JUDGMENT : N. NAGARESH, J. 1. These writ petitions are filed by petitioners who are in possession of rooms/shop-rooms of a commercial building. They are aggrieved by the proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent-Catholic Syrian Bank to take over physical possession of the premises invoking the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, as the borrower-landlord failed to discharge his debt due to the Bank. 2. The facts involved in both these writ petitions are more or less identical and the disputed property is of the 4th respondent in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 (the 3rd respondent in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023). The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 states that his father Kurian Mani took a property on ground rent in the year 1953 from one Mr. Jacob Kurian and Mrs. Mariamma. Father of the petitioner constructed a building in the property and the building is used for various commercial activities. Legal heirs of late Kurian Mani released their rights in favour of the petitioner and thereafter the petitioner is conducting a Hotel in the property. 3. The petitioner states that in the year 2008, by a registered Sale Deed, the 4th respondent purchased the property along with tenanted premises from its prior owners. In the year 2012, the 4th respondent filed Ext.P3 RCOP No. 13/2012 in the Rent Control Court, Kottayam seeking to evict the petitioner. In Ext.P3 RCOP, the 4th respondent admitted that tenancy of the petitioner started in the year 1966. The RCOP was dismissed by the Rent Control Court as per Ext.P4 order dated 10.02.2014. 4. However, in RCA No. 10/2014 filed by the 4th respondent in the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-II, Kottayam, the appellate court set aside the order of the Rent Control Court and ordered eviction of the petitioner, as per Ext.P5 judgment. The petitioner has filed RC Rev. No. 135/2019 before this Court and this Court has stayed further proceedings in the execution petition as per Ext.P6 order dated 23.09.2022. 5. It is seen that in the years 2014 and 2019, the 4th respondent had mortgaged the property to the 1st respondent-Bank and obtained financial advances. The petitioner has filed RC Rev. No. 135/2019 before this Court and this Court has stayed further proceedings in the execution petition as per Ext.P6 order dated 23.09.2022. 5. It is seen that in the years 2014 and 2019, the 4th respondent had mortgaged the property to the 1st respondent-Bank and obtained financial advances. On the failure of the 4th respondent to discharge his debts, the 1st respondent-Bank initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the SARFAESI Act”). 6. The petitioner states that suppressing the possession of the property by the petitioner, the Bank moved a petition in the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kottayam under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act seeking assistance to take over physical possession of the property. The Chief Judicial Magistrate appointed an Advocate Commissioner for taking possession of the property from the 4th respondent. After obtaining Section 14 order, the Bank officials required the petitioner to stop conducting Hotel and to vacate the premises. 7. The petitioner filed SA No. 327/2023 in the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam against the move of the Bank. According to the petitioner, when the case came up for consideration before the Tribunal on 03.07.2023, the Presiding Officer observed that as per Section 17(1), only a persons aggrieved by a proceeding under Section 13(4) can file a petition under Section 17(1). Since no proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner under Section 13(4), maintainability of SA No. 327/2023 is doubtful. The case was adjourned to 11.08.2023. 8. In the circumstances, under the threat of eviction, the petitioner filed Ext.P8 OS No. 368/2023 in the Additional Munsiff's Court, Kottayam seeking to restrain the defendants including the 1st defendant-Bank. By Ext.P9 order dated 10.07.2023, the Munsiff's Court passed Ext.P9 ad interim injunction against the Bank restraining the Bank from forcefully evicting the petitioner from the building otherwise than under due process of law. Ext.P9 order was passed on 10.07.2023. The petitioner on 24.07.2023, filed a petition for advancing MC proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kottayam. The petitioner submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate that he is conducting a Hotel and he is residing in the property. However, the Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the said petition on 26.07.2023 as per Ext.P13 holding that the Debts Recovery Tribunal alone is having jurisdiction in the matter. 9. The petitioner submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate that he is conducting a Hotel and he is residing in the property. However, the Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the said petition on 26.07.2023 as per Ext.P13 holding that the Debts Recovery Tribunal alone is having jurisdiction in the matter. 9. To the predicament of the petitioner, the Advocate Commissioner evicted the petitioner and his family from the residence and the Hotel on 26.07.2023 itself and handed over possession of the property to the Bank. The petitioner states that the entire proceedings of eviction carried out by the 3rd respondent-Bank is in violation of due process of law and not in accordance with the procedure established by law. 10. The counsel for the petitioner argued that the tenancy in favour of the petitioner was created in the year 1953. Even the 4th respondent has stated in the RCOP that the tenancy was created in the year 1966. The 4th respondent purchased the property only in the year 2008. Security interest in respect of the property in favour of the Bank, was created only in the year 2014. It is therefore evident that tenancy in favour of the petitioner was in existence much before creation of security interest in favour of the Bank. 11. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the possession of the building by the petitioner is open and demonstrative. Respondents 1 to 3 were aware of the possession of the property by the petitioner. In fact, they came to the Hotel on 15.06.2023 and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises. However, in Section 14 proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the affidavit filed by them, the Bank did not reveal existence of tenancy. An order appointing Advocate Commissioner was obtained without revealing true facts and misleading the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 12. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal vs. Central Bank of India and Another, 2019 KHC 6899, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that rights of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act will not override the right of a tenant whose tenancy is created prior to the creation of security interest. 13. 12. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal vs. Central Bank of India and Another, 2019 KHC 6899, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that rights of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act will not override the right of a tenant whose tenancy is created prior to the creation of security interest. 13. The petitioner urged that though no registered lease deed was executed between the petitioner and the landlord, the petitioner is a statutory tenant as defined under Section 2(6)(ii) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the RC Act”). The status of the petitioner as statutory tenant is supported by the judgment of this Court in Vasu v. Kallianikutty Amma [ 1982 KLT 53 ]. 14. The counsel for the petitioner argued that though the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra) has held that to avoid SARFAESI proceedings, the tenancy should be created by a registered lease agreement, the Apex Court has not considered the rights of statutory tenants in the said judgment. A case of statutory tenancy can be validly raised as a defence by a tenant to keep his possession against the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. 15. As regards the proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kottayam, the petitioner asserted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate ought not have allowed the CMP without issuing notice to the petitioner. In the judgment in Balkrishna Rama Tarle Dead through Legal Representatives and Another vs. Phoenix ARC Private Limited and Others, 2022 KHC 7020, the Apex Court has held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has to give a notice and opportunity of hearing to the persons possessing the secured assets claiming to be a class (1) or (2) lessee of mortgagor/borrower, as well as to the secured creditor, consistent with the principles of natural justice and then take a decision. Ext.P13 order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is therefore liable to be set aside, contended the counsel for the petitioner. 16. Respondents 1 to 3 opposed the writ petition. The respondents submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable and any action challenging SARFAESI proceedings can be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal alone. Ext.P13 order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is therefore liable to be set aside, contended the counsel for the petitioner. 16. Respondents 1 to 3 opposed the writ petition. The respondents submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable and any action challenging SARFAESI proceedings can be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal alone. The respondents relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 . The respondents also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Phoenix ARC Private Limited vs. Viswa Bharathi Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345 . 17. The respondents pointed out that the petitioner has approached this Court claiming to be a statutory tenant under the RC Act. However, in RCOP No. 13/2012 filed by the landlord, the petitioner specifically denied any landlord- tenant relationship. The specific case of the petitioner before the Rent Control Court was that they paid ground rent to the predecessors of the 4th respondent and thereafter constructed the building on their own before 20.05.1967. The petitioner claimed fixity of tenure under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The petitioner has taken a diametrically opposite stand in this writ petition. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in The Joint Action Committee of Airlines Pilots Associations of India and Others vs. The Director General of Civil Aviation and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 435 , the counsel for respondents 1 to 3 asserted that the petitioner cannot be permitted to aprobate and reprobate. 18. On behalf of the respondents, it is stated that if the claim of the petitioner is to be considered by this Court as that of a tenant, then the lease has been terminated by the 4th respondent-landlord under Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, as a registered lawyer notice was issued to the petitioner on 02.01.2012. The petitioner has been holding the secured asset as tenant-in-sufferance, who is not entitled to the protection available to the tenants under the RC Act, in SARFAESI proceedings. 19. The respondents alleged that the petitioner is resorting to forum shopping and has already approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the Munsiff's Court and now this Court. The petitioner has been holding the secured asset as tenant-in-sufferance, who is not entitled to the protection available to the tenants under the RC Act, in SARFAESI proceedings. 19. The respondents alleged that the petitioner is resorting to forum shopping and has already approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the Munsiff's Court and now this Court. The respondents reiterated that as on the date of creation of mortgage, there was no valid lease in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner can only be treated as tenant-insufferance, who is not entitled to any protection under the tenancy laws. 20. The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 stated that he is in possession and enjoyment of a shop building since the year 1950. The petitioner's father was conducting a small business in sale of tea. After the demise of the father, the petitioner is continuing the business. In the year 2012, the 3rd respondent (who is the 4th respondent in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023) filed RCOP No. 14/2012 in the Rent Control Court, Kottayam. The Rent Control Petition was allowed as per Ext.P2 order. The petitioner filed appeal against Ext.P2 order. By Ext.P3 judgment, the appeal was dismissed. The petitioner thereupon filed Rent Control Revision before this Court. RC Rev. No. 234/2019 is pending. Ext.P4 interim order was granted by this Court in favour of the petitioner on 23.09.2022. 21. However, on 26.05.2023, the Bank officials came to the tenanted premises and required the petitioner to vacate the building. The respondents had obtained orders from the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court for evicting the petitioner. No notice of those proceedings was served on the petitioner. The petitioner therefore filed OS No. 365/2023 in the Munsiff's Court, Kottayam. By Ext.P5 order, the Munsiff's Court has granted ad interim injunction restraining the respondents from forcefully evicting the petitioner from the shop building. 22. However, on 21.07.2023, the Bank officials along with Advocate Commissioner came to the petitioner's shop building to take over possession, though they left then for the time being. The petitioner filed a petition before the Chief Judicial Magistrate to stop the Advocate Commissioner from taking over possession of the premises. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, however, dismissed the petition on 26.07.2023 as per Ext.P8 order. The petitioner was forcefully evicted from the shop building on 26.07.2023 itself. 23. The petitioner filed a petition before the Chief Judicial Magistrate to stop the Advocate Commissioner from taking over possession of the premises. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, however, dismissed the petition on 26.07.2023 as per Ext.P8 order. The petitioner was forcefully evicted from the shop building on 26.07.2023 itself. 23. The petitioner states that Ext.P8 order and consequential Exts.P9 and P10 orders are illegal and unsustainable. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that tenants in possession of premises over which security interest as defined in SARFAESI Act is created after the tenancy is created, cannot be ousted from possession or evicted from the premises, without the tenancy being duly determined in law. 24. In any view of the matter, when a competent civil court had passed Ext.P5 ad interim order, eviction of the petitioner from the shop building has the effect of scuttling Ext.P5 order. In the facts of the case, the respondents are compellable to restore possession of the shoproom to the petitioner immediately. 25. Respondents 1 and 2 filed counter affidavit and resisted the writ petition. Respondents 1 and 2 took up the defence similar to one taken against the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023. 26. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Bank and the learned Government Pleader representing the State-respondents. 27. The petitioners, who are claiming to be tenants in possession, were in actual possession of the building for more than 50 years. In the Rent Control Case filed by the 4th respondent-landlord in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023, the 4th respondent has stated that the tenancy of the building started from the year 1966. The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 claims that he was in possession since the year 1950. The landlord in RCOP has admitted that father of the petitioner had taken the building on rent in the year 1966. The 4th respondent- landlord admittedly purchased the property only in the year 2008. 28. The landlord in the year 2012 instituted RCOP No. 13/2012 against the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 and RCOP No. 14/2012 against the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023, in the Munsiff's Court, Kottayam. Subsequent to the filing of RCOP, the landlord mortgaged the property to the 1st respondent-Bank during the years 2014 and 2019. 28. The landlord in the year 2012 instituted RCOP No. 13/2012 against the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 and RCOP No. 14/2012 against the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023, in the Munsiff's Court, Kottayam. Subsequent to the filing of RCOP, the landlord mortgaged the property to the 1st respondent-Bank during the years 2014 and 2019. On the failure of the borrower-landlord to clear dues towards loan account, the Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and now the petitioners stand evicted from their premises. 29. When the Bank obtained orders under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act for evicting the petitioner, the petitioner (in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023) filed SA No. 327/2023 in the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It is the case of the petitioner that the Debts Recovery Tribunal observed that the SA is not maintainable and adjourned the SA to 11.08.2023. Immediately, the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 filed OS No. 368/2023 and obtained Ext.P9 interim injunction order dated 10.07.2023 from the Munsiff's Court restraining the Bank from forcefully evicting the petitioner from injunction scheduled building otherwise than following due process of law. In spite of the injunction order, the petitioner was evicted by the Advocate Commissioner on 26.07.2023. The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 also was evicted from the building, in spite of him also obtaining an interim injunction from civil court. 30. Whether the petitioners can be evicted from the tenanted premises without due notice and if the eviction is illegal and without due notice, can the petitioners be put back into possession of the tenanted premises, by orders in these writ petitions? The right of the tenants of buildings subjected to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments. The SARFAESI Act itself was amended with effect from 01.09.2016 by inserting sub-section (4-A) in Section 17, enabling the tenants to raise their claims before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Section 17(4-A) reads as follows: (4-A) Where: (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy: (a) has expired or stood determined. (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882). (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage. (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 31. In Harshad Govardhan Sondagar and Others vs. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited and Others, (2014) 6 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in cases where before the mortgage is created, the borrower had already leased out the immovable property in favour of a lessee, then the lessee will have the right to enjoy the leased property in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease. The Apex Court held that where lawful possession of the secured assets is not with the borrower but with the lessee under a valid lease, the secured creditor cannot take over possession of the secured asset until the lawful possession of the lessee gets determined. The Apex Court further held that so long as lease of an immovable property does not get determined, the lessee has a right to enjoy the property and this right is a right to property and cannot be taken away without the authority of law as provided in Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 32. In Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supra), the Apex Court further held that possession of the secured asset from a lessee in lawful possession under a valid lease is not required to be taken under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate does not have any power under Section 14 to take possession of the secured asset from such a lessee and handover the same to the secured creditor. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate does not have any power under Section 14 to take possession of the secured asset from such a lessee and handover the same to the secured creditor. The Apex Court held that when a secured creditor moves the Magistrate for assistance to take possession of the secured asset, he must state in the affidavit accompanying the application that the secured asset is not in possession of the lessee under the valid lease made prior to creation of mortgage or made in accordance with Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act prior to receipt of a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act by the borrower. The Apex Court held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has powers to restore possession of the secured assets to the borrower only and not to any person such as lessee. 33. The Apex Court considered the rights of tenants under Rent Control laws in the context of the SARFAESI Act in Vishal N. Kalsaria vs. Bank of India and Others, (2016) 3 SCC 762 . The Apex Court held that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act will not override the provisions of the Rent Control Acts. Once tenancy is created, a tenant can be evicted only after following the due process of law, as prescribed under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The Apex Court held that Section 35 non-obstante clause in the SARFAESI Act cannot be used to bulldoze the statutory rights vested on the tenants under the Rent Control Act. But, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court disagreed with the conclusion in Vishal N. Kalsaria (supra) as regards the restricted application of Section 35, in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra). 34. The judgments in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supra) and Vishal N. Kalsaria (supra) were pronounced prior to the amendment to Section 17 inserting sub-section (4-A). The Hon’ble Apex Court considered the issues again in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra). The Apex Court analysed the interface of the SARFAESI Act and the Rent Control Acts and held as follows: (a) If a valid tenancy under law is in existence even prior to the creation of the mortgage, the tenant's possession cannot be disturbed by the secured creditor by taking possession of the property. The lease has to be determined in accordance with Section 111 of the TP Act for determination of leases. The lease has to be determined in accordance with Section 111 of the TP Act for determination of leases. As the existence of a prior existing lease inevitably affects the risk undertaken by the bank while providing the loan, it is expected of Banks/Creditors to have conducted a standard due diligence in this regard. Where the bank has proceeded to accept such a property as mortgage, it will be presumed that it has consented to the risk that comes as a consequence of the existing tenancy. In such a situation, the rights of a rightful tenant cannot be compromised under the SARFAESI Act proceedings. (b) If a tenancy under law comes into existence after the creation of a mortgage, but prior to the issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, it has to satisfy the conditions of Section 65-A of the T.P. Act. (c) In any case, if any of the tenants claim that he is entitled to possession of a secured asset for a term of more than a year, it has to be supported by the execution of a registered instrument. In the absence of a registered instrument, if the tenant relies on an unregistered instrument or an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession, the tenant is not entitled to possession of the secured asset for more than the period prescribed Under Section 107 of the T.P. Act. 35. In the facts of that case, in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra), the Apex Court held that the bona fide of the tenants therein is highly doubtful and that the tenancy created under an oral agreement results in a fresh tenancy after the expiry of statutory period fixed under the Transfer of Property Act. The Apex Court further held that the operation of Rent Control Act cannot be extended to a “tenant-in-sufferance” vis-a-vis the SARFAESI Act. 36. The question whether a Magistrate exercising powers under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act has adjudicatory powers, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Balkrishna Rama Tarle Dead Through Legal Representatives (supra). The Apex Court held that the powers exercisable by CMM/DM under Section 14 are ministerial steps and Section 14 does not involve any adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrower against the secured creditor taking possession of the secured assets. The Apex Court held that the powers exercisable by CMM/DM under Section 14 are ministerial steps and Section 14 does not involve any adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrower against the secured creditor taking possession of the secured assets. The Magistrate is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the borrower and the secured creditor and/or between any other third party and the secured creditor with respect to the secured assets and the aggrieved party should be relegated to raise objections in the proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 37. Going by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the afore judgments, a tenant in possession of a secured asset on the basis of a valid tenancy, cannot be dispossessed invoking Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, if the tenancy is valid. The Apex Court in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra), distinguished the implication of a registered and unregistered instrument/oral agreement and held that if any of the tenants claim that they are entitled to possession of a secured asset for any term exceeding one year from the date of the lease made in his favour, he has to produce proof of execution of a registered instrument in his favour by the lessor. Where he does not produce proof of execution of a registered instrument in his favour and instead relies on an unregistered instrument or oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession, the Magistrate will have to come to the conclusion that he is not entitled to possession of the secured asset for more than a year from the date of the instrument or from the date of delivery of possession in his favour by the landlord. 38. In the case of the petitioners, there is no dispute that tenancy was not created by a registered instrument. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument and all other leases of immovable property may be made either by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. 39. 39. Going by the law laid down by the Apex Court in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supra) and Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra), there having no registered instrument, the petitioners in these writ petitions will have to be treated as tenant-in-sufferance. However, it is to be kept in mind that the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered those issues taking note of general principles of Rent Acts. The Apex Court has also held in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra) that tenancy rights under the Rent Act has to be protected in appropriate cases. Based on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter, now I shall consider the issues in these writ petitions. 40. In both the writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kottayam under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. The petitioners would argue that though the petitioners approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court seeking not to evict the petitioners from the property, the Chief Judicial Magistrate has rejected their request. 41. In Ext.P13 order dated 26.07.2023, the Chief Judicial Magistrate found that under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court has limited power under Section 14 and the Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties or persons claiming under them. Even as tenants, the petitioners can be treated as persons claiming under the borrower landlord only and therefore their rights over the building cannot be adjudicated by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 42. Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act provides that the secured creditor may for the purpose of taking possession of the secured asset, request the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate concerned, to take possession of the property. On such request, the District Magistrate shall take possession of such asset and documents and forward such asset and document to the secured creditor. A reading of Section 14 would indicate that the power exercised by the District Magistrate is only ministerial in nature. 43. On such request, the District Magistrate shall take possession of such asset and documents and forward such asset and document to the secured creditor. A reading of Section 14 would indicate that the power exercised by the District Magistrate is only ministerial in nature. 43. In Balkrishna Rama Tarle Dead Through Legal Representatives (supra), the Apex Court considered the powers of the Magistrate under Section 14 and held that the Magistrate is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the borrower and the secured creditor and/or between any other third party and the secured creditor with respect to the secured asset and the aggrieved party should be relegated to raise objections in the proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 44. Hence, it has to be held that a Chief Judicial Magistrate exercising powers under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is not required to adjudicate the dispute between a tenant and the borrower-landlord or between the tenant and the secured creditor. The remedy available to a tenant in possession of secured asset against Section 14 proceedings, is to approach Debts Recovery Tribunal. The challenge against the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kottayam made by the petitioners therefore fails. 45. The next issue to be considered is whether the petitioners are tenants entitled to protection from SARFAESI proceedings. If the petitioners are treated as tenants, then the question of conflicting rights of the secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act and the tenants under the RC Act will arise. 46. In W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023, the petitioner claims that the petitioner's father had taken the property on ground rent from the then owners of the property and constructed a building therein, which after his death is occupied and used by the petitioner now. The petitioner claims that he is now tenant of the building. At the same time, in RC Rev. No. 135/2019, the petitioner has denied the title of the building of the 4th respondent-landlord. In W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023, the petitioner therein has stated that his father has been in possession and enjoyment of the property on his own, openly and continuously and without interruption. 47. At the same time, in RC Rev. No. 135/2019, the petitioner has denied the title of the building of the 4th respondent-landlord. In W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023, the petitioner therein has stated that his father has been in possession and enjoyment of the property on his own, openly and continuously and without interruption. 47. However, the Rent Control Court in RCOP No. 13/2012 (relating to the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023) found that the materials available are insufficient to decide the dispute between the parties and that a full-fledged trial is inevitable to decide the dispute. The contention raised by the petitioner (in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023) with respect to fixity of tenure is not a mere contention to take the dispute to a civil court. The Rent Control Court held that the parties must approach civil court for settling their dispute. 48. In RCOP No. 14/2012 relating to the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023, the Rent Control Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner is a tenant and consequently, ordered eviction. 49. Both the afore orders were challenged before the Court of Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-II, Kottayam and the Rent Control Appellate Authority, as per common judgment dated 29.10.2018, came to the conclusion that the petitioners in these writ petitions failed to discharge their burden to prove their claim of permanent tenancy. Consequently, the Rent Control Appellate Authority directed the petitioners to surrender vacant possession of petition schedule building to the landlord. The said common judgment dated 29.10.2018 is challenged before this Court in RC Rev. Nos.135/2019 and 234/2019. This Court has granted interim stay on execution proceedings. The question whether the petitioners are entitled to fixity of tenure or whether they are tenants, is yet to be finally adjudicated. 50. As on date, in view of the orders of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the petitioners are to be treated as tenants, because this Court has not stayed the operation of the common judgment of the appellate authority. If the petitioners are tenants governed by the RC Act, then question will arise as regards protection, if any, available to the petitioners under that Act. In fact, the issues involve interplay between three enactments, namely Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. 51. In fact, the issues involve interplay between three enactments, namely Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. 51. Chapter V, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 provides that in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year. A lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable by 15 days notice. In these writ petitions, the lease of immovable property is not for agricultural or manufacturing purpose. Therefore, in view of Section 106, the leases/tenancy of the petitioners should be deemed to be a lease from month to month. 52. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. In the present case, the lease is not by any registered instrument. Therefore, going by Section 106 and 107 of the Act, 1882, the leasehold right of the petitioners shall be deemed to be from month to month terminable on the part of lessor by 15 days notice. The owner of the property, the 4th respondent in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023, would assert that notice of termination of lease was given long back to the petitioners. 53. Even if a lease is terminated, if the lease is falling within the ambit of the RC Act, then eviction of the tenant from the tenanted premises can be only by resort to the provisions of the RC Act. Such eviction has to be on any of the grounds falling under Section 11. Section 11(1) states that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 54. Tenancy is strictly a matter of contract. Section 11(1) states that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 54. Tenancy is strictly a matter of contract. If it is for a term, it expires at the end of the term. If there is no agreed term, it can be terminated by due notice. When the tenancy is terminated by efflux of time or by notice, the landlord-tenant relationship ceases to exist. Section 2(6) of the RC Act defines a tenant so as to include a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. A tenant under the RC Act cannot be evicted from the building except under the provisions of the RC Act. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy, he continues to be a tenant for the purpose of the RC Act. He will continue to have the rights and obligations of a tenant as defined in the RC Act, in spite of the termination of his tenancy. It is this peculiar position of the tenant under the provisions of the statute which is described as statutory tenancy. 55. Section 11(15) of the RC Act provides that even where an eviction petition filed by the landlord is dismissed, the tenancy shall be deemed to continue on the same terms and conditions as before. The contractual tenancy will resurrect and the statutory tenancy will stand converted into the old contractual tenancy, when an eviction petition is dismissed. 56. In the judgment in Vasu (supra), this Court has held that the RC Act has to be construed without importing the technicalities of the Transfer of Property Act. There are many provisions in Act 2/65 which legal minds trained in the traditions of the Transfer of Property Act could not digest. The afore observation made by this Court with regard to the Transfer of Property Act vis-a-vis Rent Control Act is equally applicable to the SARFAESI Act vis-a-vis the RC Act. This Court held that even when a statutory tenancy is terminated, still the tenancy can continue under the RC Act in cases falling under Section 11(2)(c) of the RC Act. 57. This Court held that even when a statutory tenancy is terminated, still the tenancy can continue under the RC Act in cases falling under Section 11(2)(c) of the RC Act. 57. The question then is whether in view of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, the provisions of SARFAESI Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Though in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal (supra) the Apex Court has held that the non obstante clause Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be given restricted application, the Apex Court has also held in the same judgment that tenancy rights under the RC Act need to be protected in appropriate cases. Therefore, I hold that the petitioners who are in possession of the tenanted premises for more than 50 years, can be evicted only in compliance of the provisions of the RC Act. 58. If Section 11 of the RC Act applies to the writ petitioners, then question will arise whether a Bank which has a right to take over physical possession of the secured asset, which is a tenanted premises, can resort to the provisions of the RC Act for evicting the tenants occupying the secured asset. Section 2(3) of the RC Act defines the term “landlord” to include the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the buildings were let to a tenant. 59. Section 13 contained in Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act is relating to enforcement of security interest. Sub-section (4)(d) of Section 13 provides that in case the borrower fails to discharge his liability within the period specified in Section 13(2), then the secured creditor may require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. Therefore, a Bank or financial institution resorting to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act can be treated as “landlord” for the purpose of the RC Act since the Bank/financial institution is entitled to receive the rent of a building, which is a secured asset. The Bank can therefore very well resort to the RC Act for eviction of tenants from secured assets. 60. The forum competent to decide the legal issues arising from proceedings under the SARFAESI Act is the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Under Section 17(4-A)(i)(a), the Debts Recovery Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine whether a lease or a tenancy has expired or stood determined. Under Section 17(4-A)(ii), where the Debts Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold right claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of Clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debts Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The power so conferred on the Debts Recovery Tribunal should necessarily include power to decide the status of a tenant under the RC Act also. If the Tribunal finds that the lease or tenancy is one falling within the ambit of the RC Act, the Tribunal necessarily has to relegate the parties to the Rent Control Court, for eviction of a tenant. 61. The question then arises as to the interim arrangement to be made in this case as regards possession of the secured assets. It is not disputed that the petitioners in both the writ petitions or their predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the secured assets at least since the year 1966. They have been conducting business in the premises for long. When the Bank took steps to take over possession of the tenanted premises, the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 moved the Debts Recovery Tribunal filing SA No. 327/2023. As the Tribunal expressed doubts regarding maintainability of the SA, the petitioners approached the Additional Munsiff's Court, Kottayam, where they were successful in obtaining interim injunction orders. The Bank was a party to both the original suits. As the Tribunal expressed doubts regarding maintainability of the SA, the petitioners approached the Additional Munsiff's Court, Kottayam, where they were successful in obtaining interim injunction orders. The Bank was a party to both the original suits. It is when the orders of the Additional Munsiff's Court were in force that the Bank has evicted the petitioners and took possession of the building invoking Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. It is also relevant that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supra) has held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no power to restore possession to anyone other than borrower. In the totality of the facts of the case, I am of the view that the petitioners should be put back to possession of the building pending adjudication of the rights of the petitioners by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 62. In view of my findings made hereinabove, the writ petitions are disposed of as follows: (i) The challenge made by the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 against Ext.P13 order dated 26.07.2023 in CMP No. 2338/2023 in MC No. 22/2022 and the challenge made by the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 against Ext.P8 order dated 26.07.2023 in CMP No. 2338/2023 in MC No. 22/2022 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kottayam, fail. (ii) W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 is disposed of directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam to consider and dispose of SA No. 327/2023 expeditiously on merits. (iii) W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 is disposed of directing the petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal filing SA under Section 17 for redressal of his grievances within a period of two weeks. If the petitioner moves the Debts Recovery Tribunal within a period of two weeks, then the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall condone the period during which the petitioner has been prosecuting W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 before this Court and consider the SA on merits. (iv) The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 25857/2023 shall be put in possession of the tenanted premises in question forthwith, subject to the final decision of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (v) The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 26154/2023 shall be put in possession of the tenanted premises if and when the petitioner files SA before the Debts Recovery Tribunal as permitted above.