves the fact beyond reasonable doubt for the above stated reasons. 11. On perusal of the material on record, it appears that on 23.03.2008, the deceased along with her husband visited the parental house where they stayed for a period of four days where she has informed that her husband has not relieved her ornaments pledged by the husband. However, the deceased returned with her husband at matrimonial home and after reaching the deceased informed her mother by making telephone call. But no any detail was collected by the Investigating Officer with regard to the talk of telephone call between the deceased and the her mother and no investigation was carried out on this aspect by the Investigating Officer. The accused No. 1 has immediately informed the concerned Village Surpanch of Pisoi and in his presence, when accused No. 1 found that his wife has committed suicide in his presence, he immediately informed the concerned Police Station and the same was registered as accidental and the Entry No. 8 of 2008 as A.D. In presence of the father along with other family members, the dead-body was pulled out from the well then the panchnama was drawn at that time, neither the complainant nor any family members have raised any grievance nor they have lodged any complaint to the concerned Police Officers who remained present at the time of pulling out the deadbody of the well. Even the Police Officers were present through out, however, they have not raised any dispute or complaint and on the next day after about 12.30 hours the complainant lodged the complaint wherein he has categorically stated that there was dispute between the husband and wife with regard to pledging the ornaments except this version, no any other details mentioned. Considering the oral evidence of the complainant, it appears that there is nothing incriminating against the accused which lead that the accused have instigated the deceased to commit suicide and abetted in the alleged crime in question. Considering the oral evidence of the complainant, it appears that there is nothing incriminating against the accused which lead that the accused have instigated the deceased to commit suicide and abetted in the alleged crime in question. On perusal of the evidence of the mother, sisters and other family members of the deceased, it appears that these witnesses have examined, but they have not supported the case of the prosecution and have not stated any adverse against the accused. It is to be noted that though the incident took place at Village: Pisoi and in presence of Surpanch and independent witnesses the dead body was pulled out from the well, none of the persons of the statements have been recorded by the Investigating Officer and neither they have cited as witnesses. Considering the cross-examination of the father of the deceased, it appears that he has stated on suspicion, he filed the complaint, but there was no concrete material was produced by the prosecution to establish that all the accused were abetted in the alleged offence and the alleged offence is led to draw presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. 12. At this juncture, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court which is referred and relied upon by the trial Court is relevant to refer herein again in the case of Rajesh @ Rameshbhai Makwana Vs. State of Gujarat, 2009 (1) GCD 753 . In the said case, the marrriage span was less than seven years provision of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act could not be resorted to. The Division Bench of this Court has held and observed in Para-9 as under: “9. The second fold of arguments by learned A.P.P. was that the marriage span was of six months only and, therefore, Section 113A of the Evidence Act would come into play. As discussed earlier, evidence in the form of oral dying declaration is not an aspect to show any cruelty. Heavy reliance is sought to be placed by the prosecution on the evidence of Bhikhabhai, his wife Niruben and Bhikhabhai's cousin Pravinbhai. 9.1 If the evidence of Bhikhabhai is seen, he relies on what is claimed to have been stated by the deceased to Niruben. He states that Niruben was informed by the deceased that the appellant was talking to Gitaben and because of that, he caused cruelty or harassment to the deceased. 9.1 If the evidence of Bhikhabhai is seen, he relies on what is claimed to have been stated by the deceased to Niruben. He states that Niruben was informed by the deceased that the appellant was talking to Gitaben and because of that, he caused cruelty or harassment to the deceased. Bhikhabhai admits that he never knew about this till the previous day of the incident i.e. 8.10.2001. Contrary to this, his cousin Pravinbhai says that he came to know about the appellant having illicit relation with Gitaben about a month prior to the incident and he had gone to Ramnagar and rebuked the appellant, and the appellant had assured that it would not recur. Bhikhabhai's wife Niruben says that the deceased used to tell her about the appellant having illicit relations with Gitaben. However, the language used is of the appellant talking to Gitaben. She further says that when the appellant came to her house, she talked to him and he said that it would not happen again.” 13. In the form of lodging the case is admitted by the father. This aspect is viewed with the fact that though the complainant was present at the time when the dead body was taken out from the well in presence of the police officer and at the time of cremation, all the relatives of the deceased were present and in presence of the police, the complainant has not made any complaint with regard to ill-treatment or torture or dispute between the husband and wife or any family members on account of pledging of the ornaments meted out to the deceased or any illiterate material brought by the prosecution in this aspect. Therefore, the trial Court has not committed any error in appreciating the evidence of the witnesses while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 14. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 . The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa (supra) reads as under: “The following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge. (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 15. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decisions has held and observed in paragraphs No. 22 to 30 as under: “22. In Atley vs. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , the approach of the appellate court while considering a judgment of acquittal was discussed and it was observed that unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the acquittal was perverse, it could not set aside the same. To a similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking through Subba Rao J., (as His Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 (Sanwat Singh case, AIR pp 719-20 Para 9): “9. To a similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking through Subba Rao J., (as His Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 (Sanwat Singh case, AIR pp 719-20 Para 9): “9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case disposing of such an appeal and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as (i) substantial and compelling reasons, (ii) good and sufficiently cogent reasons and (iii) strong reasons are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.” The need for the aforesaid observations arose on account of observations of the majority in Aher Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 which stated that for the High Court to take a different view on the evidence “there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.” 23. M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was). This Court observed that the approach of the High Court (appellate court) in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial.” 24. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows: (SCC p.799, Para 6) “6.......In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows: (SCC p.799, Para 6) “6.......In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.” 25. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 , spoke about the approach of the appellate court while considering an appeal against an order acquitting the accused and stated as follows: (SCC p.229, Para 7) “7.......While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.” The object and the purpose of the aforesaid approach is to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice. In another words, there should not be an acquittal of the guilty or a conviction of an innocent person. 26. In Ajit Savant Majagvai vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110 , this Court set out the following principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court: (SCC pp. 116-117, Para 16) “16. This Court has thus explicitly and clearly laid down the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court. These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as under: (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as under: (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. (2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse. (3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. (4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness box. (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.” 27. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 observed vis-a-vis the powers of an appellate court while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, as under: (SCC p.229, Para 7) “7....While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.” 28. This Court in Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , highlighted that there is one significant difference in exercising power while hearing an appeal against acquittal by the appellate court. The appellate court would not interfere where the judgment impugned is based on evidence and the view taken was reasonable and plausible. This is because the appellate court will determine the fact that there is presumption in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of doubt but if it decides to interfere it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of acquittal. 30. In Nepal Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2009) 12 SCC 351 , this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court which had set aside the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court and restored the judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused on reappreciation of the evidence. 16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 : (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-37 to 40 as under: 37. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. as follows: “8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court. 17. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, it clearly transpires that the Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence threadbare and has not committed any error of facts and law in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. The impugned judgment and order is not perverse one and the same is sustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned judgment and order does not warrant any interference at the ends of this Court. This Court is in complete agreement with the reasoning and ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order does not warrant any interference at the ends of this Court. This Court is in complete agreement with the reasoning and ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 01.10.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Dahod in Sessions Case No. 163 of 2008 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.