JUDGMENT : This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short ‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants/defendants challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 23.07.1999, in O.S. No.175 of 1988 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry [for short ‘the trial Court’]. The Respondents herein are the plaintiffs and L.Rs. of plaintiffs in the said Suit. 2. The respondents/plaintiffs filed a Suit for partition of plaint schedule property into 8 equal shares and to put the plaintiffs 1 to 7 in possession of 1/8th share each and for future profits from the date of plaint till the date of possession and for costs. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.175 of 1988, are as under: The first plaintiff and late K.S.Hirams are the sons and plaintiffs 2 to 7 are the daughters of late Karipalli Cornelius, who died intestate on 30.06.1960. The first plaintiff’s only brother K.S.Hirams died on 01.08.1977. The first defendant is the wife and defendants 2 to 5 are the sons and defendants 6 and 7 are the daughters of late K.S.Hirams. The plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of late Karipalli Cornelius. He purchased the site under sale deed dated 03.10.1955 and constructed house in it. After his death, plaintiffs and late K.S.Hirams inherited the plaint schedule property in equal shares. The wife of Cornelius predeceased him. So they are the only heirs entitled to the plaint schedule property and the defendants became entitled to the share of late Hirams. Till the death of Cornelius he used to manage the plaint schedule property by letting out the building and collecting rents. After his death the plaintiffs and K.S.Hirams, the plaintiffs and the defendants are continuing to do so. At present, the 8th defendant is in possession of the schedule property as tenant. The plaintiffs with an intention to have their shares separated, have been requesting the defendants to partition the property since one year, but the defendants postponing the same. Plaintiffs also got issued notice to the first defendant on 16.07.1988 demanding division of the plaint schedule property and requesting her to co-operate with them in effecting division. The notice but did not send any constrained to file the suit. first defendant received the said reply. Plaintiffs also got issued notice to the first defendant on 16.07.1988 demanding division of the plaint schedule property and requesting her to co-operate with them in effecting division. The notice but did not send any constrained to file the suit. first defendant received the said reply. Hence, the plaintiffs are ii) Subsequent to the suit, plaintiffs 1 and 2 died and their legal representatives were added as plaintiffs 8 to 13, subsequent to the suit, 12th plaintiff died and his legal representative was added as plaintiff No.14. 5. The first defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the defendants 2 to 7, by denying all the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under: - The plaint schedule property is not the self acquired property of Karipalli Cornelius and the said property was acquired with the funds of late Hirams by his father, accordingly, the said property is the property of late Dr.K.S.Hirams and the said Cornelius acted as trustee. Between 1955 to 1958 late Hirams lived in United States and sent money to his father, with that funds, his father constructed the building. After returning from U.S., the said Cornelius delivered the possession of the property to Dr.Hirams, who got the building mutated in his name and paid taxes although. Cornelius never claimed any right in the property any time. It was Dr.Hirams, from the year 1960 that was in exclusive possession along with the defendants. The building is not in the tenancy of any one now and it is wholly in occupation of defendants and they are alone entitled to the property exclusive. ii) After adding the legal representatives, the first defendant filed additional written statement, which was adopted by defendants 2 to 7. Its brief averments are as follows: iii) The plaint is non-joinder of necessary parties and the suit is barred by time for the reason that since the time of return of Hirams from America, he was in possession of the schedule property. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the suit property is valued property? (ii) Whether the Court fee paid is correct? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are in joint possession of plaint schedule property? (iv) Whether the schedule properties are the self acquisition of late Cornelius? (v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to share in the plaint schedule properties? (ii) Whether the Court fee paid is correct? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are in joint possession of plaint schedule property? (iv) Whether the schedule properties are the self acquisition of late Cornelius? (v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to share in the plaint schedule properties? (vi) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to partition of plaint schedule properties by metes and bounds? (vii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to past and future profits? (viii) To what share each of the parties are entitled to? (ix) To what relief? Additional Issues: (i) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (ii) Whether the suit is barred by time? (iii) To what relief? 7. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A4 and Ex.X1 and Ex.X2 were marked. On behalf of the Defendants DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B11 were marked. 8. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 23.07.1999, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendants in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 9. Heard Sri M.V.Suresh, learned counsel for appellants/ defendants through virtual hearing and Sri A.S.C.Bose, learned counsel representing Sri P.Vivek, learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that Ex.A4 dated 14.07.1988 copy of registered partition is silent about the existence of suit schedule property, as such the Court below failed to held that the suit schedule property is not the self acquired property of late Cornelius. He would further contend that the trial Court failed to consider Ex.A4 in a prospective manner wherein it is mentioned that parties to document divided all the properties left by Cornelius. He would further contend that there is nothing in Ex.A4 to show that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of late Cornelius. He would further contend that the trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper manner and came to wrong conclusion by decreeing the suit and that the appeal may be allowed. 11. He would further contend that there is nothing in Ex.A4 to show that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of late Cornelius. He would further contend that the trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper manner and came to wrong conclusion by decreeing the suit and that the appeal may be allowed. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the trial Court rightly decreed the suit for partition and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned trial Judge and he would further contend that appeal may be dismissed. 12. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1. Whether the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of Karipalli Cornelius or Dr.K.S.Hirams? 2. Whether the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 3. Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court needs any interference? If so, to what extent? 13. Point No.1: Whether the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of Karipalli Cornelius or Dr.K.S.Hirams? The admitted facts are the first plaintiff and late K.S.Hirams are the sons and plaintiffs 2 to 7 are the daughters of late Karipalli Cornelius, who died intestate on 30.06.1960 and the first plaintiff’s only brother K.S.Hirams died on 01.08.1977 and the first defendant is the wife and defendants 2 to 7 are the sons and daughters of late K.S.Hirams. 14. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of late Cornelius and he purchased the site under sale deed dated 03.10.1955 and constructed house in the site. The plaintiffs further pleaded that after the death of Cornelius, the plaintiffs and late K.S.Hirams inherited the plaint schedule property in equal shares and the wife of Cornelius predeceased him and so they are the only legal heirs entitled the plaint schedule property and while so K.S.Hirams died intestate on 01.08.1977, the death of Cornelius and the death of K.S.Hirams is not in dispute by both sides. 15. 15. The learned counsel for appellants would contend that the plaint schedule property is not the self acquired property of Cornelius and the said property is the property of late Dr.K.S.Hirams held in trust for him and acquired with the funds of late Hirams by his father late Cornelius. The learned counsel for appellants further contend that after the death of Cornelius, the property continued to be that Dr.Hirams till he passed away and the same came to be inherited by the defendants. He would further contend that as the property never belongs to Cornelius as a beneficiary owner, but the same was held by him as a trustee. 16. In order to prove the case of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs relied on the evidence of PW1 and PW2. PW1 is the 6th plaintiff, PW2 is the Secretary of Co-operative House Building Society. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A1 copy of document vide document bearing No.4041/1955. In her evidence PW1 deposed that she is the 6th plaintiff in the suit and the first plaintiff is her elder brother, plaintiffs 8 and 9 are wife and son of the deceased first plaintiff and plaintiffs 2 to 5 and 7 are his sisters. She further deposed that plaintiffs 10 to 13 are the sons of the deceased/second plaintiff. As per her evidence, the plaint schedule property originally belongs to her father by name late Karipalli Cornelius and it is his self acquired property. She further deposed that her father joined in the building society and purchased the same from building society for Rs.1250/-under a registered sale deed and the original registered sale deed is with building society because he obtained a loan from the said society and Ex.A1 is the certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 03.10.1955. In cross examination, she admits that she accompanied with his father at the time of Ex.A1 to the building society. She pleaded ignorance about the Ac.8.00 cents of land belongs to her father situated at Kamsalabethapudi in Narsapuram taluk. She further admits that she does not know in whose house the said building society was situated at that time and it is in the year 1955 and she does not know the boundaries of the suit schedule property and she does not have any other evidence except her word that she accompanied her father on the date of Ex.A1. She further admits that she does not know in whose house the said building society was situated at that time and it is in the year 1955 and she does not know the boundaries of the suit schedule property and she does not have any other evidence except her word that she accompanied her father on the date of Ex.A1. She further admits that by the time of Ex.A1 they were residing in a rented house and there is no house in the schedule property of Ex.A1, by then her elder brother Hirams was in states. She further deposed that her father joined as a secondary grade teacher, but subsequently he worked as B.Ed. Teacher and his earnings were only in 2 digits in those days. She further stated that her mother was also working as teacher and they were 8 in number to their parents. The above admissions goes to show that she is not having any personal knowledge about the suit transaction. 17. It is the specific case of the defendants that husband of first defendant and father of other defendants by name Hirams used to stay in States by the date of Ex.A1 and he was a famous surgeon and used to work in States and send money to his father Cornelius, from out of the same, his father got obtained the sale deed from the House Building society. It does not mean that it is the self acquired property of father of Hirams by name Karipalli Cornelius. It is admitted by PW1 that by the date of Ex.A1 they were residing in a rented house and there is no house in the schedule property of Ex.A1, by then, her elder brother Dr.Hirams was in States as a doctor. She further admits that her brother Dr.Hirams was a famous surgeon in both East and West Godavari districts in those days and he earned a lot. She further admits that after Dr.Hirams returned from America, Dr.Hirams started to serve in A.E.L.C. hospital at Alcotgardens from 1958 onwards. Here it is relevant to say that Ex.A1 is dated 03.10.1955, it was pleaded by the defendants that Cornelius was not having sufficient capacity to purchase the site under Ex.A1. PW2 is the secretary of co-operative building society. PW2 admits that the site value under Ex.A1 is Rs.449-14 annas and 8 paise by then. Here it is relevant to say that Ex.A1 is dated 03.10.1955, it was pleaded by the defendants that Cornelius was not having sufficient capacity to purchase the site under Ex.A1. PW2 is the secretary of co-operative building society. PW2 admits that the site value under Ex.A1 is Rs.449-14 annas and 8 paise by then. There was a specific admission by PW1 in his cross examination itself that in those days by the year 1955, by the date of Ex.A1 her father earnings were only 2 digits and he used to work as secondary grade teacher and they are 8 in number to his parents, therefore, it strengthen the case of the defendants that the Cornelius is not having any sufficient money to purchase the Ex.A1 site with his individual income. 18. Another important circumstance to disbelieve the case of the plaintiffs is that Ex.A4 goes to show that on 14.07.1988 the first and second plaintiffs and wife of Hirams partitioned the properties of Cornelius under a registered partition deed dated 14.07.1988, after the death of Cornelius. It is relevant to say Cornelius died on 30.06.1960 intestate and Hirams also died intestate on 01.08.1977 by leaving the defendants as a legal representatives. The same is not in dispute by both sides. The plaintiffs are claiming relief of partition of the plaint schedule property on the pretext that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of Cornelius and the said Cornelius died intestate in the year 1960 by leaving the plaintiffs and defendants as a legal representatives and the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of Cornelius. It is not in dispute that the Cornelius died intestate on 30.06.1960 and Hirams i.e., eldest son of Cornelius also died intestate on 01.08.1977 and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and husband of first defendant and father of other defendants i.e., Hirams got divided the properties of Cornelius under registered partition deed dated 14.07.1988, Ex.A4 is the registration extract of the said registered partition deed dated 14.07.1988. Here it is relevant to say that the Cornelius died on 30.06.1960 intestate and the said registered partition deed is dated 14.07.1988. In Ex.A4 nothing was mentioned about the plaint schedule property and there is no mention in Ex.A4 that Cornelius was having plaint schedule property. Here it is relevant to say that the Cornelius died on 30.06.1960 intestate and the said registered partition deed is dated 14.07.1988. In Ex.A4 nothing was mentioned about the plaint schedule property and there is no mention in Ex.A4 that Cornelius was having plaint schedule property. There was a specific recital in Ex.A4 that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and wife of Hirams divided the self acquired properties of Cornelius under Ex.A4 registered partition deed dated 14.07.1988, therefore non mentioning of the plaint schedule property in Ex.A4 is certainly fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. 19. A reliance is placed by the learned counsel for plaintiffs in Md.Mohammad Ali (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Jagadish Kalita and others, (2004) 1 SCC 271, the facts in the aforesaid decision relates to the suit filed for declaration of title, whereas in the present case, the suit is filed for partition of the suit schedule property. It is not the case of the defendants in the case on hand that the possession of the defendants is by way of adverse possession. 20. A reliance is placed by the counsel for respondents in the judgment of Telangana High Court in Dr.Mutyala Vinod Kumar vs. Smt. M.Shashikala Naidu and another. In the case on hand, it is not the case of the appellants that the transaction of Ex.A4 is benamee transaction. The facts and circumstances in the aforesaid cited decision are different to the instant case. 21. The plaintiffs relied on the evidence of PW2. Admittedly PW2 has no personal knowledge about the suit transaction because he is working as a secretary of building society from 1976 onwards, Ex.A1 is relates to the year 1955. PW2 admits in cross examination that since 1976 onwards he is working as a Secretary of Co-operative Building Society and as on date their building society does not undertake the construction of the buildings and he does not know from whom the sanction for construction of the house to be obtained for construction of a house in the said plot. He further admits that the building society does not collect building tax or site tax, but the Panchayat collects the same. He further admits that the building society does not collect building tax or site tax, but the Panchayat collects the same. He further admits in the year 1970 or 1971 Gandhi Prakasamnagar panchayat area merged into Rajamahendravaram Municipality and subsequently it became Municipal Corporation, now their building society is not sanctioning authority for the construction of any building or for alteration of any building. He further admits that at the time of construction of the building in the year 1955 he never went to the building and he further admits that they are no way concerned who are the owner of the site and building and who advanced funds for construction and who is paying taxes to the concerned authority. Another crucial admission made by him is that the loan amount was fully discharged on 12.06.1967. It is not in dispute that the Cornelius died on 30.06.1960, husband of first defendant was only son of Cornelius. In cross examination PW2 admits that by the time he joined in the house building society the debt was already cleared and he does not know the father-in-law of the first defendant i.e., Cornelius. He further admits that he cannot say who paid the loan instalment. Ex.B2 to Ex.B4 are the relevant correspondence when the loanee committed default and demanding for their payment and the value of the building was nearly Rs.12,00,000/-. As per his evidence, he joined in the House Building Society as a Secretary in the year 1976 whereas the Ex.A1 is relates to the year 1955 therefore, his evidence is not supporting the case of the plaintiffs to show that the plaint schedule property is self acquired property of late Cornelius. 22. Learned counsel for plaintiffs would contend that there is no pleading in the written statement about Ex.A4 by the defendants. As seen from the plaint averments, there is no pleadings in the plaint itself about Ex.A4. Ex.A4 is not filed along with the plaint. The plaintiffs filed Ex.A4 during the course of trial, therefore, non-mentioning of Ex.A4 in the written statement is not fatal to the case of the defendants. 23. As per the evidence of DW1, Dr.Hirams is her husband and she is the first defendant and the other defendants are her children and the suit schedule property was acquired by her husband. The plaintiffs filed Ex.A4 during the course of trial, therefore, non-mentioning of Ex.A4 in the written statement is not fatal to the case of the defendants. 23. As per the evidence of DW1, Dr.Hirams is her husband and she is the first defendant and the other defendants are her children and the suit schedule property was acquired by her husband. She further deposed that in the year 1955 her husband went to States in the month of July, after her husband left to the States, her father-in-law purchased a vacant site with the money of her husband and her husband returned to India in the year 1958 and her father-in-law constructed a house with her husband money. She further deposed that after her husband returned from the States, her husband repaid the loan amount taken by her father-in-law for the construction of the said house to the Society and her father-in-law died in the year 1960. She further deposed that Ex.B7 and Ex.B8 are the receipts issued by the Building Society evidencing the payment of loan amount by her husband on the said two occasions, by the date of Ex.B7 and Ex.B8, her father-in-law is no more. The defendants are relied on Ex.B2 to Ex.B11. Ex.B2 is a letter addressed by the Secretary of Building Society to Sri K.Hirams, i.e., husband of first defendant. The recitals in Ex.B2 goes to show that Sri Hirams paid an amount of Rs.2,200/- on 24.06.1961 towards the overdue amount under the loan account of Sri Cornelius. Ex.B3 is the letter addressed by the Deputy Registrar, Rajahmundry to the president of Housing Co-operative Society. Ex.B4 is the letter addressed by the secretary of building society to the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society, wherein it was informed about the payment of money of Rs.2,200/-by Sri Hirams. Ex.B5 is the postal card, Ex.B7 to Ex.B9 goes to show that Hirams discharged the amount, under Ex.B7 to Ex.B9, in the year 1967. It is relevant to mention that the Cornelius died in the year 1960. Ex.B11 is the bunch of property tax, demand registers for the year 1973-74 to 1988-89. Ex.B11 goes to show that the plaint schedule property is in exclusive possession of Hirams during his life time and his name is also mutated in Municipal records. It is relevant to mention that the Cornelius died in the year 1960. Ex.B11 is the bunch of property tax, demand registers for the year 1973-74 to 1988-89. Ex.B11 goes to show that the plaint schedule property is in exclusive possession of Hirams during his life time and his name is also mutated in Municipal records. For the foregoing reasons, it is undoubtedly clear that the plaint schedule property is not the joint family property of both the parties to the suit and the plaintiffs failed to prove that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of Cornelius. As stated supra, the Cornelius died in the year 1960 and in the year 1988 the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and husband of first defendant partitioned the properties of Cornelius, there is no whisper about the plaint schedule property in Ex.A4. As stated supra, non-mentioning of the plaint schedule property in Ex.A4 is certainly fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the plaint schedule property is not self acquired property of Cornelius. The oral and documentary evidence strengthen the case of the defendants to show that the plaint schedule property was not the self acquired property of Cornelius, accordingly the point No.1 is answered against the plaintiffs. 24. Point No.2: Whether the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? The defendants specifically pleaded in the additional written statement that all the legal representatives of plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not added as a parties to the suit and therefore the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is relevant to say that after filing additional written statement an additional issue was framed by the trial Court on 24.08.1998 that “Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties”. The said additional issue was framed by the trial judge before the commencement of the trial itself. There was a clear admission by PW1 in her evidence in cross examination that the deceased first plaintiff is her brother and there are some other children to the deceased first plaintiff apart from 9th defendant and they were not made as parties to the suit. She further admits that there are 5 daughters to the deceased/ first plaintiff, the said 5 daughters were not added as parties. She further admits that there are 5 daughters to the deceased/ first plaintiff, the said 5 daughters were not added as parties. She further admits that as per the Christian Law all the sons and daughters are equally entitled for shares. The material on record reveals that during the pendency of the suit, 12th plaintiff died, wife of the 12th plaintiff is not added as a party to the suit. Therefore, it is undoubtedly clear that the plaintiffs failed to add the 5 daughters of the first plaintiff and so also wife of 12th plaintiff as a party to the suit for partition. 25. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra. In the case of Kanakarathanammal v. V. S. Loganatha Mudaliar, AIR 1965 SC 271 , a five-Judge Bench of the apex Court held at para-14 as follows: “14. We do not think there is any justification for allowing the appellant to amend her plaint by adding her brothers at this late stage. We have already noticed that the plea of non-joinder had been expressly taken by respondents 1 and 2 in the trial Court and a clear and specific issue had been framed in respect of this contention. While the suit was being tried, the appellant might have applied to the trial Court to add her brothers, but no such application was made. Even after the suit was dismissed by the trial Court on this ground it does not appear that the appellant moved the High Court and prayed that she should be allowed to join her brothers even at the appellate stage, and so, the High Court had no occasion to consider the said point. The fact that the High Court came to the contrary conclusion on the question of title does not matter, because if the appellant wanted to cure the infirmity in her plaint, she should have presented an application in that behalf at the hearing of the appeal itself. In fact, no such application was made even to this Court until the appeal was allowed to stand over after it was heard. Under the circumstances, we do not think it would be possible for us to entertain the said application. In fact, no such application was made even to this Court until the appeal was allowed to stand over after it was heard. Under the circumstances, we do not think it would be possible for us to entertain the said application. In the result, the application for amendment is rejected.” In the case on hand, as stated supra, a specific plea was taken by defendants in the additional written statement that all the legal representatives of plaintiffs 1 and 2 are not added as a parties to the suit and therefore the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The material on record clearly reveals that the five daughters of the deceased first plaintiff were not added as a parties to the suit for the reasons best known to the plaintiffs. It is also made it clear that the wife of the 12th plaintiff was not added as a party to the suit for the reasons best known to the plaintiffs. Therefore, certainly, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 26. In the case of Jahangirji (died) by LRs v. K. Kumar, 2011 SCC OnLine AP 744, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, held at para-30 as follows: “30. In K. Bhaskar Rao v. K.A. Rama Rao, 2010 (5) ADD 339, a learned Judge of this Court was dealing with a suit for partition wherein the defendant in the written statement raised the plea of non-joinder of the two sisters of the parties for which the plaintiff stated in his rejoinder that as they were already married and were given sufficient share in the form of cash and articles, they were not necessary parties. The plaintiff came up with an application to implead the sisters as parties in the first appeal and the learned Judge rejected the request holding that the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties being fatal, the same cannot be cured by impleading them in the appeal and upheld the dismissal of the suit on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties by the trial Court. The decisions reported in Naba Kumar Hazra v. Radhashyam Mahish (supra), Chenthiperumal Pillai Chanthanamuthu Pillai v. D.M. Devasahayam (supra) and Kanakarathanammal v. V.S. Loganatha Mudaliar (supra), were relied upon before the learned Judge in support of the proposition that non-joinder of sisters is a fatal defect and the suit for partition is liable to be dismissed even on that ground alone.” 27. In the aforesaid decision, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh further held at para-31 as follows: “31. … … … The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Addepalli Venkata Laxmi v. Ayinampudi Narasimha Rao (supra), was one where the objection about the non-joinder of necessary parties was taken for the first time during the arguments in the letters patent appeal due to which the objection was not entertained, unlike the present case where the objection runs throughout the litigation right from the written statement.” 28. In the aforesaid case, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh further held at para-32 as follows: “32. … … … Much emphasis is attempted to be laid on the use of the word “mis-joinder of parties” in the written statement and in the issue framed by the trial Court, while the intent and purport is patent and clear that it was about the non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. … … … The decision in K. Bhaskar Rao v. K.A. Rama Rao (supra), following the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court apart from the decision of a Full Bench of Travancore Cochin is binding and the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties cannot be cured by impleading them in the appeal and is fatal to the suit for partition.” The ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions squarely applicable to the present facts of the case. 29. The learned counsel for plaintiffs/respondents placed a reliance in Harihar Prasad Singh and others vs. Balmiki Prasad Singh and others, AIR 1975 SC 733 , the facts in the aforesaid decision relates to Order 41 Rule 33 Cr.P.C. Here the case on hand, the suit is for partition of the plaint schedule properties. Admittedly the suit is instituted by the plaintiffs in the year 1988 for claiming the relief of partition of the plaint schedule property. Admittedly the suit is instituted by the plaintiffs in the year 1988 for claiming the relief of partition of the plaint schedule property. Admittedly, the defendants have taken a specific plea in the additional written statement itself that the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties before the commencement of trial. An issue was also framed by the trial Court and evidence was adduced by both the parties, the plaintiffs did not evince any interest to add the daughters of the deceased first plaintiff, and wife of the deceased 12th plaintiff as a party to the suit, for the reasons best known to them. Therefore, certainly the suit for partition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Therefore, in view of the above reasons, the suit for partition is a bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Accordingly, the point No.2 is answered against the plaintiffs. 30. Point No.3: Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court needs any interference? If so, to what extent? In view of my findings in point Nos.1 and 2, the trial Court committed a grave error in decreeing the suit, therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court is not sustainable under law and the same is liable to be set aside. Consequently the suit in OS.No.175 of 1988 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry is dismissed. 31. In the result, the Appeal Suit is allowed by setting aside the decree and Judgment dated 23.07.1999 in O.S.No.175 of 1988 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry. Considering the circumstances of the case, I order each party do bear their own costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.