JUDGMENT : (J.C. Doshi, J.) Being aggrieved with the judgment and award dated 12th March, 2014 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxi.5), Ahmedabad (Rural) at Mirzapur, Ahmedabad in M.A.C.P. No.1533 of 2008, the appellant preferred this appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act. 2. Three claim petitions arose out of the same accident which occurred on 4.4.2008 at about 7.00 p.m, the claimants, namely, Arpan Kantilal Gajjar (MACP No.1533/2008), Rahul Priyankarbhai Saakya (MACP No.1566/2008) and Hiren Chunilal Patel (MACP No. 1940/2008) were traveling In Insured car No.GJ.7.AG.6409 and going towards Gandhinagar. On their way to Gandhinagar when they reached in fringe of Uvarsad at that time a branch of tree suddenly fall on the car and as a result of which claimants sustained injuries and filed these claim petitions claiming compensation of Rs.8,00,000/-, Rs.25,000/- and Rs.75,000/- respectively under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 2.1 The appellant resisted the claim petitions by filing written statements. It was inter alia contended that the accident occurred due to the "Act of God" and therefore the appellant Insurance company is not liable to pay compensation and the amount claimed by the claimant were highly exaggerated. 3. The Tribunal after considering the FIR, panchnama and evidence of the claimant held that the accident occurred due to sole negligence of the car driver and awarded compensation. It is quarreled in the appeal that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the FIR, panchnama and statement recorded by the police authority of the claimant. The Tribunal awarded exaggerated compensation and thus present appeal is filed. 4. Learned Advocate for the appellant – insurance company would submit that the judgment and award of the tribunal is contrary to law and evidence on record. He would submit that the Tribunal erred in appreciating the FIR, panchnama and further erred in holding that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of driver of the car. He would further submit that the tribunal ought to have considered the FIR, panchnama and statement record by the police authority of the claimant and held that the accident occurred due to the "Act of God" and therefore the appellant insurance company is not liable to satisfy the award amount. He would further submit that the tribunal ought to have considered the FIR, panchnama and statement record by the police authority of the claimant and held that the accident occurred due to the "Act of God" and therefore the appellant insurance company is not liable to satisfy the award amount. He would further submit that the tribunal ought to have considered the fact that at the time of accident windstorm was already on and due to that road side tree's branch fell on the car and therefore the accident occurred due to the "Act of God" and such risk is not covered by the policy. He would further submit that the tribunal erred in holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the car and further erred in holding that the appellant insurance is liable to satisfy the award amount. 5. On the other hand, learned advocate appearing for the claimant – respondent no.1 would submit that no such error much less any error of law is committed by tribunal and after considering the evidence on record the tribunal has passed the award and therefore this Court may not interfere with the finding arrived at by the tribunal and may dismiss the appeal. 6. Regard being had to the rival submissions made by learned advocate appearing for the parties at the outset let refer to the finding and observations made by the tribunal while answering issue no.1 in paragraph 18 which reads thus: “18. In the present case as per the oral evidence of petitioner Arpabhai at Exh.23 and petitioner Rahul Priyanbhai Sakya at Exh.63 the car was driven by the opponent no.1. It is stated that it was a cyclonic atmosphere and it was raining and wind was blowing very fast and it was very dark at about 7.00 hours in the evening on the road. It is deposed that Ravi 1.e. opponent no.1 was driving the Car at a fast speed, rashly and negligently and due to cyclone / blowing of wind one Tree was looming low on the road and was about to fall and even though the opponent no.1 did not slow down the Car or stopped the car and so the Tree which was looming low on the road fell on the Car and when the opponent no.1 applied brakes the car went off the road. Mr. Mr. Arpan Gajjar has been cross examined by the opponent No.3's Advocate. In his cross examination he has stated that it was raining and cyclonic atmosphere at the time of accident. He has denied the suggestion that his attention was on the side of the road and not on the front side. He has stated that on siting the tree he and Ravibhai had asked the driver to stop the Car but the driver had not stopped the Car. Mr. Rahul Sakya in his cross examination has stated that he was sitting beside the driver and the speed of the vehicle was abcut 100 kmph. He has however admitted that he had not stated in the police statement at the place of accident one Tree was looming low and as the Wagon R was stopped it dashed with the the looming Tree. However, he has further deposed that he had stated in the statement that branch of the Tree was looming between the road. In the judgment reported in 2001 ACJ 428 [supra] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has distinguished U/s 140 of the Act from the rule of strict liability. However, considering the oral evidence of the petitioners and in absence of any contrary evidence of the driver of the Car it can not be said that the accident was an Act of Go On the contrary it has been specifically stated by the petitioner Arpanbhai that on siting the Tree the and Ravibhai had asked the driver to stop the Car but the driver had not stopped the Car. It is an admitted position that it was raining and cyclonic atmosphere. From the oral evidence of the petitioners it appears that they had cited the Tree looming low on the road necessitating the driver to take extra care, which was found lackin here and as such the accident. On the other hand it can also be said that the accident arose out of the use of motor vehicle and the accident was no Act of God. This Tribunal is of the view that had the driver had paid heed to the request of the petitioner to stop the car, the accident could have been avoided. There is no rebuttal evidence to show that such a request was not made by the petitioners. This Tribunal is of the view that had the driver had paid heed to the request of the petitioner to stop the car, the accident could have been avoided. There is no rebuttal evidence to show that such a request was not made by the petitioners. Thus, from the aforesaid facts, it can be said that there was some negligence on the part of the driver as he did not take extra care in such a situated to avoid the accident. Thus, considering the observations of the Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court in the cited cases and the oral evidence of the petitioners, this Tribunal holds that accident took place out of the use of the motor vehicle and because of some negligence on the part of the driver of the Car. Hence, I answer issue No.1 accordingly.” 7. Thus, the tribunal after considering the evidence led before it and having examined the same came to the conclusion that because of the negligence on the part of the driver the accident took place and not due to the fallen of the tree and therefore the argument of the learned advocate for the appellant – insurance company that accident took place on account of falling of tree does not leg to stand. 8. Even otherwise case of motor vehicle is not in dispute. Claimants had, undoubtedly received injuries as well as physical impairment on account of use of motor vehicle. Learned advocate appearing for the insurance company failed to point out that claimant had not received injuries due to use of motor vehicle. At this juncture, I may refer to Section 165 of the MV Act which reads thus: "165. Claims Tribunals.-(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.” 9. In Kalim Khan Versus Fimidabee [ 2018 (7) SCC 687 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with such issues in regards to expression ‘use of vehicle’ has observed and held as under in paragraph 22. “22. In Kalim Khan Versus Fimidabee [ 2018 (7) SCC 687 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with such issues in regards to expression ‘use of vehicle’ has observed and held as under in paragraph 22. “22. From the aforesaid authorities, it is limpid that the expression 'use of the vehicle' under certain circumstances can be attracted when the vehicle is stationary or static. A Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa in Kanhei Rana and another v. Gangadhar Swain and others, AIR 1993 ORI 89 while dealing with a situation where the deceased labourer after loading the truck with logs lost his life. The tribunal had categorically found that death was on the account of fall of a log, when the truck was being loaded with logs. The learned Single Judge, in appeal, had concurred with the view of the tribunal by opining that the fall of the log had no nexus with the use of the vehicle not even remotely, and there was no material to show that the fall of the log was occasioned due to use of the vehicle. He had further held that the careless handling of goods being loaded on or unloaded from a vehicle had no connection to the vehicle itself. Reversing the conclusion of the learned single Judge, the Division Bench opined that the concept of movement being not intrinsically or inherently connected with the use and the term 'use' having been connotatively expanded, there can be no doubt that the same can also be extended to the arena/sphere of a claim advanced under Section 110 of the 1939 Act. Heavy on us is cast on the driver to avoid negligence while the vehicle is in use. If the term 'use' in its conceptual sweep engulfs no motion or no movement or stationariness, then by logical corollary it is made essential that the driver or for that matter any agent of the owner should be careful and non-negligent. Negligence in driving is regarded as a fact that the vehicle is in motion. But the definition of 'use' having been expanded in its broader canvas, it has to clothe in its sweep other categories of negligence. To elaborate, when a vehicle remains static, it cannot constitute that the driver is negligent because of his rash and negligent driving. On the contrary, it has to embody some other different types of negligence. But the definition of 'use' having been expanded in its broader canvas, it has to clothe in its sweep other categories of negligence. To elaborate, when a vehicle remains static, it cannot constitute that the driver is negligent because of his rash and negligent driving. On the contrary, it has to embody some other different types of negligence. Of course that would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Division Bench of the High Court went on to say that the apex Court in Patil (supra) was dealing with the negligence so far as it was concerned with Section 92 of the Act, but as the language of Section 92-A and Section 110 of the old Act used the same phraseology and there is absence of any etymological distinction, the same meaning should be given to the expression under Section 110 of the old Act. The appellate Bench held that there was causal relationship with the accident which had resulted in the death of the claimant.” 10. Thus, the appeal of the insurance company failed to establish the ground raised. Negligence on the part of the driver of the erring vehicle is noted in addition thereto use of motor vehicle resulted into injury is also justified. Moreover, three person received injuries from self-same accident have received injuries from the accident. All of them have filed claim petition before claim tribunal to get compensation and all of three petitions have been allowed. The insurance company has filed appeal against only one judgment and award, two other judgment and award are not challenged. Thus, act of insurance company to challenge only one judgment and award and accepting two other judgment and award arise from self-same road accident alters the principles of res judicata. Thus, present appeal also fails on that count. 11. For the foregoing reasons, this court does not find any substance in the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. R & P be sent back.