ORDER : 1. These two writ petitions, brought under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, involve common question of law and facts, hence, with the consent of the counsel for the parties, arguments are heard together and both these matters are decided by this common order. For convenience, the facts as well as the prayer of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7869/2023 is taken into consideration. 2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer:- “1. To quash and set aside the impugned order dated 15.02.2023 passed by the Respondent (Annexure No.P/1). 2. To restrain the respondents from interfering with the 50% quota of the Petitioner federation for admitting students in its member colleges.” RIVAL SUBMISSIONS: 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per the directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court on several Occasions, a practice is being followed by the State permitting the College Federation for granting admission on 50% seats of different discipline e.g. General Nursing & Midwifery (GNM), Bachelors of Science in Nursing, Post Bachelors of Science in Nursing and Masters of Science in Nursing. Counsel submits that an order in this regard was issued by the respondents way back in the year 2004 i.e. on 04.09.2004, by which an arrangement was made to fill 50% seats by the State and 50% seats by the Federation. Counsel submits that the aforesaid practice was followed by the State for more than a decade and all of a sudden in the year 2022, an order was passed by the State on 06.12.2022 by which the 50% quota of the Federation was reduced to 25%. Counsel submits that the aforesaid action of the State-respondents was assailed by the Colleges Federation. 4. By way of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.19083/2022 [Rajasthan Private Nursing Schools and Colleges Federation Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.] the petitioner assailed the action of the State and the said petition was allowed along with other batch of writ petitions by this Court vide order dated 02.02.2023 and the order dated 06.12.2022 was quashed and set aside and the respondents were granted liberty to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. 5. State of Rajasthan & Ors.] the petitioner assailed the action of the State and the said petition was allowed along with other batch of writ petitions by this Court vide order dated 02.02.2023 and the order dated 06.12.2022 was quashed and set aside and the respondents were granted liberty to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. 5. Counsel submits that misinterpreting the aforesaid order passed by this Court in the case of Rajasthan Private Nursing Schools and Colleges Federation (supra), a fresh impugned order has been passed by the State on 15.02.2023 by which 50% quota reserved for the Federation has been snatched and now a decision has been taken by the State to grant admission to each and every student by the State only. 6. Counsel submits that the aforesaid action of the State is arbitrary, illegal and the same has been passed in utter violation of principles of natural justice as no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner Federation before passing the impugned order. Counsel submits that the petitioner Federation has got vested right to get 50% quota for giving admission to the students in the above disciplines. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon the following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of one Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in (2003) 6 SCC 697 and P.A. Inamdar and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2005) 6 SCC 537 . Counsel submits that past practice indicates that the State was not in a position to fill even the 50% quota kept by the State for giving admission to the students. Hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted and the impugned order dated 15.02.2023 be quashed and set aside. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State-respondents opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner Federation has got no right to assail the action of the respondents. Counsel submits that the past practices adopted by the petitioner Federation indicates that they used to retain the mark-sheets of the passing students of the qualifying examination and not permitting those students to get admission in Government Colleges. Counsel submits that the past practices adopted by the petitioner Federation indicates that they used to retain the mark-sheets of the passing students of the qualifying examination and not permitting those students to get admission in Government Colleges. Counsel submits that this is the sole reason that the students are not getting admission in Government Colleges and because of the aforesaid act of the Federation, most of the seats of Government Colleges remain vacant. Counsel submits that the judgment, relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, passed in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as by way of an interim measure, for a particular session of the year 2003-2004, the permission was granted to the private colleges to get admission by the ratio of 50:50 due to the time constraint. Counsel submits that the aforesaid direction was issued by the Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra) for a particular year which does not give any vested right in favour of the petitioner to claim 50% admissions every year as a matter of right. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, the State has not committed an error in passing the order dated 15.02.2023. Counsel submits that in view of the submissions made herein above, interference of this Court is not warranted. DISCUSSIONS: 8. Heard and considered the submissions made at bar and perused the material available on record. 9. The bone of contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that looking to the past practice of the respondents since the year 2004, the petitioner College Federation has got vested right to get 50% quota for giving admissions to the students at their own in different disciplines of nursing courses. The above contention of the petitioners is based upon an interim order issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra) whereby the private institutions were allowed to take admission for 50% quota of the seats reserved for the students. Counsel submits that on the basis of the above interim direction, a regular practice has been followed by the respondents to grant 50% quota to the College Federation to get admission of the students at their own level. Counsel submits that on the basis of the above interim direction, a regular practice has been followed by the respondents to grant 50% quota to the College Federation to get admission of the students at their own level. Counsel submits that on the basis of the above past practice, the petitioner has got vested right to get 50% quota for the above purpose because the State is not in a position to even fill 50% quota reserved for the government Colleges. 10. Next contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that all of a sudden this past practice of giving admission for 50% quota was reduced by the State to 25% vide order dated 06.12.2022 and this order was challenged by the petitioners before this Court by way of filing S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.19083/2022 and the same was allowed vide order dated 02.02.2023 and the order dated 06.12.2022 was quashed granting liberty to the respondents to pass fresh order in accordance with law. 11. After passing of the aforesaid order, the respondents passed a fresh order on 15.02.2023 and this time the Government has taken a decision to fill all the 100% seats of Nursing Schools and Colleges at its own level. 12. Entry 66 of List-I and Entry 25 of List-III (Concurrent List) deals with the subject of “Education” and it deals with standards of Education. Both the Union as well as the State have the powers to legislate on Education and Entry 66 of List-I deals with the laying down of standards in Institutions of Education including technical institutions as well as it deals with coordinates of such standards. In consonance with the powers conferred upon the State, it is competent to take a policy decision about process of admission of the students in different fields of education disciplines. 13. Law is well-settled that inclusion or exclusion of a privilege is for the Legislature to decide and not for the Court to legislate. No jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court either to amend, alter or to add something into the policy of the State, as it would be for the functioning of the State in exercise of the powers conferred under the Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 14. No jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court either to amend, alter or to add something into the policy of the State, as it would be for the functioning of the State in exercise of the powers conferred under the Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 14. If the Government in its wisdom decides about certain concession to be given or concession already given in the previous years to be withdrawn, the same cannot be expected to be followed as a matter of right, unless there is arbitrariness in the said process and the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.V.Rajalakshmiah Setty vs. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1967 SC 993 has held in paragraph 12 as under: “12. There is some force in some of the contentions put forward on behalf of the State of Mysore. It is not necessary to test them as we find ourselves unable to uphold the contention of the appellants. No doubt some concession had been shown to the first batch of 41 persons and the batches of persons who had come in after the batch of 63 persons also received some concession, but after all these were concessions and not something which they could claim as of right. The State of Mysore might have shown some indulgence to this batch of 63 persons but we cannot issue a writ of mandamus commanding it to do so. There was no service rule which the State had transgressed nor has the State evolved any principle to be followed in respect of persons who were promoted to the rank of Assistant Engineers from surveyors. The indulgences shown to the different batches of persons were really ad hoc and we are not in a position to say what, if any, ad hoc indulgence should be meted out to the appellants before us.” 15. Another issue that has been raised in this case is about the legitimate expectation. The principle of legitimate itself does not confer any right on a person. In fact, the concept has been explained as a circumstance where by the conduct of a public authority or any person, another person is made to believe that a particular situation would be in existence and thereafter, when such position is altered to his disadvantage, there can be a complaint of legitimate expectation. In fact, the concept has been explained as a circumstance where by the conduct of a public authority or any person, another person is made to believe that a particular situation would be in existence and thereafter, when such position is altered to his disadvantage, there can be a complaint of legitimate expectation. As stated above, the principle of legitimate expectation is not a ground for granting any relief to any one. The person who relies on the doctrine of legitimate expectation must prove that he acted upon the representation and the denial of expectation has resulted to his detriment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the relief to be granted under the legitimate expectation is very limited. The concept of legitimate expectation has been explained in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sethi Auto Service Station & Anr. Vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors. reported in (2009) 1 SCC 180 in the following words: "24. The protection of legitimate expectations, as pointed out in De Smith’s Judicial Review (6th Edn.), (Para 12-001), is at the root of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which requires regularity, predictability and certainty in the Government’s dealings with the public. The doctrine of legitimate expectation and its impact in the administrative law has been considered by this Court in a catena of decisions but for the sake of brevity we do not propose to refer to all these cases. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the concept, we shall refer to a few decisions. 25. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to refer to a decision by the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, a locus classicus on the subject, wherein for the first time an attempt was made to give a comprehensive definition to the principle of legitimate expectation. 25. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to refer to a decision by the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, a locus classicus on the subject, wherein for the first time an attempt was made to give a comprehensive definition to the principle of legitimate expectation. Enunciating the basic principles relating to legitimate expectation, Lord Diplock observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision of the administrative authority must affect such person either (a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law, or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either: (i) he has in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until some rational ground for withdrawing it has been communicated to him and he has been given an opportunity to comment thereon, or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without first giving him an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should be withdrawn. 26. In Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, a leading case on the subject, Lord Fraser said: “When a public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure, it is in the interest of good administration that it should act fairly and should implement its promise, so long as implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty.” 27. Explaining the nature and scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries reported in (1993) 1 SCC 71 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed thus: “8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision- making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision- making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.” 28. The concept of legitimate expectation again came up for consideration in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. reported in (1993) 3 SCC 499 . Referring to a large number of foreign and Indian decisions, including in Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for Civil Service reported in (1984) 2 WLR 1174 and FCI Vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries reported in (1993) 1 SCC 71 and elaborately explaining the concept of legitimate expectation, it was observed as under: (Hindustan Development Corpn. case, SCC p.549, para 35) "35. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory unfair or based, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim biased on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the ground to consider but the court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court out of review on the merits," particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept.” Taking note of the observations of the Australian High Court in Attorney General for New South Wales Vs. Quinn reported in (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327 that “to strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism”, speaking for the Bench, K. Jayachandra Reddy, J. said that there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation should not be substantively protected than the reasons as to why it should be protected. The caution sounded in the said Australian case that the courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations was also endorsed. 29. Then again in National Buildings Construction Corpn. Vs. S. Raghunathan and Ors. reported in (1998) 7 SCC 66 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed as under: (SCC p.75, para 18) “18. The doctrine of "Legitimate Expectation" has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is making to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of "Legitimate Expectation" was evolved which has today became a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on "Legitimate Expectation" have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.” 30. XX XX XX 31. Very recently in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in (2008) 2 SCC 161 it has been reiterated that a legitimate expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It is distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is based on a right. XX XX XX 31. Very recently in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in (2008) 2 SCC 161 it has been reiterated that a legitimate expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It is distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is based on a right. It is grounded in the rule of law as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty in the Government’s dealings with the public and the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates both in procedural and substantive matters. 32. An examination of the aforenoted few decisions shows that the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. 33. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an abuse of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited." 16. When a person bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, he has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation of the authority and denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of the power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. A claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. 17. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Lt.Col. P.K.Choudhary & Ors. reported in (2016) 4 SCC 236 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that legitimate expectation as an argument cannot prevail over a policy introduced by the Government which does not suffer from any perversity, unfairness or unreasonableness or which does not violate any fundamental or other enforceable rights vested in the respondents. 18. This Court is unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, invoking doctrine of legitimate expectation to make out a case like the previous years, the College Federation legitimately expected that this year also it would get more than 50% quota of students for getting their admissions in different nursing courses, because the State was not able to fill the seats in Government Nursing Schools and Colleges. 19. The legitimate expectation is not a legal right; rather it is an expectation of benefits, relief/remedy that accrues from a promise or an established practice adopted by the State or a party. 19. The legitimate expectation is not a legal right; rather it is an expectation of benefits, relief/remedy that accrues from a promise or an established practice adopted by the State or a party. 20. In the instant case, no provision of any kind was made by the State to continue the existing policy. It is trite law that there can be no estoppel against any policy decision of the State unless it is found that there is violation of any fundamental rights or other enforceable rights, vested in the petitioners. The petitioner cannot claim the rule of estoppel or legitimate expectation on the past prevailing practice of providing 50% quota to the petitioner-federation only on the basis of any interim order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra). 21. Coming to interim order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education (supra) whereby the Institutions had been allowed to take admissions on the basis of 10+2 results and on the basis of 50% quota for the State and 50% quota for the Private Colleges, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Hon’ble Apex Court nowhere laid down a law to be followed in as a precedent on the question of procedure adopted for admissions to the Nursing Schools and Colleges. CONCLUSION: 22. Hence, it is clear neither the Hon’ble Apex Court allowed the State to provide 50% quota to the Private School/Colleges Federation to get admission for every year nor such Federation has got any vested right to get 50% quota every year for admission of the students. Hence, under such circumstances, the action of the respondent/State cannot be found to be arbitrary as the same has been taken for granting maximum admissions to the students in Government Schools and Colleges. The impugned order dated 15.02.2023 does not suffer from any perversity, unfairness or unreasonableness and it does not violates any fundamental or other enforceable vested rights of the petitioner-federation. 23. As an upshot, the impugned order dated 15.02.2023 is just and proper which does not need any interference of this Court. The writ petitions are found to be devoid of merit and the same are hereby dismissed. 24. The stay applications and all pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. 25. The parties are left free to bear their own costs. DIRECTIONS: 26. The writ petitions are found to be devoid of merit and the same are hereby dismissed. 24. The stay applications and all pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. 25. The parties are left free to bear their own costs. DIRECTIONS: 26. However, before parting with the order, this Court deems it just and proper to issue directions to the respondent-State to frame a mechanism and policy to fill the maximum seats of all the disciplines 100% in Government Schools/Colleges, at the first instance and even if the seats remain vacant, then a mechanism and policy be framed to provide the left over seats to the petitioner-Federation for taking admission of the students before commencement of studies and courses. The respondents are expected to issue adequate and proper guidelines in this regard expeditiously as early as possible.