JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL) 1. There is a sick note of one of the learned advocates appearing for appellant no. 1.4. The other appellants are represented by Mr. D.K. Puj, learned advocate and other advocates. There is no reason to adjourn the matter as the appellants have common interest and are represented by other advocates. 2. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in allowing the Special Civil Application No. 16224 of 2014, setting aside the order dated 10.09.2014, holding that the application filed by the respondents, viz. the appellants herein for mutating their names as heirs of the original tenant was nothing but a gross misuse of process of law. 3. The respondent no.1 viz. the Mamlatdar & ALT, Dahod had allowed the said application misusing his power under the guise that the revenue court had not passed any order for deleting the names of the predecessor of the respondents from the revenue record. It has been held by the learned Single Judge that the impugned order passed by the Mamlatdar is not only in utter disregard of the provisions of the Revenue Act but is also in utter disregard of the order passed by the Apex Court. The Mamlatdar had tried to overreach the order of the Apex Court by passing the impugned order for which serious note has been taken by the learned Single Judge. It was held that the rights of the parties stood determined and concluded by the Apex Court and it was not open for the original respondents no.3 to 8 to reagitate their claim for tenancy rights. It was also noted that the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the Mamlatdar for passing an illegal order overreaching the judgment of the Apex Court. 4. As noted by the learned Single Judge, this case has a checkered history. The land bearing Survey no. 533, subject matter of dispute, was sold out to two persons namely, Chottalal Mansukhlal and Punamchand Shivlal Modhia on 25.02.1939 by the original owner, viz. Modia Mansukhlal Raiji. Mr. Punamchand Shivlal Modia, after payment of full sale consideration, thereafter, sold the land to Nayak Mansingji Mokamji. The original owner Mansukhlal died leaving behind his daughter Bai Punji as his legal heir. Modia Mansukhlal Raiji. Mr. Punamchand Shivlal Modia, after payment of full sale consideration, thereafter, sold the land to Nayak Mansingji Mokamji. The original owner Mansukhlal died leaving behind his daughter Bai Punji as his legal heir. It seems that the sale price was not paid at the time of sale and as such the daughter of the original owner Bai Punji instituted a suit against Chhotalal, one of the purchasers for the unpaid sale price. Chhotalal also instituted suit bearing No. 2 of 1942 for possession of the land against Bai Punji, Mansukhlal Raiji, Nayak Mansingji, Punamchand and also the tenants who were in actual possession of the said land. The tenants were arraigned as defendants no.4 to 15 in the said suit including the predecessor of the original respondents no.3 to 8. The Suit no. 2 of 1942 filed by Chhotalal was decreed on 10.08.1943 declaring that Chhotalal and Punamchand were entitled to recover the possession of the land. 5. It seems that two appeals being Nos. 310 of 1843 and 317 of 1943 were filed by Bai Punji and Nayak Mansingji but no appeal was preferred by the alleged tenants namely, the predecessor in interest of the original respondents no.3 to 8. The decree was modified by this Court to the extent that the possession of half of the land was given to Chhotalal on payment of Rs.5000/- to Bai Punji. The decree holder Chhotalal filed Execution Case No. 2 of 1948 wherein the Court directed the Collector to partition the property. On the matter being taken to the High Court, the executing Court on 20.03.1958 passed an order directing that the actual physical possession be delivered to Chhotalal. The said order was challenged in appeal filed by the predecessor in interest of the original respondent no.3 before the Writ court and the same was dismissed. 6. The matter travelled to the Apex Court. The said order was challenged in appeal filed by the predecessor in interest of the original respondent no.3 before the Writ court and the same was dismissed. 6. The matter travelled to the Apex Court. During the pendency of the Civil Appeal No. 316 of 1970 preferred by the predecessor in interest of respondent no.2 (before the Writ Court), a Suit bearing no.8 of 1967 was filed by Hussainbhai (predecessor in interest of respondent no.3) and others against Chhotalal for declaration being owners of the land in question under Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1947 as also for permanent injunction restraining Chhotalal from taking possession of the land from them pursuant to the decree passed in Suit no. 2 of 1942 on the ground that the said decree was nullity, inasmuch as, the plaintiff had acquired the tenancy rights as protected tenant under the Tenancy Act, 1948. The said suit came to be dismissed and the decree passed by the trial court has been affirmed in the Appeal by the High Court and later in Civil Appeal no. 317 of 1970 vide judgment and order dated 24.04.1973. While dismissing the said appeal, the Apex Court has held that the conclusion of the trial court and the High court that the appellants had not been in possession of the suit land as tenants was not open to challenge and their claim must fail. It was held that the decree in Suit no.2 of 1942 being lawful decree, not being nullity, the contention made on behalf of the appellants to seek protection against dispossession was not appreciable. It was further held that the order granting delivery of actual possession to the respondents decree holder was wholly justified. 7. It has come on record that the possession of the land was handed over to Chhotalal in the year 1977 after dismissal of Civil Appeals no. 316 of 1970 and 317 of 1970 vide judgment and order dated 24.04.1973. However, even after handing over possession of the land in question to Chhotalal, the original respondents no.3 to 8 filed Civil Suit no. 59 of 1977 for declaration and injunction. On the said suit being dismissed, first appeal was filed, which was also dismissed. 8. 316 of 1970 and 317 of 1970 vide judgment and order dated 24.04.1973. However, even after handing over possession of the land in question to Chhotalal, the original respondents no.3 to 8 filed Civil Suit no. 59 of 1977 for declaration and injunction. On the said suit being dismissed, first appeal was filed, which was also dismissed. 8. However, in the meantime, the original respondent no.6 Bai Bijli had trespassed in some portion of the land in question and had filed a Regular Civil Suit no.366 of 1978 for seeking possession of the suit land in which the decree was passed in favour of the original petitioners herein. The said suit, First appeal and Second appeal were dismissed and the petitioners herein had taken possession of the disputed portion of the land through the executing court. 9. Having lost in all the forums of the Civil Court, High Court and the Apex Court, in the proceedings drawn against and by the predecessors of the original respondents no.3 to 8 and against the said respondents itself, a Tenancy case no. 10 of 2010 was filed before the Mamlatdar seeking a declaration that the original respondents no.3 to 8 were tenants in respect of the land in question. It was dismissed vide order dated 07.09.2013 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Dahod and then Tenancy appeal no.20 of 2014 was filed before the Deputy Collector. During the pendency of the said appeal, another application was filed by the original respondents no.3 to 8 for mutation of their names in the revenue record and vide impugned order dated 10.09.2014, the Mamlatdar & ALT, Dahod passed an order for mutation of names of the original respondents no.3 to 8 in the revenue records. 10. As argued before the learned Single Judge, Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants has contended that inspite of having lost in the proceedings before the Civil court and the Apex Court, in the judgment and order dated 24.04.1973 in Civil Appeals no. 316 and 317 of 1970, the claim of the original respondents no.3 to 8/appellants herein under the Tenancy Act cannot be said to have been lost. There is a purchase certificate of the year 1962 in favour of the predecessor in interest of the appellants treating them as tenants of the land in question. 316 and 317 of 1970, the claim of the original respondents no.3 to 8/appellants herein under the Tenancy Act cannot be said to have been lost. There is a purchase certificate of the year 1962 in favour of the predecessor in interest of the appellants treating them as tenants of the land in question. The appellants having been recognised as protected tenants under Section 4A of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (in short as the "Tenancy Act' 1948") by way of purchase certificate of the year 1962 issued by the Collector, have a right to seek mutation of their names in the revenue records. In fact, the predecessor in interest of the appellants being tenant of the land in question and in admitted possession prior to the year 1939 would be deemed to be protected tenant under Section 3A read with Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 which was applicable in the area before creation of the State of Gujarat. 11. The contention, thus, is that the issuance of purchase certificate in the year 1962 under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act' 1948 acts as a recognition of the preexisting rights of the appellants. In the language of Section 3A of the Tenancy Act' 1948, there is a concept that the tenant shall be deemed to be a protected tenant and has right to be recorded as such in the record of rights. It is, thus, contended that admittedly the purchase certificate issued under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act' 1948 by the Collector has not been cancelled by any competent authority or court of law. The appellants may have failed in the civil court but that would not erase their right to be treated as protected tenants in view of the existence of the purchase certificate as a valid and legal document as on date. The proceeding to challenge the said certificate ought to have been initiated by the original petitioner, viz. the respondents herein. They cannot be allowed to ignore a valid certificate. 12. The proceeding to challenge the said certificate ought to have been initiated by the original petitioner, viz. the respondents herein. They cannot be allowed to ignore a valid certificate. 12. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Saraswatibai Trimbak Gaikwad v. Damodhar D. Motiwale [ (2002) 4 SCC 481 ] to substantiate the submission that so long as the certificate remains valid or in other words unless set aside, in view of the status of the appellants being deemed tenant under Section 4A of the Tenancy Act' 1948, the appellants, viz. original respondents no.3 to 8 cannot be deprived of their right to seek mutation and retain possession of the land in question. 13. Taking note of the above, suffice it to record from the fact that an eviction decree was passed as early as on 10.08.1943 in Suit no.2 of 1942 filed by Chhotalal wherein they were held entitled to recover possession of the land from the predecessor in interest of the appellants herein. It is evident that the right of the predecessor in interest of the appellants, viz. original respondents no.3 to 8 in the land in question had been extinguished, inasmuch as, in the subsequent proceeding before the higher courts, the decree dated 10.08.1943 had attained finality. Not only that, in the Execution case no. 2 of 1948, by order dated 20.03.1958, the executing court had directed the predecessor in interest of the appellants to hand over the possession of the land in question. The order passed by the executing court was subjected to challenge upto this Court and the challenge was upturned in the year 1966 with the dismissal of Letters Patent Appeal by the Division Bench. Having lost in two Civil Appeals no. 316 and 317 of 1970, the order of dismissal of the suit and the order passed by the executing court had attained finality, the observations wherein have been noted hereinbefore. There is no room for the appellants to bring a new challenge that too when the physical possession of the land in question had been handed over to Chhotalal, namely the original plaintiff in Suit no. 2 of 1942 pursuant to the decree dated 10.08.1943. 14. There is no room for the appellants to bring a new challenge that too when the physical possession of the land in question had been handed over to Chhotalal, namely the original plaintiff in Suit no. 2 of 1942 pursuant to the decree dated 10.08.1943. 14. It seems that after having lost in Execution case no.2 of 1948 dismissed vide order dated 20.03.1958, the predecessor in interest of original respondents no.3 to 8 had succeeded in obtaining a certificate under Section 32M under the Tenancy Act' 1948 from the Collector, which has led to a new round of litigation between the parties. 15. From the above, we may note that the submissions of learned Senior counsel for the appellants about the right of the appellants to seek mutation of their names in the revenue records based on the provisions of Section 3A, Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 and Section 4A of the Tenancy Act' 1948, are misconceived. The reason being that the predecessor in interest of the respondents no.3 to 8 have never been recognised as protected tenants within the meaning of Section 3A read with Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 prior to the eviction decree passed on 10.08.1943 in the Suit no.2 of 1942. In view of the admission of the original respondents no.3 to 8 that the said decree had attained finality in the proceedings drawn before the higher court by the predecessor of original respondents no.3 to 8, it is clear that the predecessor in interest of original respondents no.3 to 8 have been left with no right under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 and later under the Tenancy Act' 1948. The judgment and decree dated 10.08.1943 having attained finality, the right of the predecessor in interest of the original respondents no.3 to 8 in the land in question had been extinguished. All the arguments of learned Senior counsel for the appellants based on the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 and the Tenancy Act' 1948 referring to the above noted provisions are liable to be turned down. 16. As noted by the learned Single Judge, the litigation brought by the appellants herein-original respondents no.3 to 8 in the new round of litigation after the delivery of possession in the year 1977 and further by the application moved before the Mamlatdar in Ganot case no. 16. As noted by the learned Single Judge, the litigation brought by the appellants herein-original respondents no.3 to 8 in the new round of litigation after the delivery of possession in the year 1977 and further by the application moved before the Mamlatdar in Ganot case no. 10 of 2010 is nothing but grossest misuse and abuse of process of law as observed by the learned Single Judge. The proceedings which were initiated in the year 1942 has been dragged upto the year 2024 by filing one or the other application and instituting proceeding before the civil court and the revenue authorities. 17. For the above fact, we find it a fit case to impose cost while dismissing the appeal so as to send a message that courts of law are not meant for unscrupulous litigants. The present appeal is, thus, dismissed with a cost of Rs. 1 lakh, which shall be deposited by the appellants within a period of three weeks from today with the Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat. The cost amount shall be transmitted to the account of the High Court Legal Services Committee to be utilised for social cause such as providing financial assistance to child care institutions, etc. in the State. Connected Civil Application would not survive and stands disposed of, accordingly.