JUDGMENT : (Saral Srivastava, J.) 1. Heard Sri Ashish Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioners/landlords through the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have assailed the judgement and decree dated 23.07.2016 passed by Additional District Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Jhansi in S.C.C. Revision No.59 of 2014 (Smt. Madhu Agrawal Vs. Jitendra Seth) whereby the Revisional Court has dismissed the S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012 against the respondents/tenants. 3. The petitioners/landlords have instituted S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012 against the respondents/tenants for eviction in respect of one shop bearing Shop No.46/1 (Old No.39/10/6) (hereinafter referred to as 'suit property') on the ground of default of rent. It is further stated in the plaint that Provisions of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 are not applicable over the suit property. Paragraph no.2 of the plaint which contains the pleading about non-applicability of Provisions of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is reproduced herein-below:- 4. The respondents/tenants filed a written statement contending inter-alia that Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable on the suit property, and therefore, the suit before the Small Causes Court is not maintainable. 5. It transpires from the record that the petitioners/landlords had earlier instituted the proceeding under Section 21 (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 which was registered as P.A. Case No.65 of 2011, in which respondents/tenants filed written statement contending inter alia that the suit property had been constructed after 1985, therefore, the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable on the suit property. Paragraph no.19 of the written statement of the respondents/tenants in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 is reproduced herein-below:- 6. Since, the respondents/tenants had taken a plea of non-applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011, the petitioners/landlords got the P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 as withdrawn on 05.04.2012. Relevant extract of the order dated 05.04.2012 is reproduced herein-below:- 7. The Trial Court based on pleadings in S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012 framed several issues. The Trial Court framed issue No.1 about the applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972. 8. Relevant extract of the order dated 05.04.2012 is reproduced herein-below:- 7. The Trial Court based on pleadings in S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012 framed several issues. The Trial Court framed issue No.1 about the applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972. 8. Since the petitioners have assailed the finding of the judgement and decree passed by the Revisional Court on the issue of applicability of Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972, therefore, the Court is not referring to the other issues in the judgement. 9. The Trial Court on the issue of applicability of Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 returned the finding that since the respondents/tenants have admitted in their written statement in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable, therefore, they cannot retract from their admission, and accordingly, the Trial Court held that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable on the suit property. Accordingly, the Trial Court decreed the suit of the petitioners/landlords by the judgement and decree dated 09.04.2014. 10. Thereafter, the respondents/tenants preferred S.C.C. Revision No.59 of 2014 against the judgement and decree dated 09.04.2014 passed by the Trial Court in S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012, which was allowed by the Revisional Court by judgement and decree dated 23.07.2016 on the ground that in the present case, non-applicability of Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is an issue which goes to the root of the matter, therefore, the question of inherent lack of jurisdiction is involved in the present case, and thus, the principle of estoppel as enshrined in Section 115 of the Evidence Act is not applicable Consequently, the Revisional Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record concluded that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable on the suit property. Accordingly, it allowed the revision and dismissed the suit of the tenant. 11. Accordingly, it allowed the revision and dismissed the suit of the tenant. 11. Challenging the aforesaid order, learned counsel for the petitioners/landlords has contended that the Revisional Court has committed material irregularity and has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it while allowing the revision of respondents/tenants, inasmuch as the admission is the best piece of evidence, and since, the respondents/tenants have admitted in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable, therefore, the Revisional Court has erred in deciding the issue of applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 against the petitioners. 12. He has further placed reliance upon the definition of Explanation (I) of Section 2 (2) of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 to contend that in the present case, admittedly, the tenants/respondents had been inducted in the suit property in the year 1998, and in the absence of any material on record in respect to first assessment of the suit property, the date of first occupation is to be treated as date of construction of the building of the suit property, and in such view of the fact, it is established that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 13. It is contended that the Revisional Court has committed a manifest error of law in not appreciating Explanation (I) of Section 2 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 correctly. Accordingly, it is contended that the judgement and order passed by the Revisional Court is not sustainable in law. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgement of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Vs. Naresh Chandra Sharma (Since Deceased) and Others, 2016 (8) ADJ 62 , 1998 (2) JCLR 358 Munna Lal Vs. RCEO Mathura & 1996 (36) (DRJ) 654 . 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the pleading in the plaint about the non-applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is vague. It is submitted that the law is no more res-integra where there is a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction, the principle of estoppel enshrined in Section 115 of the Evidence Act is not applicable. It is submitted that the law is no more res-integra where there is a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction, the principle of estoppel enshrined in Section 115 of the Evidence Act is not applicable. He submits that it is not the case of the landlords in the plaint that the date of first occupation shall be treated to be the date of construction. He contends that no case has been set up by the landlords in the plaint that since the tenants were inducted in the year 1998, and it was the date of first occupation of the suit property, therefore, that date shall be taken as the date of first occupation of the suit property, therefore, the Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable on the Suit Property. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the Case of The State of West Bengal & Others Vs. Gitashree Dutta (Dey), (2022) 4 S.C.R. 1061 where the Apex Court has held that there is no estoppel against the Statute. 15. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 16. The facts as emanates from the record are that the petitioners have instituted S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012 contending inter-alia that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable on the suit property. The aforesaid fact was denied by the respondents/tenants by contending that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable over the suit property. 17. Now, so far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners regarding admission of respondents/tenants in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 is concerned, the question that arises before this Court in the present case is whether the admission of the respondents/tenants in P.A. Case No. 65 of 2011 will attract the principle of estoppel and bind the respondents/tenants restraining them from not taking any plea about applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 in respect to the suit property. 18. Before proceeding to deal with the aforesaid contention, a few judgements of the Apex Court which throw the light whether the principle of estoppel would apply against a Statute are required to be referred to. 18. Before proceeding to deal with the aforesaid contention, a few judgements of the Apex Court which throw the light whether the principle of estoppel would apply against a Statute are required to be referred to. In the case of State of West Bengal (supra), the Apex Court has succinctly explained that there can be no estoppels against the Statute. Paragraphs Nos.25, 26, 27 & 28 of the said judgement are reproduced herein-below:- “25. It is trite law that there can be no estoppel against a statute. This Court has settled this principle in a catena of judgments, starting as early as 1955. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955) 2 SCR 303 held as follows: “….We are unable on these facts to see any basis for a plea of estoppel. The letter dated 28.11.1953 was not addressed to the petitioner; nor does it amount to any assurance or undertaking not to resume the jagir. And even if such assurance had been given, it would certainly not have been binding on the Government, because its powers of resumption are regulated by the statute, and must be exercised in accordance with its provisions. The Act confers no authority on the Government to grant exemption from resumption, and an undertaking not to resume will be invalid, and there can be no estoppel against a statue”. 26. A Constitution of Bench of this Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy. Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458 also upheld this principle and held as follows: “21. There are two short answers to this contention. In the first place, there can be no estoppel against a statute…….” 27. This Court in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation v. B Narasimha Reddy (2011) 9 SCC 286 , has held that when the actions of the government are not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. This Court observed: “40.….The State, being a continuing body can be stopped from changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry it came to the conclusion that action was not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply.” 28. It is clear that this Court in several judgments has also upheld that the plea of promissory estoppel would stand negated when the mandate of a statute is followed. It is clear that this Court in several judgments has also upheld that the plea of promissory estoppel would stand negated when the mandate of a statute is followed. This Court in A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu & ors. (2001) 2 SCC 62 , held as under: “69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central Government, a case for applying principle of “promissory estoppel” applied to the facts of this case. There could be no estoppel against the statute….” 19. The Apex Court in the case of Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation and Another Vs. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 418 held that an order which lacks inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity, therefore, the procedural law of waiver or estoppel would have no application in such a case. 20. Paragraph no.26 of the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrabhai K. Bhoir and Others Vs. Krishna Arjun Bhoir and Others (2009) 2 SCC 315 in the context of the present case is reproduced herein-below:- “26. Thus, the said issue, in our opinion, did not attain finality. In any view of the matter, an order passed without jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be a coram non judice. It is non est in the eye of law. Principles of res judicata would not apply to such cases. [See Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L.V.A. Dixitulu (1979) 2 SCC 34 , Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (2005) 12 SCC 1 and National Institute of Technology and Ors. v. Niraj Kumar Singh (2007) 2 SCC 481 ]” 21. The Apex Court in the case of Isabella Johnson (Smt.) Vs. M.A. Susai (Dead) by LRS. (1991) 1 SCC 494 has held that a Court that has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is further held that it is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. 22. (1991) 1 SCC 494 has held that a Court that has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is further held that it is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. 22. The Apex Court in a long line of decisions referred to above has postulated that the question of inherent lack of jurisdiction is a pure question of law, and the principle of estoppel or acquiescence is not attracted in such cases. 23. Now, so far as the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners i.e. Vinod Kumar Vs. Naresh Chandra Sharma (Since Deceased) and Others, 2016 (8) ADJ 62 , 1998 (2) JCLR 358 Munna Lal Vs. RCEO Mathura & 1996 (36) (DRJ) 654 are concerned, it is pertinent to note that none of the judgements considered the principle postulated by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgements, therefore, these judgements are distinguishable on facts and are of no help to the petitioners. 24. Now, based on the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, this Court proceeds to consider the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 25. In the instant case, the petitioners/landlords have instituted P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 in which the respondents/tenants took the specific plea that Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 does not apply to the suit property. The petitioners/landlords acceding to the said contention, got the said P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 withdrawn. The relevant portion of the order is already extracted above. Thereafter, the petitioners filed S.C.C. Suit No.39 of 2012 in which the petitioners have set up a plea that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable. 26. Since the petitioners/landlords have set up a plea that the provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable, therefore, the burden was upon the petitioners/landlords to prove the same by filing constructive material and cogent evidence on record to establish that the first assessment of the suit property was done after the year 1985. 26. Since the petitioners/landlords have set up a plea that the provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable, therefore, the burden was upon the petitioners/landlords to prove the same by filing constructive material and cogent evidence on record to establish that the first assessment of the suit property was done after the year 1985. The petitioner did not lead any evidence in this regard, rather the petitioners/landlords harped upon the admission of the respondents in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011 regarding applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972. 27. The law is settled that the burden is upon the person to prove a fact which he asserts. Applying the said principle, the burden is upon the petitioners to prove that the first assessment of the suit property was done after the year 1985, and therefore, the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable. The petitioners did not discharge the burden by leading cogent evidence in this regard. 28. Since the issue of jurisdiction has been raised on the ground that the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable, this issue goes to the root of the matter as the respondents are challenging the plea of inherent lack of jurisdiction and competence of the Small Causes Court to entertain the suit, therefore, being a pure question of law, the principle of estoppel is not attracted. Thus, the petitioners would not get any help from the admission of the respondents in P.A. Case No.65 of 2011, inasmuch as the burden to prove the fact that the provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable was upon the petitioners which they failed to discharge. In such view of the fact, the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is misconceived and rejected. 29. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners about the fact that since the respondents were inducted in the suit property in the year 1998 and that shall be treated to be the date of first occupation of the suit premises, therefore, the Provision of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable, this Court may note that no such case has been set up by the plaintiffs/landlords in the plaint. The plaintiffs/ landlords have made averment about the non-applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No.13 of 1972 in one paragraph of the plaint, which has been reproduced above. 30. In such view of the fact, the petitioners/landlord cannot take such a plea nor any adjudication on such a plea can be made in the absence of any pleading in the plaint. Therefore, the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is also misconceived and rejected. 31. Thus, for the reasons given above, the writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed, with no order as to costs.