JUDGMENT : (J.C. Doshi, J.) 1. The present First Appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is preferred by the appellant – Insurance Company, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award dated 11.12.2009 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Navsari in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.86 of 2007, by which the Tribunal has awarded compensation of Rs.3,64,320/- from all opponents, jointly and severally. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under : 2.1 On 17.10.2006, the claimant was driving motorcycle bearing No.GJ-21-B-4765 and when he reached near Bhana Petrol Pump on service road of village Kabilpore, at that time one Tempo bearing No.GJ-21-T-2827 come with full speed and the driver of the tempo was driving it rashly and negligently. Thereafter, the driver of the tempo dashed with the motorcycle of the claimant and due to such accident, the claimant fell on the road and sustained various injuries. Therefore, the claimant filed claim petition seeking compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- with cost and interest against the present respondents before the Tribunal. 3. In essence, the Insurance Company is in appeal on two grounds. Firstly that the learned Tribunal erred in granting the amount of compensation under the head of medical expenses despite the claimant has received the amount of medical expenses from his mediclaim and secondly, on the point of self negligence of the claimant in causing the road accident. 4. Heard learned advocate Ms.Lilu Bhaya appearing for the appellant – Insurance Company, learned advocate Mr.Sumit Prajapati for and on behalf of learned advocate Mr.Adil Mirza for respondent No.1 and learned advocate Mr.Akash Modi appearing for respondent No.3. 5. It is sought to be submitted by Ms.Lilu Bhaya that it is unquestionable accident between two vehicles with head on collision where one motorcycle was ridden by the claimant and tempo was ridden by the opponent No.1. She would submit that the accident took place on the service road near Bhana Petrol Pump which indicates that two vehicle drivers have not taken due care and diligence to avoid the accident. She would further submit that the Insurance Company does not disown the liability of its driver i.e. tempo driver in causing the road accident but at the same time, the learned Tribunal ought to have decided the self-negligence of the claimant. She would further submit that the Insurance Company does not disown the liability of its driver i.e. tempo driver in causing the road accident but at the same time, the learned Tribunal ought to have decided the self-negligence of the claimant. Taking this Court through the Panchnama on the record, she would submit that the Panchnama drawn of the post road accident discloses that the claimant was also negligent in causing the road accident. Therefore, upon this ground she would submit to interfere with the impugned judgment and award. Secondly, she would submit that admittedly the claimant got medical expenses from the mediclaim as he has purchased it and therefore, learned Tribunal erred in granting the compensation for medical expenses. She would submit that it amounts to getting benefit twice for single cause. Therefore, the claimant could not be granted compensation under the head of medical expenses. Learned Tribunal erred to that extent. She submits to interfere with the impugned judgment and award on these two grounds. 6. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Sumit Prajapati submit to sustain the impugned judgment and award. He would further submit that the prudent act of the claimant to purchase mediclaim would not absolve the liability of the tortfeasor to pay the compensation. This principle has been succinctly exposed by the coordinate Bench of this Court and rightly relied upon by the learned Tribunal in case of Ramanlal Ranchhoddas Shah vs. Asthi Gustadji Rustomji and others - 1978 GLR 990 . Therefore, he submits to dismiss this appeal. 7. Regard being had to the rival submissions of learned advocates of both sides, it is noticeable that the issue of road accident is not in dispute. What is disputed by Insurance Company is about finding of the learned Tribunal not to assess the self-negligence of the claimant who is rider of one of the offending vehicle involved in the road accident. 8. Before I delve into deciding the issue, let me observe that learned Tribunal has drawn adverse inference against the driver of the tempo for not entering into the witness-box. The process of the claim petition was served to driver, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle Tempo. The driver and owner against whom the allegations were levelled in the claim petition did not remain present before the learned Tribunal to controvert the same by filing written statement. The process of the claim petition was served to driver, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle Tempo. The driver and owner against whom the allegations were levelled in the claim petition did not remain present before the learned Tribunal to controvert the same by filing written statement. Even the driver did not take care to enter into the witness-box. Two persons are the best witnesses of the road accident. First is the claimant who is riding motorcycle at the relevant time and second is the driver of the Tempo. The driver of the motorcycle entered into the witness-box at Exhibit- 43 and put whole blame upon the Tempo driver to cause the road accident. He has been cross-examination by the learned advocate appearing for the Insurance Company. Surprisingly, no question has been put to him during the cross-examination about his negligence in causing the road accident. The Tempo driver did not enter into the witness-box. The Insurance Company had nothing to bring the oral evidence of the Tempo driver before the learned Tribunal. In nutshell, the opponents have failed to bring on record the best evidence available for the road accident. It is a fit case, therefore, to draw adverse inference. The principle has been laid down in the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Shila Datta and others – 2011 (10) SCC 509 , as under : “10. Section 170 of the Act does not contemplate an insurer making an application for impleadment. Nor does it contemplate the insurer, if he is already impleaded as a party respondent by the claimants, making any application seeking permission to contest the matter on merits. Section 170 proceeds on the assumption that a claim petition is filed by the claimants, or is registered suo moto by the tribunal, with only the owner and driver of the vehicle as the respondents. It also proceeds on the basis that in such a proceeding, a statutory notice would have been issued by the tribunal to the insurer so that the insurer may know about its future liability in the claim petition and also resist the claim, on any of the grounds mentioned in section 149(2). Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and driver will be the parties. Section 170 of the Act also assumes that the tribunal will hold an inquiry into the claim, where only the claimants and the owner and driver will be the parties. Section 170 provides that if during the course of such inquiry, the tribunal finds and satisfies itself that there is any collusion between the claimant and the owner/driver or where the owner/driver has failed to contest the claim, the tribunal may suo moto, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of the claim, who was till then only a notice, shall be treated as a party to the proceedings. The insurer so impleaded, without prejudice to the provisions of section 149(2), will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the driver/owner.” 9. In National Insurance Company Limited vs. Chamundeshwari – 2021 (18) SCC 596 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that oral evidence would exclude the contrary evidence available through FIR and Panchnama. The relevant paras of said judgment are as under : “8. It is clear from the evidence on record of PW–1 as well as PW–3 that the Eicher van which was going in front of the car, has taken a sudden right turn without giving any signal or indicator. The evidence of PW–1 & PW–3 is categorical and in absence of any rebuttal evidence by examining the driver of Eicher van, the High Court has rightly held that the accident occurred only due to the negligence of the driver of Eicher van. It is to be noted that PW–1 herself travelled in the very car and PW–3, who has given statement before the police, was examined as eye–witness. In view of such evidence on record, there is no reason to give weightage to the contents of the First Information Report. If any evidence before the Tribunal runs contrary to the contents in the First Information Report, the evidence which is recorded before the Tribunal has to be given weightage over the contents of the First Information Report. In view of such evidence on record, there is no reason to give weightage to the contents of the First Information Report. If any evidence before the Tribunal runs contrary to the contents in the First Information Report, the evidence which is recorded before the Tribunal has to be given weightage over the contents of the First Information Report. In the judgment, relied on by the appellant’s counsel in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Premlata Shukla and Others1, this Court has held that proof of rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle, is therefore, sine qua non for maintaining an application under Section 166 of the Act. In the said judgment, it is held that the factum of an accident could also be proved from the First Information Report. In the judgment in the case of Nishan Singh and Others v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited2, this Court has held, on facts, that the car of the appellant therein, which crashed into truck which was proceeding in front of the same, was driven negligently by not maintaining sufficient distance as contemplated under Road Regulations, framed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Whether driver of the vehicle was negligent or not, there cannot be any straitjacket formula. Each case is judged having regard to facts of the case and evidence on record. Having regard to evidence in the present case on hand, we are of the view that both the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, would not render any assistance in support of his case. 9. Even with regard to quantum of compensation, it is clear from the judgment of the High Court that the accident occurred on 14.10.2013, the High Court has correctly taken into account the salary disclosed by the deceased in Form–16 for the Financial Year 2012-2013 and income of the deceased is taken as Rs.12,29,949/- per annum for the purpose of determination of loss of dependency. Though, it was the claim of the respondents– claimants that the deceased was earning Rs.1,33,070/- per month, the same was not accepted and the High Court itself assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.12,29,949/- per annum. Though, it was the claim of the respondents– claimants that the deceased was earning Rs.1,33,070/- per month, the same was not accepted and the High Court itself assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.12,29,949/- per annum. As the deceased was in permanent job and having regard to age of the deceased on the date of the accident, the future prospects and the multiplier were correctly applied by the High Court, which is in conformity with the judgment of this Court in the Case of Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another3 and also in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others4. Even the amount of compensation on other conventional heads is awarded correctly by the High Court. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this Civil Appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.” 10. In the present case, the learned Tribunal has privilege to have oral evidence of one of the drivers of the offending vehicle and his evidence would exclude the contrary evidence coming through FIR and Panchnama. Having noticed so, if we go through the FIR, it is filed by some third party. Learned advocate Ms.Lilu Bhaya appearing for the Insurance Company heavily relied upon the Panchnama drawn post road accident at Exhibit- 35 to say and submit that learned advocate has committed serious error in not drawing the self-negligence of the claimant who was riding one of the offending vehicle. The bare perusal of the Panchnama indicates the position of the both offending vehicles post accident. It is expected that post accident position of both vehicle would have been substantially changed and it is exactly noticeable from the panchnama. Thus, the position of the offending vehicle visible from the Panchanama drawn post accident could not be taken as sole yardstick to draw negligence of the offending vehicle. 11. In view of above discussion, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and award of the learned Tribunal on the ground of not calculating the self-negligence of the claimant. Learned Tribunal in its judgment and award in para 8 has observed as under : “8. **** The applicant has led his evidence at Exh. 11. In view of above discussion, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and award of the learned Tribunal on the ground of not calculating the self-negligence of the claimant. Learned Tribunal in its judgment and award in para 8 has observed as under : “8. **** The applicant has led his evidence at Exh. 43 and he has stated that he was driving the motorcycle bearing No. GJ-21-B-4765 with the slow speed and on the left side of the road on the service road just opposite to Bhana Petrol Pump at Kabilpore. He has stated that the three wheeler tempo bearing No. GJ-21-T-2827 dashed with him. In the cross-examination of the applicant, the Opponents Nos. 1 and 2 have not challenged anything about the three wheeler tempo bearing No. GJ-21-T-2827 not involved in the accident. The Opponents Nos.1 and 2 not come forward to depose on oath. The applicant has produced the discharge card of Smt. Gulabben Chhotubhai Patel General Hospital at Exh.47. From the discharge card, it appears that the applicant admitted in the hospital on date 17.10.2006. So considering the above evidence and the Opponents Nos.1 and 2 not come forward to depose on oath and considering the complaint panchnama and w.s. of the Opponent No.3, I am of the view that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the tempo who was driving the tempo bearing No.GJ-21-T-2827 and due to the accident, the applicant has sustained the injuries...” 12. The second submission on the part of the learned advocate Ms.Lilu Bhaya that learned Tribunal has committed error in drawing compensation for medical expenses despite the claimant has received the amount of medical expenses from the mediclaim is also misconceived argument. This Court in case of Ramanlal Ranchhoddas Shah (supra) has addressed this issue. The prudent act of claimant to purchase mediclaim policy to avail any expenses occurred for medical treatment would not absolve the liability of the tortfeasor from paying compensation for the medical expenses claimant has suffered. Liability of the tortfeasor has to be viewed separately and distinctively. The prudent and rational act of the claimant for covering the risk of medical treatment by purchasing mediclaim policy cannot take away liability of the Insurance Company to pay the compensation under the law of tort. Liability of the tortfeasor has to be viewed separately and distinctively. The prudent and rational act of the claimant for covering the risk of medical treatment by purchasing mediclaim policy cannot take away liability of the Insurance Company to pay the compensation under the law of tort. This issue was again discussed by this Court in case of Satishkumar Rasiklal Doctor vs. Baldevbhai Chhaganbhai Thakore - 2007 (1) GCD 727 , as under : “9. We will now refer to the decisions on the question whether the claimant can be denied compensation for medical expenses and treatment on the ground that such expenses and treatment charges were reimbursed to him under a policy of insurance for which the claimant had already paid the premium. 9.1 In Helen C. Rebellow v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (para 37) the Apex Court held as under: 37. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz., accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy amount is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured, if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums, in the case of death insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc., though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as Specuniary advantage liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any correlation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount has no correlation to the compensation computed as against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual. 9.2 The aforesaid view has been reiterated in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan : 36. We are in full agreement with the observations made in the case of Helen Rebello that the principle of balancing between losses and gains, by reason of death, to arrive at the amount of compensation is a general rule, but what is more important is that such receipts by the claimants must have some correlation with the accidental death by reason of which alone the claimants have received the amounts.… 37. We therefore, do not allow any deduction as pressed by the Insurance Company on account of receipts of insurance policy and social security benefits received by the claimants. We therefore, do not allow any deduction as pressed by the Insurance Company on account of receipts of insurance policy and social security benefits received by the claimants. 9.3 At this stage, it will not be out of place to record that as far as this Court is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court had also enunciated this principle as far back as in the year 1972 in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Heirs & Legal Representatives of Decd. Naranbhai Munjabhai Vadhia reported in (1972) 13 GLR 920 in the following terms: 13. Coming now to the question of damages, we have already settled the question as to what is collateral benefit in First Appeal Nos. 159-160 of 1968 decided on November 3, 1971. We have pointed out the legal position as enunciated in the latest decision by the House of Lords in Parry v. Cleaver 1969 (1) AER 555, where it was accepted as a settled principle of common law, which was followed not only in England but in all other common law jurisdiction after Bradburn's case 1874-80 All.E.R. Reprint 195, that insurance policy amounts were collateral benefits which the deceased had bought with his own money. It was a benefit derived by way of prudent savings effected for his own benefit under a contract by the injured party whose benefit could never go to the tortfeasor. It is only a like which can be deducted from the like and, therefore intrinsic nature of the payment must be considered before any such deductions can be made. That is why any pension amount or retirement-cum-gratuity benefit which had the insurance element could never be deducted. It was only that pension which was earned after the contributions had ceased that it assumed the character of wages and which alone could be deducted, when computing the economic loss of future earnings or loss of wages. Therefore, in view of that settled legal position, the learned Tribunal was obviously wrong in excluding the amount of Rs. 2000/- of insurance money and of Rs. 1344/- the amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity which were of the same character as insurance money. These collateral benefits could not be deducted from the compensation amount. Therefore, in view of that settled legal position, the learned Tribunal was obviously wrong in excluding the amount of Rs. 2000/- of insurance money and of Rs. 1344/- the amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity which were of the same character as insurance money. These collateral benefits could not be deducted from the compensation amount. 9.4 The aforesaid view was reiterated by another Division Bench in the case of Amthiben Maganlal wd/o. Maganlal Pranlal Mistry v. Superintendent, Geophysicist, ONGC reported in 17 GLR 910 in the following words: 18. Something was urged on the ground that from the insurance the family had received a sum of Rs. 61000/- but evidence was that Rs. 11000 was by way of paid up policy and the rest was insured amount where only one premium was paid by the deceased. Even in this connection the legal position is well settled after our aforesaid decision in LIC v. LR of the deceased Naranbhai 12 GLR 920 at page 937. We have already settled this question by holding that it was a collateral benefit in First Appeal Nos. 159-160 of 1968 decided on November 3, 1971 (Jaipur Golden Transport & Co. Ltd. v. Keshavlal Mangalal and Ors.). There the entire legal position is considered as enunciated in the latest decision by the House of Lords in Parry v. Cleaver 1969 (1) A.E.R. 535, where it was accepted as a settled principle of common law, which was followed not only in England but in all other common law jurisdiction after Bradburn's case 1874-80 All.E.R. Reprint 195, that the insurance policy amounts were collateral benefits which the deceased had bought with his own money. It was a benefit derived by way of prudent savings effected for his own benefit under a contract by the injured party whose benefit could never go to the tort-feasor. It was only a like which can be deducted from the like and, therefore, intrinsic nature of the payment must be considered before any such deductions could be made. Therefore, this collateral benefit could never be deducted from the compensation amount as per the settled legal position. 9.5 In Ramanlal Ranchhoddas Shah v. Asthi Gustadji Rustomji and Ors. (decided on 12th April, 1978) 19 GLR 990 (para 16) also, the claimant had got reimbursement of medical expenses from the Insurance Company for which he had paid premium. Therefore, this collateral benefit could never be deducted from the compensation amount as per the settled legal position. 9.5 In Ramanlal Ranchhoddas Shah v. Asthi Gustadji Rustomji and Ors. (decided on 12th April, 1978) 19 GLR 990 (para 16) also, the claimant had got reimbursement of medical expenses from the Insurance Company for which he had paid premium. A Division Bench of this Court again held as under: 16. Again, this is not a case in which the claimant was entitled to free medical aid by virtue of his employment or some such consideration and that he has been reimbursed on such consideration. This is also not a case in which the Government or some such official agency under the scheme like the National Health Scheme of U.K. Provides free medical aid to the claimant, in which case, different considerations could possibly weigh, though we should not be taken to have expressed a considered opinion on the question. This is a case in which the claimant had joined a scheme of insurance by paying premium and therefore, benefits which he got were ones which he had obtained with his own money and these benefits could never go to a tort-feaser as per the ratio laid down in LIC v. L.R. of deceased Naranbhai 13 GLR 920, to which reference has already been made by the learned Judge in his judgment in para 14; and, in this view of the matter also, the appellant would be entitled to the said amount to the extent of Rs. 6157- 39 Ps. 9.6 The same Division Bench of this Court went a step further in Nirmaladevi Dilipkumar Gandhi v. Gulamnabi Usmanbhai Shaikh (decided on 26/27 April 1978) 19 GLR 620 (624) and held as under: ...In other words, even if a claimant has received free medical service at his own residence or at the residence or private nursing home or clinic of a medical practitioner who is his friend or relative or from a private medical practitioner who is not thus connected with him but who has chosen to render free services for some other personal or social consideration, the claimant must still be compensated by estimating the fair and reasonable cost of supplying those services. The tortfeaser cannot benefit, under such circumstances, by escaping his liability to compensate the claimant on the ground that the medical services were tendered to him entirely free. The tortfeaser cannot benefit, under such circumstances, by escaping his liability to compensate the claimant on the ground that the medical services were tendered to him entirely free. The question from what source the claimant's needs have been met, the question who had given the services, the question whether the claimant was under a legal or moral liability to pay or reimburse the provider of services, are all irrelevant, so far as the tortfeasor is concerned. The claimant, when he recovers such damages, will hold them in trust for the person who rendered the services to him. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal's approach to the question of compensation under this sub-head is vitiated by an extraneous consideration and the same has consequently affected its award. 13. We might make it clear that we are confining these observations to free medical services rendered to a claimant in circumstances such as those mentioned above. We do not wish to express any opinion on the question as to whether when free medical service is rendered to a claimant at a general public hospital, he would still be entitled to be compensated even though he was not required to pay for the treatment. Such a case is not before us and what we have said above should not be held to apply necessarily in such circumstances. We are making this reservation because the question of compensation in such a case is not free from doubt and even in England there appears prima facie to be some inconsistency in judicial approach on the question (see Daish v. Wauton (1972) 2 QB 262 and Cunningham v. Harrison (1973) 3 WLR 97 ). 10. It is surprising that the Tribunal has not at all considered the above binding decisions of this Court and the decision of the Apex Court in Helen C. Rebellow all of which were rendered before the date of the award. As regards the deduction on account of insurance amount, the finding of the learned Judge cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Helen C. Rebello (Supra) and the four Division Bench judgments of this Court which were rendered more than twenty years before the award under challenge in this appeal. Hence, the deduction made by the Tribunal must be held to be contrary to the well settled legal position settled in this State since 1972.” 13. Hence, the deduction made by the Tribunal must be held to be contrary to the well settled legal position settled in this State since 1972.” 13. In case of Mrs.Helen C. Rebello and others vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another – 1999 (1) SCC 90 , it was an issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that whether the amount of the life insurance received by the heirs on account of victim’s death can be deducted from the compensation worked out under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the amount received from the life insurance corporation on death of the victim under the life insurance policy cannot be equated with the amount received on account of accidental death. The relevant paras are 34 and 35, which reads as under : “34. Thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account other form of deaths, which he would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus, such. pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the "pecuniary advantage", liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received out of such insurance on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken not of such contingency, through the proviso of Section 95. Under it the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of, in the course of employment of an employee. 35. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources, viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or for his family, which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a will could be said to be the 'pecuniary gain' only on account of one's accidental death. This, of course, is pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any co-relation with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or any provisions of law.” 14. In view of the above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and award which is just and fair. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves no consideration and requires to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Registry is directed to send back the record and proceedings to the concerned Tribunal, forthwith. Consequently, connected application/s, if any, also stands disposed of.