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2024 DIGILAW 1859 (GUJ)

STATE OF GUJARAT v. RAMSING JESINGBHAI CHAVDA

2024-10-07

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK

body2024
JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been filed by the appellant-State of Gujarat challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 22.12.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge (Atrocity), Fast Track Court N.1, Dhrangadhra (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court” for short) in Special Case No. 25 of 2004 whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the accused from the charges levelled against them. 2. Brief facts of the present case are that on 06.04.2004 at about 12.00 p.m., the accused came to the house of the complainant and knocked the door and, thereafter they forcefully opened the door and entered into the house of the complainant and asked about Parsottambhai, the brother of the complainant. That brother of the complainant i.e. Parsottambhai had taken some loan from the accused and had not returned the same and, therefore, the assailants came to the house of the complainant and assaulted on Parsottambhai by the respective weapons and upon intervention by the complainant and his mother, they have sustained injuries in the scuffle. It is the case of the prosecution that the scuffle took place in the house of the complainant and, thereafter, the accused kidnapped Parsottambhai and have looted gold and silver ornaments and they have also insulted by their caste and community and used flimsy words and, therefore, the incident has taken place. 3. A complaint came to be registered as C.R. No. I-10/2004 at Dasada Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 147, 148, 149, 365, 452, 427 etc of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. During the investigation, the accused was arrested. 4. After completion of investigation, as the sufficient evidence was found, the police has arrested the accused and has filed the charge-sheet against the accused before the Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Patadi wherein it was registered as Criminal Case No. 379 of 2004. As the offence was triable by the Court of Sessions, the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) has committed the case under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Sessions wherein it has been registered as Special Case No. 25 of 2004. 5. As the offence was triable by the Court of Sessions, the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) has committed the case under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Sessions wherein it has been registered as Special Case No. 25 of 2004. 5. The charge against the accused came to be framed by the learned Presiding Officer and Special Judge vide Exhibit 7 for the aforesaid offences. On being explained it to them, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for trial. Hence, the case was tried by the learned Presiding Officer and Special Judge. 6. It appears from the records that the prosecution has examined the following witnesses: PW-1 Isubsha Chandsha Exhibit 16 PW-2 Bhandas Keshavdas Exhibit 18 PW-3 Govabhai Gandabhai Exhibit 19 PW-4 Popatjibhai Ranaji Exhibit 21 PW-5 Yunusbhai Anvarbhai Mirza Exhibit 22 PW-6 Saidubhai Alibhai Exhibit 24 PW-7 Rupeshkumar Karmanbhai Exhibit 27 PW-8 Moghiben Karmanbhai Exhibit 29 PW-9 Karmanbhai Nanjibhai Exhibit 30 PW-10 Parsottambhai Karmanbhai Exhibit 36 PW-11 Samuben Kuberbhai Exhibit 37 PW-12 Santokben Ramjibhai Parmar Exhibit 38 PW-13 Girishbhai Kuberbhai Parmar Exhibit 39 PW-14 Gopalbhai Somabhai Makwana Exhibit 40 PW-15 Mahendrasinh Anopsinh Jhala Exhibit 48 PW-16 Prabhatsinh Velubha Jadeja Exhibit 49 PW-17 Gulam Mayuddin Umarmiya Kazi Exhibit 50 7. In addition to this, the prosecution has also produced the following documentary evidence: S. No. Particular Exhibit 1 Panchnama of the arrest 17 2 Panchnama of the scene of offence 20 3 Arrest panchnama of the accused 23 4 Complaint 28 5 Police Yadi 41 6 Medical certificate of Karman Nanjibhai 42 7 Medical certificate of Moghiben Karmanbhai 43 8 Medical certificate of Rupeshbhai Karmanbhai 44 9 Police Yadi 45 10 Medical certificate of Parsottambhai Karmanbhai 46 11 Caste certificate of the complainant 51 12 Caste certificate of the complainant issued by the Social Welfare Officer 52 13 Notification of disarmament of District Magistrate 53 8. After closure of the evidence, the statement of the accused under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been recorded wherein they denied of having committed any offence and have stated that they are innocent. 9. After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on record, the Trial Court by impugned judgment and order has acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them. 10. Heard Ms. Megha Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant-State of Gujarat, Mr. 9. After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on record, the Trial Court by impugned judgment and order has acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against them. 10. Heard Ms. Megha Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant-State of Gujarat, Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for Mr. Ashish Dagli, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 to 5 and 7, Mr. Jagdhish Satapara, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 6 and Mr. K.B. Maghnani, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 8. 11. Ms. Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of appeal and has submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error of law and facts in not appreciating the evidence of the complainant as well as eye witness in its true perspective. She has submitted that the Trial Court has committed serious error while disbelieving and discarding the oral as well as documentary evidence and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. While referring the depositions of the witnesses, Ms. Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that though the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, however, the Trial Court has ignored and overlooked the same and committed an error of facts and law in passing the impugned judgment and order. It is submitted by Ms. Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the prosecution has proved the case by examining the panch witnesses and also produced relevant documentary evidence, however, the Trial Court has disbelieved the story put forward by the prosecution while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and thereby committed serious error of facts and law. It is submitted by Ms. Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the prosecution has proved the injuries sustained by the concerned witnesses by examining the concerned doctor and producing the medical certificates of the witnesses who sustained injuries at the hands of the accused and such fact was not believed by the Trial Court, while coming to the conclusion. Ms. Chitaliya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the prosecution has proved the incident to the touch stone of probability of prudence and, therefore, the Trial Court has not considered such facts while considering the depositions of the witnesses merely on the ground that they are interested and relevant witnesses and, therefore, their depositions were ignored and overlooked by the Trial Court. 11.1 According to her submissions, the Trial Court ought to have convicted the accused and ought to have imposed necessary sentence. She has prayed to allow the present appeal and quashed and set aside the impugned judgment and order. 12. Per contra, Mr. Vyas, learned counsel appearing for Mr. Dagli, learned counsel appearing for the respondents- accused has supported the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and has submitted that the Trial Court has not committed any error of law and fact in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. He has submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the accused by suppressing the genesis of the facts and the impugned judgment and order is passed on the conjuncture and surmises. He has submitted that the person who involved in the alleged offence and the allegations made against him is not joined as accused for the reasons best known to the prosecution agency and even the investigation was not carried out in proper way. He has submitted that the trial Court has rightly disbelieved the case of the prosecution as there is material discrepancy in the depositions of the witnesses and in the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution. He has submitted that there is material exaggeration in the depositions of the witnesses and the Trial Court has recorded the fact that there is serious material contradiction which goes to the route of the case and thus, the impugned judgment and order is illegal and against the settled principles of law. He has submitted that in view of the settled legal principle, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code in case of acquittal appeal, the Appellate Court has power to re-appreciate the review and re-consider the evidence of the witness and if the Court found any infirmity or illegality, the Court can certainly be entertained the appeal, however, in the present case, there is no any illegality or infirmity. He has also submitted that there is no iota of evidence to connect the accused with the alleged crime. He has prayed to confirm the impugned judgment and dismiss the present appeal. 13. Mr. Satapara, learned counsel has submitted that during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No. 6 has expired and the death certificate issued by the competent authority to that effect is produced on record. He has prayed to confirm the impugned judgment and dismiss the present appeal. 13. Mr. Satapara, learned counsel has submitted that during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No. 6 has expired and the death certificate issued by the competent authority to that effect is produced on record. Therefore, the present appeal stands abated qua respondent No. 6 and the same stands disposed of accordingly. 14. Mr. Maghnani, learned counsel has supported the case of the prosecution and has submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is erroneous, illegal and perverse and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that the Trial Court has completely ignored the genesis of the incident and impugned judgment and order is passed on the conjuncture and surmises. 15. On perusal of the evidence of PW-14 Dr. Gopalbhai Somabhai Makwana has been examined at Exhibit 40, it appears that on 07.04.2004 while he was on duty in Patdi S.A. Centre, Karaman Nanji, Monghiben Karamanbhai and Rupesh Karamanbhai were brought for treatment with the list of Dasada Police Sub-Inspector. He has deposed that he has examined Moghiben and found a dark red lump 3 x 4 cm on the outside above the left wrist. The injury was simple in nature and could have been caused by a hard and blunt object. On examination Rupesh Karmanbhai, this doctor has not found any injury. He has examined Parsotambhai and found the injury 5 cm long 6 bruises on left side middle portion of the back. In his cross-examintion, he has admitted that the injured Monghiben can get injured if she wandered with the iron door. He has admitted that the injujury caused to Parasottambhai could happen if he slept on a thorn. 16. On perusal of the evidence of panch witnesses i.e. Yusufbhai Anvarbhai Mirza examined at Exhibit 22 and Saidubhai Alibhai examined at Exhibit 24, it appears that they have not supported the case of the prosecution and panchnama of the scene of offence and they both have declared hostile. It appears that the subject goods in question are in possession does not appear to be credible. 17. It appears that the subject goods in question are in possession does not appear to be credible. 17. On perusal of the evidence of Rupeshbhai Karmanbhai, it appears that on the day of the incident, a person knocked on the door for two or three times of his house and opened it himself and at the time of the incident, Monghiben Karmanbhai was examined and according to her eight to ten persons came to the house and the vault of the house must have been opened by her husband Karmanbhai Nanjibhai who was also examined and according to him, the door must have been opened by himself or his son Rupesh or his wife Monghiben. On perusal of the evidence of Parsottambhai, it appears that on the day of the incident, ten to twenlve persons came to Dhaspur Village to abduct him in a jeep from Kakrawadi Village and knocked on the door of the house and asked him to open it and his brother has delayed in opening the door. Considering the above fact, it reveals that if this Court looks at the fact that the stopper was struck and opened, none of these witnesses definitely stated that who opened the door of the house at the first instance. As per the evidence of prosecution, Parsotambhai was sleeping inside the room, Rupeshbhai and his mother Monghiben and father Karmanbhai were sleeping in varanda of the house. There is contradiction in the evidence of the witnesses. 18. This Court has considered the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. This Court has perused the impugned judgment and order of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court and carefully considered the rival contentions, as well as material evidence placed on record. 19. On perusal of the evidence of the complainant himself, his brother, father, mother etc., it appears that there is contradiction in the version about opening of the door and all the witnesses are stated different version about the weapons. 20. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 . 20. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 . The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa (supra) reads as under: “The following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decisions has held and observed in paragraphs No. 22 to 30 as under: “22. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decisions has held and observed in paragraphs No. 22 to 30 as under: “22. In Atley vs. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , the approach of the appellate court while considering a judgment of acquittal was discussed and it was observed that unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the acquittal was perverse, it could not set aside the same. To a similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking through Subba Rao J. (as His Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 (Sanwat Singh Case, AIR pp 719-720 Para 9): “9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as (i) substantial and compelling reasons, (ii) good and sufficiently cogent reasons and (iii) strong reasons are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.” The need for the aforesaid observations arose on account of observations of the majority in Aher Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 which stated that for the High Court to take a different view on the evidence “there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.” 23. M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was). This Court observed that the approach of the High Court (appellate court) in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial.” 24. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows: (SCC p.799, Para 6) “6...........In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.” 25. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 , spoke about the approach of the appellate court while considering an appeal against an order acquitting the accused and stated as follows: (SCC p.229, Para 7) “7.......While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only - reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.” The object and the purpose of the aforesaid approach is to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice. In another words, there should not be an acquittal of the guilty or a conviction of an innocent person. 26. In Ajit Savant Majagvai vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110 , this Court set out the following principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court: (SCC pp. 116-117, Para 16) “16. 26. In Ajit Savant Majagvai vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110 , this Court set out the following principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court: (SCC pp. 116-117, Para 16) “16. This Court has thus explicitly and clearly laid down the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court. These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as under: (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. (2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse. (3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. (4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness box. (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness box. (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.” 27. This Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 observed vis-a-vis the powers of an appellate court while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, as under: (SCC p.229, Para 7) “7....While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.” 28. This Court in Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , highlighted that there is one significant difference in exercising power while hearing an appeal against acquittal by the appellate court. The appellate court would not interfere where the judgment impugned is based on evidence and the view taken was reasonable and plausible. This is because the appellate court will determine the fact that there is presumption in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of doubt but if it decides to interfere it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of acquittal. 30. In Nepal Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2009) 12 SCC 351 , this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court which had set aside the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court and restored the judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused on re-appreciation of the evidence.” 22. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 : (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paras-37 to 40 as under: 37. This Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes” etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court. 23. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that unless and until there is any infirmity or perversity in the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, the Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code can not entertain the acquittal appeal. This Court finds that the Trial Court has passed the impugned judgment and order after considering the relevant material and the evidence which are led before the Trial Court. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that there is no any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. The present appeal is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order deserves to be confirmed. 24. On consideration of entire evidence on record, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence by threadbare and has given cogent and convincing reasons for not believing the case of the prosecution and has properly acquitted the accused from the charges levelled against them. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal is sustainable on factual as well as legal aspects. 25. In light of the above discussion, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 22.12.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge (Atrocity), Fast Track Court No. 1, Dhrangadhra in Special Case No. 25 of 2004 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.