JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL) 1. This Letters Patent appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 05.05.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in allowing the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and setting aside the order dated 07.12.2019 passed by the Family Court, Ahmedabad on the application below Exh.15 filed in Family Suit No.834 of 2019 treating it as an interlocutory order. The appellant herein is the wife, whose marriage with the respondent, the original petitioner and plaintiff before the Family Court, has been solemnized on 05.07.2018. 2. From the facts recorded in the judgment impugned of the learned Single Judge, it may be noted that for both the original petitioner (husband) and the respondent wife (namely the appellant herein), (referred to hereinafter as the “original petitioner” and “respondent wife” in the same manner) it was their second marriage. The learned Single Judge has recorded that the original petitioner got divorce from his earlier wife and gave an advertisement for marriage in the newspaper along with his mobile number. The respondent wife contacted him looking to the matrimonial advertisement and told the petitioner that she was a spinster (unmarried) and expressed her desire to marry. Since, the respondent wife was a Christian by religion, a registered marriage was performed on 05.07.2018 and, thereafter, the original petitioner had left to Canada on 06.08.2018 as his tickets were already booked prior to marriage. 3. It was, however, stated by the original petitioner that on 02.08.2018, he received a letter through post, which contained the decree of divorce of the respondent wife and he was shocked by the fact and felt cheated by the respondent wife, who presented herself of being a spinster (unmarried person) at the time of marriage. 4. Be that as it may, the original petitioner left to Canada on 06.08.2018 after handing over the possession of the house namely the house in question (105, Shalin Heights -2, Narol, Ahmedabad), a flat to his parents and the statement in the judgment impugned is that the father of the petitioner is paying maintenance, taxes and the electricity bill of the residential property, the house in question. 5. 5. On 15.11.2018, the petitioner returned from Canada and immediately thereafter sent a legal notice to the respondent wife warning her not to use the surname and the photograph of the original petitioner as being her husband. It was further contended that after receiving the notice, the respondent wife took forcible possession of the house in question, which is a residential property and the shop in the same building. It is noted in the judgment impugned that on the date of the aforesaid incident, the original petitioner was in Canada and his parents were at their relative’s house. 6. The contention of the original petitioner was that the respondent wife had committed an act of criminal trespass on 12.11.2018 by entering into the house of the original petitioner (the house in question) and has misappropriated the household articles, gold ornaments and cash and other valuables lying in the house. A family Suit No.2446 of 2018 was also filed by the respondent wife before the Family Court on 19.11.2018 along with an injunction application which was rejected on 21.02.2019. 7. It was further contended that on the same grounds and contentions, the respondent wife filed application Exhibit ‘15’ under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short as “the DV Act”) as an interim application in the Family Suit No.894 of 2019 (the suit concerned) filed by the original petitioner before the Family Court. It was further stated that the respondent wife did not proceed with the Family Suit being Family Suit No.2446 of 2018 filed by her and the same was dismissed for want of prosecution on 07.12.2019. 8. It was contended that the respondent wife does not have any right, title or interest over the shop of which she has fraudulently prepared a rent agreement dated 24.12.2018 and had got it registered with the registration No.2607 of 2018. it is noted in the judgment impugned that some altercation took place between the parties and a written complaint was submitted by the petitioner before the police to register an offence punishable under Sections 461, 462, 467, 468, 471, 506(2), 120(B), 420, 447, 448, 452, 457 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent wife and other persons allegedly associated with her. 9. Another criminal complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate as Criminal Misc. 9. Another criminal complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate as Criminal Misc. Application No.6714 of 2018 on 22.11.2018, by the father of the original petitioner, wherein an inquiry was initiated under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and report was called for from the police. It was further stated that the respondent wife also filed a complaint under Section 498A against the original petitioner and the court concerned had issued the process. A criminal complaint, being I-C.R.No.290 of 2018 dated 28.11.2018, was registered before the Narol police station under Sections 498(A), 323, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code by the respondent wife. 10. The Family suit No.894 of 2019 (the suit concerned) filed by the original petitioner is for cancellation of the marriage registration under Section 25(3) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. It is stated that an interim injunction application has been filed by the original petitioner in the said Family Suit but the Court has not proceeded with the same till date. However, on an application under Sections 12, 19 read with Section 26 of the DV Act filed by the respondent wife on 22.05.2019 at Exh.15, the Family Court passed an order dated 07.12.2019 allowing the said application, restraining the original petitioner from dispossessing the respondent wife from the house in question, namely House No.F-105, Shalin Heights, Narol, Ahmedabad bearing Tenement No.0320-26-2301-001-GJ, which has led to the filing of the petition invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. We may note that the leaned Single Judge in the order impugned has exhaustively gone through the factual aspects of the matter, i.e. the claim of the original petitioner that the respondent wife had cheated him by presenting herself as an unmarried woman and that their marriage was registered on the false disclosure made by the respondent wife. 12. Further, taking note of the electricity bills filed by the original petitioner in the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has drawn a prima facie opinion that the original petitioner and respondent wife were never residing permanently with each other in the house in question and, therefore, the respondent wife cannot claim her right under Section 19 of the DV Act in the said property. The learned Single Judge has also taken note of various criminal cases filed by the parties against each other and also referred to a notice dated 15.09.2020 issued by the member of the Uma Co-operative Housing Society, wherein the house in question is situated. 13. It seems that the learned Single Judge was swayed away by the factum of the dismissal of the Family Suit No.2446 of 2018 filed by the respondent wife before the Family Court with the prayer seeking permanent injunction restraining the original petitioner from dispossessing the respondent wife from the house in question. The learned Single Judge has, thus, made an exhaustive factual inquiry about the claim of the respondent wife and the contentions of the original petitioner that the respondent wife has no right of residence in the house in question. The learned Single Judge has also noted that the Family Court has not observed any finding in the order that any domestic violence had taken place against the respondent wife by the original petitioner, and hence the order of the Family Court could not be sustained. 14. On the concept of shared household, referring to Section 2(s) of the DV Act and the judgment in the case of Vibhuti Wadhwa Sharma vs. Krishna Sharma and another delivered in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1327 of 2021 and Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 7314 of 2021 referred therein, the learned Single Judge has observed that living of a woman in a household must be a nature of permanency not a nature of mere fleeting or casual living. It was then noted in the judgment impugned that the marriage between the original petitioner and the respondent wife had taken place on 05.07.2018 and the petitioner left for Canada on 06.08.2018. The electricity bills of the subject property for the months of August and September shown as ‘Nil’ consumption. On 12.11.2018, the respondent wife tried to take forcible possession of the house in question as a result of which, a police complaint was filed by the father of the original petitioner. 15. The learned Single Judge has further gone to the extent of observing that since the original petitioner filed the suit seeking for cancellation of marriage as null and void, the Family Court could not have passed an order when the domestic relationship itself is under challenge. 15. The learned Single Judge has further gone to the extent of observing that since the original petitioner filed the suit seeking for cancellation of marriage as null and void, the Family Court could not have passed an order when the domestic relationship itself is under challenge. The application Exh.15 filed by the respondent wife has, thus, been dismissed being frivolous application, while allowing the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Taking note of the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned, when we have gone through the order of the Family Court in allowing the application Exh.15, pertinent is to note that the Family Court has recorded that the factum of marriage of the respondent wife with the original petitioner, who had filed a suit for cancellation of marriage as null and void, is not disputed. The question as to whether the respondent wife had suppressed the fact of being a divorcee at the time of marriage is a question of evidence. The contention that the respondent wife had never resided in the suit property (house in question) was considered by the Family Court to note that the father of the original petitioner had filed complaint against the respondent wife and summons of the case was served to the respondent wife at the address of the house in question, itself. The proceedings in the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner’s father is not over. The factum that the respondent, at present, is wife of the original petitioner and was in the possession of the house in question on the date of the order dated 07.12.2019 could not be disputed and hence the Family Court concluded that the respondent wife was entitled to grant of protection under the provisions of Section 19 of the DV Act. 16. Noticing these findings returned by the Family Court, considering the contentions of the learned counsels for the respondent herein, namely the original petitioner, we may note that there is no dispute about the fact of the registered marriage having been solemnized between the original petitioner and the respondent wife. The fact that the parties lived as husband and wife soon after the marriage, which was solemnized on 05.07.2018 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is also not disputed. The fact that the parties lived as husband and wife soon after the marriage, which was solemnized on 05.07.2018 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is also not disputed. The question of cancellation of the certificate of marriage registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is subject matter of consideration before the family Court. As per the own contention of the original petitioner, he had left to Canada after one month of marriage, i.e. on 06.08.2018. There is no whisper in the petition before the learned Single Judge, that the marriage was not consummated between 05.07.2018 and 06.08.2018 i.e. before the original petitioner had left to Canada. 17. The contention of the original petitioner that he went to Canada on 06.08.2018 after handing over the possession of the house in question to his parents is a bald statement which cannot be believed for the purposes of the present case, as it is a question of evidence. Moreover, the legal notice was sent by the petitioner to the respondent wife, as per his own contention, on 15.11.2018 after returning from Canada and the complaint for criminal trespass was filed thereafter by his father. 18. The contention of the original petitioner that the respondent wife had forcibly entered into the house in question on 12.11.2018 and her action amounted to criminal trespass is subject matter of enquiry in the pending Criminal Application No.6714 of 2018 filed on 22.11.2018 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, by the father of the petitioner, wherein only summons have been issued till date. 19. It is evident that the relationship between the original petitioner and the respondent wife has become strained with the complaints and counter complaints filed by them against each other. 20. But by the fact that the respondent wife has filed a complaint against her husband, it would not be a reason to throw her out of her matrimonial house, wherein she lived with her husband soon after the marriage solemnized on 05.07.2018, in absence of any disclosure made by the original petitioner as to where they lived after marriage till he left to Canada. The statement of the petitioner that he got a job in Canada and left to Canada on 06.08.2018 by handing over the possession of the house to his parents and his father was maintaining the house thereafter, itself is the proof of the fact that the parents of the original petitioner were not normally residing in the house in question and it was the house, wherein the original petitioner resided with the respondent as his wife after marriage, admittedly, after 05.07.2018 till 06.08.2018. 21. For these facts reflected from the record, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in upturning the findings of fact returned by the Family Court on two important aspects of the case namely; (i) there is no dispute about the solemnization of marriage and the declaration sought of the marriage being null and void is on the allegation of suppression of factum of the respondent wife being a divorcee, which is a question of evidence; and; (ii) the fact that the respondent wife was in the possession of the house in question on the date of filing of the application Exhibit ‘15’ and passing of the order on 07.12.2019 could not be disputed by the original petitioner. These two finding of facts, in our considered opinion, could not have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge in the limited scope of exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. Having reached at the said conclusion, we may further record that the learned Single Judge has erred in entertaining the petition invoking jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in a case where the challenge was to the order passed by the Family Court for final disposal of the application under Sections 12 and 19 of the DV Act, which has been filed in the pending Family Suit seeking for protection from dispossession, by the wife from her matrimonial home. Section 26 of the DV Act provides that the relief available under Sections 12 and 19 of the said Act may be sought in any legal proceedings before the Family Court, even before the civil or criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved person irrespective of the fact that such proceedings were initiated before or after the commencement of the Act. Section 26 of the DV Act provides that the relief available under Sections 12 and 19 of the said Act may be sought in any legal proceedings before the Family Court, even before the civil or criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved person irrespective of the fact that such proceedings were initiated before or after the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 26 further provides that any relief referred to in sub-section(1) of Section 19 of the DV Act may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such a suit or legal proceedings before a civil or criminal Court. 23. The remedy available to the respondent (destitute) wife under Section 26 of the DV Act is in addition to her claim in the Family Suit filed by the respondent wife that the marriage cannot be held as nullity. The Family Court, thus, has jurisdiction to entertain the application under Sections 12 and 19 read with Section 26 of the DV Act, registered at Exh.15. The order passed by the Family Court dated 07.12.2019, subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge, cannot be said to suffer from any error of jurisdiction of the family Court. 24. We may further note the provisions of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which provides remedy of appeal to the High Court, both on fact and on law, against “every judgment and order, not being an interlocutory order”, passed by the Family Court. Taking note of the language employed in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, a further question has arisen before us, as to the maintainability of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the original petitioner (husband), challenging the order of the Family Court on the facts and not on law. We may note that no legal issue had been raised by the original petitioner before the learned Single Judge so as to demonstrate that the order passed by the Family Court suffers from any manifest illegality being devoid of jurisdiction; for the lack of jurisdiction or the Family court has exceeded its jurisdiction conferred by law, in passing the order impugned therein. 25. 25. The factual inquiry conducted by the learned Single Judge, as noted herein before, while setting aside the order passed by the Family Court was beyond the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge has fell in error in interfering with the order passed by the family Court on the factual aspects when the relevant facts noted by the family Court remained undisputed and no jurisdictional error could be pointed out in the order of the Family Court. 26. On the factual aspects, in our considered opinion, the remedy before the original petitioner was to file a First Appeal before the High Court invoking Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, as in our considered opinion, the order dated 07.12.2019 passed by the Family Court is an order passed on application Exh.15 filed under Sections 12 and 19 read with Section 26 of the DV Act, which would fall within the meaning of “judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order” of a Family Court, covered within the meaning of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act,1984. Before elaborating on the said aspect, we find it apt to deliberate on the concept of “Shared household” under the DV Act. The Concept of “Shared Household” under DV Act: 27. To elaborate on the issue, we may also refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi [2022 LiveLaw SC 474 : (2022) 8 SCC 90 ] relied by the learned counsel for the appellant, wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the validity of the order of the right to residence passed under the DV Act, right of the victim wife to reside in her matrimonial home. Kamlesh Devi [2022 LiveLaw SC 474 : (2022) 8 SCC 90 ] relied by the learned counsel for the appellant, wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the validity of the order of the right to residence passed under the DV Act, right of the victim wife to reside in her matrimonial home. Considering the object and purpose of the DV Act, the meaning of the expression ‘shared household’ under Section 2 (s), in relation to the definition of ‘domestic relationship’ defined under Section 2 (f), it was observed therein that the expression ‘shared household’ means a household where the person aggrieved, as defined under Section 2 (a), lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which, either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly, have any right, title, interest or equity. 28. The expression ‘shared household’ includes even the household, which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the said household. The definition of ‘shared household’ is, thus, an inclusive one. Section 17 of the DV Act speaks of right to reside in a shared household while Section 19 deals with residence orders, which could be passed by a Magistrate while disposing of an application under Subsection (1) of Section 12, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place in a shared household. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 begins with a Non obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 is the protection granted to an aggrieved person from eviction or exclusion from the shared household or any part of it and restrain the respondent from doing so, save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 29. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 is the protection granted to an aggrieved person from eviction or exclusion from the shared household or any part of it and restrain the respondent from doing so, save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 29. The Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi (supra), while considering the interplay between Section 17 and Section 19 of the DV Act has further noted that while Section 19 deals with a multitude of directions or orders which may be passed against the respondent vis-à-vis the shared household in favour of an aggrieved person, Section 17 confers a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household irrespective of whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. This right to reside in a shared household, which is conferred on every woman in a domestic relationship is a vital and significant right. It is an affirmation of the right of every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in a shared household. 30. The distinction between sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 has also been noted therein to record that while sub-section (2) deals with an aggrieved person which is defined in Section 2(a) of the DV Act in the context of domestic violence, sub-section (1) of Section 17 is a right conferred on every woman in a domestic relationship irrespective of whether she is an aggrieved person or not. In other words, every woman in a domestic relationship has a right to reside in the shared household even in the absence of any act of domestic violence by the respondent. 31. It was observed that while the object and purpose of the DV Act is to protect a woman from domestic violence, the salutary object of sub-section (1) of Section 17 is to confer a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to have the right to reside in a shared household. The expression ‘shared household’ within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 has further been elaborated with examples in relation to the societal and familial context in India in Paragraphs 39 to 49, which are to be extracted hereinunder:- “39. As already noted, a domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time, lived together in a shared household. As already noted, a domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time, lived together in a shared household. The relationship may be by (i) consanguinity, (ii) marriage or, (iii) through a relationship in the nature of a marriage, (iv) adoption or (v) are family members living together as a joint family. The expression 'domestic relationship' is a comprehensive one. Hence, every woman in a domestic relationship in whatever manner the said relationship may be founded as stated above has a right to reside in a shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Thus, a daughter, sister, wife, mother, grand-mother or great grand-mother, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law or any woman having a relationship in the nature of marriage, an adopted daughter or any member of joint family has the right to reside in a shared household. 40. Further, though, the expression 'shared household' is defined in the context of a household where the person aggrieved lives or has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with respondent, in the context of Sub-Section (1) of Section17, the said expression cannot be restricted only to a household where a person aggrieved resides or at any stage, resided in a domestic relationship. In other words, a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, in the sense that who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence by the respondent, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-inlaw and daughter-in-law or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. 41. Therefore, the right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship is guaranteed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 and she cannot be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence. 41. Therefore, the right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship is guaranteed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 and she cannot be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence. By contrast, Sub-Section (2) of section 17 deals with a narrower right in as much as an aggrieved person who is inevitably a woman and who is subjected to domestic violence shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Thus, the expression 'right to reside in a shared household' has to be given an expansive interpretation, in respect of the aforesaid categories of women including a mother-in-law of a daughter-in-law and other categories of women referred to above who have the right to reside in a shared household 42. Further, the expression the right to reside in a shared household cannot be restricted to actual residence. In other words, even in the absence of actual residence in the shared household, a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside therein. The aforesaid interpretation can be explained by way of an illustration. If a woman gets married then she acquires the right to reside in the household of her husband which then becomes a shared household within the meaning of the D.V. Act. In India, it is a societal norm for a woman, on her marriage to reside with her husband, unless due to professional, occupational or job commitments, or for other genuine reasons, the husband and wife decide to reside at different locations. Even in a case where the woman in a domestic relationship is residing elsewhere on account of a reasonable cause, she has the right to reside in a shared household. Also a woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship has the right to reside not only in the house of her husband, if it is located in another place which is also a shared household but also in the shared household which may be in a different location in which the family of her husband resides. 43. Also a woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship has the right to reside not only in the house of her husband, if it is located in another place which is also a shared household but also in the shared household which may be in a different location in which the family of her husband resides. 43. If a woman in a domestic relationship seeks to enforce her right to reside in a shared household, irrespective of whether she has resided therein at all or not, then the said right can be enforced under Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the D.V. Act. If her right to reside in a shared household is resisted or restrained by the respondent(s) then she becomes an aggrieved person and she cannot be evicted, if she has already been living in the shared household or excluded from the same or any part of it if she is not actually residing therein. In other words, the expression 'right to reside in the shared household is not restricted to only actual residence, as, irrespective of actual residence, a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside in the shared household. 44. Thus, a woman cannot be excluded from the shared household even if she has not actually resided therein that is why the expression 'shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household' has been intentionally used in Sub-Section (2) of Section 17. This means if a woman in a domestic relationship is an aggrieved person and she is actually residing in the shared household, she cannot be evicted except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Similarly, a woman in a domestic relationship who is an aggrieved person cannot be excluded from her right to reside in the shared household except in accordance with the procedure established by law. 45. Therefore, the expression 'right to reside in the shared household’ would include not only actual residence but also constructive residence in the shared household i.e., right to reside therein which cannot be excluded vis-à-vis an aggrieved person except in accordance with the procedure established by law. If a woman is sought to be evicted or excluded from the shared household she would be an aggrieved person in which event Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 would apply. 46. In support of this interpretation, another example may be noted. If a woman is sought to be evicted or excluded from the shared household she would be an aggrieved person in which event Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 would apply. 46. In support of this interpretation, another example may be noted. A woman on getting married, along with her husband may proceed overseas on account of professional or job commitments. Such a woman may not have had an opportunity of residing in the shared household after her marriage. If, for any reason, such a woman becomes an aggrieved person and is forced to return from overseas then she has the right to reside in the shared household of her husband irrespective of whether her husband (respondent) or the aggrieved person (wife) has any right, title or beneficial interest in the shared household. In such circumstances, parents-in-law of the woman who has returned from overseas and who is an aggrieved person cannot exclude her from the shared household or any part of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. 47. Another situation is a case where, immediately after marriage, the wife actually resided in the shared household while her husband proceeded overseas. When such a woman is subjected to domestic violence, she cannot be evicted from the shared household except in accordance with the procedure established by law. 48. There may also be cases where soon after marriage, the husband goes to another city owing to a job commitment and his wife remains in her parental home and nevertheless is a victim of domestic violence. She has the right to remain in her parental home as she would be in a domestic relationship by consanguinity. Also in cases where a woman remains in her parental home soon after marriage and is subjected to domestic violence and is therefore an aggrieved person, she also has the right to reside in the shared household of her husband which could be the household of her in-laws. Further, if her husband resides in another location then an aggrieved person has the right to reside with her husband in the location in which he resides which would then become the shared household or reside with his parents, as the case may be, in a different location. Further, if her husband resides in another location then an aggrieved person has the right to reside with her husband in the location in which he resides which would then become the shared household or reside with his parents, as the case may be, in a different location. There could be a multitude and a variety of situations and circumstances in which a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside in a shared household irrespective of whether she has the right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Also, such a right could be enforced by every woman in a domestic relationship irrespective of whether she is an aggrieved person or not. 49. In the Indian societal context, the right of a woman to reside in the shared household is of unique importance. The reasons for the same are not far to see. In India, most women are not educated nor are they earning, neither do they have financial independence so as to live singly. She may be dependent for residence in a domestic relationship not only for emotional support but for the aforesaid reasons. The said relationship may be by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or is a part of or is living together in a joint family. A majority of women in India do not have independent income or financial capacity and are totally dependent vis-à-vis their residence on their male or other female relations who may have a domestic relationship with her.” 32. It was further observed by the Apex Court that the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) is a piece of civil remedy, which is available to every women in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in domestic relationship. Further observations in Paragraphs ‘51’, ‘52’ and ‘53’ are also relevant to be noted hereinunder:- 51. In order to give an expansive interpretation to the expression 'every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in shared household, certain examples by way of illustrations have been discussed above. Further observations in Paragraphs ‘51’, ‘52’ and ‘53’ are also relevant to be noted hereinunder:- 51. In order to give an expansive interpretation to the expression 'every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in shared household, certain examples by way of illustrations have been discussed above. However, those illustrations are not exhaustive and there could be several situations and circumstances and every woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside in a shared household irrespective of whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same and the said right could be enforced by any woman under the said provision as an independent right in addition to the orders that could be passed under Section 19 of the D.V. Act; also an aggrieved woman who has the right to reside in the shared household is protected by Sub-Section (2) of the Section 17 of the D.V. Act. 52. In the case of Smt. Bharati Naik vs. Shri Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar and Another - [2010 SCC Online Bom 243], the High Court of Bombay at Goa held that the words 'has been' and 'have lived' appearing in the definition of 'aggrieved person' and 'respondent' in the D.V. Act are plain and clear. The Court held that the aforesaid words take in their sweep even a past relationship. The words have been purposefully used to show the past relationship or experience between the concerned parties. It was further observed that the said D.V. Act has been enacted to protect a woman from domestic violence and there cannot be any fetter which can come in the way by interpreting the provisions in a manner to mean that unless the domestic relationship continues on the date of the application, the provisions of the D.V. Act cannot be invoked. 53. In a judgment of the High Court of Madras in Vandhana vs. T. Srikanth and Krishnamachari - [2007 SCC Online Mad 553], authored by Ramasubramanian, J., it was held that Sections 2(f), 2(s) and 17 of the D.V. Act ought to be given the widest interpretation possible. The Court, after observing various instances and situations, held that many a woman may not even enter into the matrimonial home immediately after marriage. The Court, after observing various instances and situations, held that many a woman may not even enter into the matrimonial home immediately after marriage. Therefore, it was concluded that a healthy and correct interpretation to Sections 2(f) and 2(s) of the D.V. Act would be that the words 'live' or 'have at any point of time lived' would include in its purview 'the right to live' as interpreted above. It would be useful to quote from the said judgment as under:- "20. In a society like ours, there are very many situations, in which a woman may not enter into her matrimonial home immediately after marriage. A couple leaving for honeymoon immediately after the marriage and whose relationship gets strained even during honeymoon, resulting in the wife returning to her parental home straight away, may not stand the test of the definition of domestic relationship under Section 2(f) of the Act, if it is strictly construed. A woman in such a case, may not live or at any point of time lived either singly or together with the husband in the 'shared household", despite a legally valid marriage followed even by its consummation. It is not uncommon in our society, for a woman in marriage to be sent to her parental home even before consummation of marriage, on account of certain traditional beliefs, say for example, the intervention of the month of Aadi. If such a woman is held to be not entitled to the benefit of Section 17 of the Act, on account of a strict interpretation to Section 2(f) of the Act that she did not either live or at any point of time lived together in the shared household, such a woman will be left remediless despite a valid marriage. One can think of innumerable instances of the same aforesaid nature, where the woman might not live at the time of institution of the proceedings or might not have lived together with the husband even for a single day in the shared household. A narrow interpretation to Sections 2(f). 2(s) and 17 of the Act, would leave many a woman in distress, without a remedy. Therefore, in my considered view a healthy and correct interpretation to Sections 2(f) and 2(s) would be that the words 'live' or have at any point of time lived would include within their purview the right to live'. A narrow interpretation to Sections 2(f). 2(s) and 17 of the Act, would leave many a woman in distress, without a remedy. Therefore, in my considered view a healthy and correct interpretation to Sections 2(f) and 2(s) would be that the words 'live' or have at any point of time lived would include within their purview the right to live'. In other words, it is not necessary for a woman to establish her physical act of living in the shared household, either at the time of institution of the proceedings or as a thing of the past. If there is a relationship which has legal sanction, a woman in that relationship gets a right to live in the shared household. Therefore, she would be entitled to protection under Section 17 of the Act, even if she did not live in the shared household at the time of institution of the proceedings or had never lived in the shared household at any point of time in the past. Her right to protection under Section 17 of the Act, co- exists with her right to live in the shared household and it does not depend upon whether she had marked her physical presence in the shared household or not. A marriage which is valid and subsisting on the relevant date, automatically confers a right upon the wife to live in the shared household as an equal partner in the joint venture of running a family. If she has a right to live in the shared household, on account of a valid and subsisting marriage, she is definitely in 'domestic relationship' within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act and her bodily presence or absence from the shared household cannot belittle her relationship as anything other than a domestic relationship. Therefore, irrespective of the fact whether the applicant/plaintiff in this case ever lived in the house of the first respondent/first defendant after 7.2.2007 or not, her marriage to the first respondent/first defendant on 7.2.2007 has conferred a right upon her to live in the shared household. Therefore, the question as to whether the applicant/plaintiff ever lived in the shared household at any point of time during the period from 7.2.2007 to 13.6.2007 or not, is of little significance." 33. Therefore, the question as to whether the applicant/plaintiff ever lived in the shared household at any point of time during the period from 7.2.2007 to 13.6.2007 or not, is of little significance." 33. It was, thus, held by the Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi (supra) that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person (woman) to have actually lived or resided with the person, against whom the allegations have been leveled at the time of seeking relief. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household, she can accordingly, enforce her right under Section 17 (1) of the DV Act. If a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek relief under the provisions of the DV Act including her right to live or reside in the shared household under Section 17 read with Section 19 of the DV Act. Maintainability of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India: 34. We may further support our observations made hereinbefore about the maintainability of the petition in view of the remedy under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 with the aid of the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Kiran Bala Srivastav Vs. Jai Prakash Srivastav [2006 ALL CJ 1936 : 2005 (23) LCD 1], wherein the full Bench has answered the question ‘whether an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act would lie against an order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for grant of interim maintenance?” The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has noted the language employed in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act and recorded that by virtue of sub-section (5) of Section 19, the legislature has contemplated only one remedy of appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against any judgment or order or decree of a Family Court, by specifying that no appeal or revision shall lie against any judgment, order or decree of the family court except as provided in Subsection (1) of Section 19. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 contains a Non-obstante clause and provides that save as provided in sub-section (2) (a decree or order passed by the family court with the consent of parties), notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment and order, not being an interlocutory order, of the family court to the High Court both on facts and law. These words appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 19 read with sub-section (5) thereof leave no room for doubt that every judgment or order of the family court is appealable under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act and no other appeal or revision would lie. The only exclusion is of ‘an interlocutory order’. 35. While considering the expressions ‘judgment or order’ and interlocutory order’, it was noted therein that these words used in sub-section (1) of Section 19 have not been defined in the Family Courts Act. However, the definition as contained in Section 2 (9) (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure can be looked into by virtue of Section 2 (e) of the Family Courts Act, which states that all other words and expression used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Code of Civil Procedure shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in the Civil Procedure Code. However, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ is not defined even in the Code of Civil Procedure though, the said expression has been used in Order XXXIX of the CPC. 36. The Full Bench has further noted the decision of the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, [ AIR 1981 SC 1786 : (1981) 4 SCC 8 ], wherein the word ‘judgment’ appearing in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent ‘Bombay’ had been interpreted to hold that those orders, which decided matters of moment or which affected vital and valuable rights of the party or which tended to work serious injustice to the party concerned, would fall within the expression ‘judgment’ appearing in relevant clause of Letters Patent. 37. It was noted that their Lordships had referred to three kinds of judgments:- (a) A final judgment.— A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing to be decided. 37. It was noted that their Lordships had referred to three kinds of judgments:- (a) A final judgment.— A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge, indisputably and unquestionably, is a judgment even amount to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to the higher court. (b) The second kind is a preliminary judgment, which may take two forms: i. Where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the higher court, ii. Another form a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, such as bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial court against the defendant but the suit is not terminated and continues and has to be tried on merits. In such a case, the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections, would adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Such an order though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a higher court. Such an order though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a higher court. (c) The third category of judgments, are Intermediary or interlocutory judgment, which are mostly such orders which contain the quality of finality as is specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC and have always be held to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters patent and, therefore, appealable. 38. It was, then, observed that there may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1, but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality, inasmuch as, the orders which may adversely affect valuable rights of the party to the trial in an ancillary proceeding. 39. It was noted therein that the Apex Court has ruled in Shah Babulal Khimji (Supra) that “order or interlocutory order” possessing the characteristics and trappings of finality or effecting valuable right of the party or deciding important aspects of the trial in the main or in ancillary proceedings, will be a “judgment”. 40. It was further noted by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court that from the reading of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, what is noticeable is that this provision deviates from Section 96 of the Code, 1908 as Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides for appeal against the judgment whereas, the Code of Civil Procedure provides for appeal only against decrees and orders and does not provide appeal against judgments. The question would, thus, arise as to why the legislature made a departure by providing appeal against judgments also under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. It was observed that it cannot be accepted that the legislature was not aware of the established practice or did not know the meaning of the word ‘judgment’, assigned to by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (Supra). 41. It was observed that it cannot be accepted that the legislature was not aware of the established practice or did not know the meaning of the word ‘judgment’, assigned to by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (Supra). 41. Further noticing the jurisdiction conferred upon the family court in Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 7 of that Act, it was noted that a glance at the said provision indicates that matters dealt with and decided by different courts and different levels of civil courts under different enactments, prior to the enactment, were placed within the jurisdiction of a Family Court constituted under the Family Courts Act, 1984. The legislature was aware of the legal position that orders or/and decrees of civil court of primary level, could be subjected to not only one appeal but to more than one. The declaration in the Bill bringing the Family Courts Act, that only one right of appeal is being provided, should be dealt in line of the abovenoted context. 42. Having said that, to consider as to whether the order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, granting pendente lite maintenance to the party to the matrimonial dispute, possess characteristics and trappings of the judgment, two decisions of the Apex Court in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, [ (1977) 4 SCC 137 : AIR 1977 SC 2185 ] and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47 ] were referred and relied upon, wherein the Apex Court has made the following observations:- “6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of Section 397 against the historical background of these facts. Subsection (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus : “The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.” The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term “interlocutory order” as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term “interlocutory order” is a term of wellknown legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. The term “interlocutory order” is a term of wellknown legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary “interlocutory” has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” 43. It was held in Amar Nath (supra) that “interlocutory order” used in Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely denotes orders on purely interim or temporary nature, which do not decide or touch upon the important rights or liabilities of the parties, such order for instance with reference to Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code are orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders of bail, cutting for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceedings, against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders, which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial, cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It was pointed out that the finality of the order could not be judged by corelating that order with the controversy in the complaint and the fact that the controversy still remains alive was irrelevant. 44. The said view stated in Amar Nath (supra) was reiterated in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra) with the observation that some kinds of orders may fall in between final order and ‘interlocutory order’ and the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not meant to be attracted to such kind of ‘intermediary orders’. In other words, according to their Lordships, what was not final, was not necessarily interlocutory for the purposes of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant paragraphs, as held and reiterated in Madhu Limaye (supra), are extracted hereinbelow:- “12. Ordinarily and generally the expression “interlocutory order” has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term “final order”. In volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at p. 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606: “... a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.” In para 1607 it is said: “In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed ‘final’.” In para 1608 at pp. 744 and 745 we find the words: “An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declaration of right already given in the final judgment, are to be worked out, is termed ‘interlocutory’. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.” 13. In S. Kuppuswami Rao v. King Kania, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court has referred to some English decisions at pp. 185 and 186. Lord Esher, M.R. said in Salaman v. Warner : “If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory.” To the same effect are the observations quoted from the judgments of Fry, L.J. and Lopes, L.J.: “Applying the said test, almost on facts similar to the ones in the instant case, it was held that the order in revision passed by the High Court [at that time there was no bar like Section 397(2)] was not a “final order” within the meaning of Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words ‘interlocutory order’ occurring in Section 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or the propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior criminal court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide for example, River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India that although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the Legislature. On the one hand, the Legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the Legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being converse of the words “final order”. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami case, but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order — pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are wellknown and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.” 14. In passing, for the sake of explaining ourselves, we may refer to what has been said by Kania, C.J. in Kuppuswami case at pp. 187 by quoting a few words from Sir George Lowndes in the case of V.M. Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons . The learned Law Lord said with reference to the order under consideration in that case: “The effect of the order from which it is here sought to appeal was not to dispose finally of the rights of the parties. It no doubt decided an important, and even a vital issue in the case, but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial in the ordinary way.” Many a time a question arose in India as to what is the exact meaning of the phrase “case decided” occurring in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Some High Courts had taken the view that it meant the final order passed on final determination of the action. Many others had, however, opined that even interlocutory orders were covered by the said term. This Court struck a mean and it did not approve of either of the two extreme lines. Some High Courts had taken the view that it meant the final order passed on final determination of the action. Many others had, however, opined that even interlocutory orders were covered by the said term. This Court struck a mean and it did not approve of either of the two extreme lines. In Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. it has been pointed out: “A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy.” We may give a clear example of an order in a civil case which may not be a final order within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution, yet it will not be purely or simply of an interlocutory character. Suppose for example, a defendant raises the plea of jurisdiction of a particular Court to try the suit or the bar of limitation and succeeds, then the action is determined finally in that Court. But if the point is decided against him the suit proceeds. Of course, in a given case the point raised may be such that it is interwoven and inter-connected with the other issues in the case, and that it may not be possible to decide it under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a preliminary point of law. But, if it is a pure point of law and is decided one way or the other, then the order deciding such a point may not be interlocutory, albeit — may not be final either. Surely, it will be a case decided, as pointed out by this Court in some decisions, within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We think it would be just and proper to apply the same kind of test for finding out the real meaning of the expression “interlocutory order” occurring in Section 397(2).” 45. Considering the said principle, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has proceeded to consider the object behind Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and noted that the order granting or refusing pendente lite maintenance under Section 24 has no connection with the questions or issues that may crop up in the main proceedings for restitution of conjugal right or judicial separation or divorce or annulment of marriage etc. The ambit and nature of the proceedings for divorce or judicial separation etc. are wholly different from the ambit and nature of the proceedings under Section 24. 46. Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is a provision, which decides the right of the party approaching the Court of having maintenance pendente lite or expenses from the other party. The refusal of maintenance under Section 24 is serious to the party in 99% of the cases wherein the applicant is wife, so much so that she may even give up the idea of defending herself for want of sufficient means. 47. With the above, considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above noted decisions, it was held by the Full Bench that the order of pendent lite maintenance has all the characteristics and trappings of the judgment as it decides the valuable rights and liabilities of the parties to the proceedings. Insofar those rights and liabilities are concerned, the order is final. 48. The question referred to the Full Bench, thus, was answered by holding that the order under Section 24 granting or refusing pendente lite maintenance is a judgment for purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 19, moreso, in view of the declaration in the bill introducing Family Courts Act, 1984 that only one right of appeal was to be provided and hence an appeal will lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act against such order. 49. Taking note of the above judgment, we may record that the order of disposal of the application under Section 12 read with Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) would decide the right of the destitute wife or woman to seek protection of restraining the respondent from dispossessing her or, in any other manner, disturbing her possession from the shared household. This right, as held by the Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi (supra), conferred on every woman in a domestic relationship is a vital and significant right. The order of disposal of the application under Section 12 read with Section 19 of the DV Act, thus, is an order of disposal of the right of residence in a shared household claimed by the aggrieved person within the meaning of the DV Act or the destitute wife. The order of disposal of the application under Section 12 read with Section 19 of the DV Act, thus, is an order of disposal of the right of residence in a shared household claimed by the aggrieved person within the meaning of the DV Act or the destitute wife. The order disposing of the application under Section 12 read with Section 19 of the DV Act has no connection with the question or issues that may crop up in the main proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, such as annulment of marriage in the instant case, inasmuch as, the issue pertaining to right to residence is an independent right claimed by the applicant herein, who is admittedly the married wife of the respondent. Moreover, the order of disposal of the application under Section 12 read with Section 19 of the DV Act is an order, which possess the characteristics and trappings of finality as it affects valuable rights of the parties deciding an important aspect in the ancillary proceedings, drawn before the Family Court. 50. As noted above, the object of the Family Courts Act is to bring all disputes pertaining to marital relationships under one umbrella by providing for establishment of family courts, and only one right of appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which shall lie to the High Court. 51. With the above, we reach at an irresistible conclusion that the order impugned dated 07.12.2019 passed by the Family Court, which is an order passed on the application (Exhibit- 15) filed under Section 12 and Section 19 read with Section 26 of the DV Act, 2005, would fall within the meaning of ‘judgment or order’, and ‘not being an interlocutory order of the family court’ within the meaning of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and hence, the only remedy available to the respondent herein was to file appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. 52. The learned Single Judge has, thus, erred in law in entertaining the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed on application (Exhibit- 15) by the Family Court, being oblivious of the legal position that the remedy before the petitioner therein was to file an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 53. 53. The judgments relied by the learned counsel for the respondents on the “maintainability of the instant appeal” and on the question of the “shared household” relied by the learned Single Judge are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 54. On overall consideration of all the above aspects of the matter, we are of the considered view that since this is a matter where the learned Single Judge has failed in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by exceeding its jurisdiction in entertaining the petition invoking revisional power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India inspite of availability of statutory remedy of appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, the instant Letters Patent Appeal challenging the order of the learned Single Judge is held maintainable as it cannot be rejected on the ground that the Letters Patent Appeal under Section 15 of the Letters Patent does not lie against an order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the single Bench of the High Court. 55. From all the above angles, the order dated 05.05.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and is, accordingly set aside. The appeal stands allowed. The original petitioner is at liberty to avail the remedy available to him in accordance with law. Consequently, the connected Civil Application also stands disposed of. 56. Lastly, it is clarified that the observations made hereinbefore are only to test the correctness of the order under challenge and all rights and contentions of the parties are left open in the pending proceedings or any further proceedings initiated by them under law. 57. The appeal stands allowed, accordingly.