ORDER : 1. Instant second appeal is preferred by the appellant plaintiff aggrieved from judgment and decree dated 01.02.2017 in civil appeal No. 88/2013 (01/2012) passed by learned Additional District Judge No.2 Behror, Alwar whereby first civil appeal under Section 96 CPC, filed aggrieved from judgment and decree dated 16.11.2011 in civil suit No. 154/2009 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Behror, Alwar was dismissed. 2. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Behror District Alwar has dismissed the civil suit No. 154/2009 for permanent injunction on 16.11.2011 filed by appellant-plaintiff after full trial. 3. Along with this appeal, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC is filed for taking certain documents on record. 4. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that on apprehension of dispossession and threat to encroach upon land of plaintiff, a suit for permanent injunction was filed before the trial court wherein oral evidence was submitted by the plaintiff but learned trial court and the appellate court have failed to consider the evidence on merits. He also submitted that the trial court and appellate court were of the view that no documents were filed in support of claim of the plaintiff therefore no case is made out. He submitted that to establish prima facie case, the appellant is not required to file any document but the trial court misconstrued the legal position. He further submitted that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is filed for taking certain documents on record and after taking these documents on record the appellant be allowed for additional evidence to prove his title from documents. He also submitted that there was a delay of 579 days in filing this appeal and to substantiate the reasons of delay, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed along with documents to support the claim that appellant got injured due to accident and he remained hospitalized and further bed ridden for a long period therefore able to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 5. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for respondent on the ground that instant second appeal is preferred from concurrent findings of the court below and no question of law can be framed for adjudication in second appeal therefore the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for respondent on the ground that instant second appeal is preferred from concurrent findings of the court below and no question of law can be framed for adjudication in second appeal therefore the appeal is liable to be dismissed. He also submitted that appellant has failed to show any sufficient ground for taking additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC on record. He also submitted that the documents submitted by appellant are not authenticated legal documents therefore the opportunity of additional evidence cannot be granted to appellant. He also pointed out that the appeal was dismissed on 01.02.2017 and alleged accident happened on 07.10.2017 but days before aforesaid accident and afterwards no specific reasons were assigned by appellant for seeking condonation of delay. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. A perusal of record indicated that a suit for permanent injunction was filed on the basis of continuous possession since 13.11.1997 but the suit was dismissed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) on 16.11.2011 though oral evidence was produced by appellant plaintiff. Aggrieved from aforesaid, an appeal under Section 96 of CPC was filed before the Additional District Judge and same was dismissed on 01.02.2017. 8. A perusal of report indicated that this appeal is delayed by 579 days though an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed for condonation of delay on ground of accident. According to medical documents, first prescription was of 04.10.2017. Thereafter another certificate on record to indicate that since 07.10.2017, Balwant Singh was in emergency condition but according to Shanti Mukund Hospital, he was admitted from 11.10.2017 to 14.10.2017. Herein no other medical certificate is available to indicate that the appellant remained in medical treatment for period other than 04.10.2017 to 14.10.2017. The instant appeal is filed on 05.12.2018 whereas the impugned judgment was pronounced on 01.02.2017 and a certified copy was obtained on 06.02.2017. At the most period from October to December 2017, can be considered for the purpose of condonation of delay. 9. The appellant is required to show sufficient ground for condonation of delay but herein the appellant has failed to show sufficient cause for inordinate delay. In G. Ramagowda Vs. At the most period from October to December 2017, can be considered for the purpose of condonation of delay. 9. The appellant is required to show sufficient ground for condonation of delay but herein the appellant has failed to show sufficient cause for inordinate delay. In G. Ramagowda Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1987 SC 897, it was held that the expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are in-action or lack of bonafide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. 10. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down following principles: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 11. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 11. Keeping aforesaid principles in mind, we are of the view that the appellant has failed to show sufficient cause for delay for not filing appeal before October 2017 and after December, 2017, therefore I am not inclined to allow this application thus this second appeal is barred by limitation and there is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay, therefore the application is liable to be dismissed. 12. When the suit was filed on the basis of cause of action accrued on 19.07.2009 and thereafter the suit remained pending before the trial court for more than two years but no efforts were made to file any document in support of the claim of appellant. Similarly the first appeal was filed in 2012 and was disposed of in February, 2017 but no efforts were made during this period for filing of documents in support of averments made in the plaint. When the appeal was dismissed and second appeal is filed then application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC was filed by the appellant-plaintiff. 13. The principle for allowing the application for taking additional evidence as provided under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is that an application for additional evidence by way of any document or oral can be allowed only if the party who has filed the appeal is able to establish/prove that despite his best efforts he was unable to produce the evidence when the trial court has disposed of the litigation. Recently in case of Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhan (Civil Appeal No. 1760/2022) Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the scope of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and laid down that the provision enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further relied upon the judgments in the cases of A. Andisamy Chettiar vs. A. Subburaj Chettiar reported in (2015) 17 SCC 713 and Uttaradi Mutt. Vs. Ragvendra Swamy Mutt (2018) 10 SCC 484 . 14. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further relied upon the judgments in the cases of A. Andisamy Chettiar vs. A. Subburaj Chettiar reported in (2015) 17 SCC 713 and Uttaradi Mutt. Vs. Ragvendra Swamy Mutt (2018) 10 SCC 484 . 14. Considering aforesaid, no sufficient ground is available on record and even from submissions of learned counsel for appellant, thus, application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC cannot be allowed for taking additional evidence on record. Otherwise also, to fill up lacuna additional evidence cannot be permitted to be taken on record. 15. Instant second appeal is preferred under Section 100 CPC and same is reproduced as under: (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. 16. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for appellant particularly in the light of Section 100 of CPC, I am of the considered view that the appeal cannot be entertained unless there is substantial question of law requiring consideration by this Court. This Court cannot interfere with the pure question of facts while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC. Normally, in concurrent finding and dismissal of appeal by the First Appellate Court, this Court cannot interfere in the concurrent finding of facts unless there is substantial question of law. This Court cannot interfere with the pure question of facts while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC. Normally, in concurrent finding and dismissal of appeal by the First Appellate Court, this Court cannot interfere in the concurrent finding of facts unless there is substantial question of law. 17. Just to determine whether a question is substantial question of law or not, was laid down by a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons. Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314 , as under: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 18. In case of In M.S.V. Raja v. Seeni Thevar AIR 2001 SC 3389 , it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the formulation of a substantial question of law may be inferred from the kind of questions actually considered and decided by the High Court in second appeal, even though the substantial questions of law were not specifically and separately formulated. 19. Recently Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Suresh Lataruji Ramteke versus Sau. Sumabai Pandurang Petkar & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6070/2023, arising out of SLP(C)No.20183 of 2022 decided on 21.09.2023) considered the scope of Section 100 of CPC and summarised the law as under: 13. The jurisprudence on Section 100, CPC is rich and varied. Time and again this Court in numerous judgments has laid down, distilled and further clarified the requirements that must necessarily be met in order for a Second Appeal as laid down therein, to be maintainable, and thereafter be adjudicated upon. The jurisprudence on Section 100, CPC is rich and varied. Time and again this Court in numerous judgments has laid down, distilled and further clarified the requirements that must necessarily be met in order for a Second Appeal as laid down therein, to be maintainable, and thereafter be adjudicated upon. Considering the fact that numerous cases are filed before this Court which hinge on the application of this provision, we find it necessary to reiterate the principles. 13.1 The requirement, most fundamental under this section is the presence and framing of a “substantial question of law”. In other words, the existence of such a question is sine qua non for exercise of this jurisdiction. 13.2 The jurisdiction under this section has been described by this Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki (2007) 1 SCC 546 (Two-Judge Bench) stating that post 1976 amendment, the scope of Section 100 CPC stands drastically curtailed and narrowed down to be restrictive in nature. The High Court’s jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC is only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved, also clearly formulated/set out in the memorandum of appeal. It has been observed that: “At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as “substantial question of law” which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become “third trial on facts” or “one more dice in the gamble”. The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question.” Gurdev Kaur (supra) was referred to and relied upon in Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh & Ors. (2019) 17 SCC 71 . (2019) 17 SCC 71 . 13.3 In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 a Bench of three Judges, held as under in regard to what constitutes a substantial question of law:- a) Not previously settled by law of land or a binding precedent. b) Material bearing on the decision of case; and (c) New point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. Therefore, it will depend on facts of each case. Such principles stand followed in Government of Kerala v. Joseph 2023 SCC Online SC 961 and Chandrabhan v. Saraswati 2022 SCC Online SC 1273. 13.4 Non-formulation of substantial question(s) of lawrenders proceedings “patently illegal”. This Court’s decisions in Umerkhan v. Bimillabi (2011) 9 SCC 684 and Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast Pvt Ltd. & Ors. (2011) 9 SCC 678 indicate this position. 14. Substantial questions of law, as framed by the High Court must be answered in light of the contentions raised therein. 14.1 If the Court is of the view that a question framed is to be altered, deleted or a new question is to be added, then the Court must hear the parties. 14.2 For both the above principles, reference may be made to Gajaraba Bhikhubha Vadher v. Sumara Umar Amad (2020) 11 SCC 114 where the following principles were observed: - a) The substantial question of law framed by the High Court must be answered, with reasons. Disposing off the appeal without answering the same cannot be justified. b) If a need is felt to modify, alter or delete a question, a hearing must be provided to the parties in respect thereof. 14.3 When the case is admitted, but upon hearing when it is found that no substantial question of law arises for consideration, reasons should be recorded in such dismissal. 15. In Kichha Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Roofrite (P) Ltd (2009) 16 SCC 280 it was observed: “4. Our attention is drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to the provisions of Section 100(5) of the Civil Procedure Code where the respondent to a second appeal is permitted “to argue that the case does not involve such question” i.e. the questions formulated earlier. Ltd. v. Roofrite (P) Ltd (2009) 16 SCC 280 it was observed: “4. Our attention is drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to the provisions of Section 100(5) of the Civil Procedure Code where the respondent to a second appeal is permitted “to argue that the case does not involve such question” i.e. the questions formulated earlier. No doubt, but then the order on the second appeal should indicate, howsoever briefly, why the questions formulated at the earlier stage had, at the stage of final hearing, been found to be no questions of law.” 16. Substantial questions should ordinarily, not be framed at a later stage. If done so, then parties must be given an opportunity to meet them. This Court in U.R. Virupakshappa v. Sarvamangala (2019) 2 SCC 177 held: “15. It, furthermore, should not ordinarily frame a substantial question of law at a subsequent stage without assigning any reason therefor and without giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the respondents. [See Nune Prasad v. Nune Ramakrishna [ (2008) 8 SCC 258 : (2008) 10 Scale 523 ]; Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami [ (1997) 4 SCC 713 ] (SCC paras 8 and 9); and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [ (1997) 5 SCC 438 ] (SCC paras 10 and 12)]. 16. The High Court, in this case, however, formulated a substantial question of law while dictating the judgment in open court. Before such a substantial question of law could be formulated, the parties should have been put to notice. They should have been given an opportunity to meet the same. Although the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to formulate a substantial question of law at a subsequent stage which was not formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal but the requirements laid down in the proviso appended to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure were required to be met.” 16.1 This Court in Mehboob-Ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani, (2019) 19 SCC 415 observed in respect of application of Section 100(5) CPC as under:- a) It is not rule under proviso to sub-section (5) to hear any other substantial question of law irrespective of the question(s) formulated, so as to annul other requirements of S. 100, CPC. b) Proviso to come in operation in exceptional cases where reasons are to be recorded by High Court. b) Proviso to come in operation in exceptional cases where reasons are to be recorded by High Court. 16.2 It has further been held that the application of this section is only when some questions, substantial in law, already stand framed. (B.C. Shivashankara v. B.R. Nagaraj) (2007) 15 SCC 387 . 16.3 Wrong application of law laid down by the Privy Council, Federal Court or the Supreme Court, will not qualify for substantial question of law and neither wrong application of facts. 16.4 If on an issue, the trial court discusses the evidence but does not return a finding thereon, High Court in jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC may do so. Reference be made to Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai (2020) 16 SCC 255 . This Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722 , observed- “6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law…” 16.5 Interference on findings of fact permitted in exceptional cases, i.e., when finding is based on either inadmissible or, no evidence. This Court in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali (2010) 12 SCC 740 referring to various other cases held:- a) It is not permissible for High Court to reappreciate evidence as if it was the first appellate court unless findings were perverse. b) Finding of fact can be interfered in exceptional circumstances as rarity, rather than a regularity. c) Scrutiny of evidence in second appeal is not prohibited but has to be exercised upon proper circumspection. 17. Jurisdiction under second appeal not to be exercised merely because an alternate view is possible. It was observed in Hamida v. Mohd. b) Finding of fact can be interfered in exceptional circumstances as rarity, rather than a regularity. c) Scrutiny of evidence in second appeal is not prohibited but has to be exercised upon proper circumspection. 17. Jurisdiction under second appeal not to be exercised merely because an alternate view is possible. It was observed in Hamida v. Mohd. Khalil (2001) 5 SCC 30 . 7. …The High Court, it is well settled, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot reverse the findings of the lower appellate court on facts merely on the ground that on the facts found by the lower appellate court another view was possible.” This position was reiterated by Avtar Singh & Ors. v. Bimla Devi & Ors (2021) 13 SCC 816 . 17.1. In aid of such a restricted application, an essential aspect in ensuring that it does not acquire the nature of a “third appeal” is the limited possibility of appreciation of evidence and connectedly, the restriction on upturning concurrent findings of fact. However, there are certain exceptions to the rule as pointed out by this Court in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2020) 19 SCC 57 as under: “33.4. The general rule is, that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognised exceptions are where: (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 17.2 The extent of the same may be underscored by the observation that: “32. In a second appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar [V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar , AIR 1963 SC 302 ] . An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter.” 20. Hon’ble Court Court in case of Chandrabhan Vs. Saraswati 2022 SCC Online (SC) 1273 (decided on 22.09.2022) has summarised principle relating to Section 100 of CPC in following manner: “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof.” 21. Thus, Hon’ble Supreme Court summarised the principle relating to Section 100 of CPC in following words: “(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. (iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. (iv) In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (v) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below, But it is not an absolute rule. (v) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below, But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (a) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (b) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (c) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. (vi) When the Court refers to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 22. Considering the concurrent findings of learned trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, particularly wherein no perversity or illegality was found, I am of considered view that no legal question which requires adjudication can be framed on the basis of material on record, therefore appeal is liable to be dismissed. 23. In view of aforesaid, application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and second appeal are hereby dismissed. 24. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of.