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2024 DIGILAW 1876 (ALL)

Kamlesh Kumar v. Sardar Manjeet Singh

2024-08-12

SARAL SRIVASTAVA

body2024
JUDGMENT : SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard Sri P.K. Jain, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Himanshu Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord, and Sri Kiran Kumar Arora, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant and perused the records. 2. The petitioner through the present petition has assailed the judgment and decree dated 29.1.2014 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 10, Moradabad in S.C.C. Revision No. 24 of 2010, whereby the learned Judge has allowed the revision of the respondent-tenant and set aside the judgment and decree dated 3.5.2010 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Moradabad in S.C.C. Suit No. 58 of 2006, whereby the Trial Court has decreed the suit of the petitioner-landlord for eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-landlord had instituted a S.C.C. Suit No. 58 of 2006 contending, inter alia, that the respondent-tenant is the tenant of one shop in a commercial building situated at Mohalla Bishanpura, main market, Kasba Kanth, District Moradabad. It is also alleged that the tenancy of the respondent-tenant was month to month and began on the 10th of every month and ended on the 9th of the succeeding month. It is further alleged that the rent has been paid by the respondent-tenant till 09.11.2001, and after that the rent was not paid which led the petitioner-landlord to send notice dated 04.08.2006 to the respondent-tenant terminating the tenancy of the respondent-tenant. The said notice was received by the respondent-tenant on 05.08.2006. It is further pleaded that the respondent-tenant in his reply to the notice dated 04.08.2006 has incorrectly stated that the petitioner-landlord had stopped accepting rent from him. It is further pleaded that the respondent-tenant in reply to the said notice has incorrectly stated that he had sent the rent for the period from 10.11.2001 to 09.05.2002 by two money orders, which the landlord refused to accept. It is further pleaded that the respondent-tenant had sent a money order of Rs. 900 to the petitioner-landlord in December 2001 and another money order of the same amount in January 2002, which was not accepted by the petitioner-landlord for the reason that the rents for the months for which two money orders by the respondent-tenant were sent were not due, therefore, the petitioner-landlord was not bound to accept the rent sent by two money orders. 4. 4. It is also pleaded that the rent deposited by the respondent-tenant under Section 30(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was not deposited in the prescribed manner and the petitioner-landlord has not received any summon or notice from any competent court in respect to the deposit of the rent by the respondent-tenant under Section 30(1) of the Act. The petitioner-landlord specifically pleaded that the summons in Misc. Case No. 6 of 2002 under Section 30(1) of the Act was never received by the petitioner-landlord. On the aforesaid facts, the petitioner-landlord prayed for a decree of eviction and recovery of rent, etc. 5. The respondent-tenant filed a written statement contending, inter alia, that there was no default in payment of rent. 6. The Trial Court framed as many as four issues. On issue no. 1, with respect to the applicability of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972, the Trial Court held that provisions of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 apply to the shop. 7. Issue no. 2, regarding service of notice was decided in favour of the petitioner-landlord. The Trial Court decided issue nos. 3 and 4 together which reads as under: 8. On the issue nos. 3 and 4, the Trial Court held that since the deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act had been made by the respondent-tenant in District Court, J.P. Nagar, whereas after 30th of July, 2002 by the notification dated 30th of July, 2002 of the Governor, the Tehsil Kanth fell under the jurisdiction of the Court of Moradabad, therefore, the respondent-tenant should have deposited the rent before the Court at Moradabad, and since rent under Section 30 had been deposited in a court which did not have jurisdiction, therefore, respondent-tenant had defaulted in payment of rent. Consequently, it decided the issue nos. 3 and 4 in favour of the petitioner-landlord. 9. Consequently, it decided the issue nos. 3 and 4 in favour of the petitioner-landlord. 9. The respondent-tenant thereafter preferred a S.C.C. Revision No. 24 of 2010 which was allowed by the Revisional Court on the ground that there are several judgments decided by the Civil Court of District J.P. Nagar, wherein the dispute was concerning the property situated in Tehsil Kanth and, therefore, there was no clarity as to which Court i.e. Small Causes Court at Moradabad or J.P. Nagar had jurisdiction to try cases of Tehsil Kanth, and because of this confusion, the respondent-tenant deposited the rent before the District Court, J.P. Nagar. Consequently, it held that there was no default on the part of the respondent-tenant in depositing the rent. Consequently, the Revisional Court reversed the finding of the Trial Court on issue nos. 3 and 4. 10. Revisional Court further held that the object of submitting the process fee and Form ‘F’ along with the deposit under Rule 21 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 is to inform the landlord that the rent has been deposited. It further held that since the tenant through the reply to the notice of the petitioner informed the landlord about the deposit of rent under Section 30 of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972, therefore, non-compliance with Rule 21 of Rules 1972 would not render the deposit under Section 30 of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972 invalid. 11. Challenging the aforesaid order, Sri P.K. Jain, learned Senior Counsel has placed the statement of DW-1 Atar Singh, wherein he has admitted that while depositing the rent on 9.5.2008 in Misc. Case No. 06 of 2002, the notice and talwana were filed along with the deposit tender, but after that, only the rent was deposited, and neither notice nor talwana was filed with the application. Thus, it is contended that the deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act cannot be said to be the deposit in the prescribed manner as contemplated under Rule 21(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules 1972’). Thus, it is contended that the deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act cannot be said to be the deposit in the prescribed manner as contemplated under Rule 21(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules 1972’). He submits that specific pleadings have been taken by the petitioner-landlord in the plaint and since the Trial Court has decreed the suit on the ground that the rent had not been deposited in the proper and appropriate Court, therefore, this issue was not considered by the trial court. He further submits that the Revisional Court has committed illegality in concluding that non-compliance with Rule 21(5) in depositing rent under Section 30 of Uttar Pradesh Act, 1972 is not material to deny the benefit of Section 30 of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972. 12. He further contends that it is evident from the notification dated 30th of July, 2002 that after publication of the said notification, the jurisdiction of Tehsil Kanth fell in the District Moradabad, therefore, the respondent-tenant should have deposited the rent in District Moradabad and not in District J.P. Nagar. He submits that in this respect, the petitioner-landlord obtained information under the Right to Information Act from the Central Public Information Officer, Civil Court, Moradabad, District Moradabad and the following information was furnished to the petitioner-landlord: 13. Sri Jain further submits that the Senior Administrative Officer, District Court, Moradabad by letter dated 21.4.2011, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-9 to the paper-book, addressed to the District Judge, Moradabad informed that the cases of Tehsil Kanth are cognizable by Civil Court, Moradabad. He submits that the Revisional Court did not consider the letter of the Administrative Officer dated 21.4.2011, in which the information was supplied after making necessary inquiries from the Allahabad High Court which discloses that the cases of Tehsil Kanth are cognizable by Civil Court, Moradabad, and, therefore, the finding of the Revisional Court is perverse. 14. He submits that the Revisional Court did not consider the letter of the Administrative Officer dated 21.4.2011, in which the information was supplied after making necessary inquiries from the Allahabad High Court which discloses that the cases of Tehsil Kanth are cognizable by Civil Court, Moradabad, and, therefore, the finding of the Revisional Court is perverse. 14. He submits that the Revisional Court has relied upon various judgments of Civil Court, J.P. Nagar which are not admissible in evidence, inasmuch as they had no bearing with the case and they were the cases, where no issue that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit was raised and they are not binding precedents, therefore, the Revisional Court has erred in law in relying upon those judgments of Civil Court, J.P. Nagar. He lastly contends that the petitioner-landlord filed an amendment application to amend the plaint, to which the respondent-tenant filed a reply, wherein the respondent-tenant denied the title of the petitioner-landlord. Thus, it is submitted that this amounts to denial of the title of the petitioner-landlord by the respondent-tenant and this ground is sufficient to pass a decree for eviction. 15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant would contend that the Revisional Court has rightly held that the cases of Tehsil Kanth are cognizable by the Civil Court, J.P. Nagar since as per the notification dated 1st of June, 1999, paper number 75-Ga, which was issued by the Governor in consultation with the High Court under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887, the jurisdiction of cases falling in the Tehsil Kanth was conferred with the District J.P. Nagar, Tehsil Amroha and this notification was never superseded by any of the notification. Accordingly, it is contended that the notification of 1st of June, 1999 would prevail over the notification of 30th of July, 2002, since the power to confer the jurisdiction upon a Court with respect to any Tehsil is to be exercised by the Governor in consultation with the High Court under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887. Accordingly, it is contended that since there was no notification on record establishing that any notification after 1st of June, 1999 was issued by the Governor in consultation with the High Court, the deposit made by the respondent-tenant was in the appropriate Court. Accordingly, it is contended that since there was no notification on record establishing that any notification after 1st of June, 1999 was issued by the Governor in consultation with the High Court, the deposit made by the respondent-tenant was in the appropriate Court. Accordingly, it is contended that the Revisional Court has not committed any error of law. 16. He further submits that the Trial Court has non-suited the respondent-tenant only on the ground that the rent has not been deposited in the appropriate court, therefore, this Court may not non-suit the respondent-tenant on the ground of noncompliance with Rule 21(5) of the Rules, 1972, since this ground was not considered by the Trial Court. 17. He lastly urges that so far as the amendment application filed by the petitioner-landlord for amending the plaint is concerned, it was not allowed by the Revisional Court and, therefore, in the absence of any pleading and the necessary material on record indicating intention of the respondent-tenant to deny the title of the petitioner-landlord, the eviction decree cannot be passed on the ground of denial of title. 18. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord and learned counsel for the respondent-tenant. 19. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord is concerned, the plaint discloses that the petitioner-landlord has taken a specific plea about noncompliance with Rule 21(5) of Rules, 1972 in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the plaint. 20. The fact of noncompliance with Rule 21(5) of Rules, 1972 has been accepted by the respondent-tenant on record, as is evident from the statement of Atar Singh, a tenant’s witness, but the Revisional Court has failed to consider the same. 21. Further, the Revisional Court held that the purpose of deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act was that the landlord has notice about the deposit of the rent, therefore, the violation of Rule 21(5) of the Rules, 1972 is not material. At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce the statement of Atar Singh: 22. In the statement reproduced above, it is admitted by Atar Singh that while depositing the rent up to 10.11.2011 in Misc. Case No. 6 of 2002 on 09.05.2007, he had annexed the notice and talwana along with the deposit, whereas in subsequent deposit, he deposited the rent, but he did not enclose the notice and talvana. 23. In the statement reproduced above, it is admitted by Atar Singh that while depositing the rent up to 10.11.2011 in Misc. Case No. 6 of 2002 on 09.05.2007, he had annexed the notice and talwana along with the deposit, whereas in subsequent deposit, he deposited the rent, but he did not enclose the notice and talvana. 23. It would also be appropriate to have a glance at Rule 21(5) of Rules, 1972: “In the case of continuance of deposit of rent for any subsequent period, fresh application shall not be necessary. But process fee and the notice in Form-F shall accompany every deposit.” 24. The provision of Rule 21(5) of Rules, 1972 reveals that the Rule is specific and unambiguous and it casts a duty upon the tenant to enclose process fee and notice in form-F along with every deposit, and if Rule 21(5) is not complied with, the deposit shall not be treated to be a valid deposit in compliance with Section 30(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972. In this respect, the counsel for the petitioner-landlord has relied upon judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Rani Devi and others Vs. Additional District and Sessions Judge, CT No. 13, Lucknow and others, 2018 (3) ARC 601 . Paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the said judgment are reproduced herein-below: “19. By a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court, it is now settled that in order to avail the benefits under rent control legislations the tenants are obliged to strictly comply with the provisions of these rent statutes. 20. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (D) & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 123 , the Apex Court held as follows: “5. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well- settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statues can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. to deposit rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant.” (Emphasis supplied) 21. In Jagat Prasad v. Distt. Judge, Kanpur & Ors. 1995 Supp (1) SCC 318(I), with reference to the Uttar Pradesh Act XIII of 1972 the Apex Court has observed as under: “Nevertheless, the defence of the appellant that he had deposited bona fide the rent in the civil proceeding that would enure to the benefit of the rent control proceedings is unacceptable to us. Law prescribes the procedure as to the deposit under Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Such a procedure if complied with alone will be a valid defence to a petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. In Chotey Lal v. XIVth Additional District Judge, Kanpur & Ors. 1994 (1) ARC 289, a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with an identical situation has held as under: “The provision of sub-rules (3) and (5) of the said Rule are important. For the first deposit under Section 30, the tenant was required to take steps so that a notice about the deposit could have been served to the landlord. In subsequent deposit for continuation of depositing the amount of rent, fresh application was not necessary but process fee and the notice in Form ‘F’ was necessary and it is a mandatory requirement.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Panna Lal v. XIIIth ADJ & Ors. 1999 (1) ARC 473 and Gulam Mohammad Ansari v. III ADJ & Anr. 2004 (22) LCD 765. 24. Thus, mere deposit of the amount under Section 30 is not sufficient. For treating the deposit as valid, due compliance of law and availability of the same to landlord is also necessary. 1999 (1) ARC 473 and Gulam Mohammad Ansari v. III ADJ & Anr. 2004 (22) LCD 765. 24. Thus, mere deposit of the amount under Section 30 is not sufficient. For treating the deposit as valid, due compliance of law and availability of the same to landlord is also necessary. The manner in which the rent is to be deposited under Section 30 of the Act has been laid down in Rule 21 of the Rules. The deposit made under Section 30 of the Act is deemed to be a deposit in favour of the landlord. For treating the deposit as valid, the requirements under Rule 21 of the Rules have to be complied with strictly.” 25. In the case of Hari Gopal v. Vijay Kumar and others, 2009 (3) ARC 193 this Court held that to take the benefit of Section 20(4) of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972, the compliance of Rule 21 (5) of the Rules, 1972 is mandatory. Paragraph No. 14 of the said judgment is being reproduced herein-below: “14. The procedure for deposit under section 30 is provided in rule 21 of the Rules framed under the Act. Sub Rule 5, though empowers continuance of deposit in consonance with section 30 (1) it imposes a mandatory condition that on every subsequent deposits, though fresh application is not necessary, but process and notice in the Form ‘F’ shall accompany every subsequent deposit. The trial court has recorded a finding of fact that it is admitted to the tenants that process fee and notice in the Form ‘F’ with regard to subsequent deposits was not made but the revisional court, relying upon the order dated 18.10.1997 has held that after passing of the said order it would be deemed that all the provisions have been complied. No doubt, so far as the initial deposit is concerned, it would be presumed that the service was sufficient on the landlord but the said order dealt with the deposit made on or prior to 18.10.1997, years before the notice determining the vacancy was given. Therefore, the legality of subsequent deposits was crucial for relieving the tenants from eviction and thus in view of rule 21 (5), it was incumbent upon the tenant to have proved that they had deposited fresh process and notice in Form ‘F’ with regard to subsequent deposit made after October, 1997. Therefore, the legality of subsequent deposits was crucial for relieving the tenants from eviction and thus in view of rule 21 (5), it was incumbent upon the tenant to have proved that they had deposited fresh process and notice in Form ‘F’ with regard to subsequent deposit made after October, 1997. There is no evidence on record to show compliance with the requirement of rule 21 (5) in regard to subsequent deposit and therefore, the trial court had rightly held that the tenants would not be entitled to the benefit of subsequent deposit and therefore, the protection of section 20 (4) of the Act. In fact even the defence of the tenants was liable to be struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. for not depositing the monthly dues within time. Thus, this argument is also bound to be accepted.” 26. The counsel for the respondent-tenant has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in Chameli Devi Vs. VI Additional District Judge, 2003 Law Suit (All) 1080. But, the judgment of Chameli Devi (supra) has not considered the various precedents of this Court relied upon in the case of Smt. Rani Devi (supra). Therefore, this judgment of Chameli Devi (supra) is of no help to the respondent-tenant. 27. Counsel for the respondent-tenant further contends that in the present case, it is admitted by the petitioner-landlord that the respondent-tenant had sent two money orders paying the rent for six months in advance, but both the money orders had been deliberately refused by the petitioner-landlord and, since the refusal by the petitioner-landlord in respect to the deposit of rent was for no valid reason in law, therefore, there was no default on part of the respondent-tenant in depositing the rent, and no cause of action accrued to the petitioner-landlord to institute the suit. 28. In this respect, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Gokaran Singh and others Vs. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and others, 2000 SCC Online (All) 174. Paragraphs 20, 30, and 31 of the said judgment are reproduced below: “20. In Jitendra Prasad v. Mathura Prasad Darzi, it was held that the words ‘for more than three months’ qualified words ‘rent’ and not words ‘is in arrear. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and others, 2000 SCC Online (All) 174. Paragraphs 20, 30, and 31 of the said judgment are reproduced below: “20. In Jitendra Prasad v. Mathura Prasad Darzi, it was held that the words ‘for more than three months’ qualified words ‘rent’ and not words ‘is in arrear. On the same analogy, it can be said that words ‘for not less than four months’ qualified word ‘rent’ and not words is in arrears. Thus, a tenant who has run into the arrears of rent for a period of four months, is liable to be ejected by the landlord, if he fails to pay the amount of arrears of rent within thirty days of the receipt of the notice of demand. In Indrasani v. Dani Ilahi, it was ruled by a Full Bench of this Court as under: “.........A tenant can be said to be in arrears of rent only when by non-performance of his legal obligation he has deprived the lessor of the benefit of the accrued rent.” “.........We may point out that there is a clear distinction between a case in which the tenant is in arrears of rent and a case in the rent is in arrears. In the former case arrears of rent are the consequence of the default committed by the tenant in paying rent, in the latter case the arrears or rent may be due to causes attributable to the improper conduct of the landlord in refusing to accept rent lawfully tendered to him. Where such is the case and arrears of rent are due to reasons beyond the control of the tenant, the Courts will give a beneficial construction to the provisions of the Act keeping in view aims and objects to fulfil which it was enacted.” 30. So far as the question of depositing rent after refusal by the landlord, on the correct rate of rent or otherwise, is concerned, the sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act is relevant for the said purposes, which provides as under: “30. So far as the question of depositing rent after refusal by the landlord, on the correct rate of rent or otherwise, is concerned, the sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act is relevant for the said purposes, which provides as under: “30. Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances: (1) If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it.” 31. From a reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that refusal to accept the rent from a tenant by the landlord, his tenant is entitled to deposit the amount of rent in the Court. Under the aforesaid provision the tenant is entitled to continue to deposit the said rent after the same is refused by the landlord till landlord expresses his willingness to accept the same. In Indrasani’s case (supra), it has been ruled by a Full Bench of this Court that if rent tendered by the tenant covers specified period and the same is refused by the landlord, the amount of rent so tendered, shall be deemed to have been paid to the landlord. Tenant, thereafter, is at liberty to deposit the same in the Court. Even if said rent is not deposited in the Court, said tenant cannot be held to be a defaulter in respect of the said period. It has also been held that on receipt of notice if the landlord expresses willingness to accept the rent, tenant need not tender or pay the arrears of rent, which was already refused by the landlord. In the said case, it was ruled as under: “.....There can be no legal obligation on a tenant to tender the amount previously tendered but refused by the landlord, alongwith the tender for the subsequently accrued rent. In the said case, it was ruled as under: “.....There can be no legal obligation on a tenant to tender the amount previously tendered but refused by the landlord, alongwith the tender for the subsequently accrued rent. Neither the Transfer of Property Act, nor the Contract Act, nor the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act provides for any such tender.” “....We are of the opinion that where non-payment of rent is on account of the intransigence of the landlord to accept or receive the rent tendered to him he cannot call his own improper conduct in aid as a means to evict the tenant. We, therefore, hold that where rent due has been lawfully tendered to the landlord and is improperly refused by him, the tenant cannot be held to be in arrears of rent.” “It will this appear that a tenant who has made a valid tender of the rent which fell due, in law cannot be treated as a tenant in arrears of rent nor even can the rent be said to be in arrears although the amount actually still remains payable to the landlord whether in the hands of the tenant or in deposit in Court.” “.......On a consideration of the whole matter, we are of the opinion that the question referred to the Full Bench must be answered in tenant’s favour and it must be held that where a tenant remits rent by money order and the amount remitted covers rent for a particular month and the landlord refuses to accept the same the tenant cannot be said to be in arrears in respect of that month within the meaning of Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act.” 29. Sri P.K. Jain, counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that even if the landlord has refused to accept the rent, the tenant has to deposit the rent as per Section 30(1) of the Act, and if the procedure contemplated under Rule 21(5) of the Rules, 1972 is not adhered to in depositing the rent under Section 30(1) of the Act, the tenant cannot take any benefit of refusal of the rent by the landlord. 30. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that the suit had been instituted by the petitioner-landlord claiming rent for the period from 10.11.2001 to 09.05.2006. The suit was instituted in the year 2006. 30. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that the suit had been instituted by the petitioner-landlord claiming rent for the period from 10.11.2001 to 09.05.2006. The suit was instituted in the year 2006. The rent has been paid as per the plaint case till 9.11.2001. The tenant–respondent had sent the money order of Rs. 900 in December 2001 and in January 2002. Thereafter no money order was sent. So, there was no rent paid by the respondent-tenant, after January 2002 as per the case of the respondent-tenant. There is no pleading in the written statement as to whether the respondent-tenant had intended to pay any rent, after January 2002 which the petitioner-landlord refused to accept. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gokaran Singh (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. 31. Since it has been held that there is non compliance with Rule 21(5) of the Rules, 1972, therefore, this Court is not inclined to enter into the other contention advanced by the counsel for the petitioner-landlord that the rent should have been deposited before the Court of J.P. Nagar or Moradabad. 32. Thus for the reasons given above, the order impugned dated 29.1.2014 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 10, Moradabad in S.C.C. Revision No. 24 of 2010 cannot be sustained in law and is, hereby, set aside. 33. The judgment and decree dated 3.5.2010 passed by the Trial Court/Judge, Small Causes Court, Moradabad in S.C.C. Suit No. 58 of 2006 is restored. 34. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and is, allowed. No order as to costs.