JUDGMENT : S.V. PINTO, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgement and order dated 7.10.2014 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Kheda @ Nadiad (hereinafter referred to as the “learned trial court”) in Sessions Case No. 36 of 2014. The appellant is referred to as the accused as he stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under. 2.1 As per the case of the prosecution, the accused was living with his wife, Masooriben in Bhathiji Faliya of village Ladwa and on 28.06.2013 at about 7:30 hours when they were at home, the accused had a doubt that his wife Masooriben had an affair with one Vikrambhai Bhalabhai Thakore, and he asked his wife where she had got the new sari from and had a quarrel with his wife. At that time, the accused got enraged and took a chopper and a knife and caused injuries on the chest and over the stomach of his wife and strangulated her and caused her death. The accused came to the Kathlal Police Station and filed the complaint before the PSI, Kathlal Police Station which was registered at CR No.93 of 2013 under Section 302 of the IPC on 28.06.2013. 2.2 The Investigating Officer visited the place of offence and drew the necessary panchnama and sent the dead body of deceased Masooriben for post-mortem, seized the necessary muddamal and recorded the statements of the connected witnesses, arrested the accused and filed the chargesheet before the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kathlal. As the case was exclusively triable by the learned Sessions Court by a committal order passed under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the case was committed to the Sessions Court Kheda @ Nadiad which was registered as Sessions Case No.36 of 2014. 2.3 The accused was produced before the learned trial court and after it was verified that the procedure under section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was followed, a charge at exhibit 5 was framed against the accused, and the statement of the accused was recorded at exhibit 6 wherein the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4 The prosecution produced the following oral and documentary evidence in support of their case. WITNESSES Sr No. NAME EXHIBIT 1. Ashishbhai Arvindbhai Modi 8 2. Patel Dhananjay Maganbhai 11 3. Maniben Khodabhai Senva 14 4. Jayantibhai Khodabhai Senva 15 5. Shantaben Mafatbhai Luhar 16 6. Laxmanbhai Kalabhai Parmar 18 7. Satarbhai Ismailbhai Vohra 22 8. Pravinkumar Kantilal Shah 26 9. Chimanbhai Shanabhai Senva 30 10. Chhaganbhai Somabhai Senva 35 11. Pareshkumar Bhagwandas Khambhla 36 12. Solanki Rajendrasinh Indrasinh 40 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SR.NO. DESCRIPTION OF THE DOCUMENT EXHIBIT 1 Yadi for carrying out PM of dead body. 9 2 Postmortem note of dead body of Masuriben Laxmanbhai Khodabhai Senva 3 Report of FSL Mobile van 12 4 Inquest panchnama 17 5 panchnama of scene of offence 19 6 panch slip of muddamal article No.1 20 7 panch slip of muddamal article No.2 21 8 panch slip of muddamal article No.8 23 9 panch slip of muddamal article No.9 24 10 panchnama of condition of the body of the accused as well as clothes. 25 11 panch slip of muddamal article No.6 27 12 panch slip of muddamal article No.7 28 13 panchnama as per Section 27 of the Evidence Act 29 14 panchnama of cloth on the dead body. 31 15 panch slip of muddamal article No.3 32 16 panch slip of muddamal article No.4 33 17 panch slip of muddamal article No.5 34 18 Complaint 37 19 Inquest Form 38 20 muddamal despatch note 39 21 FSL slip 41 22 Letter of FSL 42 23 FSL report 43 24 Serology report of FSL 44 2.5 The learned APP filed the closing pursis at exhibit 45 and the further statement of the accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded wherein the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution and refused to step into the witness or examine any witnesses on his behalf and further stated that he was innocent and he has been wrongly framed for the offence. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard by the impugned judgement and order dated 07.10.2014, the learned trial Court was pleased to find the accused guilty for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default rigorous imprisonment for six months. 3. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgement and order of conviction, the appellant has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgement and order of conviction is arbitrary, erroneous in law and contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record and the findings arrived at and assigned by the learned trial court, are erroneous and the same deserves to be quashed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record. The learned trial Court has not considered that there are no eye witnesses who have seen the offence being committed and the prosecution has failed to prove that there were any fingerprints on the weapons recovered by the Investigating Officer. The complaint has been given by the accused himself and is not to be considered as evidence and cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused as a confession before a police officer is not admissible in law. Hence, there is no FIR which deals with the motive for commission of the crime, which can be legally looked into and the trial court ought not to have given much importance to the evidence of the complaint. The recovery panchnama has not been proved as all the panch witnesses have turned hostile and the recovery panchnama of the alleged muddamal, namely the chopper, and the knife have not been prepared as stated by the prosecution, but are concocted. Moreover, though blood stains have been found on the clothes of the appellant, and there is no material evidence as no blood group has been identified. That the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and hence the impugned judgement and order must be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Mahendra U Vora for the appellant and learned APP Mr Bhargav Pandya for the respondent State. We have minutely perused the impugned judgement and order and the evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Mahendra U Vora for the appellant and learned APP Mr Bhargav Pandya for the respondent State. We have minutely perused the impugned judgement and order and the evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned advocate Mr.Mahendra U Vora has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution and submitted that in the present case, the complainant is the appellant himself who has filed the complaint before the PSI, Kathlal Police Station and as per the settled principles of law, a confession statement before a police officer is not admissible in law. That there are no witnesses to the incident and some of the panch witnesses have turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution. That the learned trial Court has relied on the complaint which is the confession statement of the appellant before the police officer, but in fact, the same could not be admissible in evidence and the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in convicting the appellant on the basis of the evidence which has been produced by the prosecution before the learned trial Court. That the impugned judgement and order is required to be quashed and set aside, and the appellant must be acquitted for the said offence. 6. Learned APP Mr.Bhargav Pandya has submitted that on the basis of the FIR, the Investigating Officer has investigated the offence and has collected the muddamal chopper and knife which were the weapons that were used in the murder of the deceased have been seized at the instance of the appellant. It is true that the complaint has been filed by the appellant before the PSI, Kathlal Police Station, but on the basis of the complaint, the investigation has taken place and all the circumstantial evidence pointing to the involvement of the appellant in the offence have been collected by the Investigating Officer. The learned trial Court has discussed each and every evidence and in a judgement has found that it was only the appellant who has committed offence and there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgement and order of the learned trial court and learned APP has urged this court to reject the appeal of the appellant. 7. The learned trial Court has discussed each and every evidence and in a judgement has found that it was only the appellant who has committed offence and there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgement and order of the learned trial court and learned APP has urged this court to reject the appeal of the appellant. 7. The only question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned trial Court was justified in passing the order of conviction? 8. Before we proceed to decide the aforesaid question, it would be appropriate to refer to the evidence induced by the prosecution on record of the case. 8.1 The prosecution has examined PW 1 Dr.Ashishbhai Arvindbhai Modi at exhibit 8, and the witness is the medical officer who has conducted the postmortem on the dead body of deceased Masooriben Laxmanbhai Senva. The witness has stated that he had received the yadi of PSI, Kathlal Police Station for conducting the postmortem from Unarmed Police Constable Hitendrasinh Buckle No.850 on 28.06.2013, while he was on duty at Community Health Centre, Kathlal. That he and panel doctor Dilip Kumar C Vatalia had conducted the postmortem on the same day at 12:15 hours and completed it on 2.15 hours and the witness has produced the postmortem note at exhibit 10. The dead body was of 38 years old female with blood stains present over the clothes and rigor mortis was present in the jaw, neck, both shoulders, both elbows, both hips, and both knees in developing stage. The injuries as per column number 17 of the postmortem note are as under : “1. Stab wound present over upper part of left side of chest, 2 cm below mid of left clavicle, oblique in direction, upper end is lateral than lower end, 4.5 cm X 1 cm size, upper lateral end is sharp end lower medial end is blunt, margins of wound found sharply cut and well defined. 2. Incised wound present over front of mid of upper part of chest, over manubrium, 1 cm x 0.5 cm size, oblique in direction upper end towards left end lower end towards right, margins of wound sharply cut, wound found bone deep. 3. Stab wound present over front of right side of lower chest, 1 cm right mid line Rt. 2. Incised wound present over front of mid of upper part of chest, over manubrium, 1 cm x 0.5 cm size, oblique in direction upper end towards left end lower end towards right, margins of wound sharply cut, wound found bone deep. 3. Stab wound present over front of right side of lower chest, 1 cm right mid line Rt. 4th inter costal space, oblique in direction, upper end towards left end lower end towards Right margins of wound sharply cut end well defined upper and is sharp end lower end is blunt, 3.5 cm x 2 cm in size. 4. Stab wound present over front of Right of lower chest, 2 cm Right to mid line over, Right 6th rib, oblique in direction, upper and towards left end lower end towards Right, margins of wound sharply cut and well defined, upper end is sharp and lower end blunt, 3.5 cm x 1 cm in size. 5. Stab wound present over front of Right side of lower chest, 8 cm Right to mid line, 7th inter costal space oblique indirection upper end is sharp and lower end blunt. upper end towards left and lower end towards Rt. 3.5 cm x 1.5 cm in seize. margins of wound sharply cut and well defined. 6. Stab wound present over front of Rt. side of lower chest, 1 cm below above mentioned injury No.(5), 6 cm right to mid line, oblique indirection upper end towards left and lower end towards right, margins of wound sharply cut and well defined upper end is sharp and lower end is blunt 3.5 cm x 1 cm in size. 7. Stab wound present over front of Rt. side of lower chest, 5 cm below Right nipple vertical in direction margins of wound sharply cut and well defined upper end is sharp and lower end is blunt 3.5 cm x 1 cm in size. 8. Stab wound present over Rt. lateral aspect of chest 12 cm axilla wound antropostcrioriy antr end is blunt and postr end is sharp, margins of wound sharply cut and well defined 2 cm x 1 cm in size. 9. Incised wound present over Rt. 8. Stab wound present over Rt. lateral aspect of chest 12 cm axilla wound antropostcrioriy antr end is blunt and postr end is sharp, margins of wound sharply cut and well defined 2 cm x 1 cm in size. 9. Incised wound present over Rt. lateral aspeat of chest 15 cm below axilla, anterior end is lower than posterior end, antrend is blunt and postr end is sharp margins of wound sharply cut and well defined, 3.5 cm x 1 cm in size, muscle deep. 10. Incised wound present over front of right side of lower chest, at mid claviculor kine over 7th rib transeverse in direction, muscle deep, 2.5 cm x 1 cm size. 11. Incised wound 1 cm x 0.5 cm over left hypochondricl region muscle deep, transverse in direction. 12. Incised wound 1 cm x 0.5 cm present over 2 cm lateral to above mentioned injury No (11), muscle deep, vertical in direction. 13. Abrasian 3 cm x 1 cm in size over Rt. side of neck, transverse in direction. 14. Stab wound present over middle of Rt. forearm in dorsal aspect, 3.5 x 1 cm in size, oblique in direction upper end is blunt and lower end is sharp, margin of wound sharply cut and well defined. 15. Incised wound present over dorsal aspect of rase of Rt. little finger, 2 cm x 0.5 cm size, muscle deep transverse in direction.” The cause of death as as per the opinion of the panel doctors was shock and hemorrhage as a result of stab injuries sustained. The witness was shown muddamal article No.6, the chopper and muddamal article No.7, the knife and the witness has opined that the injuries found on the dead body could be caused by such type of weapons. During the cross examination, the witness has stated that a fracture can be caused by the muddamal article No.6 and there was no fracture on the dead body of the deceased. 8.2 The prosecution has examined PW 2 Dhananjay Maganbhai Patel at exhibit 11 and the witness is the FSL Officer, who had visited the place of offence and prepared the FSL Investigation Van Report which is produced at exhibit 12. As per the report, the place of offence was the house of the accused and the deceased and a detailed report of the place of offence was made. As per the report, the place of offence was the house of the accused and the deceased and a detailed report of the place of offence was made. Blood stains were found on the floor and a mangalsutra with blood stains was also found and cotton was rubbed on the blood stains and taken for investigation. 8.3 The prosecution has examined PW 3 Maniben Khodabhai Senva at exhibit 14 and the witness is the mother of the accused, and she has stated on oath that on the day of the incident, she had gone to the hospital and does not know what had occurred. That she returned home between eight and nine hours and was unconscious and did not know anything about the incident. The accused had himself gone to the police station in connection with the incident and the accused had a fight with his wife Masooriben and killed her, but she does not know who killed her as she was unconscious for 2 to 3 days after the incident. Masooriben had a vow to be fulfilled, and her nephew, Ramanbhai had come, and they had cut a goat for the vow, and all the relatives went away early in the morning. At that time, the accused and Masooriben were at home, and she and Jayanti and Balu were also at home and thereafter, Jayanti and Balu took her to the hospital. She saw Masooriben dead at her home and she saw blood, and they did not do anything. She does not know where the accused was at that time and a lot of people had gathered. She does not know who is Vikrambhai Balabhai, and she did not try to find out who killed Masooriben. On 26.06.2013 her son Laxman, daughter-in-law Masooriben and Chimanbhai Shivabhai Leuva, the brother-in-law of her son Laxman had come and on the next day, Chimanbhai went to his house and Laxman and Masooriben stayed back. Laxman and Masooriben were working in Nirma factory at Savli and the children were at Savli and they were getting ready to go at around 730 in the morning and they had a fight about wearing a sari. That she, her son Jayanti and daughter-in-law Baluben came running and pushed open the door and found Masooriben in a pool of blood. That she, her son Jayanti and daughter-in-law Baluben came running and pushed open the door and found Masooriben in a pool of blood. That her son Laxman was the accused for the murder of Masooriben and she did not wish that her son should be punished. 8.4 The prosecution has examined PW 4 Jayantibhai Khodabhai Senva at exhibit 15 and the witness is the brother of the accused and has stated that on 26.06. 2013, all relatives, including Chimanbhai and Masooriben had come to the village. That other relatives, including Ramanbhai and Ramanbhai Khodabhai Ambaliyawala who is the brother-in-law of Masooriben had also come. They had kept a vow of a goat and the goat was offered and everyone had food, and all those who had come by rickshaw, went away and Masooriben and Laxmanbhai stayed back. Laxmanbhai’s children were at Savli and early in the morning when it was dark, he had gone to the hospital as he was suffering from tuberculosis and breathing ailment. His wife Baluben had accompanied him and they had returned after about one and half hours. When they returned, he saw a huge crowd in the faliya and he came to know hat his sister-in-law was killed, but he does not know who had killed Masooriben. He did not know where Laxman had gone, and when he learnt of the incident, he was unconscious. That he had seen blood on the floor, which was the front portion in the house of his brother Laxmanbhai. That he does not know Vikrambhai Balabhai and the police had recorded his statement. The accused and the deceased had a fight about wearing a sari, and when he, his wife and his mother pushed open the door, they found Masooriben in a pool of blood. 8.5 The prosecution has examined PW 5 Shantaben Mafatbhai Luhar at exhibit 16 and the witness is the panch of the Inquest panchnama produced at exhibit 17. The Inquest panchnama narrates the injuries that were found on the dead body of deceased Masooriben. 8.6 The prosecution has examined PW 6 Laxmanbhai, Kalabhai Parmar at exhibit 18 and the witness is the panch witness of the panchnama of the place of offence which is produced at exhibit 19 and the place of offence is the house of the accused and blood stains were found on the floor. 8.6 The prosecution has examined PW 6 Laxmanbhai, Kalabhai Parmar at exhibit 18 and the witness is the panch witness of the panchnama of the place of offence which is produced at exhibit 19 and the place of offence is the house of the accused and blood stains were found on the floor. 8.7 The prosecution has examined PW 7 Sattarbhai Ismailbhai Vohra at exhibit 22, and the witness is the panch witness of the arrest panchnama produced at exhibit 25 and at the time of the arrest, the accused had won a full sleeved green shirt with black and white horizontal lines and a light khakhi pant, and both the clothes had blood stains on them. The accused had a cut injury on the right hand between the little finger and the fourth finger and cut marks between the thumb and the first finger and the cuts were bleeding. 8.8 The prosecution has examined PW 8 Praveenkumar Kantilal Shah at exhibit 26 and the witness is the panch witness of the discovery panchnama produced at exhibit 29 by which in the presence of the panch witnesses, the accused was in Kathlal Police Station and the panch witnesses, police personnel and the accused went in the government vehicle towards Ladvel crossroads and to a field and one chopper and one knife were recovered, and both had blood stains on them. 8.9 The clothes of the deceased were seized as per the panchnama produced at exhibit 31 and the panch witnesses PW 9 Chimanbhai Shanabhai Senva and PW 10 Chaganbhai Somabhai Senva have been examined at exhibit 30 and exhibit 35 respectively. 8.10 PW 11 Pareshkumar Bhagwanbhai Khambhla has been examined at exhibit 36 and he was working as the PSI in Kathlal Police Station on 28.06. 2013, and the accused came to the police station and filed the complaint which is produced at exhibit 37. The offence was registered at CR No 93/2013 under section 302 of the IPC and he went to the place of offence and found the dead body of deceased Masooriben and prepared the Inquest panchnama. That he sent the dead body for post-mortem and drew the panchnama of the place of offence and collected the necessary samples from the place of offence. That he sent the dead body for post-mortem and drew the panchnama of the place of offence and collected the necessary samples from the place of offence. That he had arrested the accused as per the panchnama produced at Ex 25 and seized his clothes which were stained with blood and thereafter in the presence of the panch witnesses, the discovery panchnama was drawn and as per the say of the accused, they went to the place in the field and found the chopper and the knife, which were seized. The muddamal was sent to the FSL and he had recorded the statements of the witnesses and thereafter as he was transferred from Kathlal Police Station, further investigation was handed over to PSI R.I.Solanki. 8.11 The prosecution has examined PW 12 Rajendrasinh Indrasinh Solanki at exhibit 40 and the witness had taken over the investigation of CR number 93 of 2013, and after the FSL reports were received, he had filed the chargesheet before the concerned court. 9. We have minutely perused the impugned judgement and order and find that the complaint has been filed by the accused himself and the complaint which is produced at exhibit 37 in the deposition of PW 11 Pareshkumar Bhagwanbhai Khambhala who has recorded the complaint and has narrated all the facts that were stated by the accused in his presence when he was on duty at the Kathlal Police Station as a Police Sub Inspector. Admittedly, the complaint is in the form of a confession and as per the settled principles of law, a confession by an accused cannot be made the basis for conviction and in convicting the accused the learned trial court must not look for corroboration to the confessional statement. 9.1 The Apex Court in Kashmira Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1952 SC 159 has observed thus : “The confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as defined in section 3. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshall the evidence against the accused in excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed whether a conviction could safely be based on it. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshall the evidence against the accused in excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed whether a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession, he would not be prepared to accept.” 9.2 At this juncture, we deem it fit to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in paras 9 to 20 in the case of Aghnoo Nagesia versus State of Bihar reported in AIR 1966 SC 119 which are quoted below : “9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading "Admissions". Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confession caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides: "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence". The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s. (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy and the fullest effect should be given to them. 10 Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the first information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under S. 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under S. 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as a witness. If the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under S. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under S. 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant, see Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cri. Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated 24-1-1964: ( AIR 1964 SC 1850 ), explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 and Dal Singh v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137: ( AIR 1917 PC 25 ). Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated 24-1-1964: ( AIR 1964 SC 1850 ), explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 and Dal Singh v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137: ( AIR 1917 PC 25 ). But a confessional first information report to a police Officer cannot be used against the accused in view of S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11 The Indian Evidence Act does not define "confession". For a long time, the Courts in India adopted the definition of "confession" given in Art. 22 of Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence. According to that definition a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. This definition was discarded by the Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, 66 Ind App 66 at p. 81: ( AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52). Lord Atkin observed: ".......no statement that contains self exculpatory matter can amount to confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man's possession." These observations received the approval of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1), 1953 SCR 94 at p. 104; ( AIR 1952 SC 354 at p. 357). In State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 at p. 21: ( AIR 1960 SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129). Shah, J., referred to a confession as a statement made by a person stating or suggesting the inference that he has committed a crime 12 Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence. A statement which contains selfexculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. A statement which contains selfexculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should be tendered in evidence and if part of the admission is exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only. See Hanumant Govind v. State of M. P. 1952 SCR 1091 at p. 1111: ( AIR 1952 SC 343 at p. 350) and 1953 SCR 94 : ( AIR 1952 SC 354 ). The accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission including the exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no assistance to the accused where no part of his statement is self-exculpatory; and the prosecution intends to use the whole of the statement against the accused. 13 Now, a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted the taint attaches to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each of them being part of a confessional statement partakes of the character of a confession. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession. 14 If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law such as S.24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all its parts including the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other section under as S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance and content would be left in Ss. Little substance and content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of admission of incriminating facts in a confessional statement is permitted. 15 Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may not amount to a confession at all. Take a case of a person charged under S. 301-A of the Indian Penal Code and a statement made by him to a police officer that "I was drunk: I was driving a car at a speed of 80 miles per hour. I could see A on the road at a distance of 80 yards; I did not blow the horn: I made no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked down A". No single sentence in this statement amounts to a confession; but the statement read as a whole amounts to a confession of an offence under S. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not be permissible to admit in evidence each sentence separately as a non- confessional statement. Again, take a case where a single sentence in a statement amounts to an admission of an offence. 'A' states "I struck 'B' with a tangi and hurt him". In consequence of the injury 'B' died. 'A' committed an offence and is chargeable under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. Unless he brings his case within one of the recognised exceptions, his statement amounts to an admission of an offence, but the other parts of the statement such as the motive, the preparation, the absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the gravity of the offence and the intention and knowledge of the accused, and negatives the right of private defence, accident and other possible defences. Each and every admission of an incriminating fact contained in the confessional statement is part of the confession. 16 If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by S. 24 of the Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by S. 24. Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also the admission of every other incriminating fact such as the motive, the preparation and the subsequent conduct is excluded by S. 24. Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also the admission of every other incriminating fact such as the motive, the preparation and the subsequent conduct is excluded by S. 24. To hold that the proof of the admission of other incriminating facts is not barred by S. 24 is to rob the section of its practical utility and content. It may be suggested that the bar of S. 24 does not apply to the other admissions, but though receivable in evidence, they are of no weight, as they were caused by inducement, threat or promise. According to this suggestion, the other admissions are relevant but are of no value. But we think that on a plain construction of S. 24, proof of all the admissions of incriminating facts contained in a confessional statement is excluded by the section. Similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar not only proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a police officer or made by him while in the custody of a police officer but also admissions contained in the confessional statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence 17 A little reflection will show that the expression "confession" in Ss. 24 to 30 refers to the confessional statement as a whole including not only the admissions of the offence but also all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence. Section 27 partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much of the information whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in consequence of the information, if the other conditions of the section are satisfied. Section 27 distinctly contemplates that an information leading to a discovery may be a part of the confession of the accused and thus fall within the purview of Ss. 24, 25 and 26. Section 27 thus shows that a confessional statement admitting the offence may contain additional information as part of the confession. Again, S. 30 permits the Court to take into consideration against a co-accused a confession of another accused affecting not only himself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows that matters affecting other persons may form part of the confession. Again, S. 30 permits the Court to take into consideration against a co-accused a confession of another accused affecting not only himself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows that matters affecting other persons may form part of the confession. 18 If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of S.25 is lifted by S. 27. 19 Our attention is not drawn to any decision of this Court or of the Privy Council on the question whether apart from S. 27, a confessional first information report given by an accused is receivable in evidence against him. Decisions of the High Court on this point are hopelessly conflicting. They contain all shades of opinion, ranging from total exclusion of the confession to total inclusion of all admissions of incriminating facts except the actual commission of the crime. In Harji v. Emperor, AIR 1918 Lah 69 and Nur Muhammad v. Emperor, 90 Ind Cas 148 (Lah), the Lahore High Court held that the entire confessional first information report was inadmissible in evidence. In Emperor v. Harman Kisha. ILR 59 Bom 120: (AIR 1935 Bom 26), the Bombay High Court held that the entire confessional report dealing with events on the night of the offence was hit by S. 25, and it could not be said that portions of it dealing with the motive and the opportunity were not parts of the confession. In Emperor v. Kommoju Brahman. ILR 1940-19 Pat 301 at pp. 308, 314: (AIR 1940 Pat 163 at pp. 165, 167), the Patna High Court held that no part of the confessional first information report was receivable in evidence, the entire report formed a single connected story and no part of it had any meaning or significance except in relation to the whole, and it would be wrong to extract parts of the statement and treat them as relevant. 165, 167), the Patna High Court held that no part of the confessional first information report was receivable in evidence, the entire report formed a single connected story and no part of it had any meaning or significance except in relation to the whole, and it would be wrong to extract parts of the statement and treat them as relevant. This case was followed in Adi Moola Padayachi v. State, 1960 Mad WN 528 and the Court admitted only the portion of the confessional first information report which showed it was given by the accused and investigation had started thereon. In State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh, AIR 1962 Raj 3 , the Court admitted in evidence the last part of the report dealing with the movements of the accused after the commission of the offence, but excluded the other parts of the statement including those relating to motive and opportunity. In Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy, ILR 49 Cal 167 : ( AIR 1922 Cal 342 ), the Calcutta High Court admitted in evidence the narrative of the events prior to the night of the occurrence disclosing the motive of the offence. This case was followed by the Nagpur Court in Bharova Ramdayal v. Emperor, AIR 1941 Nag 86. In Kartar Singh v. State, AIR 1952 Pepsu 98, the Court admitted in evidence the introductory part and the portion narrating the motive and the opportunity. In Ram Singh v. The State, ILR (1952) 2 Raj 93, the Rajasthan High Court held that where it is possible to separate parts of the first information report by an accused from that in which he had made a confession that part which can be so separated should be admitted in evidence, and on this view, admitted a part of the report relating to motive and subsequent conduct including the statement that the accused had left the deceased lying wounded and breathing in the tibari and there was no hope of her surviving and he had come having covered her with a cloth. In Lachman Munda v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1964 Pat 210 , the Patna High Court admitted in evidence portions of the first information report relating to the motive, the opportunity and the entire narrative of events before and after the crime. This case was followed in the judgment under appeal. In Lachman Munda v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1964 Pat 210 , the Patna High Court admitted in evidence portions of the first information report relating to the motive, the opportunity and the entire narrative of events before and after the crime. This case was followed in the judgment under appeal. Some of the decided cases took the view that if a part of the report is properly severable from the strict confessional part, then the severable part could be tendered in evidence. We think that the separability test is misleading and the entire confessional statement is hit by S.25 and save and except as provided by S. 27 and save and except the formal part identifying the accused as the maker of the report, no part of it could be tendered in evidence. 20 We think, therefore, that save and except parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying the appellant as the maker of the first information report and save and except the portions coming within the purview of S. 27, the entire first information report must be excluded from evidence." 10. In view of the above settled position of law, the entire complaint has to be excluded from evidence and thus the case on hand would be a case purely dependent on circumstantial evidence and we have examined the evidence as a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence and how the learned trial court has dealt with the evidence. 11. With regard to circumstantial evidence in criminal trials, the Apex Court in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda versus State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) SCC 4 116 has in paras 151 to 159 observed as under : “151.Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court, we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character, and essential proof required in criminal case, which rest on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this court is. Hanumant versus The State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1952 SC 343 ). This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this court in a large number of decisions up to date. For instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simi versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Ram Gopal versus state of Maharashtra. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J has laid down in Hanumant’s case (supra) 12. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this court in a large number of decisions up to date. For instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simi versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Ram Gopal versus state of Maharashtra. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J has laid down in Hanumant’s case (supra) 12. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and pendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. 152 A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘maybe’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘maybe proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as was held by this court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobde and Anr. versus State of Maharashtra, where the following observations were made: “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely maybe guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘maybe’ and ‘must be’ as long and divides way conjectures from conclusions.” (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. 153 These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence 154 It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of proof and a criminal case, depending on circumcision evidence, in the absence of a corpus deliciti, the statement of law is to prove of the same was laid down by Gresson, J. (and concurred by three more Judges) in The King versus Horry, thus “Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime morally certain and leave no ground for Reasonable doubt: the circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that up to up on no rational hypothesis, other than murder in the facts be accounted for. 155 Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression, morally certain by ‘such circumstances as render the commission of of the crime certain.’ 156 This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure model conviction. Harry’s case (supra) was approved by this Court in Anant Chintaman Lagu versus The State of Bombay. Lagu’s case, as also the principles enunciated by this court in Hanumant‘s case (supra) have been uniformly and consistently followed in all later decisions of this Court without any single exception. To quote a few cases Tufail’s case (supra), Ramgopal‘s case (supra) Chandrakant Nyalchand Sheth versus The State of Bombay (Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 1957 decided on 19.02.58), Dharambir Singh versus The State of Punjab (Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1958 decided on 4.11.1958). To quote a few cases Tufail’s case (supra), Ramgopal‘s case (supra) Chandrakant Nyalchand Sheth versus The State of Bombay (Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 1957 decided on 19.02.58), Dharambir Singh versus The State of Punjab (Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1958 decided on 4.11.1958). There are a number of other cases where although Hanumant’s case has not been expressly noticed but the same principles have been expounded and reiterated as in Naseem Ahmed versus Delhi Administration, Mohan Lal Pangasa versus State of UP, Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit versus State of Maharashtra and M C Agrawal versus State of Maharashtra - five Judge bench decision. 157 It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful argument submitted by the Additional Soliciter General relying on the decision of this Court in Deonandan Mishra versus The State of Bihar to supplement this argument that if the defence case is false, it would constitute an additional link so as to fortify the prosecution case. With due respect to the learned Additional Solicitor General we are unable to agree with the interpretation given by him of their force case, the relevant portion of which may be extracted thus: “But in a case like this, whether various links as started about have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the appellant as the probable assailant with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation - such absence of explanation of false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain.” 158 It will be seen that this court while taking into account absence of explanation or a false explanation did hold that it will amount to be an additional link to complete the chain but these observations must be read in the light of what this Court said earlier viz., before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (1) various links in the chain of evidence lead by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved (2) the said circumstance point to the guilt of the accused with reasonable definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 159 If these conditions are fulfilled, only then a court can use a false explanation or false defence as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. 159 If these conditions are fulfilled, only then a court can use a false explanation or false defence as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, this does not appear to be such a case. This aspect of the matter was examined and Shankarlal’s cases (supra) where this court observed thus: “Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A false plea can best be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused”. 12. In light of the above settled principles in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, we proceed to examine how the learned trial Court has appreciated the evidence of the prosecution on record. The learned trial Court has discussed the evidence and has in para 28 of the judgment discussed the settled principles of law in cases of circumstantial evidence and in para 29 laid down the circumstances by which the learned trial court has arrived at a conclusion that it was only the accused who had committed the offence. 13. We have minutely perused the evidence on record and find that the following circumstances are approved beyond reasonable doubts : “1. On 26.06.2013 the accused, his wife, Mussooriben, brother-in-law, Chimanbhai and many other relatives came to village Ladvel where the accused and the deceased had their house and they came to fulfil the vow that they had kept to the Goddess. 2. They offered a goat for fulfilling the vow to the Goddess and all had food and the relatives left but the accused and the deceased stayed back and the next morning they were getting ready to go to their work at Nirma Factory at Alindra, Taluka Salvi, District Vadodara. 3. The accused and the deceased were alone at their house which is proved by the evidence of eye witnesses PW 2 Maniben Khodabhai Senva, the mother of the accused and PW 3 Jayantibhai Khodabhai Senva, the brother of the accused. 4. The accused and the deceased had a fight about the saree worn by the deceased and the same is proved by the evidence of the witnesses PW 2 Maniben Khodabhai Senva, the mother of the accused and PW 3 Jayantibhai Khodabhai Senva, the brother of the accused. 4. The accused and the deceased had a fight about the saree worn by the deceased and the same is proved by the evidence of the witnesses PW 2 Maniben Khodabhai Senva, the mother of the accused and PW 3 Jayantibhai Khodabhai Senva, the brother of the accused. 5. The dead body of the deceased Mussooriben was found in a pool of blood in the house of the accused and the deceased situated in Bhathiji Temple Street, Senva Vas, Ladvel and as per the panchnama of the place of offence produced at exhibit 19 stains of blood were found on the floor and samples of the blood was taken by the FSL Officer and sent for investigation and the blood was of the blood group ‘O’ which was the blood group of the deceased Mussooriben. 6. The inquest panchnama produced at exhibit 17 was drawn on 28.06.2013 between 10:15 hours and 11:00 hours. 7. As per the arrest panchnama produced at exhibit 25, the accused was arrested on 28.06.2013 between 14:00 hours and 14:30 hours i.e on the same day in proximity of the body of deceased, Mussooriben being found in a pool of blood in the house of the deceased and the accused. 8. At the time of the arrest of the accused, the panchnama at exhibit 25 was drawn and the accused was wearing a full sleeve, green colour shirt with black and white horizontal linings, and a light khaki pant, and there were blood stains on the shirt and pant of the accused, and the clothes were recovered and sent to the FSL and the shirt and pant had blood of the blood group ‘O’ which was the blood group of deceased Mussooriben. 9. As per the arrest panchnama at exhibit 25 the accused had a cut injury on the right hand between the little finger and the fourth finger and cut marks between the thumb and the first finger and the cuts were bleeding and there is no explanation forthcoming in the further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure about the injuries found on his body or the blood stains found on his clothes. 10. 10. After the accused was arrested, he voluntarily showed the place where the weapons were kept in the presence of the panch witnesses and the panchnama produced at exhibit 29 was drawn and the chopper and knife with blood stains were recovered. As per the FSL Serology report produced at exhibit 44 the weapons - chopper and knife had human blood of the blood group “O” which was the blood group of the deceased Mussooriben.” 14. We have minutely perused the reasonings given by the learned trial court and find that the learned trial court has appreciated the evidence as a case of circumstantial evidence and has not relied upon the complaint given by the accused. As per the case of the prosecution, the accused had gone to the police station and filed the complaint and at that time, the accused was not arrested and was not in police custody. On the basis of the information received, the Investigating Officer has visited the place of offence and the inquest panchnama was drawn between 10:15 hours and 11:00 hours and panchnama of the place of offence was drawn between 12:30 hours and 13:30 hours. The accused was arrested with blood stained clothes between 14:00 hours and 14:30 hours and the weapons were recovered between 16:30 hours and 18:30 hours. In the further statement recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused has merely denied all the evidence of the prosecution and has denied that at the time of his arrest, his clothes were stained with blood. To the question about the injuries on his right hand, the accused has stated that the injuries were sustained by him when he went to save his wife in a scuffle. Besides this, no other defence of the accused has come on record, and there is no clarity as to with whom had the scuffle taken place. The admission that there was a scuffle with his wife immediately prior to the incident and the injuries sustained by the accused were bleeding is also a material fact to be considered pointing to the guilt of the accused and the fact that the accused was with his wife immediately prior to his arrest is proved beyond reasonable doubts. The admission that there was a scuffle with his wife immediately prior to the incident and the injuries sustained by the accused were bleeding is also a material fact to be considered pointing to the guilt of the accused and the fact that the accused was with his wife immediately prior to his arrest is proved beyond reasonable doubts. As discussed above, the facts are fully established proving the guilt of the accused and exclude hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved by the prosecution, which is that the offence has been committed by the accused alone. The chain of evidence that has been produced by the prosecution on record is complete and does not leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it proves that in all human probability, the offence has been committed by the accused. 15. Learned Advocate for the accused has pleaded that the case of the accused should not traverse beyond the purview of Section 304 Part - II of the IPC and the incident took place on a sudden fight without any premeditation and the act of the accused hitting the deceased was committed in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. That the accused did not take any advantage of acting in a cruel or unusual manner as the deceased had an affair with one Vikrambhai Bhalabhai Thakor and he had given the deceased a saree and she wore the same sari, and the accused told her to remove the saree, but she refused to do so. 15.1 In the case on hand and the materials available on record as per the case of the prosecution, the accused and the deceased had a quarrel about the saree worn by the deceased which was given by one Vikrambhai Bhalabhai Thakor with whom the deceased was having an illicit relationship, but there is no iota of evidence to indicate when the accused had come to know about the illicit relationship and there is nothing on record to even remotely indicate the time gap between the occurrence of the incident and the knowledge of the accused about any illicit relationship of his wife. In fact the witnesses have denied having any knowledge about any illicit relationship between the deceased and Vikrambhai Bhalabhai Thakor, but both the witnesses i.e the mother and the brother of the accused have stated that the accused and the deceased came on the previous day to fulfill a vow to the Goddess and many other relatives had also come for the function. Considering the evidence on record, it is proved that there was no dispute between the accused and the deceased on the previous day but on the day of the incident when they were getting ready to go for work a sudden quarrel took place between them about the saree worn by the deceased. There is no evidence that the accused was carrying the chopper or knife with the intention of attacking and killing the deceased and the weapons used in the incident were lying in the house of the accused and the deceased. 16. The Apex Court in Surinder Kumar versus Union Territory, Chandigarh reported in (1989) 2 SCC 217 has observed as under : “Exception 4 to Section 300 reads as under: "Exception 4 : Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation : It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault." To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly. 17. For the reasons stated above, in view of the legal proposition enunciated by the Apex Court, looking to the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased and the accused and the circumstances discussed above, we are of the opinion that it can safely be concluded that there was a sudden fight, and there was no premeditation on the part of the accused to cause the death of the deceased and the act was done in a heat of passion. The accused did not have the chopper or the knife with him from the beginning, and the relationship between them was good on the previous night, but only on the fateful morning when they were leaving for work, a sudden quarrel took place and the injury was caused with the intention of causing such bodily injury as would likely to cause death and hence the offence would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 304, Part-I of IPC instead of Section 302 of IPC for an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 18. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of IPC is set aside and the accused is convicted under section 304 Part I of IPC and sentenced to imprisonment of 10 years and fine of .10,000/- and in default further simple imprisonment for six months. The appellant accused be set at liberty if he had already undergone the imprisonment of 10 years and has paid the fine and if he is not required in any other offence. 19. Resultantly, the appeal is partly allowed with the aforesaid modification in the impugned judgement and order dated 07.10.2014 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Session Judge, Kheda @ Nadiad in Sessions Case No. 36 of 2014. Rest of the order remains unaltered. 20. 19. Resultantly, the appeal is partly allowed with the aforesaid modification in the impugned judgement and order dated 07.10.2014 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Session Judge, Kheda @ Nadiad in Sessions Case No. 36 of 2014. Rest of the order remains unaltered. 20. R & P be sent back to the learned trial Court.