JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, the present criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, 'CrPC') has been filed by the Appellant Jayram Salam calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 9.9.2016 passed by Special Judge (N.I.A. Act/Scheduled Crime), Bastar, Jagdalpur (in short, ‘Trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.26/2015, while acquitting the other two accused persons, namely – Sanjay Hurra and Ramdhar Dhurwa, for the offences punishable under Sections 148/149, 307/149, 121/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC') as well as under Sections 25(1A) and 27(2) of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short, ‘Arms Act’), has convicted the Appellant for the aforesaid offences and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence 1. u/S. 148/149 of IPC. R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer additional R.I. for 3 months. 2. u/S. 307/149 of IPC. R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer additional R.I. for 3 months. 3. u/S. 121/149 of IPC. Imprisonment for Life and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer additional R.I. for 3 months. 4. u/S. 25(1A) of Arms Act. R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer additional R.I. for 3 months. 5. u/S. 27(2) of Arms Act. R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer additional R.I. for 3 months. All substantive sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 13.8.2014 at about 10:00 a.m., near the pond, in the field of Mangal Singh Sori situated at Village Ghumsimunda, within the limits of Police Station Antagarh, the Appellant and the aforesaid two acquitted accused persons along with 28 other absconded accused persons, constituted an unlawful assembly armed with deadly and dangerous weapons to fulfill their unlawful object and opened fire on S.D.O.(P) Daulat Ram Porte (PW-2) and police party with automatic rifles and waged war against the Government of India, thereby committed the aforesaid offences. 3. 3. Further case of the prosecution is that on 13.8.2014, the Station House Officer, Police Station Antagarh received a secret information from the Superintendent of Police, Kanker in respect of unlawful assembly of the Appellant and other acquitted and absconded accused persons, being naxalites, at Village Ghumsimunda, near the pond in the field of Mangal Singh Sori, to boycott to the Independence Day. On receiving the aforesaid information, a joint party of S.D.O.(P), Antagarh, B.S.F. and C.A.P.F. cordoned off the field of Mangal Singh Sori and while the joint party was moving forward from the western front, the Appellant and other acquitted and absconded accused persons, opened fire on the joint police party who answered them with counter firing and all the accused persons then ran away towards the jungle from southern part of the area. During the conflict, one accused was found injured with gun shot, who named himself as Jayram alias Jitru, i.e., the present Appellant, and he also told the name of other accused persons, including the two acquitted accused persons, who had fired on the police party and fled from the spot. During the search, certain weapons, daily use articles and naxalite pamphlets etc., were recovered. 4. The matter was registered at Police Station Antagarh and the wheels of investigation started running. Dehati Nalishi was prepared vide Exhibit P-10 and F.I.R. was registered vide Exhibit P-11. Sketch Map of the place of incident was prepared. Vide Exhibit P-3, seizure of one AK-47 Rifle is said to have been made from the present Appellant. One country made pistol and other articles were also seized from the place of incident vide Exhibits P-4 & P-5. Vide Exhibit P-6, banners, pamphlets and fired cartridges (blank) were also recovered from the place of incident. The appellant and other two accused persons (who have been acquitted) were arrested and the other accused persons were declared absconded. MLC of the injured appellant was conducted vide Exhibit P-20. Vide Exhibit P-21, sanction was granted by the Government of Chhattisgarh to prosecute the Appellant and two co-accused persons. Accordingly, the Appellant and two accused persons, Sanjay Hurra and Ramdhar Dhurwa, were charge-sheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 148, 307, 121A, 121 read with Section 149 of IPC as well as under Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act read with Section 149 of IPC before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhanupratappur. Accordingly, the Appellant and two accused persons, Sanjay Hurra and Ramdhar Dhurwa, were charge-sheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 148, 307, 121A, 121 read with Section 149 of IPC as well as under Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act read with Section 149 of IPC before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhanupratappur. 5. Subsequently, the matter was submitted for trial and its disposal in accordance with law before the Trial Court where charges under the aforesaid offences were framed and read out to the accused persons who abjured their guilt, took a plea of false implication and entreated for trial. During the course of trial, in order to bring home the offences, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses as PW-1 to P-14 and exhibited 21 documents vide Exhibits P-1 to P-21. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. However, in defence, neither any witness has been examined nor any document has been exhibited. 6. After conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court, by impugned judgment and order dated 9.9.2016, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, acquitted two accused persons, Sanjay Hurra and Ramdhar Dhurwa of the charges under Sections 148, 307, 121A, 121 read with Section 149 of IPC as well as under Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act read with Section 149 of IPC. However, the Trial Court, proceeded to convict the present Appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 307, 121 read with Section 149 of IPC as well as under Section 25(1A) & 27(2) of Arms Act, after acquitting him for the offence punishable under Section 121A read with Section 149 of IPC, and accordingly sentenced the Appellant as mentioned at the table shown in the opening paragraph of this judgment, which led to the filing of the present criminal appeal by the Appellant. 7. Mr. Shrawan Kumar Chandel, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, would submit that the conviction of the Appellant under Section 121 of IPC is absolutely perverse and contrary to record. 7. Mr. Shrawan Kumar Chandel, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, would submit that the conviction of the Appellant under Section 121 of IPC is absolutely perverse and contrary to record. The seizure of AK-47 Rifle and other articles made by Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5 & P-6 were made from the spot as per the statements of PW-4 Vijay Markam and PW-5 Mangal Singh, as such, no seizure of any arm and ammunition can be said to be made from the present Appellant. The only allegation against the Appellant as per the charge is of attacking the joint police party headed by PW-2 Daulat Ram Porte, S.D.O.(P). There is no allegation against the Appellant of waging war against the Government of India as he has already been acquitted of the charge under Section 121A/149 of IPC and therefore his conviction under Section 121/149 of IPC is bad in law. Learned Counsel for the Appellant would further submit that no one has received any injuries much less simple injuries and therefore Section 307 of IPC also would not attract. Thus, for the said reasons, the conviction of the Appellant for the offences in question is absolutely perverse and the same is liable to be set-aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 8. Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate, per contra, would submit that there is enough material available on record to convict the Appellant for the offences in question and the Trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting him for the said offences. Section 307 of IPC to cause death is sufficient even if no injury has been caused by the Appellant. Therefore, the conviction of the Appellant for the offences in question is well merited and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsels for parties and Amicus Curiae, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The Appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 307, 121 of IPC read with Section 149 of IPC as well as under Sections 25(1A) & 27(2) of Arms Act. For the sake of clarity, we will deal with the conviction of the Appellant under the aforesaid offences separately, one by one. Conviction of the Appellant under Section 121 of IPC: 11. For the sake of clarity, we will deal with the conviction of the Appellant under the aforesaid offences separately, one by one. Conviction of the Appellant under Section 121 of IPC: 11. The Appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 121 read with Section 149 of IPC. Section 121 of IPC defines that whoever, wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. The said Section 121 within its meaning covers the action of waging war, or attempting to wage war or abetting to wage war, against the Government of India, punishable with death or imprisonment for life and also unlimited fine. From reading of the aforesaid provision contained in Section 121 of IPC, in order to attract the offence under the said provision the following ingredients are to be established:- (1) Waging war, or (2) Attempting to wage war, or (3) Abetting to wage war, (4) It must be against the Government of India. 12. In the matter of Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have defined the meaning of “Government of India” and held that the expression “Government of India” is surely not used in the narrow and restricted sense in Section 121 of IPC and the expression “Government of India” is used in Section 121 of IPC to imply the Indian State and observed in paragraphs 537, 538 & 539 as under:- “537. The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is what is the true import of the expression “Government of India”? In its narrower sense, Government of India is only the executive limb of the State. It comprises a group of people, the administrative bureaucracy that controls the executive functions and powers of the State at a given time. Different governments, in continuous succession, serve the State and provide the means through which the executive power of the State is employed. The expression “Government of India” is surely not used in this narrow and restricted sense in Section 121. Different governments, in continuous succession, serve the State and provide the means through which the executive power of the State is employed. The expression “Government of India” is surely not used in this narrow and restricted sense in Section 121. In our considered view, the expression “Government of India” is used in Section 121 to imply the Indian State, the juristic embodiment of the sovereignty of the country that derives its legitimacy from the collective will and consent of its people. The use of the phrase “Government of India” to signify the notion of sovereignty is consistent with the principles of Public International Law, wherein sovereignty of a territorial unit is deemed to vest in the people of the territory and exercised by a representative government. 538. It is important to note here that earlier the word used in Section 121 (as well as all the other Sections referred to above) was ”Queen”. After the formation of the republic under the Constitution it was substituted by the expression “Government of India” by the Adaption of Laws Order of 1950. In a republic, sovereignty vests in the people of the country and the lawfully elected government is simply the representative and a manifestation of the sovereign, that is, the people. Thus, the expression “Government of India”, as appearing in Section 121, must be held to mean the State or interchangeably the people of the country as the repository of the sovereignty of India which is manifested and expressed through the elected Government. 539. An illuminating discussion on the issue of “Waging war against the Government of India” is to be found in this Court’s decision in Navjot Sandhu. In paragraph 272 of the judgment P. Venkatarama Reddi, J., speaking for the Court, referred to the report of the Indian Law Commission that examined the draft Penal Code in 1847 and quoted the following passage from the report: “We conceive the term ‘wages war against the Government’ naturally to import a person arraying himself in defiance of the Government in like manner and by like means as a foreign enemy would do, and it seems to us, we presume it did to the authors of the Code that any definition of the term so unambiguous would be superfluous.” 13. The word 'waging war' has been subjected to the various pronouncements from time to time by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The word 'waging war' has been subjected to the various pronouncements from time to time by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It would be appropriate at this stage to notice the decisions defining 'waging war' by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 14. In Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the expression 'waging war' only means of waging war in the manner usual in war and in order to support a conviction on such charge, it is not enough to show that the persons charged have contrived to obtain possession of an armoury and have, when called upon to surrender it, used the rifles and ammunition so obtained against the Government troops. It must also be shown that the seizure of the armoury was part and parcel of a planned operation and that their intention in resisting the troops of the Government was to overwhelm and defeat these troops and then to go on and crush any further opposition with which they might meet until either the leaders of the movement succeeded in obtaining the possession of the machinery of the Government or until those in possession of it yielded to the demands of their leaders. 15. Subsequently, in the Parliament attack case i.e., in the matter of State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in paragraph 271 of the Judgment, framed the question whether the dare devil and horrendous acts perpetrated by the slain terrorists pursuant to the conspiracy, amount to waging or attempting to wage war punishable under Section 121 of IPC. Analyzing the law on the subject, their Lordships have clearly held that in context of war, the animus of the party is important (ii) the use of force and arms is necessary (iii) number of members in the party is not relevant and even a few can cause devastation (iv) pomp and pageantry opening of war is relevant and even a stealthy operation. However, it is made clear that the act of violent resistance even against the armed forces and public officials could not be branded as an act of war. For ready reference, paragraphs 282 & 283 are being reproduced below:- “282. However, it is made clear that the act of violent resistance even against the armed forces and public officials could not be branded as an act of war. For ready reference, paragraphs 282 & 283 are being reproduced below:- “282. On the analysis of the various passages found in the cases and commentaries referred to above, what are the high-lights we come across? The most important is the intention or purpose behind the defiance or rising against the Government. As said by Foster, "The true criterion is quo animo did the parties assemble"? In other words the intention and purpose of the war-like operations directed against the Governmental machinery is an important criterion. If the object and purpose is to strike at the sovereign authority of the Ruler or the Government to achieve a public and general purpose in contra-distinction to a private and a particular purpose, that is an important indicia of waging war. Of course, the purpose must be intended to be achieved by use of force and arms and by defiance of Government troops or armed personnel deployed to maintain public tranquility. Though the modus operandi of preparing for the offensive against the Government may be quite akin to the preparation in a regular war, it is often said that the number of force, the manner in which they are arrayed, armed or equipped is immaterial. Even a limited number of persons who carry powerful explosives and missiles without regard to their own safety can cause more devastating damage than a large group of persons armed with ordinary weapons or fire arms. Then, the other settled proposition is that there need not be the pomp and pageantry usually associated with war such as the offenders forming themselves in battle-line and arraying in a war like manner. Even a stealthy operation to overwhelm the armed or other personnel deployed by the Government and to attain a commanding position by which terms could be dictated to the Government might very well be an act of waging war. 283. While these are the acceptable criteria of waging war, we must dissociate ourselves from the old English and Indian authorities to the extent that they lay down a too general test of attainment of an object of general public nature or a political object. 283. While these are the acceptable criteria of waging war, we must dissociate ourselves from the old English and Indian authorities to the extent that they lay down a too general test of attainment of an object of general public nature or a political object. We have already expressed reservations in adopting this test in its literal sense and construing it in a manner out of tune with the present day. The Court must be cautious in adopting an approach which has the effect of bringing within the fold of Section 121 all acts of lawless and violent acts resulting in destruction of public properties etc., and all acts of violent resistance to the armed personnel to achieve certain political objectives. The moment it is found that the object sought to be attained is of general public nature or has a political hue, the offensive violent acts targeted against armed forces and public officials should not be branded as acts of waging war. The expression 'waging war' should not be stretched too far to hold that all the acts of disrupting public order and peace irrespective of their magnitude and repercussions could be reckoned as acts of waging war against the Government. A balanced and realistic approach is called for in construing the expression 'waging war' irrespective of how it was viewed in the long long past. An organized movement attended with violence and attacks against the public officials and armed forces while agitating for the repeal of an unpopular law or for preventing burdensome taxes were viewed as acts of treason in the form of levying war. We doubt whether such construction is in tune with the modern day perspectives and standards. Another aspect on which a clarification is called for is in regard to the observation made in the old decisions that "neither the number engaged nor the force employed, nor the species of weapons with which they may be armed" is really material to prove the offence of levying/waging war. This was said by Lord President Hope in R Vs. Hardie in 1820 and the same statement finds its echo in many other English cases and in the case of Maganlal Radha Krishan Vs. Emperor [AIR 1946 Nagpur 173 at page 186]. But, in our view, these are not irrelevant factors. This was said by Lord President Hope in R Vs. Hardie in 1820 and the same statement finds its echo in many other English cases and in the case of Maganlal Radha Krishan Vs. Emperor [AIR 1946 Nagpur 173 at page 186]. But, in our view, these are not irrelevant factors. They will certainly help the Court in forming an idea whether the intention and design to wage war against the established Government exists or the offence falls short of it. For instance, the fire power or the devastating potential of the arms and explosives that may be carried by a group of persons may be large or small, as in the present case, and the scale of violence that follows may at times become useful indicators of the nature and dimension of the action resorted to. These, coupled with the other factors, may give rise to an inference of waging war.” 16. Subsequently, in the matter of Mohd. Jamiludin Nasir v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 7 SCC 443 , the general principles to be applied with regard to the charge of ‘waging war’ have been summarized in paragraph 160 as follows:- “160. A close reading of the above referred to paragraphs is sufficient for anyone to understand the concept and to apply the same in a given case in order to find out as to how the sentence can be imposed in such cases. Having read the above well laid down principles, we can cull out the following general principles to be applied: 160.1. The most important is the intention and purpose behind the defiance or raging against the government. 160.2. Though the modus operandi of preparing for the offensive act against the government may be quite akin to the preparation in a regular war, it is often said that the number of force, the manner in which they are arrayed, the arm and or equipments are immaterial. 160.3. Even a limited number of persons who carry powerful explosives and missiles without regard to their own safety can cause more devastating damage than a large group of persons armed with ordinary weapons or firearms. 160.4. There need not be the pomp or pageantry usually associated with war such as the offenders forming themselves in battle line and arraying in a war-like manner. 160.5. 160.4. There need not be the pomp or pageantry usually associated with war such as the offenders forming themselves in battle line and arraying in a war-like manner. 160.5. The Court must be cautious in adopting an approach which has the effect of bringing within the fold of Section 121 all acts of lawless near and violent acts resulting in destruction of public property, etc. 160.6. The moment it is found that the object sought to be attained is of a great public nature or has a political hue the offensive violent act targeted against the armed force and public officials should not be branded as acts of ‘waging war’. 160.7. The expression ‘waging war‘ should not be stretched too far to hold that all acts of disrupting public order and peace irrespective of their magnitude and repercussions could be reckoned as acts of ‘waging war’ against the government. 160.8. A balanced and realistic approach is called in construing the expression ‘waging war’ irrespective of how it was viewed in the long long past. 160.9. An organized movement attended with violence and attacks against the public officials and armed forces while agitating for the repeal of an unpopular law or for preventing burdensome taxes were viewed as acts of treason in the form of ‘waging war’. 160.10. Neither the number engaged nor the force employed nor the species of weapon with which they may be armed is really material to prove the offence of waging war. 160.11. The single most important factor should be to think that in a case that is being considered of waging or attempting to wage war against the Government of India, what is the target of attack chosen by the conspirators and the immediate objective sought to be achieved thereby. 160.12. The planned operations if executed what is the extent of disaster spelt out to the whole nation. Whether a war like situation lingering for days or weeks would have prevailed and such offensive acts of unimaginable description and devastation would have posed a challenge to the government and the democratic institutions for the protection of which the government of the day stands. 160.13. Was it mere desperate act of a small group of persons who were sure to meet with death is to ignore the obvious realities and to stultify the wider connotation of the expression of war chosen by the drafters of IPC. 160.13. Was it mere desperate act of a small group of persons who were sure to meet with death is to ignore the obvious realities and to stultify the wider connotation of the expression of war chosen by the drafters of IPC. 160.14. The undoubted objective and the determination of the offenders was it to impinge on the sovereign authority of the nation and its government.” Similarly, the other principles in the cases where charge of ‘waging war’ is involved have also been elucidated in paragraph 176 as under:- 176. In cases of this nature where charges under Sections 121, 122, 121A read with 120B IPC as well as 302 IPC are involved, other principles should also be kept in mind, namely: 176.1. Most important factor should be the intention and purpose behind the waging of war against the State should be ascertained. 176.2. The modus operandi adopted which involved mobilization of men materials such as arms and ammunitions indulging in serious conspiracy over a period of time are another relevant factor 176.3. It will not depend upon the number of persons – even limited persons can indulge in more harmful crime than large crowd of persons could do. 176.4. There need not be pomp and pageantry like a battlefield. 176.5. Not all violent behaviour would fall within the prescription of waging war as stipulated under Sections 121, 121A, 122 read with 120B. 176.6. The object sought to be achieved should be directed against the sovereignty of the State and not merely commission of crime even if it is of higher velocity. 176.7. The concept of ‘waging war’ should not be stretched too far. 176.8. A balanced and realistic approach should be maintained while construing the offence committed and find out whether it would amount to waging of war against the State. 176.9. Mere organized movement with violence without any intention of acting against the interest of the nation has to be examined. 176.10. Neither the number engaged nor the power employed nor the arms used can be the criteria. 176.11. It should be seen as to what is the purpose behind the choosing of a target of attack. 176.12. When a planned operation is executed, what was the extent of disaster resulted, is to be seen. 176.10. Neither the number engaged nor the power employed nor the arms used can be the criteria. 176.11. It should be seen as to what is the purpose behind the choosing of a target of attack. 176.12. When a planned operation is executed, what was the extent of disaster resulted, is to be seen. 176.13 It is to be seen whether it is a mere desperate act of a small group of persons who indulged in the crime. 176.14. It must be seen whether the undoubted objective and determination of the offender was it to impinge on the sovereignty of the nation. 176.15. In this context the expansive definition of government of India should be understood.” 17. The principles of law laid down in the matter of Navjot Sandhu (supra) were followed with approval in the matter of Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., (2016) 14 SCC 536 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in clear terms that every act of violence, even though it may be directed against the armed forces or public officials would not lead to an inference that a war is going on or that war-like conditions are prevailing and observed in paragraph 197 as under:- “197. Therefore, animus to wage a war or any other similar activity is important before a non-conventional war or war-like situation can be said to exist. Every act of violence, even though it may be directed against the armed forces or public officials would not lead to an inference that a war is going on or that war-like conditions are prevailing. Similarly, sporadic but organized killings by militants and ambushes would not lead to a conclusion of the existence of a war or war-like conditions. Were such a blanket proposition accepted, it would reflect poorly on our armed forces that they are unable to effectively tackle a war-like situation for the last almost six decades. It would also reflect poorly on the Union of India that it is unable to resort to available constitutional provisions and measures to bring a war-like situation under control for almost six decades. We cannot be expected to cast or even countenance any such aspersions on our armed forces or the Union of India. It would also reflect poorly on the Union of India that it is unable to resort to available constitutional provisions and measures to bring a war-like situation under control for almost six decades. We cannot be expected to cast or even countenance any such aspersions on our armed forces or the Union of India. All that we can and do say is that in such a situation, our Constitution recognizes only an internal disturbance, which is what the situation in Manipur is and that ought to be dealt with by the civil administration with the services of the armed forces that are available in aid of the civil power.” 18. Similarly, in the matter of Mohammad Irfan v. State of Karnataka, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 590, which is a case of terror attack at the Indian Institute of Science in Bengaluru, relying upon Nazir Khan (supra) & Navjot Sandhu (supra), it was held in paragraph 38 as follows:- “38. What constitutes an offence under Section 121 of the IPC is the waging of war or attempt to wage war or abetting of waging of such war against the Government of India. The expression “waging of war” was considered by this Court in Navjot Sandhu (supra). Paragraph 34 of the decision of this Court in Nazir Khan (supra) was also to the same effect. Said paragraph reads as under:- “34. The expression “waging war” means and can only mean waging war in the manner usual in war. In other words, in order to support a conviction on such a charge it is not enough to show that the persons charged have contrived to obtain possession of an armoury and have, when called upon to surrender it, used the rifles and ammunition so obtained against the government troops. It must also be shown that the seizure of the armoury was part and parcel of a planned operation and that their intention in resisting the troops of the Government was to overwhelm and defeat these troops and then to go on and crush any further opposition with which they might meet until either the leaders of the movement succeeded in obtaining the possession of the machinery of government or until those in possession of it yielded to the demands of their leaders.” 19. Reverting to the facts of the case, in light of the abovestated decisions of the Supreme Court, qua Section 121 of IPC, it is quite vivid that the case of the prosecution is that the Appellant along with the two acquitted accused persons and 28 other absconded accused persons armed with deadly and dangerous weapons opened fire on the police party headed by S.D.O.(P) Daulat Ram Porte (PW- 2) by constituting unlawful assembly for their unlawful object in order to cause damage to the police party, thereby committed the said offence. In order to prove the offence, it has been brought on record that from the possession of the Appellant, one AK-47 Rifle with Magazine loaded with 25 rounds, was seized vide Exhibit P-3 in presence of two seizure witnesses, Vijay Markam (PW-4) and Mangal Singh (PW-5). Vijay Markam (PW-4) in his examination-in-chief has clearly stated that in Village Ghumsimunda from the agriculture field of Mangal Singh, one AK-47 Rifle with loaded Magazine was seized from the possession of the Appellant vide Exhibit P-3. However, it is necessary to mention that the said AK-47 Rifle was not seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the Appellant. It was seized in presence of Vijay Markam (PW-4) and Mangal Singh (PW-5). The evidentiary value of the article which has been seized without any memorandum statement of the accused, has been discussed and laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court recently in the matter of Boby v. State of Kerala, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 50 wherein following the principle of law laid down in Chandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1978) 4 SCC 90 it has been held as under:- “21. It could thus be seen that Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires that the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to the said fact. The information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery. The said view has been consistently followed by this Court in a catena of cases. 22. This Court, in the case of Chandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu (supra) had an occasion to consider the evidence of recovery of incriminating articles in the absence of record of the statement of accused No.1. The said view has been consistently followed by this Court in a catena of cases. 22. This Court, in the case of Chandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu (supra) had an occasion to consider the evidence of recovery of incriminating articles in the absence of record of the statement of accused No.1. In the said case also, no statement of accused No.1 was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act leading to the recovery of jewels. The Court found that the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court had erred in holding that the jewels were recovered at the instance of accused No.1 therein in pursuance to the confessional statement (Ex.P- 27) recorded before PW-34 therein. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case : “36. …... Thus the fact remains that no confessional statement of A-1 causing the recovery of these jewels was proved under Section 27, Evidence Act.....” 26. This Court has elaborately considered as to how the law expects the IO to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the present case, leave aside the recovery panchnama being in accordance with the aforesaid requirement, there is no statement of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein) recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the circumstance that the dead body of the deceased was recovered at the instance of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein).” 20. Moreover, Vijay Markam (PW-4), in whose presence the said AK-47 Rifle is said to have been seized from the possession of the Appellant, though in his examinationin- chief has stated that the said Rifle was recovered from the possession of the Appellant, but, in the crossexamination, the said witness has clearly stated that all the articles were seized from the place of incident and the seizure memos, Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5 & P-6, were signed in the police station. Similarly, Mangal Singh (PW-5), the another seizure witness, has stated that all the articles seized by Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5 & P-6 were lying at the spot and which were seized from the place of incident. Similarly, Mangal Singh (PW-5), the another seizure witness, has stated that all the articles seized by Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5 & P-6 were lying at the spot and which were seized from the place of incident. In his cross-examination, the said witness (PW-5) has admitted that no seizure proceeding was conducted by the police in his presence and the seized articles were only shown to him by the police. As such, the seizure of AK-47 Rifle from the possession of the Appellant is tainted on two counts; firstly, it was not seized from the possession of the Appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and, secondly, it was not proved to have been seized from the possession of the Appellant as per the statement of the seizure witnesses, Vijay Markam (PW-4) and Mangal Singh (PW-5) as they have not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, it cannot be held that the Appellant was armed with deadly and dangerous weapon. As regards, the recovery of other deadly and dangerous weapon along with other articles seized by Exhibits P-4, P-5 & P- 6 in presence of Vijay Markam (PW-4) and Mangal Singh (PW-5) also has not been fully established as they were seized from the place of incident and, therefore, seizure of these articles also cannot be used against the Appellant. Thus, there is no evidence on record that the Appellant was armed with deadly and dangerous weapon and he had opened fire on the police party, as no AK-47 Rifle has been found proved to have been seized from the possession of the Appellant and other weapon and articles seized from the place of incident cannot be used against the Appellant. As such, there is no evidence that the Appellant did any act which falls within the meaning of Section 121 of IPC of waging war, or attempting to wage war or abetting to wage war. 21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Appellant is entitled to be acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 121 of IPC read with Section 149 of IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. 21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Appellant is entitled to be acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 121 of IPC read with Section 149 of IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. Consequently, the Appellant, since he has not been found in possession and in use of any deadly and dangerous weapon, is also entitled for acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 148 of IPC read with Section 149 of IPC as well as for Sections 25(1-A) & 27(2) of Arms Act on the basis of benefit of doubt. It is accordingly held so. Conviction of the Appellant under Section 307 of IPC: 22. The Appellant has also been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC read with Section 149 of IPC. As discussed above, it is apparent that the Appellant has not been found in possession of any deadly and dangerous weapon. The said AK-47 Rifle and other weapon and articles have been seized from the place of incident and for which the Appellant cannot be held responsible. However, he has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC on the ground that he has opened fire on the police party by the said AK-47 Rifle. It has come on record that the police party made counter-firing and the Appellant was suffered gut shot injuries. MLC of the Appellant was conducted vide Exhibit P-20 by Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-10) who found a round puncture wound of 0.5cm on the front side of his left thigh, a lacerated wound 1.5cm deep in his left hand and there was injury also on his left hand medial aspect of 5x4x1cm in size. He was thereafter referred to Dr. Bheemrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital, Raipur where he was treated by Dr. Swapnil Bhele (PW-11) during the period from 14.8.2014 to 1.9.2014. On examination of the Appellant, Dr. Swapnil Bhele found that two bones of his right hand were fractured; bone of his right hand palm was fractured; there were severe injuries on his left hand palm 10x6cm in size and his palm was not functioning properly; there were also two punctured wound 1x0.5cm in size on his left thigh. His left hand was operated and rod was inserted. He was discharged on 1.9.2014 vide Discharge Ticket (Art.-1). 23. His left hand was operated and rod was inserted. He was discharged on 1.9.2014 vide Discharge Ticket (Art.-1). 23. The question is, as to whether the Appellant has rightly been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, as it is not the case of the prosecution that pursuant to the fire made by the Appellant any member of the police party suffered injuries, grievous or otherwise. 24. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 307 of IPC which states as under: - “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein-before mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.—When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 25. The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 of IPC are:- (i) that the death of a human being was attempted; (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as: (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excused for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury." 26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., (1988) 4 SCC 551 has held that under Section 307 of IPC what the court has to see is, whether the act irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the provision. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of “attempt to murder”. Under Section 307 of IPC, the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences that ensue. It has been further held that the nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted are some of the factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention. 27. Similarly, in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao & Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 434 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that for the application of Section 307 of IPC, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 of IPC. It has been observed by their Lordships in paragraph 21 of the report as under :- “21. In offence under Section 307 all the ingredients of the offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. For the application of Section 307, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 IPC. But since sentence and fine have been maintained, alteration of conviction notwithstanding no modification of sentence need be made....” 28. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189 has also held that to constitute an offence under Section 307 of IPC, two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189 has also held that to constitute an offence under Section 307 of IPC, two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the report as under :- “15. To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence “of attempt to murder”. Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors....” 29. In the matter of Jage Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of IPC and held as under :- “12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. 14. Having regard to the weapon used for causing the head injuries to Sukhbir, nature of injures, situs of the injury and the severity of the blows, the courts below recorded concurrent findings convicting the second appellant under Section 307 IPC. In our considered view, the conviction of the second appellant Rajbir @ Raju under Section 307 IPC is unassailable.” 30. To attract Section 307 of IPC, some overt-act causing bodily injuries is absolutely necessary. Mere intention would not constitute an offence under the said provision unless it is accompanied by some over-act to cause bodily injury. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 28 has categorically held in paragraph 9 as under:- "9. ...To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this Section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof." 31. In the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha @ Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have reiterated the aforesaid principles of law laid down in Balram Bama Patil (supra) which have further been followed with approval in the matters of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem alias Chamaru & Anr., 2005 (5) SCC 554 and Jage Ram (supra) and held that:- "10. Several judgments of this Court have interpreted Section 307 of the Penal Code. In State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil, this Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted: “9...To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) This position in law was followed by subsequent benches of this Court. 11. In State of MP v. Saleem, this Court held thus:(SCC pp. 559-60, para 13) “13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, this Court held that to establish the commission of an offence under Section 307, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted: “12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.” The above judgments of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained (2015) 11 SCC 366 from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent."" 32. Furthermore, since the Appellant as per the MLC conducted by Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-1) and as per the statement of Dr. Swapnil Bhele (PW-11) has suffered serious injuries, as a principle of appreciation of evidence, it becomes obligatory on the prosecution to explain the injuries. But before this obligation is placed on the prosecution, two conditions must be satisfied :- (1) That the injuries on the person of the accused must be very serious and severe and not superficial. (2) That it must be shown that these injuries must have been caused at the time of the occurrence in question. (See: Jagdish v. State of Rajasthan, (1979) 2 SCC 178 followed in the matter of Hare Krishna Singh and others v. State of Bihar, (1988) 2 SCC 95 .) 33. Now, the question is, whether the two conditions as held in Jagdish (supra) followed in Hare Krishna Singh (supra), have been fulfilled in the present case or not? 34. So far as condition No.1 is concerned, perusal of the statements of Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-10) and Dr. Swapnil Bhele (PW-11) would show that the injuries suffered by the Appellant were serious and severe in nature. 34. So far as condition No.1 is concerned, perusal of the statements of Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-10) and Dr. Swapnil Bhele (PW-11) would show that the injuries suffered by the Appellant were serious and severe in nature. Similarly, as regards the second condition, as per the statements of Vijay Markam (PW-4) and Mangal Singh (PW-5), the Appellant was found in injured condition at the place of incident. Thus, the second condition that injuries must have been caused at the time of occurrence, is clearly satisfied. Thereafter, it was the prosecution who was to explain as to how the Appellant has suffered grievous injuries. 35. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rajender Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 298 held that when injuries sustained by accused are grievous, non-explanation of the same would render the prosecution case suspicious, and observed as under :- “4. So far as the question whether nonexplanation of the injuries on accused Rajender ipso facto can be held to be fatal to the prosecution case, it is too well settled that ordinarily the prosecution is not obliged to explain each injury on an accused even though the injuries might have been caused in the course of the occurrence, if the injuries are minor in nature, but at the same time if the prosecution fails to explain a grievous injury on one of the accused persons which is established to have been caused in the course of the same occurrence then certainly the court looks at the prosecution case with a little suspicion on the ground that the prosecution has suppressed the true version of the incident. In the case in hand accused-appellant Rajender had one penetrating wound, three incised wounds and one lacerated wound and of these injuries, the penetrating wound on the left axillary area in the 5th intercostal space ½” x ” x ¾” was ? grievous in nature as per the evidence of the doctor, PW-3 who had examined him. On the basis of the evidence of PW-3 as well as PW-11 the courts have come to the conclusion that there is no room for doubt that the appellants and their men had injuries on their person on the date of the occurrence. grievous in nature as per the evidence of the doctor, PW-3 who had examined him. On the basis of the evidence of PW-3 as well as PW-11 the courts have come to the conclusion that there is no room for doubt that the appellants and their men had injuries on their person on the date of the occurrence. The question, therefore, that remains to be considered is whether non-explanation of the said injuries on accused appellant Rajender can form the basis of a conclusion that the prosecution version is untrue. In Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1968 SC 1281 ) this Court had held that the failure of the prosecution to offer any explanation regarding the injuries found on the accused shows that the evidence of the prosecution witness relating to the incident is not true or at any rate, not wholly true and further, those injuries probabilise the plea taken by the accused persons. But in Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar, (1976) 4 SCC 394 , this Court considered Mohar Rai (supra) and came to hold that non-explanation of the injuries on the accused by the prosecution may affect the prosecution case and such non-explanation may assume greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. The question was considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 , and this Court held that if the prosecution evidence is clear, cogent and credit-worthy and the court can distinguish the truth from falsehood the mere fact that the injuries are not explained by the prosecution cannot by itself be a sole basis to reject such evidence and consequently the whole case and much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In Vijayee Singh case (supra) the Court held that non-explanation of injury on the accused person does not affect the prosecution case as a whole.” 36. In Vijayee Singh case (supra) the Court held that non-explanation of injury on the accused person does not affect the prosecution case as a whole.” 36. Returning to the facts of the case, it is quite established that though the prosecution has alleged that the Appellant had opened fire/made gun shot injuries from AK-47 Rifle or the Appellant was found in possession of the said weapon and other articles, but, as held in the preceding paragraphs, the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in respect of seizure of the said weapon from the possession of the Appellant. The S.D.O.(P) Daulat Ram Porte (PW-2) to whom the death was attempted has stated that a joint operation was being carried out by three parties, one was headed by him and the second was headed by Inspector G.S. Thakur, Police Station Antagarh and the third was headed by the B.S.F. Company Commander, K.K. Sharma and when they reached towards naxalite site, an open firing was made by the naxalites and in firing, the Appellant had suffered gut shot injuries and he was caught red handed by the police party in injured condition with AK-47 Rifle (which has not been found proved in possession of the Appellant). In crossexamination, the said witness Daulat Ram Porte (PW-2) has clearly stated that on the place of occurrence i.e. the field of Mangal Singh Sori, unknown naxalites were firing gun shots and he could not see who was actually firing and the firing was made from the jungle side. He further candidly admitted that he did not see the Appellant firing with the weapon and also admitted that no memorandum statement and panchnama was prepared in respect of the Appellant and no incriminating article also was seized from the Appellant in his presence. Moreover, the injuries on the person of the accused were serious and severe in nature in view of the statements of Dr. Sheetal Dugga (PW-10) and Dr. Swapnil Bhele (PW-11) and it has been established that the injuries on the person of the Appellant have been caused at the time of occurrence in question. No bodily injury caused by the Appellant has been proved rather the Appellant himself has suffered bodily injury and which has not been explained by the Prosecution. Sheetal Dugga (PW-10) and Dr. Swapnil Bhele (PW-11) and it has been established that the injuries on the person of the Appellant have been caused at the time of occurrence in question. No bodily injury caused by the Appellant has been proved rather the Appellant himself has suffered bodily injury and which has not been explained by the Prosecution. Therefore, it cannot be said that death of human being was attempted and the Appellant had intention to cause death. To constitute an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, the prosecution must prove (i) the intention to commit murder and (ii) the overt-act done by the accused. Both of these ingredients are absolutely missing in the instant case and in absence of which, the Appellant deserves to be and is acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. 37. Consequently, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction of the Appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 307, 121 of IPC read with Section 149 of IPC as well as under Section 25(1A) & 27(2) of Arms Act is set-aside and he is acquitted of the said charges, extending him the benefit of doubt. He is reported to be in jail since 21.11.2014, therefore, he be released from jail forthwith, if his detention is not required in any other offence. 38. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted forthwith to the Trial Court and the concerned Superintendent of Jail, where the Appellant is suffering his imprisonment, be also supplied with a certified copy of this Judgment for information and necessary action, if any, at the earliest. 39. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case of the absconding coaccused persons in the instant case.