JUDGMENT : Sanjay Prasad, J. This Criminal Appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellant challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence, both dated 14.02.2008 passed in S.T. No. 100/2004 passed by Shri Bhola Prasad, learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XX, Ranchi, by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of eight years and the learned Court below has further directed that the period of detention undergone by the convict as under trial prisoner shall be set off towards the period of sentence in view of Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. 2. The prosecution case was initiated on the basis of written report submitted by victim, aged about 14 years, stating therein that on 11.4.2003 at about 10.30 A.M., while the informant-victim had gone to the nearby forest for picking dung. Then, at that time the accused Kario Nayak, son of Malinder Nayak came and caught hold of her from her back side. On that she told the accused Kario Nayak that she is his cousin sister so why he wants to outrage her modesty. On that the accused replied that he treats his own sister only his sister and the rest are not his sister and thereafter the accused dragged the informant-victim, thrown her on the ground and torn her salwar. The informant cried and tried to resist the accused but the accused did not take care and further torn the under garment of the victim and committed rape on her and after committing rape the accused Kario Nayak fled away. The informant thereafter cried there and she was feeling pain in her private parts and anyhow saving her dignity from the torn clothes she came weeping to her house. It is further stated that on the way the co-villagers Mudra Nayak, Paku Nayak and Shambhu Nayak met her to whom she told about the incident. On return to her house she told about the matter to her sister Dukhni Devi and uncle Shambhu Nayak and other family members. It is stated that as the parents of the victim were not in the house, therefore, on 14.04.2003 the victim came with her parents and other relatives to the police station and submitted the written report about the occurrence and also produced the undergarment having blood stain and white stain mark before the police. 3. Heard Mr. It is stated that as the parents of the victim were not in the house, therefore, on 14.04.2003 the victim came with her parents and other relatives to the police station and submitted the written report about the occurrence and also produced the undergarment having blood stain and white stain mark before the police. 3. Heard Mr. Naveen Kumar Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mrs. Vandana Bharti, learned counsel for the State. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Court below is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated by the informant-prosecutrix. It is submitted that there is delay of three days in lodging the F.I.R. and as such the prosecution case becomes doubtful. It is submitted that the learned Court below has not properly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is submitted that no sign of rape was found by the Doctor on examination of the victim. It is submitted that several prosecution witnesses were declared hostile by the prosecution. It is submitted that the learned Court has erred in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence by not considering that most of the important witnesses of this case have turned hostile and P.W.-1 is heresay on the point of occurrence. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court has failed to consider that the statement of P.W.-6-the victim girl of this case was not corroborated by the evidence of Medical Officer who had examined the victim girl on 14.4.2003 just three days after the occurrence and found no injury anywhere on the body and she had not complaint of pain or injury anywhere and even the doctor further opined that the findings of physical examination and pathologists report suggest that there was no sexual assault with the girl. It is submitted that the learned Court below has not considered that the clothes, handed over to the police by the victim girl, was never produced in this case during trial. It is submitted that the learned Court below has not considered that the clothes, handed over to the police by the victim girl, was never produced in this case during trial. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court has failed to consider that there is unexplained delay of three days in lodgment of the F.I.R., when the mother of the victim girl returned on the same day and in F.I.R. she was explaining that due to absence of parents she has not informed the police but in her examination as P.W.6 she explained that there was a call for Panchayat and when it was not held then she informed the police and the Police Station is about 100 yards in front of her house. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to produce the I.O. of this case as well as the learned Judicial Officer who had examined the girl at the first instance after lodging of the F.I.R., which caused serious prejudice while passing the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the learned Court below has failed to appreciate that the prosecution has failed to prove the place of occurrence as the victim girl stated that the place of occurrence is about 100 yards in front of her house and the police station is also 100 yards in front of her house. It is submitted that the learned Court below has failed to appreciate that the sister of the victim was not brought as prosecution witness, whom the victim told about the occurrence and at the same time other important witnesses as victim’s cousin brother and uncle had turned hostile and stated that they did not know about the incident. It is submitted that even the F.I.R. was not proved by the competent authority and it was proved by an Advocate’s Clerk and the I.O. has not been examined. It is submitted that the appellant remained in custody for around five years and served more than half of the sentence and hence, in view of the discussions made above, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence may be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted. 4. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. has submitted that the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Court below does not require any interference from this Court. 4. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. has submitted that the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Court below does not require any interference from this Court. It is submitted that this is a case of committing rape of a minor girl aged about 14-15 years. It is submitted that the Court below has considered all the evidence of the witnesses and rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of the I.P.C. It is submitted that the P.W. 6 is the victim girl herself and she has fully supported her case that the accused caught hold of her from behind and had torn her clothes and assaulted her and committed rape upon her. Even during her cross-examination she has fully supported her case and stood the test of cross-examination. It is submitted that the victim, during her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. has also stated against the appellant for committing rape upon her. It is submitted that P.W.1 is the mother of the victim-prosecutrix-informant; and she has also fully supported the prosecution case during her cross examination she has also stood the test of cross-examination. Thus, the evidence of the P.W.1-victim girl is corroborated by the evidence of P.W.1, namely Wasni Devi. It is submitted that P.W.7, i.e. the Doctor has stated during her evidence that the victim was aged about 14-15 years and has stated that the victim was a minor on the date of occurrence and thus, the allegation of the informant is corroborated from the evidence of P.W.7-The Doctor. It is submitted that non-examination of the I.O. is not fatal to the prosecution case as the victim girl has supported the occurrence against the appellant. It is submitted that conviction can be made also upon the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix if her testimony is found to be truthful. Therefore, there is no illegality committed by the learned Court below and hence, conviction and sentence may be upheld and criminal appeal may be dismissed. 5. Perused the Lower Court records and considered the submission of both the sides. 6. It transpires from the F.I.R. that the occurrence took place on 11.04.2003 while the prosecutrix had gone to the forest for picking cow dung and the appellant had caught her from behind and had torn her clothes and had committed rape upon her. 5. Perused the Lower Court records and considered the submission of both the sides. 6. It transpires from the F.I.R. that the occurrence took place on 11.04.2003 while the prosecutrix had gone to the forest for picking cow dung and the appellant had caught her from behind and had torn her clothes and had committed rape upon her. However, the F.I.R. was lodged on 14.04.2003 by the victim girl-informant (name not disclosed in view of the guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court). She has stated in the F.I.R. that even blood was oozing from her genital parts and while she was returning to her residence, then she has disclosed the matter to Mudra Nayak, Paku Nayak and Shambhu Nayak and even after returning to the residence, she disclosed the matter to his Didi-Dukhni Devi, Uncle Shambhu Nayak and other family members and has also produced the blood stained and white stained clothes before the Officer-in-Charge, Silli Police Station. 7. On the basis of written application submitted by the victim girl-prosecutrix the Officer-in-charge Silli P.S. has instituted Silli P.S. Case No. 22 of 2003 under Section 376 of the I.P.C. on 14.04.2003. 8. Thereafter, the police after investigation, has submitted chargesheet under Section 376 I.P.C. on 04.07.2003 against the appellant and the learned Court below had taken cognizance against the appellant under Section 376 I.P.C. on 04.7.2003. 9. After supplying police papers to the appellant accused, charges were framed against the appellant under Section 376 I.P.C. on 21.04.2004 by Shri I.B. Mandal, learned A.J.C.-F.T.C.-II, Ranchi and to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 10. During trial the prosecution has got nine (09) witnesses examined, who are as follows:- (i) P.W. 1 is Wasni Devi, i.e. mother of the Informant, (ii) P.W. 2 is Parku Nayak, (iii) P.W. 3 is Shanti Devi, (iv) P.W. 4 is Sukri Nayak, (v) P.W. 5 is Lakhi Ram Nayak @ Mudra Nayak, (vi) P.W. 6 is victim-Informant of the case, (vii) P.W. 7 is Dr. Jyotsna Sinha, (viii) P.W. 8 is Shambhu Nayak and (ix) P.W. 9 is Manoj Kumar. 11. The prosecution, in support of its case, has got exhibited certain documents, which are as follows:- (i) Exhibit 1 is the Injury Report-Medical Report (ii) Exhibit 2 is Formal F.I.R. (iii) Exhibit 3 is the endorsement on the written application. 12. Jyotsna Sinha, (viii) P.W. 8 is Shambhu Nayak and (ix) P.W. 9 is Manoj Kumar. 11. The prosecution, in support of its case, has got exhibited certain documents, which are as follows:- (i) Exhibit 1 is the Injury Report-Medical Report (ii) Exhibit 2 is Formal F.I.R. (iii) Exhibit 3 is the endorsement on the written application. 12. Thereafter, the appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 15.12.2007 and to which he denied the circumstances put forth before him. 13. Neither any defence witness was examined on behalf of the appellant nor any document has been marked as Exhibit on behalf of the defence. 14. Thereafter, the learned Court below, after considering the case of both the sides, had convicted the appellant under Sectio 376 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for eight years, hence, appreciation of prosecution witnesses is required to be done. 15. P.W. 1 is Wasni Devi, who is the mother of the victim girl and who has stated during her evidence that on the date of occurrence, she has gone before her relative and when she returned to her residence, then her younger daughter started weeping and on being asked her younger daughter informed her that the appellant Kario Nayak had torn clothes of her daughter and forcibly committed rape upon her and the occurrence has also been seen by Paku Nayak. She further stated that her daughter was aged about 12-13 years on the date of occurrence and she identified the appellant as he lives in front of their house. During cross-examination, she stated that she had gone to the house of her middle daughter for hospitality one day before Ram Navami and returned to her residence after three days of Ram Navami and she had not seen the occurrence but heard about the same. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W.1, it would appear that she is a hear-say witness and she is the mother of the victim girl but she has supported the prosecution case that the victim girl was subjected to rape at the hands of the appellant. 16. P.W. 2 is Parku Nayak, who has stated during evidence that the prosecutrix is the sister of his elder uncle. However, he does not know anything about the occurrence and the police has not recorded his statement. 16. P.W. 2 is Parku Nayak, who has stated during evidence that the prosecutrix is the sister of his elder uncle. However, he does not know anything about the occurrence and the police has not recorded his statement. The P.W. 2 was declared hostile by the prosecution and during his cross-examination he has denied to have given any statement before the police to have learnt about the occurrence from the prosecutrix. Even during his cross-examination he has stated that he does not know anything about the occurrence. Thus, evidence of P.W. 2 is not reliable and P.W. 2 is declared hostile by the prosecution. 17. P.W. 3 is Shanti Devi, who has also stated that she had not heard anything about the occurrence and had not seen the occurrence and declared hostile by the prosecution and her cross examination is declined by the defence. Thus, evidence of P.W.3 is not reliable. 18. P.W. 4 is Suki Nayak, who has been tendered by the prosecution and thus, evidence of P.W. 4 is not reliable. 19. P.W. 5 is Lakhi Ram Nayak @ Mudra Nayak, who has stated during his evidence that police had not recorded his statement and he does know anything about the occurrence. The P.W. 5 has also been declared hostile by the prosecution. Even during his cross examination he stated that he does not know anything about the occurrence. Thus, evidence of P.W. 5 is not reliable. 20. P.W. 8-Shambhu Nayak is the Uncle of the prosecutrix and has stated during his evidence that he does not know anything about the occurrence and the victim girl is his own niece and he is not aware of any occurrence involving her and the police has not recorded his statement. P.W. 8 has also been declared hostile by the prosecution. Even during his cross examination he stated that he does not know anything about the occurrence. Thus, evidence of P.W.8 is also not reliable. 21. P.W. 7 is Dr. Jyotsna Sinha, who has examined the victim girl–the prosecutrix and proved the medical report as Ext.1, which is as follows: “On 14.04.2003 I was posted as M.O. at Sadar Hospital Ranchi and I examined Rubi Kumari D/o Madhu Nayak of vill-silli, Tola Kerkera, P.S. Silli, and the findings are as follows:- 1. Height 58 inches, weight 35 K.G. Pubic & axillary hair present, breast developed, teeth 14/14. Height 58 inches, weight 35 K.G. Pubic & axillary hair present, breast developed, teeth 14/14. On general examination no injury found anywhere on the body, and she does not complaint of pain or injury anywhere 2. On P/V examination no trauma, -no matting, no foreign hair could be found. Introitus admits just one finger. M.I.-Mole on chin on left side. Brought by lady police on 6/7 pramila Kumari of silli P.S. On microscopic examination of vaginal smear no dead or alive spermatozoa could be found. According to radiologist her age is between 12-15 yrs. Opinion-The finding of physical examination and pathologists report suggest that there was no sexual assault. Age of patient could be between 14-15 years.” She has further proved the medical report, marked as Ext. 1 in her writing and signature. This P.W. 7, i.e. the Doctor was discharged without cross-examination by the learned Court below as none had appeared for her cross-examination till 4 p.m. Thus, mere scrutinizing the evidence of the doctor, i.e. the P.W. 7 it would appear that no injury was found anywhere on the body of the victim girl and she had not complained of any injury anywhere and no dead or live spermatozoa can be found. Further, she stated that there was no sexual assault could be found as per the physical examination and pathologist’s report. However, she stated that the age of the patient should be between 14-15 years. Therefore, it is evident that the victim girl was a minor on the date of occurrence. 22. P.W.9 is the Advocates’ Clerk-Ram Chandra, who has proved the formal F.I.R. in signature of the then Officer-in-Charge, marked as Ext. 2. He has also proved the endorsement on the written application marked as Ext.3. During cross-examination, he has stated that he does not know anything about the occurrence. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W. 9, it is evident that he is an Advocate’s Clerk and he is a formal witness. Thus, the formal F.I.R. and Written Application were not proved by the competent person. 23. During cross-examination, he has stated that he does not know anything about the occurrence. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W. 9, it is evident that he is an Advocate’s Clerk and he is a formal witness. Thus, the formal F.I.R. and Written Application were not proved by the competent person. 23. P.W. 6 is the victim girl-Prosecutrix herself, who has stated during her evidence that occurrence took place on the date of Ramnavami at around 10 a.m. in the morning and at that time she had gone to the Jungle, which is in front of her house for picking cow dung and she was alone and while she was picking up cow dung, then the appellant Kario Nayak caught hold of her from the behind and opened her Salwar and thrashed her and on her protest she was slapped twice by the appellant, who then committed rape upon her and due to pain she started shouting and blood started oozing out from her genital part. She also stated that while she was shouting then the villagers Bora Nayak, Paku Nayak and some village brothers also came and she has disclosed about the occurrence to them but the appellant fled away. Thereafter, she returned to her residence in weeping condition and disclosed the matter to Bimla Devi, Sukhi Devi and also stated that at that time her mother was not present in the residence and hence, she disclosed the matter to her Aunty also. When her mother returned then she also disclosed the matter to her mother and then her mother asked her to go to the police station and then she went to police station after four days. Although, Panchayat was convened and father of the appellant and villagers attended but no decision could be taken and hence, the matter was informed to the police station. She had also handed over the clothes to the Officer-in-Charge, which was wore by her at the time of occurrence on the instruction of the Officer-in-Charge. Thereafter, the Officer-in-Charge took her to the Court and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded and then she put her thumb impression on the statement recorded before the Judicial Magistrate. She also identified the accused appellant in the Court for committing rape upon her. Thereafter, the Officer-in-Charge took her to the Court and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded and then she put her thumb impression on the statement recorded before the Judicial Magistrate. She also identified the accused appellant in the Court for committing rape upon her. During her cross-examination she stated that her mother is a maid and her father has performed second marriage and the police station is 100 yards from her house and her father has four brothers and she had described the children of her uncles. She stated that the forest in question is big and situated at a distance of 100 yards and villagers used to go there for grazing their cattle and the village is situated at a distance of 50 yards from the place of occurrence and it was a festival day on the date of occurrence. She further reiterated and asserted that the accused caught hold of her and tore her clothes and committed rape upon her. However, when she protested then he told her that he recognizes only his own sister as his sister and has described the manner of rape committed upon her by the appellant. She reiterated that she was taken before the Doctor, who treated her. She also stated that her mother is not a cook. She had denied the suggestion for instituting false case as no such occurrence has taken place. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of P.W.6, i.e. the victim girl, it is evident that she has fully supported her case that the appellant had committed forcibly rape upon her by tearing her clothes and the appellant is the cousin brother of the victim girl and she even had stated that blood started coming out from her genital part and she had given the blood and semen stained clothes to the police officer. Even during her cross examination she has fully supported the commission of rape upon her by the appellant and she has fully stood the test of cross examination and there is no infirmity in her statement, rather she is fully consistent in her statement during her evidence regarding commission of rape upon her by the appellant. Thus, evidence of P.W. 6 is trustworthy and can be relied upon. 24. Thus, evidence of P.W. 6 is trustworthy and can be relied upon. 24. It transpires that the I.O. of this case has not been examined by the Court below and it reveals from the ordersheet that despite issuing letter to Sr.S.P., Ranchi, the I.O. was not examined by the prosecution during the trial. The Court below should have taken some more effective steps for securing evidence of the I.O., but it failed to do so. However, it appears that the learned Trial Court was under the impression that he has to conclude the trial within a period of six months in compliance of the direction of the High Court in order dated 19.01.2006 passed in B.A. No. 7379 of 2005, vide which prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected. So far as non-examination of the I.O. is concerned the same is not fatal to the prosecution case as P.W. 6 has fully supported the prosecution case and she has remained consistent during her evidence before the learned Trial Court below and in view of the fact that conviction can be based even on the basis of solitary evidence of the prosecutrix, this Court finds that non examination of the I.O. is not so fatal and has caused no serious prejudice to the accused-appellant. 25. The accused is fully aware of the fact of allegation as has been made out in the F.I.R. and the statement of the witnesses were recorded during his presence before the learned Court below as he was in custody from 11.05.2003 till his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by the learned Court below. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 15.12.2007 by the learned A.J.C.-XX, Ranchi and he was granted bail vide order dated 24.04.2008, passed by the High Court in Cr.A. No. 430 of 2008 and he has furnished his bail bond on 28.4.2008. Thus, the appellant has remained in custody for a long period. 26. It appears from the Lower Court Record that even the seizure list was prepared by the I.O. on 14.4.2003, in which there is seizure of the blood and semen stained undergarments of blue colour of the victim girl, which has been enclosed with the chargesheet but the same has not been marked as Exhibit by the prosecution due to non-examination of the I.O. 27. It has been held in the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. reported in (1995) 5 SCC 518 , Paragraph 6 and 7 as follows:- “Para 6:-We must admit that the defective investigation gave us some anxious moments and we were at first blush inclined to think that the accused was prejudiced. But on closer scrutiny we have reason to think that the loopholes in the investigation were left to help the accused at the cost of the poor prosecutrix, a labourer. To acquit solely on that ground would be adding insult to injury. 7. We have carefully examined the evidence of the prosecutrix, the medical evidence of her examination and the evidence of the investigating officer and we are inclined to think there is no risk involved in accepting the version of the prosecutrix. Her evidence shows that she had joined the two accused persons hardly three days before the incident as a labourer under a contractor. She was, therefore, in not too familiar an environment. She was the only female worker just out of her teens. Besides, the two accused persons and the prosecutrix there was one more person by the name Charan who was sent away to fetch tea. Taking advantage of the prosecutrix being alone in their company the appellant picked her up and took her inside the machine room, laid her on a pile of sand, removed her saree and petticoat, and had sexual intercourse with her against her wish. After he had satisfied his lust, he called his companion but before the latter could have her, she ran away and narrated the incident to Multanabai and then went in search of her husband, a rickshaw-puller. After narrating the incident to him, both of them went to the police station and lodged the complaint, Exhibit P-1, at about 4.10 p.m. It was said that there was considerable delay and sufficient time for tutoring and therefore her evidence could not be believed. There is no merit in this contention. The submission overlooks the fact that in India women are slow and hesitant to complain of such assaults and if the prosecutrix happens to be a married person she will not do anything without informing her husband. Merely because the complaint was lodged less than promptly does not raise the inference that the complaint was false. The submission overlooks the fact that in India women are slow and hesitant to complain of such assaults and if the prosecutrix happens to be a married person she will not do anything without informing her husband. Merely because the complaint was lodged less than promptly does not raise the inference that the complaint was false. The reluctance to go to the police is because of society's attitude towards such women; it casts doubt and shame upon her rather than comfort and sympathise with her. Therefore, delay in lodging complaints in such cases does not necessarily indicate that her version is false. The possibility of tutoring is ruled out because the evidence does not show that her husband knew the appellant and his companion before the incident. She too had started work hardly three days before and therefore she had no reason to falsely involve the appellant. No such reason is even suggested. She was a poor labourer hired by a contractor just a few days back and had no enmity with the appellant and his companion. Nor is there any such history so far as her husband is concerned. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt her word. As for corroboration the find of semen stains on her ‘saya’ and in her vagina lends sufficient assurance to her accusation. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [ (1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] this Court speaking through one of us (Ahmadi, J.) had occasion to point out that a woman who is a victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and therefore her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. She is not in the category of a child witness or an accomplice and therefore the rule of prudence that her evidence must be corroborated in material particulars has no application, at the most the court may look for some evidence which lends assurance. 28. It is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of KASHINATH MONDAL Versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL reported in (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 699 that defective investigation should not always result into acquittal. 28. It is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of KASHINATH MONDAL Versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL reported in (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 699 that defective investigation should not always result into acquittal. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment, i.e. Para No. 19 and 20 is quoted herein below: “Para 19:-There is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel for the appellant that the investigating agency also did not obtain fingerprints from the place of incident. But, it is well settled that remissness and inefficiency of the investigating agency should be no ground to acquit a person if there is enough evidence on record to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Para 20:-It is said by this Court in a number of cases that irregularities or deficiencies in conducting investigation by the prosecution is not always fatal to the prosecution case. If there is sufficient evidence to establish the substratum of the prosecution case, should not weigh with the Court.” 29. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Singh v. State of H.P. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 445 , at Para 16 and 18 as follows: 16. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the bloodstained clothes which were said to have been handed over to the officer-in-charge at the Polic se Station by the husband of the victim were not sent for chemical examination and, therefore, the corroboration which such evidence could offer was absent. In our view, the failure of the investigating agency cannot be a ground to discredit the testimony of the victim. The victim had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence, if any, of the investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of PW 1, the victim. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that on the basis of the evidence on record, the conviction of the appellant can be sustained. 18. In the present case, the testimony of the victim inspires confidence. Her testimony is not only corroborated by other witnesses but also by the medical evidence. Even if the statement of Niaz Deen, PW 4 is not taken into consideration, the other corroborative evidence in the case is sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. 30. 18. In the present case, the testimony of the victim inspires confidence. Her testimony is not only corroborated by other witnesses but also by the medical evidence. Even if the statement of Niaz Deen, PW 4 is not taken into consideration, the other corroborative evidence in the case is sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. 30. From the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it transpires that the victim-prosecutrix should not suffer for the latches on the part of the I.O. as the I.O. had not even sent the seized blood and semen stained clothes of the victim girl to the F.S.L. for its examination and hence, the prosecutrix should not suffer for any lapses on the part of the I.O. or any other official. 31. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GANESAN Versus STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS INSPECTOR OF POLICE reported in 2020 (10) SCC 573 , Para 10, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 11 and 12 as follows:- “Para 10:-In the present case, the appellant-accused has been convicted by the learned trial court for the offence under Section 7, punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. We have gone through the entire judgment passed by the learned trial court as well as the relevant evidence on record, more particularly the deposition of PW 1 father of the victim, PW 2 mother of the victim and PW 3 victim herself. It is true that PW2 mother of the victim has turned hostile. However, PW3 victim has fully supported the case of the prosecution. She has narrated in detail how the incident has taken place. She has been thoroughly and fully cross-examined. We do not see any good reason not to rely upon the deposition of PW 3 victim. PW 3 aged 15 years at the time of deposition is a matured one. She is trustworthy and liable. As per the settled proposition of law, even there can be a conviction based on the sole testimony of the victim, however, she must be found to be reliable and trustworthy. “10.1.Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 639] , it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. “10.1.Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 639] , it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. … Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … 12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1080] , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] , it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 750] . 10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 750] . In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” Para 11:-On evaluating the deposition of PW 3 victim on the touchstone of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are of the opinion that the sole testimony of the PW 3 victim is absolutely trustworthy and unblemished and her evidence is of sterling quality. Para 12:-Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court has not committed any error in convicting the accused, relying upon the deposition of PW 3 victim. The learned trial court has imposed the minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the learned trial court has already shown the leniency. At this stage, it is required to be noted that allegations against the accused which are proved from the deposition of PW 3 are very serious, which cannot be permitted in the civilised society. Therefore, considering the object and purpose of the POCSO Act and considering the evidence on record, the High Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and has rightly sentenced the accused to undergo three years' RI which is the minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.” 32. Therefore, considering the object and purpose of the POCSO Act and considering the evidence on record, the High Court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and has rightly sentenced the accused to undergo three years' RI which is the minimum sentence provided under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.” 32. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PHOOL SINGH Versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH reported in 2022 (2) SCC 74 , Para 9, Para 10, Para 15 as follows: “Para 9:-In Pankaj Chaudhary [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264] , it is observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of the accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It is further observed and held that sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be doubted by the court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In para 29, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 587) “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] ]. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 898] ].” Para 10:-In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana [Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 129] , it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Para 15:-Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that there was a delay of three days in lodging the FIR is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that it was the specific and consistent case on behalf of the prosecutrix that immediately on the occurrence of the incident, she narrated the incident to her sister-in-law (Jethani) and mother-in-law but they did not believe the prosecutrix. On the contrary, they beat her. Even no other family members in her matrimonial home supported the prosecutrix and therefore she sent message to her parental house and thereafter she was taken to her parental house and FIR was lodged. It is very unfortunate that in this case the sister-in-law and mother-in-law though being women did not support the prosecutrix. On the contrary, she was compelled to go to her parental house and thereafter the FIR was lodged. Being women at least the sister-in-law and mother-in-law ought to have supported the prosecutrix, rather than beating her and not believing the prosecutrix. Therefore, when in such a situation, the delay has taken place in lodging the FIR, the benefit of such delay cannot be given to the accused who as such was the relative.” 33. Being women at least the sister-in-law and mother-in-law ought to have supported the prosecutrix, rather than beating her and not believing the prosecutrix. Therefore, when in such a situation, the delay has taken place in lodging the FIR, the benefit of such delay cannot be given to the accused who as such was the relative.” 33. Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in view of the discussions made above and in the light of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, judgment of conviction of the appellant is upheld, however, considering the fact that appellant has been in custody from 11.5.2003 to 28.04.2008, i.e. for around five years and has faced trial for around 5 years and even more than fifteen years have passed since the filing of this Criminal Appeal, the sentence of the appellant is reduced from R.I. for eight (08) years to R.I. for seven (07) years and period undergone by the appellant in jail shall be set off as provided under Section 428 of the I.P.C. 34. The appellant is directed to surrender before the learned Court below to serve the remaining sentence, however, he will be entitled to remission as provided under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. 35. Thus, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed with modification in sentence of the appellant by reducing the period from R.I. for eight (08) years to R.I. for seven (07) years. 36. However, this Court further finds that the Prosecutrix-victim was a minor girl, aged about 1415 years on the date of occurrence and she had suffered a lot of humiliation and mental agony before the society and as such, it will be adequate that she should be provided compensation under the provisions of Victim Compensation Scheme as provided in Section 357-A of Cr.P.C., hence, the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA is directed to provide her Rs. Five Lakh (Rs. 5,00,000/-) towards the payment of victim compensation to the victim-prosecutrix under the Victim Compensation Scheme as provided under Section 357-A of the Cr.P.C. 37. It will be further desirable that the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA may take suitable steps for rehabilitation of the victim girl, if so desired by her, in co-ordination with the learned Secretary, D.L.S.A., Ranchi. 38. 5,00,000/-) towards the payment of victim compensation to the victim-prosecutrix under the Victim Compensation Scheme as provided under Section 357-A of the Cr.P.C. 37. It will be further desirable that the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA may take suitable steps for rehabilitation of the victim girl, if so desired by her, in co-ordination with the learned Secretary, D.L.S.A., Ranchi. 38. Let a copy of this order be sent by Fax to the Court of Shri Bhola Prasad, learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XX, Ranchi or his Successor Court and to the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA and the learned Secretary, D.L.S.A., Ranchi with a copy to the learned Principal Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi for the needful. 39. Thus, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid direction and observations.