JUDGMENT : AJAY MOHAN GOEL, J. 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for the following relief: “(a) That appropriate writ, order or direction may very kindly be issued and the impugned order dated 31­03­2023, Annexure P­4 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh may very kindly be quashed and set aside by further direction to the respondents to refer the dispute to the Labour Court­Cum­Industrial Tribunal, in the interest of Law and justice.” 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present petition are that as per the petitioner, he was engaged as a daily wage beldar in the office of respondent No. 4 on 01.08.1997. His services were wrongly terminated in the month of August, 2000. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute in this regard in terms of Demand Notice (Annexure P­1), which was submitted in the month of February, 2021. His grievance is that rejection of his Demand Notice by the Deputy Labour Commissioner in terms of the impugned order dated 31.03.2023 (Annexure P­4), inter-alia, on the ground that raising the alleged industrial dispute after more than twenty years without any justification or delay seems to be afterthought for getting reinstatement in Government employment, was bad in law as once the petitioner had issued a Demand Notice, the Appropriate Government was bound to make Reference to learned Labour Court for adjudication thereof. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Deputy Labour Commissioner erred in rejecting the Demand Notice of the petitioner on the ground that the same was stale as he erred in not appreciating that the petitioner was time and again taking up the issue with the Authority concerned and it was only after the petitioner found that no positive response was coming from the Government that he raised the Demand Notice. 4. On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General has supported the impugned order and submitted that as the petitioner did not raise the Demand notice within reasonable time, as from the date when the cause of action accrued and the same was filed after twenty years, the Authority rightly rejected the Demand Notice on the same being stale. Learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that in the Demand Notice there was no justification given as to why the demand was raised after two decades. 5. Learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that in the Demand Notice there was no justification given as to why the demand was raised after two decades. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through the documents appended with the petition including the impugned order. 6. It is the own case of the petitioner that his services were terminated in the month of August, 2000. The Demand Notice was issued by the petitioner in the month of February, 2021. A perusal of the said Demand Notice demonstrates that it was mentioned therein that the applicant had earlier filed an application before the Labour Officer, Chamba in the year 2010, but no conciliation took place and he was under the impression that the matter of the applicant was sent to the Government. However, as nothing was come­forth, hence, the said Demand Notice. 7. This Court fails to understand as to why the applicant assuming, he did raise a Demand in the year 2010 as it stands mentioned in the Demand Notice (Annexure P­1), slept over the matter for ten years before filing of Annexure P­1. Incidentally, except a bald assertion made in Annexure P­1 that the petitioner had raised a demand in the year 2010, there is nothing placed on record to substantiate this fact. Neither the said alleged Demand Notice which was filed in the year 2010 has been placed on record nor there is any other material from which it can be inferred that indeed the petitioner raised such a demand. Even in the reply which has been filed to Annexure P­1 by the Department, the raising of the demand has been denied, though for want of knowledge. Now, in these peculiar facts and circumstances, but of course the termination of the petitioner in the year 2000 has become a stale issue after two decades more so when there is nothing on record that the issue was still alive intra the parties or there was some kind of correspondence going on or assurance given forth from the Department that the petitioner would be re­engaged. 8. In the present case, the Authority concerned has refused to make a Reference on the ground of delay. The delay is not small, but is of twenty years. 8. In the present case, the Authority concerned has refused to make a Reference on the ground of delay. The delay is not small, but is of twenty years. That being the case, as it is settled law that the Government is not under any compulsion to make Reference of stale and dead industrial dispute, this Court does finds any infirmity in the order impugned, as this Court is also of the considered view that delay of twenty years was fatal and the issue in fact had become stale. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Prabhakar vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another, (2015) 15 SCC 1 after referring to his earlier judgments as also Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has inter-alia reiterated that in terms of the language used in Section 10 of the Act, though there is no period of limitation prescribed for making an order of Reference, yet at the same time the Appropriate Government has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is still existing or live dispute and has not become as stale claim and if that is so the Reference can be refused. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that whether a dispute is alive or it has become stale/non­existence at the time when the workman approaches the Appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making the order of Reference. 10. In the backdrop of the said pronouncement of law by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, this Court concurs with the view of the Appropriate Government that the delay of twenty years in raising the industrial dispute had in fact rendered the dispute stale and non­existing one and therefore, as this Court does not finds any merit in the present petition, the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.