Judgment Mr. Sureshwar Thakur, J. The petitioners became aggrieved from order dated 17.06.1996 (Annexure P-8), whereby the Director, Consolidation of Holdings Punjab, Jalandhar, exercising powers under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act of 1948’) thus proceeded to direct the Consolidation Officer (Tehsildar), Bathinda to attest mutation, in view of sale deed, of one Rupa wife of Bishan Singh, in favour of Ujagar Singh. FACTS OF THE CASE 2. The petitioners, are mortgages over the disputed land, thus, from one Mukhtiar Kaur daughter of Sarwan Singh, One Bishan Singh and Sarwan Singh, sons of Chanda Singh. It is evident on a perusal of Annexure P-1, Annexure whereof, encloses a decree passed by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Bhatinda, upon the plaintiffs’ declaratory suit, thus seeking a declaration that they have acquired title, through adverse possession, over the disputed lands. 3. In the said suit the plaintiffs impleaded one Mukhtiar Kaur as a defendant. The said Mukhtiar Kaur is the successor-in-interest of one Chanda Singh, from whom the plaintiffs acquired rights as mortgages over the disputed lands. Uncontrovertedly, the declaratory decree supra, as became passed, and, as enclosed in Annexure P-1, became affirmed by the learned first Appellate Court concerned. Therefore, finality and conclusivity, is acquired by the said concurrently made declaratory decree(s), which are not contested by the learned counsels appearing before this Court, to thus cover the suit lands. 4. It appears, that the private respondents were unaware of the rendition of the said decrees, besides were unaware of a mortgage being created, qua the present petitioners by the mortgagors concerned, thus over the disputed lands. Moreover, it also appears that they were unaware of the rendition of Annexure P-1, as apparently they were not impleaded thereins as co-defendants. 5. From the record, as placed before this court, therefroms, rather a prima facie inference at this stage can become drawn by this court, that as a matter of fact, the decree supra though labelled as a decree, thus declaring the plaintiffs to acquire title over the disputed lands, through adverse possession. However, when there are also references in the said concurrently made decrees, qua the suit lands, that the learned counsel concerned also impliedly argued, that the plaintiffs concerned had acquired a foreclosure title, as mortgagees over the disputed lands. However, when there are also references in the said concurrently made decrees, qua the suit lands, that the learned counsel concerned also impliedly argued, that the plaintiffs concerned had acquired a foreclosure title, as mortgagees over the disputed lands. Therefore, prima facie it appears that plaintiffs therein though had claimed the rendition of declaratory decree, qua theirs acquiring title through adverse possession, over the disputed lands, but, it appears, that they yet in the face of the above references, were also required to make a claim for the rendition of a decree of foreclosure in their favour. However, it appears that the said declaratory claim rather foreclosing the defendant(s) in the said suit, from seeking the redemption of the mortgage monies, rather intentionally became omitted to be claimed therein. It appears that the said intentional omission, became generated from the factum, that they did not receive, an order attesting mutation of mortgage of the suit properties, thus from the Assistant Collector concerned. 6. Though the revenue entries, do display, that the petitioners are mortgagees over the suit lands, but, the said revenue entries, do not marshal strength, rather from the compatible thereto attestation of mutation of mortgage, thus as may be made by the revenue officer, concerned. Therefore, prima facie it appears, that thereby, the decree Annexure P-1 appears to be fraudulently procured, through inter se collusion inter se the plaintiffs, and, the defendant one Mukhtiar Kaur. 7. Leaving aside the liberties, if any, to the aggrieved from the said decree, to thus make a challenge to the said decree, but what is of utmost consequence, in the instant case, is as follows : (i) that the private respondent No.1 Ujagar Singh had preferred a petition cast under Section-42 of the Act of 1948. In the said petition, he claimed, but naturally the makings of a declaration, that since one Rupa the widow of Bishan Singh, had assigned right, title and interest qua the disputed lands, thus to the petitioners, through hers making a sale deed no.795 dated 19.01.1959, thereby the rights declared thereunders to the said petitioners, thus were required to be incorporated in the revenue records. It is also averred in the petition, that despite production of the said sale deed, before the Consolidation Officer concerned, yet he proceeded to attest the contested mutation no.8606, whereby he entered the disputed lands in favour of the concerned. It is also averred in the petition, that despite production of the said sale deed, before the Consolidation Officer concerned, yet he proceeded to attest the contested mutation no.8606, whereby he entered the disputed lands in favour of the concerned. A reference in the impugned order is also made to the Settlement Officer Consolidation, who was then exercising the powers of Assistant Collector, and who proceeded to attest the relevant mutation, on 27.02.1967, whereby, he declared one Ujagar Singh, the private respondent herein, to be the owner in possession of the disputed land. An appeal there against before the District Collector also became dismissed. 8. In the wake of the above, thus through the impugned order, the Director concerned, proceeded to hold that the omission on the part of the Consolidation Officer concerned, to despite the apposite production of the relevant sale deed, rather confer rights, title and interest, but, in derogation of the sale deed, over the disputed lands qua the litigant concerned, rather was unvindicable. 9. However, it appears the above happened, despite a contention and an argument being raised before the Director concerned, thus by the present petitioners, that since the purported predecessor-in-interest, of the private respondent(s), inasmuch as, Rupa had died in 1952, thereby there was no legal capacity, in the deceased vendor, as such to execute any valid deed of conveyance in respect of the disputed land, vis-a-vis, the private respondent concerned. Nonetheless, it appears that the said objection, did not at all lead to an issue becoming drawn thereon, nor also any evidence if permissible, to be received by the Director, was permitted to be adduced by the litigant concerned, whereons whom, the relevant discharging onus became cast. 10. The above, omission when but necessarily devolved, upon, the said factum, qua on the demise of Rupa, in the year 1952, thus thereby hers becoming totally incapacitated to execute the deed of conveyance, in favour of the private respondent, but naturally appears to be a sequel of the gravest non-application of mind to the said relevant factum. 10. The above, omission when but necessarily devolved, upon, the said factum, qua on the demise of Rupa, in the year 1952, thus thereby hers becoming totally incapacitated to execute the deed of conveyance, in favour of the private respondent, but naturally appears to be a sequel of the gravest non-application of mind to the said relevant factum. What was required to be done in the said event was, that on prima facie evidence becoming adduced, in respect of the above, by the objector, that thereby the Director concerned, was required to be refraining himself, from exercising jurisdiction, over the relevant lis, as the validly exercisable jurisdiction thereon, was limited to occurrences of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or was excercisable, when in the Consolidation Scheme rather no consolidation rasta became carved, thereupon thus, there being an imperative duty, upon, the Director to carve a consolidation rasta, through his recoursing the mandate of Section 42 of the Act. 11. Uncontrovertedly, none of the above prayers were canvassed before the Director. Contrarily the prayer which was canvassed before the Director, became hinged upon the legality of the refusal of the consolidation officer concerned, to accept the deed of conveyance executed, by a purportedly, deceased vendor one Rupa, who was most forcefully contended, by the present petitioners, to have lost the capacity to execute a valid of deed of conveyance, given hers in contemporaneity, to its execution, rather being not alive. It also appears that the order attesting mutation in favour of the private respondent, by the Assistant Collector concerned, and, which became latter affirmed by the District Collector, did sway and lead the Director, to assign relief to the private respondent. The said objection, was not required to be summarily thrown out, and that too on a mere dependance being made on the orders of mutation passed by the Revenue Officer concerned, rather the said objection was required to be ensured, to be put to the fullest trial. The fullest trial to the said objection was to be done only through the parties being directed to institute a declaratory suit, before the learned Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The fullest trial to the said objection was to be done only through the parties being directed to institute a declaratory suit, before the learned Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, conspicuously, the said objection, was completely undealt with, whereas, its tenability was required to be at least referred in the impugned verdict, and thereafter, the Director was required to, for want of jurisdiction vesting him, to make a declaration, whether the deed of conveyance was or was not validly executed, and or whether the private respondent was entitled to receive, the benefit thereof, thus reserve liberty to the aggrieved concerned, to rather access the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. 12. For all what has been stated above, the impugned verdict, is made in the grossest departure of apparently rather no jurisdiction becoming vested thus, in the Director, exercising powers under Section 42 of the Act, hence for meteing an adjudication in respect of the above objection. Therefore, the impugned order is quashed and set aside, but liberty is assigned to all the contesting litigants to access the learned Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, for seeking therefroms, a declaratory decree, whether the deed of conveyance executed in favour of private respondent rather is a validly executed, besides for seeking a declaration, that the order(s) of mutation as made in terms thereof, respectively by the Assistant Collector concerned and by the Collector concerned, rather are validly or not validly recorded. 13. Disposed of accordingly. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.